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ological positions advanced with regard to the social sciences are seriously 
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These critiques are shown to depend on what I have called 'the rationalist - 
conception of the production of discourse*, I demonstrate that this 
conception is untenable and that, in consequence, the critique of 'empiricist' 
epistemological and methodological doctrines cannot be extended to a 
critique of what are held to be the product of empiricist methods. The 
chapter concludes with an examination of the implications of these results 
both for the analysis and critique of substantive theoretical discourses 
and for the theory of the production of theoretical discourse. It shows, 
in particular^- that a rigorous distinction must be maintained between the 
question of the production of a discourse on the one hand and questions of 
its coherence, consistency and other logical properties on the other.
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1Introduction
The first six chapters of this book provide a systematic critique of 
epistemological and philosophical interventions in the social sciences and of 
prescriptive methodology in general. The first chapter examines the methodological
doctrines of Max Weber and his definition of sociology as a science of social action.
... SSI argue that Weber's definition of sociology is based ozi an evidentially religious, 
metaphysical conception of man, that his methodology is relativistic and irrationalistf 
and that his concept of scientific objectivity Is a facade for an underlying notion 
of verisimilitude, of plausibility and subjective conviction. The next two chapters 
deal directly, with phenomenology and phenomenological sociology. The first is an 
extended critique of the work of Alfred Schutz, showing that it reduces the social 
sciences literally to story-telling and, further, that far'' from being an application 
of Husserl's philosophy it represents a vulgar psychologistic distortion of it. The 
second examines Husserl's conception of the nature of the sciences and of philosophy 
in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology and argues that, 
despite its rigour, Husserl's epistemology is structured around a number of crucial 
contradictions which render it ultimately Incoherent, It follows that there can be no 
rational or coherent phenomenological 'foundation' of the social sciences. In the 
next three chapters I have developed an extended critique of empiricist methodologi/Ses 
and of their epistemological bases in the postiivist and neo-positivist philosophies 
of Carnap, Mill, Popper and others.
Two of these chapters have been published elsewhere and, sxHne save for minor’ 
revisions and corrections, they are reprinted here without change. The rest have their 
origin in lectures or seminars prepared for various audiences during the last few years 
These have been heavily expanded and expanded for publication in their present form.
In all cases my approach has been abstract and theoretical. I have been concerned to 
examine the concepts and relations between concepts entailed In the methodological 
and epistemological doctrines in question and to investigate what might be called the 
logical character of the systems of concepts involved, in particular their relative 
coherence and consistency. I propose no methodology or epistemology as an alternative
2to the positions criticized here. On the contrary I argue that the problems which 
these disciplines pose are false problems and that they arise only as a function of a 
conception of knowledge which can be shown to be fundamentally and inescapably 
incoherent. Epistemology and such derivative doctrines as methodology and philosophy 
of science have no rational or coherent foundation. In particular, then, there can 
be no rational or coherent prescriptive methodology. These arguments are outlined 
below. ' .
If these chapters merely bring together the substance of arguments that I have 
put forward in one form or another over recent years, then my concluding chapter must 
be seen as a development of some of my earlier positions and a. correction of others. 
The precise character of these corrections will be discussed in later sections of 
this Introduction, For the present it is enough to say that while some of the positio
taken up in the earlier chapters^ must now main conclusions
concerning the coherence of epistemology and the possibility of prescriptive 
methodology remain untouched by these changes.
Philosophy and Methodology
In sociology and more generally in the social sciences methodology is taken to be 
a discipline, bordering on philosophy, whose function is to examine the methods which 
are used or which should be used to produce valid knowledge. It is in this sense that 
Talcott Parsons refers to:
'the questions of the grounds of empirical validity of scientific propositions, 
the kinds of procedures which may on general grounds be HCKeptsd expected to 
yield valid knowledge. 1 (The Structure of ’Social Action p.23)
Methodology lays down procedures to be used either in the generation or in the
testing of propositions by those who wish to obtain valid knowledge. These
procedures, as Parsons also notes, are justified by means of philosophical arguments.
It ic clear that methodology's claim to prescribe correct procedures to the sciences
must presuppose a form of knowledge which is in some sense superior to that produced
in the sciences.- Scientific knowledge is thought to be valid only if its production
3conforms to the prescribed procedures; it follows that the prescriptions of
methodology cannot be validated by scientific knowledge. Access to this special kind
of knowledge is thought to be provided by philosophy. Methodology, then, presupposes
a particular kind of relationship between philosophy and the sciences in which the one
is able to judge and to validate the claims to knowledge advanced by the other.
Different philosophies may conceive of that relationship in somewhat different terms
but it is well represented in Winch’s assertion that:
'The difference between the respective aims of the scientist and the philosopher 
might be expressed as follows. Whereas the scientist investigates the nature, 
causes and effects of particular real things and processes, the philosopher is 
concerned with the nature of reality as such and in general. ’
(The Idea of a Social Science p.8)
The 'nature of reality as such and in general* can be known quite independently of the 
particular little investigations of the sciences. If, then, some'science ' were to 
pretend to knowledge of an object falling outside the realm of 'reality as such', 
then that 'science' would be an illusion: it could not give knowledge of particular 
real things at all. In principle and in practice Winch’s philosophy claims to judge 
the sciences. Indeed Winch proceeds to castigate much of sociology for failing to 
the findings of his own (or rather Wittgenstein's) philosophical investigations.
Whilst nothing could be further from my intention than to attribute a scientific 
status to the products of sociology, this example may serve to illustrate the general 
character of the relationship between philosophy and the sciences as it is conceived 
by philosophy itself and as it is presupposed by any methodological discourse. 
Methodology lays down procedural rules for scientific practice which it derives by 
means of a 'knowledge* provided b}' philosophy- Methodology is the product of 
philosophy and the sciences are the realization of their methodology.
In this book I intend to expose and to destroy the myths of methodology and, in 
particular, philosophy's claims to an esoteric 'knowledge' from which these myths 
derive. If the claims of philosophy to a special kind of knowledge can be shown to 
be without foundation, if they ai'e at best dogmatic or else incoherent, then 
methodology is an empty and futile pursuit and its prescriptions ax*e vacuous.
Methodological prescriptions may bo derived from epistemology, a conception of
4the forms of knowledge that are possible and of the conditions in which valid 
knowledge may be achieved, or from ontology, a conception of what exists. In the one 
case prescriptions relate to what is thought to be the characterSSXSi: of knowledge 
as such, and in the other they relate to what are thought to be the essential 
properties of the object of investigation. Where ontological doctrines are invoked 
with respect to the social sciences they generally concern an alleged distinction 
between the essential properties of things social and those of (all other) things 
natural which, far from being established by scientific investigation, is supposed to 
call for a corresponding distinction in scientific methods of investigation. I shall 
comment first on epistemology and secondly on the doctrine of the distinctive 
character of the objects of the social sciences.
An epistemology is a theory in which knowledge is conceived in terms of both a
\
distinction and a cornspondence between two realms. It is concerned with a distinction----------- --- ---------
and a corresi^idencc between a realm of knowledge, of propositions, concepts, beliefs,
etc., and a realm of objects, variously conceived in terms of 'real objects',
-m.'phenomena1, 'experience', ’sense-data', ’the given', and so on. By virtue.of the 
distinction between, say, the concept 'dog' which does not bark and the real dog 
which does, the precise character both of the correspondence involved' in a genuine 
knowledge and of the conditions in which a genuine knowledge may be said to exist 
becomes problematic. Epistemology attempts to pose and to answer the problems -that 
arise in this area. For example, early logical positivism as represented in Carnap’s 
The Logical Structure of the World conceived of knowledge in terms of propositions 
on the one hand and the given,namely, 'cross-sections of consciousness ' and 
'remembrance of similarity' on the other. The elementary propositions of knowledge 
represent the relational structure of the given and they 'point to* its content. Thus 
the distinction between knowledge and its object is acknowledged and, at least in 
intention, a bridging correspondence is established.
A conclusive critique of epistemology in all its forms has been outlined by 
Althusser in his analysis of the structure of 'the empiricist conception of knowledge'. 
I discuss that analysis and critique in Chapter 7. For the purposes of this 
Introduction it is enough to say that Althusser’s concept of 'the empiricist
5conception of knowledge^ designates a conception which, counterposes subject to 
object, knowledge to being, theory to fact, and so on, and which represents genuine 
knowledge as a function of a process which bridges the distinction between know^ige 
and its object. Althusser describes that process as an operation of abstraction which 
is thought to be carried out by a ’subject', whether an individual - an empirical 
or transecendental individual - or a community of scientists, or whatever. There 
can be various conceptions of the 'subject' and the ’object’ from which ii, absciacts 
knowledge but in all cases the structure of the empiricist conception of knowledge 
establishes some form of fundamental HppKstx opposition between, say, 'theory' and 
’fact', 'men' and ’world’, 'transcendental subjectivity' and 'transcendent 
objectivity', and so on. All epistemology takes some such opposition as constitutive 
of its theory of knowledge, the aim of which is to lay down the conditions in which 
valid knowledge is possible. Its conception of 'knowledge' is therefore a function 
of the particular form in which this opposition is conceived. Epistemology involves 
a definite conception of the 'subject', the 'object' and the relation between them 
and it derives its protocols for the evaluation of knowledge from its own 'knowledge' 
of that relation. 'Empiricism' in this gdneral sense is by no means restricted to
the British empirical tradition and its associates slljce it subsumes the classical 
rationalist epistemologies which, while they do not conceive the subject as a merely 
passive recipient of knowledge, nevertheless retain the fundamental structure of 
distinction and correlation between knowledge and the world. Weber's conception of 
knowledge, for example, is clearly empiricist in this sense. It presents a knowing 
subject as confronted by an infinity of given facts so that the subject is. capable of 
knowledge of the world only through the intervention of values which act as a principL 
of selection in determining what he may or may not choose to investigate.
The inescapable circularity of epistemology is evident for, however,it may 
conceive the distinction between knowledge and the world, its theory of knowledge 
logically presupposes a knowledge of the conditions in which knowledge takes place, 
that is, of the terms of the opposition^ 'subject' and 'object', and of the nature 
of the relation between them. Thus the epistemological specification of the criteria 
of the validity of ail knowledge must presuppose the validity of the prior 'knowledge 1
6from which that specification is derived. Many instances of the general structure 
of empiricism and of the inescapable problems to which it gives rise are examined 
in the foilwing chapters.
Two consequences of this critique of epistemology may be noted. The first is 
that there can be no epsitemological protocols of scientific practice and no 
exti'a-scientific guarantees that what the sciences or other epistemologically 
approved disciplines produce is real knowledge. To the extent that methodological 
doctrines are derived from epistemology their rules and protocols have no rational 
or coherent foundation and methodology's claims to prescribe for scientific practice 
are vacuous. Second!}^, knowledge can no longer be conceived as involving a relation 
of 'abstraction' between knowledge on the one hand and the world on the other. There 
can be no question of maintaining both a distinction and a correlation between a 
real object located outside knowledge and an object of knowledge constituted within 
knowledge. It follows that the classical epistemological problems of knowledge, 
concerning criteria for the validity of knowledge, can no longer arise. In particular 
then, there can be no question of the evaluation of particular substantive discourses, 
say, Political Economy or Sociology, in terms of epistemologically defined criteria. 
This last point raises a general problem of the terms in which a coherent critique 
of determinate theoretical discourses may be conducted. I return to this problem 
in Chapter 7. .
So much for epistemology and epistemologically derived methodologies. But, in
e
the social sciences in particular, methodological doctrines pertaining to the general 
character of knowledge as such are fi’equently combined with implicit or explicit 
ontological conceptions of the distinctive character of the object of investigation. 
These conceptions are ontological, and therefore philosophical, to the extent that 
the recognition of that distinctive character is thought to be not the product of 
scientific investigation but rather its precondition. Winch maintains, for example, 
that:
'the central problem of sociology, that of giving an account of the-nature of 
social phenomena in general, itself belongs to philosophy. In fact, not to put 
too fine a point on it, this part of sociology is really misbegotten epistemology 
I say "misbegotten" because its problems have been largely misconstrued, and
7therefore mishandled, as a species of scientific problem. * (op.cit.p,43
emphasis added)
Not only does philosophy tell us ’the nature of reality as such and in general*
'F'but it also tells us the distinctive character of one particular kind of reality, 
that is, ’the nature of social phenomena in general*. In the absence of such 
knowledge sociology cannot proceed without fundamental error.
Winch's thesis is only one, and by no means the most rigorous, of the many
positions which pretend to a special knowledge of 'the nature of social phenomena
in general*. Nevertheless, and in spite of considerable variation, these positions
can be shown to be a function of what I shall call the rationalist conception of 
1action. In its.-.'most general form this conception presents a realm of ideas, a 
realm of nature, and a mechanism of the realization of ideas in the realm of nature, 
namely, human action. This mechanism may be thought to operate at the level of the 
individual human subject, that is, as a function of its consciousness and will, or 
at. some supra-individual level of determination which subsumes the actions of 
individuals to its functioning. But however the mechanism may be conceived, its 
effect is to constitute some portion of the realm of nature as a product of extra­
natural determinations. In this sense social phenomena may be conceived as both 
natural and extra-natural. The rationalist conception of action condemns all 
positions which fail to acknowledge the extra-natural determination of social 
phenomena as 'naturalistic* or 'positivistic*. In its view 'naturalism* or 
'positivism* commits the fundamental error of treating social phenomena as
things. The things of nature are to be the object of natural scientific investigations 
but where the things of nature are the products of rationalist mechanism they must 
also be understood,
I have defined the rationalist conception of action in its most general fomij 
because, as the debates in the social sciences and history have made abundantly clear, 
it is not confined to any particular philosophical or epistemological position and it. 
may even be combined with a positivist methodology. It is well known, for example, ZH2E 
that in The Rules of Sociological Method Durkheim adopts as his first and most 
fundamental rule that we 'consider social facts as things' (Rules p,14) and he insists
8that, in the observation of social facts, 'all preconceptions must be eradicated', 
(ibid, p.31) However, he also conceives of social facts as 'representations', as 
'states of the collective consciousness’ which are different in kind from those of
tthe individual but are nevertheless of the order of 'ideas', 'concepts' and 'images'/ 
In Durkheim's sociology suicide rates and many other manifest phenomena are conceived 
as manifestations or expressions of the state of the social consciousness.
Now in referring to the rationalist conception of action I do not intend to 
suggest that this conception must involve a rationalist epistemology. Rationalist 
epistemology conceives oifjknowledge as inter alia a function of concepts and relations 
between concepts that are independent of experience. The world is a rational order 
in the sense that its parts and the reWljtions between them conform to the order of
concepts and the relations between them. It is for this reason that concepts 
independent of experience can nevertheless givei/j^genuine knowledge of the world.
Where rationalist epistemology presupposes an a priori correspondence, a pre-given 
harmony, between ideas and the world, the rationalist conception of action postulates 
a mechanism of the realization of ideas. For example, in Weber’s conception of action 
as 'oriented in its course' by meanings the relation between action and its 
meaning is one of coherence and logical consistency: the action realizes logical 
consequences of its meaning. Is it necessary to point out the theological affinities 
of this conception of action? Whilst theology postulates God as the mechanism par
excellence of the realization of the word, the rationalist conception of action 
conceives of a lesser but not essentially dissimilar mechanism.
Two sets of problems may be noted which arise within any form of the rationalist 
conception of action. The first is that what actually appears in nature is not the 
idea as such but only what is thought to be its expression. Thus, in the investigation 
of what it regards as social phenomena, the rationalist conception must not only 
postulate that some set of given phenomena are indeed the expression of some ideal 
totality, a system of ideas, but it must also speculate as to the ideas that are 
expressed in those phenomena. The inescapably speculat^ character of rationalist 
conceptions should be abundantly clear from my discussions of Weber, Schutz and
TI 3Husserl.
9The other set of problems may be indicated as follows. The rationalist conception
of action postulates first a system of ideas (ultimate values, rules, presuppositions,
or whatever), an ideal totality, and secondly processes of realization of the ideas
in that totality. The ideas govern action in the sense that the relation between all
actions and the ideas of the totality is one of coherence and consistencjl. For example
it may be said that action is governed by a system of ultimate values if all actions
conform to those values, that is, if actions which conflict with them are precluded.
Thus, whatever processes of realization may be invoked, they are somehow
constrained (it is never clear quite how) to conform to the prior determination of the
ideal totality. Problems arise if it is possible for an ideal totality to contain
contradictory ideas, for example, conflicting ultimate values. If two contradictory
ideas are involved in a given totality then rationalist mechanisms of realization must
be indeterminate. Expressions of one idea should be precluded by the other idea.
Thus, if contradiction is possible the action cannot be represented simply as the
realization of one idea, since in the event of an action which realizes one of two
conflicting ideas there is nothing in the ideas by themselves to account for the
realization of one rather than the other in the action. For example, if, as in the
case of Winch, conduct is held to be a KJCtJSfc matter of following rules, then, in
the event of logical contradiction, the rules themselves cannot determine conduct.
Short of adopting the relativist position which denies the existence of logical
contradiction, the rationalist conception of action can only conceive of the siutation 
4as indeterminate. The alternative is to conceive of rationalist mechanisms as 
functioning by courtesy of quite different extra-rational determinations. Hence the 
alternatives for the rationalist conception of action are either theoretical 
indeterminacy or the achievement of theoretical determination at the price of 
incoherence. This critique is developed in greater detail in Chapter 7.
The consequences of these problems for any methodological doctrine based on 
a rationalist conception of action must be clear. But there is another consequence 
of some importance for the argument of this book. If the rationalist conception of 
action is untenab3.e, then, in particular, no substantive theoretical discourse in
Sociology, Histoi’y, Political Economy, and so on, can be conceived as the product of
i
i
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rationalist mechanisms, as the realization of a methodology, of an author's 
presuppositions, or what have you. It follows that no critique of methodology can be 
carried MX over to a critique of those theoretical discourses which represent 
themselves- as the product of a methodology. Similarly, the Althusserian critique of 
the empiricist conception of knowledge cannot be carried over into a sxiqna critique 
of what might seem to be a substantive empiricist discourse. If the rationalist 
conception of action is untenable XM then there can be no process in which the empiric 
ist conception of knowledge is realized. I will return to the significance of 
this point.
'Understanding 1 the Social World
\
Pex-haps the most sustained body of work concerned to establish the distinctive
character of the subject matter of social scientific and historical investigation is
that of German neo-Kantian philosophy of history. Few of the major works of this
tradition have been translated into English and it is probably best known in the
English-speaking world , if only1SxxeiS5y^ through the writings of Max Weber. Neo-
Kantian philosophy includes several quite distinct and often opposing tendencies
but, rather than attempt to cover their differences in this Introduction, I shall
confine myself to giving a general characterization of the main features of the
5neo-Kantian conception of history. The methodological writings of Max Weber are 
examined in Chapter'.!.
Neo-Kantian philosophy elaboi'ates ,a distinction between the natural and the 
social or cultural sciences on the basis of certain features of Kant's conception of 
theoretical and practical reason. For the purposes of a schematic exposition it is 
probably best to begin by considering two sets of problems. First there are the 
problems posed by Humean empiricism with respect to the status of certain concepts 
often held to be essential for science. If all knowledge is to be based on experience, 
and on experience alone, then it is easy to show, for example, that there can be no 
warrant for the assertion that one event is the cause of another. Experience may tell 
us that the events occur together or in close proximity but we cannot experience any
11
causal connection between them. Thus the concept of causality and, by the same 
token, all other concepts pertaining to the notion of scientific determination 
appear to have no foundation in experience. A second set of problems arises out 
of the notion of scientific determination itself; if every phenomenon has a cause, 
as science seems to suggest, then what remains of the notion of human freedom? How 
can human action be free and at the same time determined? Kant’s reply to Humean 
empiricism provides a solution to the second set of problems so that Kant can, in his 
view, maintain without contradiction both that man is free and that human action, 
as an event in nature, must be governed by natural determinations. This conception 
of man as both free and determined is the foundation for the neo-Kantian 
conception of history.
Kant disputes Humean empiricism on the one hand by admitting that all knowledge 
begins with experience and on the other hand by denying that all knowledge arises 
out of experience;
'For it may well be that even our empirical knowledge is made up of what we
receive through impressions and of what our own faculty of knowledge (sensible
impressions serving merely as the occasion) supplies from itself. If our
faculty of knowledge makes any such addition, it may be that we are not in a
position to distinguish it from the raw material, until with long practice of
attention we have become skilled in separating it.' (Critique of Pure Reason,B,ppTinrj
By postulating a faculty of knowledge which 'supplies from itself' certain features 
of empirical knowledge Kant is able to save the field of nature for scientific 
determinism and also to save human freedom from the determinism of nature, Man is 
possessed of the faculties of sensibility, understanding and reason by virtue of .. 
which he is receptive to sensory givens, capable of organizing these givens into 
knowledge, and of synthesizing his knowledge into systems. These faculties cannot 
be the object of empirical knowledge since they provide the conditions of the 
possibility of empirical knowledge.
5&vt
Kantian empiricism imposes a distinction between sensible and super^ible 
objects. Sensible objectsV^fCsensory experience, that is, they are the product 
of impressions and of what our cognitive faculties supply themselves; they must
5'2/‘rl
therefore be distinguished from supei,4ible objects, from things as they are
12
in themselves. Thus whilst sensible objects are immanent to experience there is a
S<?VL
realm of supei^ible objects, or noumena, that is transcendent,.The totality of
sensible objects constitutes the realm of nature. Its contents are distributed in
space and time as a function of our faculty of sensibility and they are governed
by natural causality as a function of our faculty of understanding. Nature is
therefore a realm of scientific determination whilst man as a transcendental object, 
"fell©i,e. as a possessor of cognitive faculties, is external to the realm of nature.
’Man, however, who knows all the rest of nature solely through the senses, 
knows himself also through pure apperception; and this, indeed, in acts and 
inner determinations which he cannot regard as impressions of the sensed.
He is thus to himself, on the one hand phenomenon, and on the other hand, in 
respect of certain faculties the action of which cannot be ascribed to the 
receptivity of sensibility, a purely intelligible object. ’ (ibid, pp.574-5)
Now, since thez’e are forms of experience and forms of the understanding it follows
that certain types of knowledge exist which are totally independent of experience,
Okfor example, ma^thematics, geometry, and certain conceptions of the natural sciences
Si/
the concept of ’law of nature’, the conception that every phenomenon has a cause in 
previous phenomena, etc. That knowledge, which is provided by pure reason, is not 
a knowledge of objects, since these are constituted as a function of experience, 
and it is not a knowledge of noumena. In Kant’s view any claim to a knowledge of 
noumena is entirely speculative and any attempt at argument or demonstration with 
regard to such claims is dialectical, that is, worthless rubbish. In particular, 
concepts such as 'God’, ’freedom’, ’immortality1, which refer to transcendent 
objects belong to the sphere of faith but not of knowledge. As far as such objects 
are concerned Kant finds it ’necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room 
for faith * (ibid, p.XKK ) Faith and the objects of faith are introduced by Kant 
specifically with reference to morality. They may be necessary for morality but 
they are no part of knowledge,
’The doctrine of mr^orality and the doctrine of nature may each, therefore, 
make good its position. This, howevei’, is only possible in so far as 
criticism has previously established our unavoidable ignorance of things 
in themselves, and has limited all that we can theoretically know to mere
13
appearances. ' (ibid.p,xxix)
Hence Kant *s distinction between theoretical and practical reason. Theoretical
reason is concerned with the Imowledge with the realm of nature.
Practical reason is concerned with morality and its conditions, in particular with 
freedom (in the strictest sense) as a property of our will,' (loc.cit.) Practical 
reason is a sphere of thought concerning practical and moral considerations and it 
includes a sphere of pure practical reason which subsumes these considerations 
under general principles, but it cannot be a sphere of knowledge.
Now human action is pertinent both to theoretical and to practical reason: it 
is part of nature and therefore governed by law and it is the action of a rational 
being, which can act according to a conception of law. Every human subject has an 
empirical character and an intelligible character. With regard to the former, this 
subject 'would have to conform to all the laws of causal determination. To this 
extent it could be nothing more than a part of the world of sense, and its effects, 
like all other appearances, must be the inevitable outcome of nature. ' (ibid,p,568) 
In its intelligible character, on the other hajin, 'this same subject must be
considered to be free from all influence of s^jejsibility and from all determination 
 
through appearances. ' (loc,cit) Human action is both free and determined. In so 
far as it is an object of knowledge action is o£ the order of nature and is subject 
to causal determination. But as an object of thought in the sphere of practical 
reason it is free and undetetermined ~ it is the expression of a will.
For Kant, then, the sphere of history is a sphere of natural determinations. 
While, for purposes of practical reason we must conceive of man as free and 
undetermined, if we are concerned with knowledge we must restrict ourselves to the 
order of appearances. We may believe, as a matter of faith, that action is the 
expression of the will of a free actor but we cannot hope to know the noumenaj we 
can know only the order of appearances within nature, Kant insists on this point 
in the opening lines of his "idea for a Universal History":
'Whatever concept one may hold, from a metaphysical point of view, concerning 
the freedom of the will, certainly its appearances, which are human actions,
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like every other natural event are determined by universal laws.1
(Kant 1963 p. 11 emphasis added)
Human history is a part of nature.6 For Kant the distinction between practical
and theoretical reason implies no. corresponding distinction between the social or
cultural sciences and the natural sciences.
The neo-Kantians do not agree. The neo-Kantian treatment of the cultural or 
7 ,historical sciences is completely opposed to Kant on this point. As far as these 
disciplines are concerned the most striking feature of the nineteenth century ' 
’return to Kant* in German philosophy and historiography, from Dilthey to Windelband 
and Rickert, lies in its invoking what Kant could only regard as a speculative 
claim to knowledge. To take just one example, consider the following passage from 
Rickert’s Preface to the Sixth and Seventh German edition of his Science and 
History:
■- n jn r. n ■>« i ^
’"spirit" means something essentially different from, and even in great 
measure independent of, all merely physical existence. It is akin to what 
Hegel, using a terminology now taken up once again, called "objective 
spirit" in contrast to "subjective spirit". "What remains as mere "unspiritual" 
inner life can thus be subsumed under "nature". ...on this hypothesis, what 
distinguishes culture from the whole of nature is not, then, its psychical, 
but its objectively "spiritual" content, i.e,, the sum total of that which is 
not perceptible by the senses but which can be grapsed only in a nonsensorial 
manner and which gives life its importance and meaning... ’ (p.xv)
Here Rickert retains a form of the distinction between sensible and supersensible, 
’that which is not perceptible by the senses', and lays claim to a form of knowledge 
of the latter. It is the objectively spiritual content of cultural phenomena which 
delimits that particular portion of nature as precisely the expression of extra­
natural meanings and it is the task of the sciences of culture and of history to 
grJpg 'in a nonsensorial manner’ the content that is expressed in these phenomena. 
Cultural phenomena must be treated not only as events in nature but also as the 
expression of meanings - they must be understood.
gNow, whatever 'common humanity ' may be invoked to account for the miraculous 
faculty of understan ding, it is clear that the neo-Kantian sciences cannot be other 
than essentially speculative in character. In retaining the dfetinetion between
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sensible and supersensible and in laying claim to a knowledge, and not merely 
faith, with regard to the latter, the neo~Kantian theories are condemned by their 
own concepts to recognize a necessary indeterminacy in the relation between 
sensible phenomena and the ’meanings ’ that may be read into them. The very 
delimitation of a certain sphere of phenomena as cultural, rather than merely 
natural, requires that they be known to be the expression of some, as yet unknown, 
objective meaning,and the*UnderstandingM of any given cultural phenomenon requires 
an indeterminate process of speculative interpretation. This process of inter! 
retation, in the nature of the case, is always open to challenge by alternative, 
equally speculative interpretations. The dependence of these positions on a 
rationalist conception of action is evident: cultural phenomena are the product of 
acts of expression. We shall see in Chapter 1 that Weber’s neo-Kantian positivism 
and his insistence on ’causally adequate’ expilanation in no way escapes the
rationalism and the necessary element of speculation of neo-Kantian historiography.
In Chapters 2 and 3 we shall see that while Schutz and Husserl depart from neo- 
Kantianism in several respects they do not depart either from the rationalist 
conception of action or from its speculative consequences. The doctrines of Schutz 
have been taken over to a greater or lesser extent in the so-called phenomenological 
sociology and in parts of ethnomethodology, two of the more fashionable anti-positiv­
ist tendencies in contemporary sociology. The far more rigorous and serious work 
of Hussei’l has had little direct impact on the social sciences; it is known, if at
Merleau-Ponty, and others. In Chapter 2
I argue that far from being based on the work of Husserl, Schutz’z ’phenomenonology ’ 
perpetrates a vulgar humanist ssxxEiX and psychologistic distortion of Husserl's
philosophy. The critique of Schutz's conception of history and the social sciences
in that chapter is therefore directed not against the phenomenology of Husserl but 
only against some of its grosser misrepresentations. The argument of that chapter, 
then, leaves open the possibility that the I'igorous transcendental phenomenology 
of Iluseeri might form the basis of a coherent phenomenological social science and 
science of history. In Chapter 3 I examine Husserl's own theory of the history 
of the sciences and of philosophy, and I argue that no such possibility exists.
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Husserl’s position is shown to be structured around a central contradiction 
between his objective of a rational, non-subjectivist history of the sciences and 
the transcendental empiricist epistemology in terms of which that objective is to 
be realized. The effect of this contradiction between one set of Husserl’s concepts 
and another is a theoretical discourse structured by a series of logical 
discrepancies and a denegatory play on words which glosses over the discrepancies. 
Husserl’s epistemology is shown to be impossible without these necessaary 
discrepancies and to be ultimately incoherent as an epistemology because of them.
Thus there can be no Husserlian theory of knowledge unless these contradictions 
are also present and no corresponding realization of that theory in 'positive ' 
knowledges.
There are, of course, forms of the rationalist conception of action which do 
not involve the neo-Kantian distinction between sensible and supersensible objects 
or the phenomenological demarcation between transcendental subjectivity and 
objects in the world. For example, the dominant tendency in recent British 
philosophy has been to reject any distinction between my ’consciousness' on the 
one hand and my ’body’ on the other: there are not two kinds of object here but 
only one. Persons are distinguished from other types of object not in that they 
combine two kinds of entity in one but rather in that certain types of description 
are pertinent to persons and not pertinent to other things. We attribute an intention
to a person who hits me over the head but not to an apple which falls on me from a
9tree. In these cases the basic rationalist conception of action is retained - 
men realize ideas, apples falling off trees do not. While the rejection of the 
doctrine of two kinds of entity in one person has definite theoretical effects, it 
cannot avoid the fundamental problems of the rationalist conception of action and 
the speculative effects which it imposes. I have not discussed this position at any
length in this book but it may readily be subsumed under the general critique of
the rationalist conception of action developed in Chapter 7,
Positivism and Positivist Methodology
The term 'positivism' is used in a number of different senses in the social
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sciences and in philosophy. I use it here to refer to a distinctive type of 
epistemology characterized by its insistence that we can know reality only on 
the basis of experience. There is no pure a priori knowledge of the kind that 
Kant suggests and there are no objects which lie beyond the realm of sensible 
phenomena. Positivsm asserts the claims of experience as the ultimate foundation 
of human knowledge and denies the possibility of meaningful discourse concerning 
supersensible HXH2SSK3SSS objects. Further, since all knowledge is based on 
experience there can be no foundation for the ontological doctrines which underlie 
the rationalist demarcation between the sciences of nature and those of history
and culture. If positivist moth-ed-olegy presents a definite conception of the
oforms and conditions of knowledge then j^itivist methodology proceeds to derive 
and to elaborate a definite system of rules and protocols both for knowledge in 
general and for scientific knowledge in particular. In the social sciences the 
dominant .positivist methodologies are the varieties of systematic empiri^m,
the methodology of deductive testing proposed by Popper and his associates, and 
the vulgar positivist epistemology of model-building. The first been
subjected to a devastating critique by David and Judith Wilier in Systematic 
Empiriqsm; critique of a pseudo-science.
KX§KXIihXXXXXXXXXXX]5i&XXbX&££XKXKXXIiXSKX!5XKXX}IXX2 In spite of the weakness of their 
own conception of science and empiricism their thorough and systematic demolition
of many of the dominant positivist methodological doctrines cannot be too highly 
recommended. Rather than attempt to repeat their arguments I shall be concerned 
in Chapter 4 to outline the basic features of positivist Hatkadaiagy epistemology 
and to demonstrate the inescapable circularity and utlimate dogmatism of even the 
most xigHXHHH sophisticated positivist epistemology. Popper's position, which 
deviates from positivism in certain limited respects is examined in Chapter 6. The 
epistemology of model-building, in which knowledge is said to be obtained through 
the construction of models on the basis of g^ven facts, is discussed in Chapter 5.
As an epistemology positivism falls under the general critique of the 
empiricist conception of knowledge outlined above. Its conceptions of the forms 
of knowledge that are possible and of the criteria for the validity of claims to
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knowledge logically presuppose a ’knowledge’ of the conditions in which knowledge 
takes place, that is, of the terms of the opposition: ’subject’/'object ’, and of the 
character of the relation between them. Thus, the specification of the criteria 
for the validity of knowledge must presuppose the validity of the knowledge from 
which that specification is derived. Positivism faces the additional problem that 
the attributes of the knowing subject which are required for its theory of 
knowledge cannot, even on its own terms, be established on the basis of experience 
alone. In this resj^pt positivist epistemology presupposes what it must regard as 
a metaphysics, that is, a form of knowledge not reducible to experience. It 
presupposes what its own criteria must dismiss as meaningless. Thus, quite apart 
from the general problems of the empiricist conception of knowledge, positivist 
epistemology and its secondary discourses on methodology and philosophy of science 
are logically incoherent and rationally indefensible. ^
But there is a further set of problems for any positivist epistemology which 
concerns its conception of the relations between the propositions of science on the 
one hand and the phenomena of experience on the other. Concepts such as ’electro­
magnetic field’, ’electron', ’proton', 'the geometrical structure of relativistic 
space-time continua1, can hardly be considered to refer to objects of direct 
experience. How, then, can we be sure that to speak of such entities is not to 
introduce surreptitious metaphysical elements into scientific discourse? ‘In the 
later work of Carnap such problems are resolved in terms of his distinction between 
the languages of theory and of observation. There is a language of observation 
whose elementary propositions express the relational structure of the given and 
point to its content. These propositions are strictly irreducible and they refer 
only to what is given in experience. They contain no theoretical admixture. The 
theoretical language, on the other hand, refers to objects and properties of objects 
that are not given in experience. Carnap proposes a number of rigorously defined 
conditions which can ensure that a theoretical term or proposition is meaningful, 
that is, empirically significant. The details of these proposals need not concern 
us here. What must be noted at this point is that the concept of an a-theoretical 
observation language makes possible a very precise conception of the testing of
theory against observation. The testing of theory against irreducible 
statements of observation is equivalent to a direct comparison between theory 
and the real. Sf the^ fail to correspond then the theory is false and it may 
therefore be rejected.
So far so. good. Nov/, many positivist philosophers have disputed the 
possibility of drawing any hard and fast distinction between the languages of 
theory and of observation. In fact, as I argue in Chapter 5, that distinction 
involves a definite conception of logic and pure mathematics as being independent 
of any empirically given conditions. In effect their propositions must be true in 
all possible states of affairs, logic and pure mathematics give a knowledge of the 
structure of the given that is arrived at independently of the given itself. It 
is clear that this conception of logic and pure mathematics is incompatible with the 
fundamental positivist doctrine of the reducibility of all knowledge to experience, 
Thus the distinction between theoretical and observational languages cannot be 
sustained within any strict positivist epistemology.
What are the implications of the rejection of the notion of an a-theoretical 
observation language for the positivist doctrine of the testing of theory against 
experience? The answer to this question is given in Chapter 6 where I examine 
Popper's methodology of deductive testing. It is true that Popper has always 
x-ejected certain features of positivist epistemology, notably the thesis of an 
a-theoretical observation language and the doctrine of the meaninglees^ss of 
metaphysics. Nevertheless he insists that the sciences advance by the testing of 
theory against the 'facts', that is, against descriptions of observations. If all 
observation is to some extent theoretical then how is it possible to maintain that 
all knowledge is reducible to observation and that theory is to be tested against 
the 'facts ' of observation? For Carnap there is no problem: theory is to be tested 
against the observation statements because the latter really do designate the given 
and they really do express its relational structure. ■ But, if there is no a-theoretica 
observation language then observation statements do not strictly designate
the given nor do they■strictly express its relational structure. Why then test 
theory against observation statements? If observation statements do not express
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the structure of the realt if they are always to some extent theoretical, then there 
is no reason why we should accept a theory if it conforms to them and reject it as 
false if it fails to conform. The doctrine of reduction and of the testing of 
theory against the 'facts ' of observation can be defended only within a strict 
positivist epistemology by reference to its strict observation language. If the 
existence of an a-theoretical observation language is denied then these doctrities 
have no possible rational foundation, I ax’gue this case at length in relation to 
Popper’s epistemology in Chapter 6 but the argument applies equally to all those,' 
for example Quine and Hempel, who dispute the possibility of a rigorous distinction 
between theoretical and observation languages while retaining a residual positivist 
commitment to the doctrine that loiowledge is reducible to the phenomena of experience.
The argument of Chapters 4 to 6, then, is that positivist epistemology in all 
its forms and the related doctrines of deductive testing and of model-building are 
logically incoherent and rationally indefensible. Positivist methodology, philosophy 
of science, and other derivative discourses are therefore jxntenable. It follows 
that the sciences cannot be conceived as either testing or measuring theory against 
the standard of the real. The protocols* of positivist epistemology or of Popper's 
'critical rationalism' therefore have no pertinence to any'empirical1 investigations.
The Critique of Empiricism and the Production of Theoretical Discourse
Finally it is necessary to consider the implications for the critique of 
emxj^icist positions of my analysis of the rationalist conception of action 
elaborated in Chapter 7 and outlined above. Chapter 7 opens with a
distinction between two levels or forms of critique of empiricism: one 
directed at epistemology and related doctrines, the other directed at what ax*e 
thought to be products of an empiricist process. For example, the authors of 
Systematic Empiririjgm elaborate a critique of particulai* epistemologies and 
methodological positions but they also insist that empiricism is a I’eal process of 
the production of knowledge. It pi’oduces not scientific knowledge but only 
.empiricist knowledge. Thus their concept of empiricism provides the basis for a 
ci'itique of substantive positions which are held to be the products of an empiricist
I2 X
process. Similarly the far more rigorous and sophisticated work of Althusser 
contains both an analysis and critique of the empiricist conception of knowledge 
and a distinction between science and theoretical ideology as the products of 
distinct types of process of production of knowledge. The production of theoretical
ideology is a process dominated by empiricism. Thus Althusser’s concept of the
\
empiricist conception of knowledge on the one hand and his concepts of science and 
theoretical ideology on the other provide the foundation for an 'Althusserian ' 
critique of work in Sociology, Political Kconomy, History - in short, of all 
substantive theoretical discourses that can be represented as and
therefore, ideological. Much of the argument of this book is based on Althusser's 
critique of the empiricist conception of knowledge but, in other publications, I 
have sometimes adopted the second ’Althusserian’ mode of critique. For example, in 
our Introduction to Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production Paul Hirst and I have 
suggested:
K
’The empiricism of the academic social sciences and of much Marxist 
scholarship has serious theoretical effects. In so far as certain facts 
are represented as ’given’ in the real or as ’given’ by history they must 
fall below the levell of theoretical determination: they cannot be the product 
of an explicit theoretical practice. The empiricism of these disciplines 
therefore ensures that these 'facts ' are ideological constimcts and that their 
'theories' are, at best, sophisticated theoretical ideology. ’ (p.3)
This critiqqe is of no great importance for the major arguments of Pre-Capitalist
Modes of Production but its general character is clear. There is a real empiricist
process of knowledge and it results in ideological knowledge not in scientific
knowledge. _
Chapter 7 examines the Willers ’ concept of systematic emppjljicism and the
'Althusserian' critique of empiricism. In both cases I argue that, however
effective their respective critiques of methodology and epistemology may be, their
conceptions of empiricism as a real process of production of knowledge and of
science as a distinct type of real process generate insurmountable problems and
result in a logically impossible theory of the process of production of knowledge.
"Consequently the anti-empiricist critique of theoretical discourses other
than those of epistemology and methodology is an invalid and logically ineffective 
form of critique.
<L
Now, these arguments raise a more gpueral problem which I consider in the 
third part of Chapter 7. It concerns not the demarcation of science from non­
science but rather the manner in which the process of production o^§ilcourse, 
scientific or otherwise, is conceived in terms of the realization of extra-discursive 
conceptual relations. What is at stake here, whether what is thought to be 
realized in theoretical discourse is conceived as a methodology, an author's 
presuppositions, or even a theoretical (scientific or ideological) problematic 
which governs the order of appearance of concepts in the production of discourse, 
is what I shall call the rationalist conception of the production of discourse.
This is a special case of the more general rationalist conception of action outlined 
above in that the relation between what appears in the discourse and the extra- 
discursive conditions implicated in its production is conceived as one of coherence 
and logical consistency - the order of concepts in the discourse realizes ideas and 
relations between ideas that are held to govern the production of that discourse.
I argue that the rationalist conception of action is untenable and that it can be
maintained only at the price of theoretical incoherence. The rationalist conception 
of the production of discourse is therefore untenable. Theoretical discourse cannot 
be conceived as the outcome of a rationalist process of production. It follows 
that a rigorous distinction must be maintained between problems concerning the 
logical properties of the order of concepts of a discourse and problems concerned 
with the process of production of discourse. I conclude the chapter by considering 
the implications of that distinction for the analysis of discourse and for the questi 
of the terms in which a rational and coherent critique of particular discourses may 
be conducted.
What are the consequences of these arguments for the critique of epistemological 
and methodological positions developed in the preceding chapters? One consequence 
has already been noted, namely, that the critique of methodology cannot be extended 
to a critique of those substantive discourses which are represented as if they were 
the product of the application of methodological protocols-. If there is no
I
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rationalist process of production of discourse then it is impossible to maintain 
that methodological or other protocols may be effectively realized in particular 
theoretical discourses. Similarly Althusser’s critique of the empiricist 
conception of knowledge cannot be extended into a critique of what might seem to be 
a substantive empiricist discourse. But there is a second consequence which should 
be noted before I conclude tiiis'Introduction. Although my examination of 
methodological and epoistemological positions in the first six chapters is primarily 
concerned with kUs concepts and the relations between their concepts there are also 
a number of passages in which I counterpose these positions to a quite different 
conception of science. For example, in the chapter on Popper X assert, in.contra­
diction to Popper's position, that:
’the sciences work upon constructs which are produced through the operation 
of its theory and instruments (and these latter in their turn depend upon 
theory). It follows that the relations between theory, instrument and 
observation must be conceived as internal to the practice of the science 
concerned. ’
At work in this and other passages is a particular rationalist conception of the
process of production of scientific knowledge developed in the work of Bachelard and 
/
Althusser. It follows from my critique of the rationalist conception of action that 
this conception of the process of production of scientific knowledge cannot be 
sustained. However, this conception plays no significant part in my examination of 
the coherence of epistemological and methodological doctrines. Thus, while some of 
the positions taken up in these chapters must now be regarded as untenable, my 
conclusions concerning the coherence of epistemology and methodology must stand.
1. The Methodology of Max Weber
"l'
In a seriCvS of essays published together in English under the title of
The Methodology of the Social Sciences (hereafter : Methodology) and again in the
first part of Economy and Society, ’The Fundamental Concepts'of Sociology',
Weber attempts to define the general character of the social and cultural
sciences and to establish general canons of proof and demonstration for use in
their investigations. These texts are by no means equivalent. Economy and Society .
is presented as a systematic elaboration and classification of general concepts
while the essays in the Methodology are more polemical in tone and more discursive
in style, Economy and Society concerns itself with sociology (as Weber conceives it)
while the Methodology essays are more concerned with problems of the definition of
history as a cultural science and with problems of historical proof and explanation,
sociology being relegated to the status of an ancillary discipline, a useful tool
which no historian should be without. Nevertheless there are few significant
epistemological differences between these texts and tucy imolve identical
conceptions of the nature of the social and cultural sciences as the sciences of
1action in general and of social action in particular.
In this chapter X examine Weber's definitions of action and of sociology as a 
science of social action as given in the opening paragraphs of Economy and Society 
and the forms cf proof which he outlines there and in Mc{E)t!odclogy in relation to 
the concepts of ideal type, causal explanation and causal significance, objective 
possibility and probability. While Economy and Society refers mainly to sociology’ 
its most general concepts - action, meaning and behaviour - serve to define tne 
social and cultural sciences as a whole specifically as sciences of action in 
•contrast to the natural sciences. The definition of action in terms of extra- 
phenomenal, transcendent meanings is crucial to Weber's conceptions of the social 
and cultural sciences and of the particular theoretical and methodological problems 
that; may arise within them. Action is not the product of psychological causes,
it is the phenomenal expression of transcendent meanings. I consider first the
general concepts of action, rajsinsx meaning and behaviour, secondly Weber's epistemology 
and the role of values within it, and finally, his m£ore ’technical’ conceptions of 
scientific objectivity, Weber’s definition of sociology is based on an essentially 
religious metaphysical conception of man, his methodology is relativistic and 
irrationalist, and his corc-eptjof scientific' objectivity is a facade for an 
underlying notion of verisimilitude, of plausibility and subjective conviction.
1. Meaning, Action and Behaviour,
'The fruit of the tree of knowledge, which is distasteful to the complacent 
but which is, nevertheless, inescapable, consists in the insight that every 
single important activity and ultimately life as a whole, if it is not to be 
permitted to run on as an event in nature but is instead to be consciously 
faaided, is a series of ultimate decisions through which the soul - as in 
Plato - chooses its own fate, i.e. the meaning of its activity and existence. 
(Methodology, p.13)
froi. I'cu cv„rt religious and mystical ovortc-iCS tu. e<'..„cp'.:j.on 
outlineti in this p~3ouge reappears in Weber’s definition cf action in the first 
paragraph of Economy and Society :
’In ’’action" is included all human behaviour when and in so far us the acting 
.individual attaches a 'subjective meaning to it' (The Theory cf Social and 
Economic Organisation - hereafter : Theory - p,88)
Here the distinction between 'action' and 'behaviour' reproduces tne earlier
distinction between ’an event in nature’ and action that is ’consciously guioed ’.
The difference between natural phenomena and action guided by ’meanings’, ’values ’
and other such human attributes and the peculiar character of the relation tnat
obtains between these two realms is fundamental to Weber's conception of Man
and therefore of the human or cultural sciences.
It should be noted that while Weber refers us to ’the fruit of the tree of
knowledge’ for a constitutive element of his sociology he makes no attempt to
establish this alleged ’knowledge’. In the abser.ee of the slightest attempt at
proof or demonstration we appear to be confronted by an arbitrary and dogmatic
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assertion that plays a crucial role in Weber's definition of sociology as ' a
science which attempts the interpretative understanding of social action'.
Elsewhere Weber makes it clear that we owe the fundamental definition of the Bhajl:
object of the social or cultural sciences to philosophy. For example, he refers
to 'the transcendental presupposition of every cultural science', namely :
'that we are cultural beings , endowed with the capacity and the will to 
take a definite attitude toward the world and to lend it significance' 
(Methodology, p,81)
The fundamental concepts of the social sciences are to be based on a 'knowledge ' 
provided by philosophy, in particular by the neo-Kantian philosophy of Rickert and 
Wlndelband mixed with more than a pinch of Dilthey. This 'knowledge', such as it 
is, is constitutive of the social sciences; it cannot be established within them. 
Weber’s social sciences are constituted by what he imag'ines to be established in 
philosophy.
Whatever the -status of that alleged 'knowledge* the precise character of the 
relation that is supposed to hold between meanings and actions remains obscure.
It is obscure not only in the work of Weber but in all those texts which peddle 
non-natural ’meanings' as the constitutive elements of the social sciences. 'Action' 
is distinguished from keh 'behaviour' by means of the subjective moaning which is 
attached to it. Or again:
'Action is social in so far as, by virtue of tl^e subjective meaning attached 
to it by the acting individual (or individuals), it takes account of the 
behaviour of others and is thereby oriented in its course'(Theory, p,88)
What are the mechanisms which enable meanings to produce their effects? How, in
the case of social action, does meaning 'take account of the behaviour of others '
in such a way as to orient action 'in its course '? If Weber does not and indeed
cannot answer these questions, it is, as we shall see, because the relation of
meaning to behaviour is not a relation 'in nature ' between one phenomenon and
another but a relation, betv/een phenomena and extra-phenomenal, non-natural entities^
an expressive and teleological relation which vitiates any attempt at a rigorous
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Weberian theoi^ of action,
Nevertheless the concept of 'subjective meaning1, however obscure and ill-definet
it may be, plays a crucial role in Weber's sociology. Social relationships, social
2collectivities (e.g. the state) , the different types of action,and so on, are all
defined by reference to meanings. For example, in the case of economic action :
'"economic" processes and objects are characterized as such entirely by the 
.meaning they have for human action in such roles as ends, means, obstacles, 
and by-products ,.., these phenomena have a peculiar type of subjective 
meaning. This alone defines the unity of the corresponding processes, and 
this alone makes them accessible to subjective interpretation ' (Theory, p,158-9)
Subjective meanings cannot be conceived as epiphenomenal, as something which
merely accompanies action; on the contrary jet enterr/ in to the definition of the 
distinct types of action and it is primarily with respect to their meanings that 
actions are to be classified. Thus the substantive concepts of Weber's social 
theory involve an essential reference to meanings. In effect the general notion 
of the human subject - making decisions, interpreting situations, acting 'in terms 
of' meaning's and intentions and in relation to similarly constituted actors -' 
appears as an unquestioned and essential basis of Weber's theory of action. What 
is distinctive, however, is not so much the conception of the human subject as agent, 
which in one form or another characterizes the bulkxsfxs:en±o:l»gyy academic social 
sciences, but the manner in which Weber's human subject is alleged to function, 
in particular the peculiar relation of meaning and action which is constitutive of 
Weber's sociology. In the following chapter we shall see that it is lax'gely with
respect to how this peculiar relation is to be conceived that Weber has been
criticized by social phenomenology.
Nov/, if Weber explains anything about ’meaning' it is not haw it relates to 
overt behaviour. Instead he offers a distinction between two kinds of.meanings: 
’the actually existing meaning' which refers to a given actor or actors and 'the 
theoretically conceived pure type of subjective meaning attributed to the
hypothetical actor or actors in a given type of action *(Theory, p,S9), The term
actually existing' is confusing.. The distinction made hero is not between
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a 'real' meaning and one that is postulated by the social scientist; it is between
two"postulated meanings, one referring to a particular given actor or actors, the
other referring to actors engaged in particular types of action. The crucial
point for Weber’s conception of meaning and its relation to overt behaviour is
made in the sentence which follows. 'In no case does it refer to an objectively
"correct'' meaning or one which ^’’true” in some metaphysical sense.'(ibid. ). In
the social sciences or in history 'meaning' is always something attributed
3by an observer, 'Meanings ' are not phenomena, they are not events 'in nature'.
Rather they belong to the supersensible essence of' Man, an essence that in 
neo-Kantian epistemology must be conceived as radically exterior to the realm of 
nature, 1 c. to the field of phenomena open to empirical investigation,^
. We can now approach the fundamental theoretical problems deriving from a 
'transcendental presupposition1 such as "tfeher's and the peculiar character of the 
relation it effects between ’meaning', 'action’ and 'behaviour'. Weber’s definition 
of action implies a reference to human behaviour that is not action, i.e., that has 
no subjective meaning attached to it. There are psychophysical processes that 
cannot be considered meaningful action at all and the line between action ahd 
behaviour is always difficult to determine. Indeed’:
'A very considerable part of sociologically relevant behaviour, especially
purely traditional behaviour, is marginal between the two' (Theory, p,90)
The category of action th&t is marginal between action and behaviour occupies a 
central position in Weber's sociological theorj'- and in his investigations of the 
differences between the development of rationality in the West and its non-development 
elsewhere. Section 2 of 'The Fundamental Concepts of Sociology* distinguishes 
four basic types of social action according to their mode of orientation. Two are 
defined as rational: xweekrational, defined in relation to a system of discrete 
individual ends and the rational estimation of means available for their attainment1"; 
wertra11ona1, involving a conscious belief in an absolute value and its implementation
independently of any prospects of succesfu.l realisation. The others, traditional 
and affcctual orientations, are explicitly conceived as on the borderline of 
meaningful orientation. In so far cis they cease to be marginal they 'shade over' 
into one or other of the rational action types. We may therefore conclude that 
action is essentially rational and that it deviates from rationality only to the 
extent that it is polluted by an admixture of behaviour, i.e,, to the extent that 
it becomes ’an event in nature’,^
Now the existence of a mass of human behaviour that is not action at all and, 
presumably, of a great deal more that is on the borderline raises the question of 
the relative proportions of the rational or meaningful and of the merely natural 
in any given society. More generally, given that there is always a great deal of 
mere behaviour, why is it necessary to define sociology as a science of social 
action in particular rather than of a more general range of behaviours?
Consider first the question of the relative proportions of action and mere 
behaviour in any given society. It is clear that Weber's concepts preclude any 
empirical determination of those proportions since meanings are supersensible 
entities. They may be postulated by the observer but they cannot be empirically
discovered, Weber is undeterred. In a very revealing discussion of the 
potentialities of the subjective understanding of animal behaviour Weber tells us 
that biological analogies:
’may throw light on the question of the relative role in the early stages of 
human social differentiation of mechanical and instinctive factors, as 
compared with that of the factors which are accessible to subjective inter­
pretation generally, and more particularly tc the role of consciously ration
Ti ecessary for the sccioltv t?'.orc aghly Lvr.ro of the
fact that in the early stages ef: even of human development, the first sot of 
factors is onmipleiely predominant, Nven in the later stages he "ust take 
account of their continual interaction with the others In a role which is of 
cf decisive importance. This Is particularly true of all Jirad Itiona 1’ act! 
and of many aspects of charisma.1 (Theory, p,10S, emphasis added)
There are two levels in man: the mechanical and biological, viuh , the animal; and
the level of subjective meanings, of the rational essence of ma
7predominant in the early stages of human development.
The former is
It is easy to recognize
here the traditional religious and metaphysical dichotomy of body and soul, material 
and spiritual,- etc. V.’ebor, following much of German philosophy of history, 
represents this metaphysical dichotomy as achieving a certain realization in history.
In defining' sociology as a science of action, that as, of the realization of 
human purposes, Y.'ebor in no way denies that there is always a great deal of mere 
behaviour. But purpose, subjective meaning and rationality, is nevertheless
represented as what is specifically and essentially human. History is, inter alia,
9a process of realization of that essence, It is in this sense that, in the 
Introduction to his studies of the World Religions, Weber can refer to the 
rationalizing development of Western civilization (in contrast to the ossification
and stagnation of the East) as lying ’in a line of development having universal
,10significance and value ' (Protestant Ethic, p.13)'
It is this conception of the rational essence of man which necessitates the 
definition of the social and cultural sciences as sciences of action, of human 
purposes and their realizations. More precisely, it is the valuation of this 
alleged rational essence that is decisive here. The more fact that, some behaviour 
is meaningful and other behaviour is not does not suffice, in Weber’s epistemology, 
to define the field of action as a distinctive area of scientific investigation.
’Value-relevance ' is decisive for the constitution of the theoretical objective of
11Economy and Society.' For all' its generalizing and systematizing tendencies
Economy and Society does not escape the theoretical relativism and irrationalism
consequent upon the attempted definition of objects of investigation on .the basis 
of their relevance for values. The inescapable relativism and irrationalism of 
Weber's doctrine of value-rolevancc is examined below.
Similarly, it is the essential rationality of action that entails Weber's 
insistence that psychological and irrational elements in behaviour are to be 
interpreted as loading to deviations from the pure type of rational action. It is 
only by comparison with an ideal type, with the theoretical construct of a rational
course of action, that:
3 ( 
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'it is possib3.e to understand the ways in which actual action is influenced 
by irrational factors of all sorts,,,,., in that they account for the 
deviations from the line of conduct which would be expected on the hypothesis 
that action were purely rational’ (Theory,p,92)
At this point Weber adds that ’rational types ’ are only a methodological device.
Nevertheless, for reasons of 'methodological convenience*, sociologiets are
enjoined to work with rational action types and to interpret the causal significance
of all other behavioural elements merely ’as accounting for the deviations from th^
f.
typo 1 (ibid, ). Hero it is clear that rationality is presf/ui^osed as essential and
that only that presupposition can justify Weber's insistence on the use of rational 
12ideal types.
Finally, in this section, it should be noted that Weber's conception of action 
as the realization of meanings or purposes involves a necessary reference to values 
as the ultimate source of purposes. The precise theoretical dtatus of these 
'ultimate values * is brought out most clearly in the passage from the .Methodology 
cited at the beginning of this section and again in the following:
*[We] must recognize that general views of life and the universe can .never be
s . v'products of irveroh^ng empirical Knowledge, and that the highest ideas, which
move us most forcefully, are always formed only in the struggle with other
f-
idcals which arc just as sacred to others as ours-|: are to vis, 1 (Methodology, p. 57) 
The essence of human action, as opposed to mere behaviour, must thev.’efore be 
conceived as involving rationality and ultimate values. It is the choice of 
ultimate values, and therefore- of the meaning of life, and the attempt to realize 
those - ..os which distinguishes action from *an event in nature’. Values are 
conceived as radically exterior to the world of nature since it is precisely their 
intervention which distinguishes essentially human action from merely natural 
behaviour. Values intervene in the natural, or material, world through the medium
of their attempted realization in action but they are not part of that world and 
they cannot be formed within it.
Thus the fundamental concepts of Weber's social science are defined by reference 
to an extra-natural, if not super-natural, realm of values, meanings, purposes.
J2.
Weber's 'man' is a sensible-supersensible unity, a combination of natural elements
pertaining to behaviour and non-natural elements pertaining to action. Sociology,
the 'science ' of social action, is defined as a science of the expressions of those
13oxtra-natural elements in the realm of nature' Given the essentially religious 
character of its fundamental concepts Weber's sociology must be unremittingly 
hostile to all forms of materialism. The claim that Weber's work may be interpreted 
as a footnote to Marx or that it is a correction of Marx's 'one-sided' emphasis on
the role of economic factors in history is completely without foundation.14
2, Knowledge, Values and Meanings.
We have seen that the Weberian concept of action is predicted on a dichotomy 
between the phenomenal or empirical realm of events in^nature and an extra-phenomenal 
realm containing, inter alia, meanings, values and the like. Whilst, entities of 
the former realm are thought to be subject to empirical observation and therefore 
to empirical canons of proof those of the latter are not strictly empirical at all - 
they may be expressed in the phenomenal realm but they do not reside in it. The 
presence of meanings, values and other attributes of rational beings in the 
transcendent is disclosed by philosophy which also supplies us with the invaluable 
information that some, if not all, behaviours of human animals are expressions of 
those particular transcendent entities. To each phenomenal human animal there 
corresponds .a transcendent rationa1 being which expresses itself in and through 
the behaviours of that animal. The task of the student of action, the social 
scientist or historian, is to investigate the phenomenal expressions of transcendent 
meanings and thereby to account for the appearance of these phenomena and for the
J
relations which obtain between them.
(a) value-relevance and concept formation
'Weber's motnodologieal protocols are a function of his epistemological 
conception of the relation between the knowing subject (the scientist) and the 
realm of nature which confronts him together with certain complications deriving 
from the fact (alleged by noo-Kantian philosophy) that certain natural phenomena
yj
two also expressions of transcendent meanings, While nature itself is conceived 
of as a realm of mechanical regularity and mechanical causation the expressions
JK.
of meanings in nature cannot be conceived in the same way. Following the neo-Kantian
epistemology of Rickert^ Weber argues that the differences in the objects of the
natural and the cultural sciences in no way preclude the development of objective
knowledge in the for. The fact that the student of action must investigate
yalues>does not entail that his knowledge must be purely subjective and evaluative.
In addition Rickert's neo-Kantianism involves a conception of nature and of
everything within it as infinite in all significant respects. While some sciences
investigate general regularities and produce nomological knowledge others (the
cultural sciences) investigate individual cases and produce ideographic knowledge.
Yet no complete description of any event or situation is possible. All description
or
of particular events rj): situations therefore requires some principle of selection. 
For Rickert and for Weber that principle is provided by values : it is their 
relevance to values that determines which particular phenomena^pertinent to
invest! gat ion in the cuXtura.1 sciences and which are not, Once again., however, 
the intervention, of va.lues is thought not to preclude objectivity. The selective 
principle of value-relevance does not depend on the investigators own subjective 
valuation of phenomena but only on the relevance of phenomena to particular values 
The values in question, may or may not be the as shared by the investigator himself 
but in principle his own subjective valuation should play no part in scientific 
investigation. However, unlike Rickert, Weber denies that there are universal 
objective values in terms of which the relevance of cultural phenomena, may be
assessed. On the contrary:
'the highest ideals, which move us most forcefully, are always formed only in 
the struggle with other ideals which are just as sacred to others as ours^' 
are to us. ’ (Methodology, p,57)
What arc the consequences of this conception of the role of values in scientific 
15investigation? 0
First, there is an inevitable discrepancy between concepts and the reality
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to which they relate. Whatever event or situation we may investigate its infinity 
ensures that we must always ignore certain of its features as not pertinent to the 3ra± 
values in question, Henco Weber’s comments on what he calls ’the economic interpret­
ation of history*f i.e,, Marxism, The economic interpretation:
'is antiquated at best. The explanation of everything by economic causes alone 
is never exhaustive in any sense whatsoever in any sphere of cultural phenomena, 
not even in the 'economic ' sphere itself ,.,, ^TheJ 'one-sidedness ' and the 
* unreality of the purely economic interpretation of history is in general only 
a special case of a principle which is generally valid for the scientific 
knowledge of cultural reality' (Methodology, p.71)
That ’generally valid ' principle is that there :cs can be no objective study of
'"social phenomena" independent of special and one-sided viewpoints' (ibid,, p.72)
Secondly, all concepts are a product of values. Thus, in the essay 'Objectivity
in Social Science and Social Policy’ Weber insists that the very definition of a 
phenomenon as 'economic.' is a product of values.:
'The quality of an event as a vtsocia economic" event is not something which
it possesses objectively 
cognitive interest, as it
, It is rather conditioned by the orientation of our 
arises from the specific cultural significance which
we attribute to the particular event in a given case* (ibid,, p,64)
The implications of this position are devastating. Different values will have 
the result that different events or configurations' will be judged to be historically 
significant and consequently that different concepts are to bo used in their
investigation. Furthermore the imputation of causes is also supposed to be a
function of value-relovance, For example :
'an exhaustive causal investigation of any concrete phenomena in its full 
reality is not only practically impossible - it is simply nonsense. We select 
only those causes which are to be imputed in the individual case, the "essential' 
feature of an event' (ibid., p.78 , emphasis added).
Thus, with regard to tlio same historical event, say, the development of modern
capitalism, different investigators may quite legitimately attribute entirely
different causes without: departing in any way from the highest Weberian standards
of ' obj octivity * and ’value-freedom’,
Finally, a third consequence is that any idea of a universally valid classif­
ication or theory is entirely meaningless because our interests, and therefore our
concepts, arc subject to change - so long as ’a Chinese ossification of intellectual 
3 Glife ’ (ibid., „ p, Si) does not set in and spoil everything.
'The light of the great cultural problems moves on. Then science too prepares 
to change its standpoint and its analytical apparatus and to view the streams 
of events from the hfeghts of thought. It follows those stars which alone are 
able to give moaning and direction to its labours ’ (ibid. , p.112)
Weber's metaphysical and fundamentally religious conception of the relation of man
to the? world of nature therefore entails a systematic epistemological relativism,
y
a relativism defined at the level of cultural values rather than individual
17subjectivities but a relativism nonetheless. In this respect the cultural 
sciences, as Weber defines them, might seem to be a not unpleasant pastime but they 
could hardly be considered a serious intellectual pursuit for grown men. However, 
utter relativism notwithstanding, Weber proceeds to elaborate canons of causal 
explanation, objective possibility, causal adequacy, and the like, Is it possible 
to attach any coherent intellectual content to these notions? Before proceeding 
to examine this question it is necessary to consider the implications resulting 
from the introduction of transcendent elements into Weber fs concept of action.
(b) knowledge of actor's meanings
.k.
The social scientist or historian is concerned with the study of action and
with its causal explanation by means of 'subjective interpretation ', that is, by
-arefei'ence to its meaning for the actor or actors coneer^ned. Unfortunately the 
moaning of an action is a transcendent entity; it is not a phenomenon and cannot 
be subjected to empirical xnrxKtlgakxxn observation. While its behavioural 
expression may appear in the realm of empirical phenomena the meaning itself cannot. 
The social sclent is i; is therefore constrained to work with meanings which he 
postulates in order to account for the behaviour with which ho is c on c e rn c d. Action
is distinguished fvor.: iwevc bchavimir, from the effects of 'mechanical and instinctive 
factors’ (Theory, p,10S), by the fact that it has meaning for the actor, and actions 
are distinguished from one another by their different meanings, all of which are 
equally unobservable.
On the one hand, therefore,, the h'eberian sociologist must attempt to classify 
and to differentiate actions by reference to the meanings which they express. To 
that end he may, should he feel so inclined, make use of the categories elaborated 
by Weber in Economy and Society for such a purpose. On the other hand^while 
behaviours may bo subjected to empirical observation^their meanings, if indeed 
they do have meanings, are specifically excluded from the realm of observation. 
Nevertheless, if he is to investigate action and to provide causal explanation by 
reference to its meanings he must be able to distinguish action from mere behaviour 
and to establish the meanings of the actions thus distinguished. How is the poor 
man to proceed?
It should be noted that neo-Kantian philosophy has nothing to offer at this 
point. That philosophy tells us, if we care to listen, that sonic human behaviour 
expresses a transcendent moaning and that there is a sense in which that moaning 
accounts for the corresponding behaviour. However, if meanings could be established 
by empirical observation they would cease to bo transcendent. Thus while moaning 
expresses itself In behaviour it is not a phenomenal attribute of behaviour; Its 
presence or absence cannot be established by any proceedure appropriate to the 
investigation of natural phenomena, Meaning may be postulated by the student of 
action but in no case is it ’an objectively "correct'’ meaning or one-which is "true" 
in some metaphysical sense 1 (Theory., p,89)
'This radical disjunction between meanings postulated by the investigator and 
those intended by actors is central to Weber's conception of the social and cultural 
sciences. The possibility of subjective interpretation requires that both actor 
and investigator be similarly constituted as rational transcendent beings. Rut that 
condition of the possibility of subjective interpretation in general establishes no
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no ccs; sar 3r relation botv/oon the moan in'-s of the investigator and those of the actor
1Meanings' aro essentially unknowable, they are a product of the actor’s free and
1 Surdetermined choice of ultimate values.'
Tho Weberian student of action must therefore be constrained to analyse and
to classify behaviours by reference to tho meanings which ho has to postulate in
i oorder to account for iiiemr his classification and analysis of human behaviour 
is thus a function of the meanings which ho himself proposes, There can be no 
question of proof or demonstration xxir of the adequacy of the postulated meanings, 
i.e., of thdir identity with such real meanings as the behaviour in question may 
actually express, indeed'Weber's injunctions concerning the use of rational ideal 
typos might seem to allow free reign to the ‘investigator in his -postulation of 
meaningsj if behaviour appears not to conform to its proposed moaning he can always 
toss in a few irrational factors to account for the deviation. In this respect the 
sociologists postulation of meanings appears to be limited only by the power of 
his imagination - and if lie has access to a good library even that limit may be 
.readily overcome,
Tho absurdity of this situation is evident^yet it is an inescapable consequence 
of the Weberian definition^ of action and of the peculiar character of the concepts 
which the student of action is required bj' that definition to use, Weber describes the 
distinctive concepts of the social and cultural sciences as 'pure’ or 'ideal1 types.
If7 for Weber, there is always a necessary discrepancy between concepts and the 
reality to which they refer then ideal types are doubly discrepant with respect to 
the reality of action to which they refer. On tho one hand they are constituted 
by the intervention of value ^relevance as a selective criterion; on the other they 
involve the speculative postulation of meanings. These concepts involve a necessary 
reference to non-empirical meanings and they may also refer to observable phenomena, 
overt behaviour, moans and objects in a situation of action, and so on.
In the formatiori of these concepts the requirement^! of tho causal explanation 
of action by moans of the subjective interpretation of bxxxximur meanings implies
:m that meaning's should occupy the central and primary place. Meanings and relations 
het’.veen meanings must therefore provide the fundamental principles of organization^ 
and construction of ideal type concepts. The social scientist or historian will 
tend to work with concepts formed by a double abstraction in relation to. the
historical situations with which'he is concerned: abstraction by value-relevance
s
and a further quite distinct abstraction in the intercuts of forming concepts
organized according to the principle of subjective interpretation. In the first 
section of Economy and Society, for example, Weber tells us that:
’In a 11 cases, rational or irrational, sociological analysis both abstracts 
from reality and at the same time helps- us to understand it, in that it shows 
with what degree of approximation a concrete historical phenomenon can be 
subsumed under one or more of these concepts' (Theory,p,110)
It is tlie second abstraction and the requirements of 'understanding 1 that are at
\
issue here. These account for the problematic character of the 'approximation'
between 'concrete historical phenomena' and ideal type concepts. Weber proceeds:
'For example, the same historical phenomenon may be in one aspect "feudal", 
in another patrimonial', in another "bureaucratic", and in still another 
"charismatic". In order to give a precise meaning to these terms it is 
necessary for the sociologist to formulate pure ideal types of the corresponding- 
forms of action which in each case involve the highest degree of logical
integra11on by of their complete adequacy at the level of meaning.
But precisely because this is true, it is probably seldom if ever that a real 
phenomenon can be found which corresponds exactly to one of these ideally 
constructed pure types' (ibid., emphasis added)
As a general rule ’complete adequacy on the level of meaning' precludes elnpirical 
adequacy in the sense of a correspondence between concept and phenomena. Here the 
doctrine of the primacy of meaning which leads Weber to concentrate on meanings and 
(logical) relations between them in the construction of ideal types requires that 
those ;t5rpes must tend to be 'one-sided accentuations ’ of reality,
There is therefore an inevitable discrepancy, not only between reality and
the sociologist's ideal type concept, but also between ideal typos and the 'historical
individuals 1 (abstracted, from the real through considerations of value-relevance) 
to which the ideal types are to bo applied. This second discrepancy, is crucial.
si
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It follows that the utility of ideal types cannot be evaluated in terms of the 
extent to which they coi-rspond or fail to correspond to the real. Instead their 
utility consists in showing 'with what degree of approximation’ concrete historical 
phenomena can bo subsumed under these concepts. We have seen an example of this 
position in Weber's comments on the use of X'ational typos to determine the causal 
effectivity of irrational factors: ’they account for the deviation which 'would be 
expected on the hypothesis that action were purely rational. ’ (Theory, p.92)
Thus apart from its rational coherence at the 1’eve 1 of meaning - a consideration 
whose pertinence is clearly restricted to the case of rational typos only - there can 
be no question of Idle validity of any ideal typo concept. Ideal types do not 
correspond to the real; they define and measure the extent to which phenomena do not 
correspond to them. They may be more or less useful but they cannot be more or less 
valid. In this respect the theory of knowledge through ideal types reproduces the 
basic features of the epistemology of models. I examine that epistemology in 
Chapter £ . For the present it is enough to note that in defining the relations
between concepts and the real as an extra-theoretical relation of similarity or 
difference the epistemology of models or ideal types precludes rigorous conceptual 
investigation of any real event or situation. When is the difference between ideal 
type and the real significant? Under what conditions docs that difference require 
that the ideal p~ be abandoned in favour of another, more useful^ typo? Since 
concepts are types there can be no theoretical evaluation of these diffcrancos.
In terms of the epistemology of ideal types the judgement of the usefulness of 
of a type concept, must bo considered, to be theoretically arbitixrry. At this point th 
Weberian apologist miglib bo tempted to suggest that the problem of theoretical 
arbitrariness may bo overcome by invoking considerations of ’value-relevance': the 
difference between type and reality is significant if it is relevant to the values 
governing the investigation, But that ’solution’’ is no solution at all. First, 
Weber's concepts of objectivity and vdlue—relevance require that considerations 
of value-relevance should intervene only in the initial, ’pre-tiieorctical ’,
n _section of the ohgect of investigation. Thereafter value-relevance, has no farvw'v 
car? to ala; : V'-oeri^s and concepts must confront the tribunal of the facts, Now, 
the theoretical arbitrariness implicit in the epistemology of ideal types ensures 
that the evaluation cf the usefulness of type concepts cannot he objective in this
LtO
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soi1-3o. O''icc vc.lues are called in to perform a theoretical tael: then ’objectivity',
1 vaice•v"i’ ;cdcm 1 a-d th-c. lihe must by th-o board. Vc'eber’s conception of scientific 
objectivity is a logical impossibility; it contradicts the f'undanental concepts of his 
epistemology. I return to this point in the following section,
Secondly, hov/over relevant to values the difference between type and reality miglv
be, that relevance has no determinate theoretical implications: are wo to 'account fox-
tthat difference by invoking some iirrational mechanical, or biological factors or are we 
to discard our ideal type and try another? The arbitrariness entailed in the 
epistemology of ideal types .is essentially'theoretical and the invocation of value- 
relevance at this point leaves that theoretical arbitrariness untouched. Finally we 
should recall that ideal types involve a necessary reference to non-empirical meanings 
as well as to observable phenomena. Any comparison between type and reality must 
therefore be restricted to the latter. For the rest, as we have seen, there is no 
reason why the social scientist should not let his imagination run wild. He has 
nothing to lose but the chains of reason.
3, Weberian Conceptions of Proof and Demonstration
V/e have seen that Weber's epistemology requires that cultural values play an 
essential part in the definition of the object of scientific investigation. Values 
themselves arc located in the extra-phenomenal urdnscendont sphere. They cannot be 
proved or ostab1ishod in or by the sciences and there is no sense in which values 
can be considered universally valid or objective. The individual's choice of values 
is essentially free and undetermined, that is, it does not take place within the
realm of nature and it cannot be subject to any natural determination. The formationiAV
of values cannot be subsumed under scientific laws. But if the choice of values is 
dppsndentjon the sciences^ the sciences are nevertheless essentiadlly dependent on the 
Intervention of values. The constitution of the distinct sciences and of their 
particular objects of investigation takes place on the basis of considerations of 
valuo-relcvoncc, Different values determine different objects of investigation 
by their differential partitioning of the infinite phenomenal world into value- 
relevant and non-relevant phenomena. The result, as wo have seen, is that the 
formation of scientific concepts and the attribution of causes arc inescapably
coloured by the initial choice of cultural values. Concepts, exp.Enat ions, laws, 
all arc dependent: on values and, since there are no objective or universal values, 
Weber's position involves an essential epistemological relativism.
Relativism is the logically inescapable consequence of Weber’s epistemology.
Yet it is well known that Weber insists on 'value-freedom1 and 'scientific objectivity1 
that he elaborates standards of adequacy for sociological explanation and for the 
determination of causal significance and objective possibility. Indeed, as Lukacs
has noted:
'On several occasions, Weber defends himself against the reproach of relativism. 
However, he holds up his formalist and agnostic method as the only truly 
'scientific' mthod, as he argues that it permits nothing to be introduced into 
sociology that cannot be proven precisely. ' (Lukacs 1972 p, 394)
21Lukacs, in many respects one of the most perceptive critics of Weber's irrationalism, 
continues:
'For him, only technical criteria can be expected from sociology; in other words, 
only "which means for the achievement of a proposed end are appropriate dr 
inappropriate" can be investigated. On the other hand it can determine the 
consequences which the application of the means to be used will produce in 
addition to the eventual attainment ox the proposed end, " Everything else will 
be outside the domain of science, an ' ideational! article of faith. Thus, Weber 
demands the "neutrality of sociology, the total absence of value judgements, he 
desires it purged of all apparently irrational elements", * (ibid, pp,394-95)
What is the status of j'/e’clc'sltechnica! criteria of 'scientific objectivity* and
’value-freedom’? Is it possible that/ at least at this technical level, Weber escapes
the irrationalism and relativism of his more general epistemology? I have shown above
that W'eber's conception of the use of ideal types in sociological explanation# involve:
an inescapable theoretical arbitrariness, To the extent that it depends on the use of
such-ideal types, then, Weber’s 'scient^f^c objectivityis a logical absurdity. In
the remainder of this chapter^ I propose to examine other central concepts of his
technical methodology, in particular, the concepts of ’correct causal explanation',
'probability' and 'objective possibility' and of the historical judgement of 'causal
significance'. This examination will show that Weber's technical methodology is
intellectually worthless and that it cannot'■provide the basis for logically coherent
theoretical investigations in the social sciences,
o
Weber distinguishes the 'sciences ' of sociology and history in the following terms
'The science of sociology seeks to formulate type concepts and generalized 
uniformities of empirical processes. This distinguish.es it from history, which 
is oriented to the causal analysis and explanation of individual actions, 
sti’ueturos and personalities possessing cultural significance. ' (Theory p, 109)
One'science seeks to establish general laws and uniformities and to formulate general 
concepts. The other makes use of these generalities for the causal investigation of 
singular events or singular concatenations of events. Whilst these sciences may
confront rather different theoretical exigencies certain common epistemological
o
concepts recur in Weber's discussions of sociology and history; in particular there 
recur the concepts of 'causal law', - ’cmpjp.cfal uniform^ity ', and 'probability'. 
Nevertheless his most extensive methodological discussions of these concepts takes 
place in The Methodology of the Social Sciences, which is primarily concerned with
problems of historical explanation. The following discussion will therefore 
concentrate on that text.
(a) causal laws and causal explanation \
A correct causal explanation is one" which is both causally adequate and, since we
#
are dealing with action, adequate at the level of meaning. The latter means:
'the subjective interpretation of a coherent course of conduct when and in so far 
as, according to our habitual modes of thought and feeling, its component parts 
taken in their mutual relations arc recognised to constitute a 'typical' complex 
of meaning ... An example of adequacy on the lev^lj of moaning in this sense is 
what is, according to our current norms of calculation or thinking, the correct 
solution of an arithmetical problem,1 (Theory p.99 emphasis added)
The theoretical implications of Weber's definition of action in terms of non-empirica1 
meanings have been examined above. It is enough to note here that the relations bh.fhc 
between meanings themselves or between meaning curd behaviour is judged to be adequate 
according to ’habitual inodes of thought and feeling’, according to 'current norms’.
The epistemological ■>'" lativism pf this position is apparent: as our norms and habits.
change so does our of 'adequacy on the level of meaning1. Furthermore it is
clear that the reference to habit or tradition in this context in no way elucidates 
the precise character of the relation of meaning to action which is- so central to 
Weber's rociclog^ . It is surprising therefore that Weber goes on to claim that 
In contrast to history 'sociological analysis can offer a greater precision of
’ ' (ibid.p.109) precisely because its concepts are fully adequate at the levelconeopus
L\$
of iAoaning;. 'Proclsion of concepts' is a matter of satisfying an obscure condition.
There arc good theoretical reasons for that obscurity: a rigorous theoretical
formulation of the artioulation of meanings and actions must encompass transcendent
and phenomenal events. If transcenden^t meanings are beyond the realm of objective
knowledge then so is the relation that obtains between an actor's meanings and his
overt behaviour. VeVor proposes to fill this gap by reference to habits and norms
but iiis metaphysical conception of man precludes all theoretical justification of that
proposal. There can be no theoretical grounds for accepting Weber's arbitrary notion
. 22of 'adequacy at tne level of meaning'.
So much for ’meanings'. Now consider the concept of causal adequacy,
'The interpretation of a sequence of events will on the other hand be
called causally adequate in so far as, according to established generalizations 
from experience, there is a probability that it will always occur in the same 
way. ' (Theory p,99)
In this definition two elements appear to be especially important: 'established
generalizations from experience ' and the judgement of the probability of an event
established.or sequence of events. Probability is examined below, as for ^generalizations 
Weber also refers to these as 'causal laws1 or ' "nomological" knowledge - i.e, the
knowledge of recurrent causal sequences.1 (Noth, p.79) Those 'laws’ are essential 
for sociology and, as we shall see, for history. _How are they to be established? 
Recall that Weber, following Rickert, insists on the absolute infinity of the world
and all that appears within it:
'it presents an infinite multiplicity of successively and coexistently emerging 
and disappearing events, both ’within' and ’outside’ ourselves. The absolute 
infinitude of this multiplicity is seen to remain undiminished even when our 
attention is focused on a single object”,5 (Meth, p,72)
This absolute in faulty appears to bo conceived, somewhat in the manner of J.S.Mill,
as structured by an infinity of causal sequences between one phenomenon and another.
These ’causal sequences' may bo identified and validated 'by means of comprehensive
historical induction ' or they may be ’immediately and tangibly plausible according to
our subjective -'xpcrionce '. (ibid, pp. 72.-73) While such laws5 are not the principal
object, of history, in Weber's sense, they are nevertheless its essential tools. Nov;,
the infinity of cay. vorjd moans that no individual event or ptoromonon can be
‘ii(
i.ins t select the ecu,30 to ho imputed through our selection of the 'essential' 
features of the event and our investigation of causal significance. In effect, value- 
relevance determines the finite class of causes that we choose to investigate in each 
i n d x v i d n a 1 ea s e .
That aspect of Weber’s position is well known: the infinity of the world means 
that caxtsal laws alone can never' suffice for the explanation of the individual fact. 
Unfortunately for Weber's methodology the infinity of the world must also imply 
that no discrete causal sequences can ever be identified - either through 'compre~ 
hensi.vo historical induction' or through 'our subjective experience'. First, if the’ 
historian is compelled to select from the absolute infinity of phenomena then so is 
the sexologist. His 'established generalisations' will be a, product of his selection 
criteria. Secondly, if each phenomenon is in fact the effect of an infinity of 
'causes’ then no finite process of induction can discover real causal sequences since 
the-constant conjunction of phenomena in a finite numhter of cases may be entirely 
aceidouta.1. The absurdity of the doctrine of knowledge by induction is demonstrated 
in Chapter If the world of phenomena is infinite, as Weber's epistemology
supposes, then induction is worthless and 'nomological knowledge — i.e. the knowledge 
of recurrent causal sequences* is nothing" of the kind. Whatever their source 
Weber's 'causal laws' cannot be derived by induction or experience and they cannot 
perform their required role’ in sociological or historical proofs of 'causal 
significance', 'objective possibility', and the like.
Consider, for example, a 'law' which Y/ober introduces to account for the failure 
of rational administration to develop in China, lie notes that a tendency toward 
rational administration was present in the period of the Warring States but that it 
dies out after political unification.
'Just as competition for markets compelled the rationalization of private 
enterprise, so competition for political powers compelled the rationalization 
of tlie state economy and economic policy both i>. the Occident and in the China 
of the Warring otates. In the private economy cartellization weakens rational 
calculation which is the soul of capitalism; among states, power monopoly 
prostrates rational management in administration, finance and economic 
policy. ’ (The Ilaligion of China,'p, 61)
This may bo a vague analogy from a conservative economic platitude but it is hardly 
a 'causal law* rcr even an 'empirical generalization*. The -'law of the ratior.alir.iu
w S
effect of coauotItuv.i ' and the other 'causal laws 1 that may be abstracted from Wel>rr's 
voluminous \vriti7'c;s arc not the product of any empiricist process of induction, While 
ii.any such Tlavs ’ have a definite theoretical place in relation to the. concepts and
theoretical positions elaborated in Weber's substantive discourse^that place is not the
2&.one ascribed to 'causal laws' and 'empirical generalisation 4 in his methodology- '
(b) causal signi f: loanee, objective possibility, and probability
In Weber's epistemology the absolute infinity of the phenomenal world and of 
every object and event within it poses a problem of the causal explanation of any 
individua 1 fact:
'Even with the widest imaginable knowledge of ’laws’, we arc helpless in the 
face of the question: how is the causal explanation of an Individual fact possible
since a description of even the smallest slice of reality can never be 
exhaustive?' (Moth, p.7S)
The solution is gix^cn by the doctrine of value-relevance: 'V/e select only those causes
f<.Uvwhich are to be imputed in the indiviSa 1 case, the uessentialfl feature of an event. *
(ibid.) But the doctrine of value-relevance gives rise to another problem, namely, th<
problem of the causal significance of a specific historical event with regard to
subsequent, culturally significant historical developments. While there may be causal
laws, in the sense of determinate recurrent and sequential relations between
one type of phenomenon and another, the rea1 movement of history cannot be subsumed
under-any such law. Laws, in Weber's sense, refer only to regularities that may be
observed between determinate phenomena or classes of phenomena. The notion that
history itself is governed by a lp^) of this kind is absurd: history, for Weber, is a
unique sequence of unique concatenations of an infinite multiplicity of discrete
phenomena. Thus the problem of the.significance of one particular event for n
x ^ hit w
subsequent historical conditions cannot be resolved by the application of any causal^] 
Instead Weber proposes that we proceed by a series of abstractions. Apart from 
the initial abstraction required by consideratioixs of value-relevance the most 
important of these is that:
'wo conceive of one or a few of the actual causal components as modified -in a 
certain direction and then ask ourselves Th whether ...the same effect or some 
other effect would be expected, ' (ibid,p.171) '
In this way, for example, the battle of Marathon may be imagined as effecting a Xhil 
’decision' between two possible lines of development:
it 6
eithor 'devclppmont of a th.oocratic-religious culture, the beginnings of 
■■■'bich lay in tho iviystcvies .and orac3.es, under the aegis of the 
Po i’s i an p v o t ecto ra te '
or 'the triumph of the free Hellenic circle of ideas, oriented towards 
the world, which gave us those cultural values from which we still 
draw our sustenance. ' (ibid.)
Marathon decided in favour of the second altex’native and thereby made possible 
the development of the V.ostem JvSSXH values which we know and love. That ’is the 
only reason why we are historically interested in it, ' (ibid. p. 172-)
The only serious complication in this procedure is that, having conceived the 
situation as different in some respect, say, a Pelts inn victory at Marathon, we must 
make a judgement of 'objective possibility' with regard to the effects of that 
difference. The judgement that the situation would have been different must be more 
than a mere guess; it must be causally adequate. Thus the judgement of the causal 
significance of the kOXfh battle of Marathon for the ’development of Western 
civilization:
'rests, on the one hand, on the knowledge of certain 11 facts w (ontological 
knowledge), ^belonging ^ to the ''historical situation*1 and ascertainable on the 
basis of certain sources, and on the other, knowledge of certain known empirical 
rules, particularly those relating to- the ways in which human beings are prone 
to react under given situations (nomological knowledge(ibid, p.174)
Consider, first, these- facts 'belonging to thb historical situation'. Why do 
we not investigate their ’causal significance’ for Western civilization? It is all 
too easy to discover facts and events belonging to the sx^u|t)ation which might be 
considered pertinent, for example, the wreck of the Persian fleet off Mount Athos
in 492 B.C. or the revolt against the Persians by the Ionian Greeks ±x from 499 to 
494. Or again wo might speculate, in the case of Marathon itself, what might have
the consequences had the Athenian commander, Miltiades, forgotten to blow his nose 
on the morning before the battle commenced.
The list of facts 'belonging to the siQtJation* whose potential causal 
significance might be investigated is endless. Yet in order to arrive at our 
judgement of the causal significance of one £act, the Athenian victory, we have to
hold these other facts constant. Our judgement of 'the decisive causal significance
of one thing requires that wo choose not t,o investigate a mass of other things. In 
this respect t as so often according to Weber's methodology, our conclusions appear to 
be the' product of an entirely arbitrary theoretical choice. We choose to investigate 
one feature of a situation, we choose to treat certain other features as given facts 
of the historical situation and considerations of va.].uc-relevance ensure that we 
ignore other features altogether.
Next, the 'known empirical rules' that Weber refers to, 'the ways in which 
human beings are prone to react under given conditions'. The general character and 
status of such rules or 'causal laws' has been outlined above. In the present case 
Weber has in mind rules such as 'the Persians establish the .cooperation of and the 
domination by the priests whenevj^ they get the chance'. It is true,as Weber admits
(iwiWit
in a later discussion of this same example, that this 'hsaiuss* empirical rule* rests on 
a very small number of instances, viz. 'the examples of the conduct of the Persians
in cases where they were victorious, as in Jerusalem,3gypt and Asia Minor, and even 
this verification must remain unsatisfactory in certain respects’. (3 & S p.98)
No matter, we empirical scientists must do the best we can with the available 
materials, and further, 'the striking rational plausibility of the hypothesis must 
here necessarily be rolled on as a support. ' (ibid.)v,
Finally, let us consider the concepts of 'objodtive possibility’ or 'probability 
Weber tells us that the judgement of objective possibility admits gradations of degre 
and that, in this respect, it involves principles similar to those of the calculus 
of probability. The only difference is that we cannot assign a numerical value to 
this 'probability' and the judgement canoot bo perfectly unambiguous. Tnus, apart 
from the fact that mathematical calculation and rigorously determined results are 
mnnossible, the procedure is identical to that of mathematical probability theory- 
’When wo carry through this comparison in our imagination ,.. ‘then a
considerable degree of certainty for a judgement of 'degree 1 of objective 
possibility is conceivable at least in principle - and it is only its 
conceivabilif.y in principle which concerns us here prim a rily. 1 (Moth, p,lS3)
Such judgements arc made all the time in daily life and in history. Indeed, 
without them:
’a distinction of the causally 'important' and 'unimportant ' would simply
not bo possible. (Moth, pp,183-4}
iloro tlie decree of 'objectivo possibility’ oi’’ ’probability' is a matter of a 
'fcrling of certainty*.
It is this concept of 'probability' that appears in Weber's definition of 
causal adequacy and in his definitions of the concepts of social relationships and 
social collectivities;
’The social I’elationshxp consists entirely and exclusively in, the existence of 
a probability that there will bo, in some meaningfully understandable sense,
a c oursc of social action. 1 (Theory, p.118 emphasis added)
Similarly V/cber insists that to talk of the existence of fricnphlp as a state means: .
’that we, the observers, .iud ge ^tliat^ the re is or has been a probability that 
on the basis of certain kiihhK kinds abjective attitudes of certain
individuals there will result in tho average sense a certain specific type 
of action, ' (ibid, p.119)
What is tno logica character of such judgements of 'objective possibility' or
'probability '? Wober insists that such judgements .are 'frequently made 
and in ordinary life but, even if we were to grant Weber that 'fact1, 
is no proof that those judgements are rational or logically coherent. 
certainty1 is not a mathematical proof; it■is not even unanmbiguous,
in history 
its existence 
A 'feeling of 
Yet Weber insist
on the objective character of judgements based on such feelings.
Weber *s error 
2 rof certainty 
dotermination of m 
di£ fe recce, That
g UV- Me
is a sisiSihSc one; ho confuses the rigour of a proof with a 'feeling 
Thus the mere absence of the calculation and struct.numerical 
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So anic]r for Weber's 'objective possibility* and ’probability', I have bk shown above 
how little value can ho attached to his 'known empirical rules' or his ’causal law's *, 
Rut, oven if we were to grant him his 'causal laws’, the fact remains that no 
rigorous and unambiguous determination of the degree of 'objective possibility' is 
possible. Given all the causal laws you like KffidaiTkiXdLkXKkkhKHKIUtgJkiKlXs'IXavxKiiKk 
we arc stIIlj.loft with nothing but feelings of certainty For all the pretentious 
chatter about theory, objectivity and the like in Weber's methodological writings 
'causal adequacy1 and 'causal significance’ are matters of voij^imllltude at best, of 
plausible and subjecti\rcly convincing stories. Weber's 'objective' and 'value-free' 
social scientist avid hi.stori|an are authors of plausible generalisations and plausible 
stories, nothing more.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have outlined Weber's metaphysical conception of man, which 
govern-s his distinction between action and behaviour, and his epistemology. Together 
these define the distinctive methodological problems confronting what Weber represents
is the social and cultural sciences, the sciences of action. The essential roler ------------------ >—
is signed to values in Weber's conception oil knowledge entails an inescapable
epistemolog’ical relativism - concepts, theories and explanations depend on the 
scientists selection of the cultural values which govern his research. A further
dietinct
and :Hd.:;c-irrf: set of problems emerge as a result of the supposedly transcendent
character of human meanings and values, the essential rationality and freedom of man 
with respect toxxib:: all merely natural determinations. The attribution of meanings by 
the student of action is necessarily speculative and, since pure ideal type concepts 
are organized around meanings and relations between meanings, these concepts take on 
the character of models to be compared with and measured against the real. If concept 
are models then any comparison with the real must bo extra-concoptua 1; it is
the c ic., lly e, rb i t iv,. i‘y. Finally, I have examined V/cber's conceptions of proof and 
ciCi.ions trail or. in sociology and history with particular reference to his' concepts of 
’causal adequacy', 'causal significance', 'objective possibility1 and 'probability ',
QFven at this laoro technical level V/eb^'s ihethodology utterly fails to escape the 
relativism and irrationalism of his more general epistemology and metaphysics. His 
technical canons of scientific objectivity are logically absurd; they are more
appropriate to story-tclling than to science. It says mud 
sociology as a discipline that it regards I\Iax vreber as one 
f ovemos t practit loner/As , '
for the character of 
of its XMMXMg
Notes : Introduction
I The rationalist conception ox action is examined at length in my .forthcoming 
paper ’Humanism and Teleology in Sociological Theory*
2, It is clear that this conception of social facts conflicts with Durkheim's 
fundamental rule, cf,Hirst, 1975
3. Lukacs attempts to overcome these problems in History and Class Consciousness 
with the postulate of the working class as both subject and object” of”TIistory,
4 The relativist tendency is taken to an extreme in Winch, 1970.
5 Neo-Kantianism is conventionally divided into the Marburg and the Heidelberg 
schools. Where the former is primarily concerned with questions of logic and 
epistemology and with the conditions of knowledge in the natural sciences the 
latter attempts to theorize the conditions of knowledge in the cultural of historical 
sciences. The Heidelberg school conceives of culture as a realm of the realisation 
of values in human existence. The philosophy of history is conceived as interpreting 
the products of the cultural sciences in the light of universal values. Dilthey 
differs from the Heidelberg school in rejecting the conception of universal values 
and in denying the division of the human subject into an empirical and a transcend­
ental part. I have not attempted to examine these differences i3i this book. 
References to English language works or translations on the Heidelberg school and
on Dilthey are given in the bibliography. See especially works by Dilthey, Rickerfc, 
Hodges, Mandelbaum and Antoni, An extremely elementary survey of doctrines of 
'understanding' is given in Outhwaite, 1975.
6. In so far as history is, for Kant, the realization of an idea tiie mechanism 
of realization is not conceived at the level of the consciousness and will of the 
human individual but at the level of nature as a whole. 'The history of mankind 
can be seen, in the large, as the realization of Nature's secret plan.., '(Kant,
1963, p,21)
7 But see note 5 for the position of the Marburg school.
8 cf. Outhwaite*s comment: 'the question why social life or the bahaviour of 
other people is in some sense intelligible to us need not be discussed in texmis of 
an a priori 'social' form of apperception; it is enough to say that we haxx live in 
the same world as our fellow men and have a c'erTaTn "a^miT^ir^onmion’^i^h^^thenT'”’”™ 
(Outhwaite, 1975, p.61, einphasis added) Outhwaite's comment manifestly begs”"the 
question: everything turns on his being able to establish that what men do have in 
common is sufficient to sustain the postulated forms of understanding.
9 There are many forms of this type of argument. Perhaps the most rigorous is 
that given in Strawson, 1959. See especially chapter 3.
U4
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1. There ir conriclcrable debate within sociology concerning' the precise 
significance of the dift'-renees between these texts from different periods and' 
on l;he nature of V.'obcr's transition from historian to sociologist. (For references 
to the more recent literature see Torrance, 1974), Heedless to say those questions 
a3‘o of no concern in this text.
7, The theoretical individualism apparent in Weber's definition of relationships 
and collectivities is a logical consequence of his definition of action in terms of 
the individual actor who is a free, transcendent being. Thus 'action exists
only as the behaviour of one or more individual human beings' (Theory,p.101). This 
individualistic definition of relations and collectivities does not prevent ’Weber 
outlining conceptiovis of collective action, for example with reference to shared 
va1uos (c f.Jone s, 1975),
3. cf, the discussion of Schuta's distinction between 'objective' and 'subjective' 
meanings in chapter 2,
4. :‘ Meanings, as conceived here, are essentially extra-linguistic. They may be 
expressed in speech but they are not constituted there. Action in general, and
speech in particular, is the free creative act of a transcendent rational being.
The meaning of action or discourse must always bo postulated .by the observer.
Thus ’subjective interpretation' is essentially speculative. For an excellent 
discussion of the absurdity of such extra-linguistic conceptions of meaning and
consciousness see Volosinov, 1973.
5. This concept of 'instrumental rationality' opens wap the possibility of a sphere 
of action not governed by values in any strict sense, a merely formal rationality. 
That possibility is most clearly realised in Weber's concept of capitalism, in 
which the market functions as a sphere of instrumental rationality abstracted from 
values,and also in the formal rationality of bureaucracy. Modern capitalism, which 
requires both a market economy and a developed bureaucratic organisation, leads to 
the meaninglessness of the world. It becomes an iron cage of formal, instrumental 
rationality entirely abstracted from values";
'For the last stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly said; 
specialis !:.s without i-ixart spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity
imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before acheived"'
(Fortestant Hthic, p,182)
G. -See the Introduction for the neo-Kantian character of this conception of the 
rcat.txxxx essence of man as rational. It should be clear that Weber's classification of 
types of action is not a necessary logical consequence of this metaphysical concept 
of the essence of man. Whilst the exigencies of the expression of meanings in the 
medium of the behaviour of human animals may well require some conception of 
borderline types of action the specific concepts of affectual and traditional action 
cannot bo established in this way.
7. It is for this reason that Weber treats primitive men as closer to the animals 
than us civilised creatures of the West, For example, he notes thtt domestic 
animals react to human commands in ways that are 'by no means purely instinctive 
and mechanical 1 * * * 5 * 7 8and adds : 'there is no a priori reason to suppose that our ability 
to share the feelings of primitive men is ve"ry much greater' (Theory, p, 104)
8, Nevertheless it would be an error to interpret Weber as merely reproducing 
the Hegelian philosophy of history. ’Where Hegel represents History as a process 
of auto-development Weber's explicit conception of history is very different. For 
example, in his Introduction written in 1S20 to his works on the World Religions 
Weber poses the problem of the development of the West in terms of a 'combination 
ox circumstances'. Thus the different histories of the West and the Hast arc to be 
accounted for in terms of different 'combinations of circumstances'. In fact, of
'.V' *.c
T-hC
coui'f'.o, V.'obcr's toxtuaJ. assemblage of ‘combinations of circumstances' has the 
character of special pleading for a conclusion known in advance. The speculative 
empiricism of b'drorbr methodology should not be allowed to obscure the teleological 
cha-ncter of his fundamental concepts, cf.my 'Humanism and Teleology in Sociological 
Theory*
th cf.Hunt's 'Idea for a Universal History' where the conception ox history as 
leading to the full development of human capacities is explicitly avancod. For 
example, the eighth thesis begins :'The history of mankind car* be seen, in the large, 
as the realisation of Nature;s secret plan to bring forth a perfectly constituted 
state as the only condition in v.'hienHbhcT capacities of mankind can bo fully 
‘developed ,.. ! (nxnt,19G3,p.21, emphasis added) . Nature has chosen men’s antagonism 
in society to achoive this end. This conception of Nature's secret plan is a Kantian 
Idea ; it regulates empirical investigation but it cannot bo established by it.
10. of. Parsons’1 concurrence in Parsons, 1971, p. 139
11. cf. Parsons' comment in his Introduction to Theory, p,12.
12. The transcendent status of the human essence is central to v/eber’s treatment
of the significance of possible racial differences as 'non-understandable uniformities 
underlying what has appeared to be specifically meaningful action’ if such differences 
wroo to bo established ’they would have to bo treated by sociology as given data in 
the same way as the physiological facts of the need for nutrition or the effect of 
senescence on action’(Theory,p.94), Merely biological differences do not affect 
the human essence, since that is extra-phenomenal, but they may affect the forms 
and conditions.in which it realizes its intentions. ;
13. heber’s anti-psychologism is a necessary consequence of this conception of 
action. The means-end relation is a rational relation based on technical consider- 
’ations; it is not a function of psychological, i.e. natural, mechanisms . Thus 
Weber remarks ’how ex’Z’oncous it is to regard any kind of psychology as the ultimate 
foundation of the sociological interpretation of action' (Theory, pxHH:) p.108)
14, See, e.g., the editors’ Introduction to Fron max Weber, Sven in The Protestant
religious and idealist characterEthic , frequently cited in this connection, the 
of Leber’s position is quite clear, Weber's Introduction describes the text as
concerned with 'the influence of certain religious, ideas on the development of an 
oeone.mic spirit, or the ethos ox an economic system. In this case we are dealing 
the connection of thewith  spirit of modern economic life with the rational ethics of 
xxx ascetic Protestant ism. Thus we treat here only one side of the caxisai chain'(p. 27) 
Wo be r ' s problem concerns* the connection between one sot of ideas and another. The 
’causal' relations involved are essentially spiritual. The other ’side of the i"
causal chain' therefore concerns the influence of an economic ethos on the developmerj 
of religious ideas.
15. cf. the discussion of Schulz's very similar position in chapter 2,
16. See the analysis of Weber's concepts of meaning aiid behaviour in section 1. It 
is clear that ’Chinese ossification ' entails a significant reversion to the 
borderline state between action and; merely animal behaviour, to a state that, in a 
very real sense, is less than fully human,
17. For an examination of the effects of the latter see Kindess, 1973c.
18. Contract tnvery different 'Hegelian ' position of Lukaes, Lukacs conceives
of knowledge as the consciousness of classes with the bourgeois i.e and the px'clotariat 
(ie successive periods) as the dominant subjects (the agents) of history. In this 
conception an identity of essence between the class subject as actor and class 
sc1 j-w.; as k'-'ewer is a possibility, much c. condition of adequation, of true
knowledge of the extra - phenomenal meaning of history, is pro eluded by V.’ebei* (s 
c-Hc.^tice epistemology.
19, For the absurd consoq.acncGS of such a position see discussion in Hind ess, 
1379c, A similar position on the relations botree.a meaning and overt behaviour was 
ad van Cod in so;no of my own earlier v/oriji, e.g. , Ilinclcss, 1971a,
y
7,0. In Methodolo;;;/ 'u'eber uses the term 'ideal type 1 more generally so that it 
refers, inter alia, to these 'a is tor i.eal individuals' constituted by considerations 
of valuo-rolevanco. ( e. g. p. 91
71, L'jt.acs att ribotos 'Voter's irrationalism to an effect of his class position 
as a result of which Weber is forced into 'the irrationalism of the imperialist 
epoch which is engendered by false replies to correct questions (correct because 
posed by reality itself)' (op,cit. p.395), Lukacs* explanation is based on his 
expressive and teleological conception of knowledge and its relation, to class 
positions. Nevertheless be correctly identifies the relativist and irrationalist 
consequences of Y/ebor's epistemological concepts.
72. cf, Sclrat?;'s closely related criterion of adequacy with respect to 'common-sense 
interpretations! ’
23, oee also the excellent discussion of ivlill in YYiller 2, YYiller, 1973,
2d, The problem of the discursive status of positions which are represented as 
the products of empiricist prx'.p protocols is considered in chapter 7,
25, It is surpriciug, therefore, to find Parsons, normally the most rigorous of 
sociological theorists, remarking : 'It is by means of this concept that Y/eber, in 
a highly ingenious way, has bridged the gap between the interpretation of meaning 
and the inevitably more complex facts of overt action' (Theory, p,100, note.21)
The concept may well be ingenious but it is certainly not logically cohereiit.
2 ’Phenomenological ' Sociology ot Allred Schuta
The work ox Allred Schuta has become increasingly well known since the 
publication of the three volumes of his Collected Papers (CPI, CPU, CP111) and 
the appearance of an English translation of The-Phenomenology of the Social World
\
(PSW). His attempts to provide ail elaborated philosophical foundation lor the
itsocial sciences has been particularly influential in the recent growth of 
’phenomenological’ sociology and of ethnomethodology?" In his Introduction to 
The Problem of Social Reality, Natanson refers to the following remarks of Alfred 
Schuta: 'of my results I am not so sure, others may do better; but of one thing I 
am Ki-ire deeply convinced. Here are the problems of the social sciences ' (CPI, p. XD/11), 
In this chapter I argue that Schutz*s conviction is entirely without foundation, 
that his protjq^ns are not the problems of the social sciences, I argue that, on 
the contrary, the very formulation of his problems is possible only on the terrain 
of an eclectic theoretical position in which no coherent theoretical discourse, and 
therefore no science of history nor of society, is possible and in which what is 
called 'history1 or 'Social science* is no more than a specialised form of story­
telling. In that respect the various Schutzian propagandists, revisionists and more
2distant followers are in much the same position as Schutz himself. The first section 
of this chapter contains a summary discussion of Schutz's account of how the social 
scientist should proceed. In the following section;I examine the specific character 
of his phenomenology and the place it occupies in the foundation of his social 
science. I argue that his attempt to provide a phenomenological foundation for the 
social sciences and history is theoretically eclectic and logically incoherent. In 
the final section I examine in more detail his account of the social scientist and 
historian as two different kinds of story-tellers with particular reference to his 
conceptions first of 'meanings' and the situations in which they are effective and
secondly of the time-structure of the social world.
1. Humanistic puppets and empiricist monster!
For Schutz, as for Weber, the point of departure for any serious consideration 
of the social sciences is the notion that human action is governed by subjective 
meanings. These svibjective meanings cannot be observed and they cannot be investigated 
according to the procedures appropriate to the natural sciences. This 'fact* has 
serious consequences for the methodology of the social sciences. The most important 
question methodology has to answer is: 'How is it possible to form objective 
concepts and an objectively verifiable theory of subjective meaning structures?'.
The answer, in Scutz's view, is given by 'the basic insight that the concepts formed 
by tljie social scientist are constructs SsrmedxxKXKEiraiiiEiHXKsiisis of the constructs 
formed in common sense thinking by actors on the social scene'(CPI, pp.62-3).
The significance of that question and of that answer will become clearer if 
we consider Schutz's use of 'objective1 and of 'subjective'-
'I can, on the one hand, attend to and interpret in themselves the phenomena 
of the external world which present themselves to me as indications of the 
consciousness of other people. But I can, on the other hand, look over and 
through these external indications into the constituting process within the 
living consciousness of another rational being.'(PSW,p.37)
To \ know the subjective meaning of a product means that we are able to
run over in our minds in simultaneity or quasi-simultaneity the polythetic 
3Acts which constituted the experience of the producer,... Objective meaning 
we can predicate only of the product as such, that is, of the already constituted 
meaning context of the thing produced, whose actual production we meanwhile 
disregard. Objective meaning therefore consists only in a meaning context 
within the mind of the interpi’eter, whereas subjective meaning refers beyond it 
jjl.e. beyond the mind of the interpreter ~B.h7| to a meaning context in the 
mind of the producer.' (ibid., pp. 133-4)
The world of objective meaning therefore contains a potential reference back to
particular individual actors whose own subjectivity lies beyond the sphere of 
objectivity. The effects of conceiving objective meanings as constituted products 
in this way are rs clearly recognised by Schutz :
1 ^The^J problem of fks subjective and objective meaning is the open door to 
every theology and metaphysics. [rhus^J the search for the meaning of every 
object kssxbhks is so tied up with the idea that the object was once given 
meaning by some mind that everything in the world can be interpreted as a
1
s y
product and therefore as evidence for what went on in the mind of God. 1 
(ibid., p.136)
On a more mundane level it follows that 'what we call the world of objective 
meaning is abstracted in the social sphere from the constituting process of
a meaning-endowing consciousness.... This results in the anonymous character of the 
meaning content predicated of it'. The world of subjective meaning on the other 
hand is never anonymous. Subjective meaning always refers to a determinate subject 
and his subjective, or intended, meaning 'remains a limiting concept even under 
optimum conditions of interpretation1 (ibid., pp.37,3S)
Strictly, then, it is not possible for the social scientist to comprehend the 
subjective meaning of the actor. In that case how is he to cope with the problem 
of the subjective meaning of action? The answer, of course, is by the use of 
Ideal Types. The 'constructs of the constructs formed in common-sense thinking' 
are typifications. In forming them the social scientist is only doing, rather more 
carefully and in a different context, what the ordinary actor on the social scene 
does all the time. With such constructs of the second level it is possible to 
develop theoretical systems embodying testable general hypotheses.4
'{rhe social scientist^ observes certain facts and events within social 
reality which refer to human action and he constructs typical behaviour or 
course-of-action patterns from what he has observed. Thereupon he coordinates 
to these typical course-of-action patterns models of an ideal actor or actors, 
whom he imagines as being gifted with consciousness. Yet it is a 
consciousness restricted So as to contain nothing but the elements relevant 
to the performing of the course-of-action patterns observed. He thus ascribes 
to this fictitious consciousness a set of typical notions, purposes, goals, 
which are assumed to be invariant in the specious consciousness of the imaginary 
actor-model. This homunculus or puppet is supposed to be interrelated is in 
interaction, patterns to other homunculi or puppets constructed in a similar 
way....sets of motives, goals, roles are distributed in such a way as the 
scientific problems under scrutiny require’ (CPI, p.64)
The social scientists model-building is constrained by the scientific problem 
at hand and, more generally, by three basic postulates. The postulate of logical 
consistency 'warrants the objective validity of the thought objects constructed by 
the social scientist' (ibid.,p,43), The strictly logical character of scientific
constructs is one of the most impoi'tant features which distinguishes them from 
common-senso constructs. o The postulate of subjective interpretation concerns what 
'model of an individual mind ....can be constructed in order to explain the 
observed facts as the result of the activity of such a mind'(ibid,), Finally there 
is the postulate of adequacy which
'means that each term in a scientific model of human action must be constructed 
in such a way that a human act performed v/ithin the life-world iKxsnskxaxKay 
by an individual actor in the way indicated by the typical construct would be 
understandable for the actor himself as well as for his fellow-men in terms 
of common-sense interpretations of everyday life'(ibid,, p.44)
Y/here Weber writes of 'our habitual modes of thought and feeling' (Theory, p.99)
in his definition of adequacy at the level of meaning Schutz refers to 'common-sense
interpetations1 and adds:
'compliance with this postulate warrants the consistency of the constructs of 
the social scientist with the constructs of common-sense experience of 
social reality f dCPj.pWt)
Common-sense experience is the measure of the sciences.
Within these constraints the social scientist has considerable freedom of action. 
He may, for example, 'construct a model of a producer acting under conditions of 
unregulated competition, and another of a producer acting under cartel restrictions, 
and then compare the output of the same commodity of the same firm in the two models T 
(ibid,, pp.64-5). In this way it is possible to discover certain determinate relations 
between a set of variables, in terms of which empiracally ascertainable regularities C8 
be explained. It is possible, in other words, to produce something which has the 
appearance of the type of theory advocated by logical empiricist philosophy of science.
How does Schutz's ’theory' with its-unobservable 'subjective meanings' differ 
from the more orthodox empiricist theories of action in sociology? A brief 
comparison of Schutz's puppets with lazarsfeld's monsters (a logical empiricist 
equivalent) should help to answer this question. lazarsfeld introduces his 
monsters in the course of a paper on latent structure analysis in which he is 
concerned with the problem
of *liow precisely inferences from concrete observations to underlying 
concepts are to be made1. (Lazarsfeld, I954}j>354) Consider the simplest 
case, in which concrete observations refer to positive or negative 
responses to questions. A probability mechanism may then be defined 
as ‘any kind of structure which, through repeated trials, yields results 
approximating more and more closely to a previously determined 
proportion of positive replies5, {ibid^ p 357) For example, a roulette 
wheel with black counting as positive is a mechanism with a probability 
of 0-5. Equivalent mechanisms are those which produce the same 
probability. In the case of physiological mechanisms we may not know 
the precise blueprint of tire structure.
No matter: ‘even in those cases, repeated and controlled tests may 
make us confident that, for all practical purposes, the structure does 
have a positive response probability of its own5. (1/7^358)
The world of Lazarsfeld’s model is not peopled by ordinary human 
beings. ‘Instead, its inhabitants are monsters who have roulette wheels 
... which provide answers to questions put to them. There is a separate 
wheel corresponding to each question that might be asked. . . . Within 
an individual monster the wheel settings associated with different 
questions are likely to vary. . . . But, in addition, the probability 
mechanisms associated with a particular question are likely to vary from 
individual to individual5, {ibiih. JPpJpF^’') The settings of the different 
wheels are determined by a Relatively small number of underlying 
attitudes, traits or other characteristics. In Lazarsfeld's mechanical 
model this means that the settings of the wheels are centrally controlled 
by means of transmission devices.
Examples of central characteristics are given in the text: courage, 
prudence, ethnocentrism, political interest, morale. The social scientist 
proceeds by constructing appropriate monsters and endowing them 
with suitable central characteristics. By means of various statistical 
tests he examines the ‘fit5 between the wheel settings determined by 
those central characteristics and the observed facts—that is, question­
naire responses and so on. If the ‘fit5 is a good one then the postulated 
‘underlying5 characteristics may be said to explain or to cause the 
observed facts. In this way it is possible to discover statistical relation­
ships between morale, political interest, etc., and other characteristics 
of the individuals concerned.
There is a clear formal correspondence between the two worlds. 
Puppets correspond to monsters; purposes, motives, goals and systems of 
relevance, correspond to probability mechanisms, systems of trans­
mission and central characteristics. In both cases it is the task of the 
social scientist to construct a theoretical model to reproduce the 
observed facts, ‘to save the phenomena’.^The best model is the simplest 
or the one that saves the most phenomena. In both cases the phenomena 
are to be saved by means of characteristics ascribed to individual actors.
It is in the character of the connection between observations and
6unobservables, the theoretical constructs required to 'explain the observed facts' 
that the most significant differences between the two worlds appear. Lasarsfeld 
relies on statistical or mathematical constructs connected to observation terms 
by arbitrarily chosen but nonetheless precise and unambiguous probability functions
JjVu^v crnT He operates with a well-defined mathematical theory, while the
k- colourful and sometimes extravagant terminology is merely a convenient
means of exposition to a mathematically unsophisticated audience. Thus 
the only theoretically significant characteristics of ‘morale’ or ‘courage’ ■ '
. are those wliich determine their statistical properties. The ‘common-
I sense’ meaning of such terms plays no theoretical role.
I For Schutz, on the other hand, it is precisely the ‘common-sense’
meaning of his constructs that is important. The connection between 
theoretical and observational terms is supplied by ‘common-sense inter­
pretations of everyday life’. (Cp|., p. 64) Thus the social scientists’ data 
are ‘constituted in part by common-sense concepts . , . [they are] the 
already constituted meanings of active participants in the social world’.
They have ‘while still in the pre-scientific stage, those elements of 
meaning and intelligible structure which later appear in more or less 
explicit form with a claim to categorial validity in the interpretive 
science itself’. (9, 10) In a vague and’confused way human 
behaviour is already intelligible at the level of daily life. It is that 
, intelligibility which lies at the heart of the social scientific enterprise.
In Lazarsfeld’s case clear and precise mathematical formulations 
allow for the production of data in standardised and readily manipulable 
forms—all based upon an essentially arbitrary choice of mathematical 
structure. With Schutz, on the other hand, a determinate system of 
theoretical constructs (notions, values, goals, etc.) is related in not too 
clear and not too precise waj^s to observation terms. In this case the 
general form of the relation between theoretical and observation terms 
purports to be not in the least arbitrary: it is determined by common- 
sense interpretations. The justification of that assertion is the result 
of ‘a laborious philosophical journey, for the meaning structure of the 
social world can only be deduced from the most primitive and general 
characteristics of consciousness’. (*y., p( 12) The puppet world can only 
be investigated using a style of research in which there is a premium 
• . ' on sensitivity to nuances of meaning. Studies of this type produce
more insights and fewer tables per 1,000 words than the corresponding 
monster studies.
1!. Alfred Schutz and phenomenology
t
In this work I have attempted to trace the roots of the problems 
of the social sciences directly back to the fundamental facts of 
conscious life. Of central importance for this investigation are 
the studies of Bergson and Husserl on the internal time sense.
Onfy in the work of these two thinkers, especially in Husserl's 
transcendental phenomenology, has a sufficiently deep foundation 
been laid on the basis of which one could aspire to solve the 
problem of meaning/ (f^^XXXII)
Schutz’s work is frequently said to have laid the foundations of a 
phenomenological sociology. Schutz himself and . • many com­
mentators’^ his phenomenology is based on that of Husserl. This inter­
pretation appears to be supported by the appearance of his Collected 
Papers in the Phaenomenologica series, published under the patronage 
of the Husserl Archives in Louvain, and even by certain remarks of 
Husserl/
In fact Schutz’s phenomenology involves a gross distortion of Husserl. 
Far from being phenomenologically founded, Schutz’s sociology employs 
a phenomenological gloss to support its basic and unquestioned premise 
that ‘the world of objective mind’ can be reduced to the actions of 
individuals. The specific form of Schutz’s distortion of Husserl deter­
mines the general character of the ‘phenomenological’ sociology that 
may.be derived from his work. This is not the place to document 
these assertions in great detail. However, in view of its^significance 
for his sociology, it is necessary to briefly examine Schutz’s pheno­
menology and its distortion of Husserl’s. The discussion will be 
organised around the following headings:
(i) the role of phenomenology in Schutz’s foundations;
(ii) psychologism and the transcendental ego;
(iii) the lebenszoelt and the world of everyday life;
(iv) the subject of science.
(z‘) The role of phenomenology in SchutPs foundations
Schutz begins his attempt to ‘trace the roots of the problems of the 
social sciences directly back to the fundamental facts of conscious life’.
XXXII) with an examination of Max Weber’s Methodological 
Concepts. He accepts that ‘Weber’s approach was correct and that he 
had determined conclusively the proper starting point of the philosophy 
of the social sciences’. V;>XXXI) What is this approach?
'Never before had the project of reducing the ‘world of objective 
mind’ to the behaviour of individuals been so radically carried 
out as it was in Max Weber’s initial statement of the goal of 
interpretative sociology. This science is to study social behaviour 
by interpreting its subjective meaning as found in the intentions 
of individuals. The aim, then, is to interpret the actions of . 
individuals in the social world and the ways in which individuals 
give meaning to social phenomenal (; ^ p 6)
Unfortunately Weber's analysis suffers from severe theoretical limitations.
’He breaks off his analysis of the social world when he arrives at what he
assumes to be the basic and irreducible elements of social phenomena. But
he is wrong in this assumption. His concept of the meaningful act of the
individual - the key idea of interpretative sociology - by no means defines
n.
a primitive, as he thinks it does. It is, on the contrary, a mere label for 
a highly complex and ramified area that calls for mush further, study' (ibid, pp'/-8
This further study which Schutz proposes takes up the analysis where Weber left off.
While accepting the conception of sociology as a science of action in Weber’s sense
he believes that Weber's concept of the 'meaningful act of the individual* requires
further analysis. It is at this point, and this point only, that Schutz proposes
to make use of Husserl, Here certain conclusions and analyses of Husserl are to
be located within an already defined Schutzian, or Weberian, ’science'. It is
Schutz*s initial conception of the nature and problems of the social sciences
that defines the contributions required from Husserl*s phenomenology,
'In order to be clear about the status of the following investigations from 
the point of view of phenomenology, it should be stated that:
Our studies of the constituting process in internal time consciousness will 
be carried out within the ^phenomenological reductionr'. Therefore they 
presuppose the bracketing of the natural world and therewith the carrying 
into effect of a complete change of attitude (the epoche) toward the thesis 
< of the vworld given-to-me-as-being-there (als daseinde gibt)" ... However, 
our analysis will be carried out within the phenomenological reduction only 
so far as this is necessary for aquiring a clear understanding of the 
internal time consciousness.
The purpose of this work, which is to analyse the phenomenon of meaning in 
ordinary (mundanen) social life, does not require the achievement of a 
transcendental knowledge that goes beyond that sphere of a further sojourn ' 
within the area of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction'(ibid,,pp,43-4)
The place and function of Husserl’s phenomenology in Schutz*s foundations
should now be entirely clear. These are prescribed and precisely determined by the
nature of the basic project which Schutz finds in Weber, namely, to reduce*the
’world of objective initid11 to the behaviour of individuals’. That project is not
questioned, founded or justified in any way in the work of Alfred Schutz. It is
not derived from any investigation, phenomenological or otherwise, of anything at all.
Ill particular, Schutz makes no attempt to establish that the object o£ his 
proposed science a possible or coherent object of investigation or that its 
definition is compatible with the fundamental concepts of Husserlian epistemology.
He does not subject his basic project to any ’radical investigation of sense' ivhich, 
according to Husserl, is necessitated by 'the present condition of the European 
sciences ' (Husserl, 1969, p.5). Modern science has 'abandoned radicalness of 
scientific self-responsibility.No longer is its inmost driving force that 
radicalness which unremittingly imposes on itself the demand to accept no knowledge 
tha|t cannot be accounted for by original first principles, which are at the same 
time matters of perfect insight - principles such that profounder enquiry makes 
no sense (ibid.,p.4). Such a 'radical investigation of sense* is essential if we 
are to transform a judgement that is a mere opinion, for example, that 'the world 
of objective mind ’ exists as a coherent field of scientific investigation; into 
a ’fulfilled ’ judgement in which we have either established that things are indeed 
xsxks just as we imagine them to be or discovered that they are not.
Sense investigation signifies nothing but the attempt actually to 
produce the sense 'itself5, which, in the mere meaning, is a 
meant, a presupposed, sense;
or, equivalently, it is the attempt to convert the ‘intentive sense 
\jntendierenden simi\\ the sense ‘vaguely floating before us’ in 
our unclear aiming, into the fulfilled, the clear, sense, and thus 
to procure for it the evidence of its clear possibility' (ibid,^9)
Schutz does not attempt to procure for his projected science any 
‘evidence of its clear possibility*, i.e. to show that it is based upon 
‘principles such that profounder enquiry makes no sensed On the 
contrary the assumption of the clear possibility of Schutz’s ‘social 
science provides the basis for his ‘phenomenological’ investigations. 
His conception of the nature and problems of the social sciences 
determines in advance the theoretical range and scope of the set of 
concepts produced by these investigations.
Whatever it is that Schutz founds, its foundations are not pheno­
menological. Furthermore, as the following sections will show, these 
foundations, and the basic project they involve, are incompatible with 
Husserl’s phenomenology. Thus, when Schutz calls upon Husserl to 
do his turn, it is only the latter’s words that are brought into play. 
Husserl s concepts cannot enter the space that Schutz provides for 
them.
(ii) Psychologism and the transcendental ego
No longer am I the man who, in natural self-experience finds 
himself as a man and who, with the abstractive restriction to 
the pure contents of ‘internal’ or purely psychological self­
experience, finds his own pure ^nens sive animus sive intellectus*; 
nor am I the separately considered psyche itself. Apperceived 
in this ‘natural’ manner, I and all other men are themes of 
sciences that are Objective, or positive, in the"usual~seiise7~
.fihtjhlQhQl.PRy and also (as included in thesej psychology. 
The psychic life that psychology talks about lias in fact always " 
been, and still is, meant as psychic life in the world.' (Husserl, 
i97°c.y -f-Mptasu
/The Objective world, the world that exists for me, that always 
has and always will exist for me, the only world that ever can 
exist for me—this world, with all its Objects, I said, derives its 
whole sense and its existential'status, which it has for me, from
me myself, from me as the transcendental ego, the ego who comes 
to the fore only with the transcendental-phenomenological 
epochc.
This concept of the transcendental and its correlate, the 
concept of the transcendent, must be derived exlusiyely from 
our philosophically meditative situation; The following should 
be noted in this connection: Just as the reduced Ego is not a 
piece of the world, so, conversely, neither the world_norjmx,. 
worldJyjQbiect is a piece of my Ego, to be found in iiiY_cpnsgipus 
lifeas a really inherent part of it, as a.complex of data of. 
sensation or a complex of acts’! {ibidt) p'if, ■
For phenomenology, and for all forms of idealism, the question of the differs 
between the transcendental and its correlate is not just one question among other 
questions. It is a question of fundamental importance for the whole character of 
the philosophical and epistemological concepts that may be derived from its answer.
Either the difference is denied or is blurred in some way or else tins 
denial is a radical vice or perversion. This choice is decisive: it deter­
mines the possibility of a rigorous idealism^on the one hand or the 
inevitability of incoherence on the other. In the rigorous transcendental 
phenomenology of Husserl this perversion is called psychologism: an 
identification, for example,, of the ‘real’, or psychological, Ego and the 
transcendental Ego; of what can and what can never be a theme of 
some positive science.
For the ego of the transcendental reduction, all that exists is and 
must be a constituted product. The constituting ego is not the ego of 
the positive sciences: the ego of the positive sciences cannot constitute.
Husserl does sometimes admit a different type of constitution. 
‘Conscious life is constituted necessarily as human in the constituted 
world, and as a human conscious life in which the world is intended, 
psychically constituted, and so forth’. (ibidjP.^n) This psychical 
constitution takes place within a constituted, i.e. transcendent, conscious 
life.-' It may, therefore, appear as a theme in ‘sciences that are objective, 
or positive, in the usual sense; biology, anthropology and also . . . 
psychology’, (ibidpzf)
Sclmtz appears to be concerned with the analysis of this latter, 
non-transcendental, constitution. ‘In ordinary social life we are no 
longer concerned with the constituting phenomena as these are studied 
■within the sphere of the phenomenological reduction. We are concerned 
only with the phenomena corresponding to them in the natural attitude.’ 
(-£&/,• ?>44) It I® such ‘corresponding’ phenomena that appear to be 
involved when he talks of ‘the meaning of each social relationship and 
structure, constituted as these are, in the last analysis, by the action 
of the individual in the social world’ (ibid^' 6), or of social phenomena 
as ‘constituted in part by common-sense concepts’, (ibidfi 9)
Such constitution is carried out by individuals living in the social 
world: that is, in the Objective world that exists/or the transcendental
Ego which is ‘not a piece of the world’. (Husserl, 1970^^:) The concept 
of this constitution V a properly scientific concept and its explication
a proper concern 01 the positive sciences. Schutz does not agree:
1 '
It is within . . . duration that the meaning of a person’s experience 
is constituted for him as he lives through the experience. Here 
and here only, in the deepest stratum of experience that is 
available to reflection, is to be found the ultimate source of the 
phenomena of ‘meaning5 and ‘understanding5. This stratum of 
experience can only be disclosed in strictly philosophical self- 
consciousness'. 12)
Or again:
J
(1) What does it mean to say that the actor attaches a meaning 
to his action?
(2) In what manner is the other self given to the Ego as something 
meaningful?
(3) In wliat manner does the Ego understand the behaviour of 
others, (a) in general, (6) in terms of others5 own subjective 
meaning?
These questions do not as such belong to the social sciences.
They refer rather to that substratum of objects of the social 
sciences, [to] the level at which the social world is constituted 
in Acts of everyday life with others-—Acts, that is, in which 
meanings are established and interpreted! (tiid ^iy)
Schutz conflates two constitutions, the transcendental and the 
psychical and two constituting Egos. The difference between the 
transcendental and its transcendent correlate, between philosophy and 
(positive) science, is transformed into a mere distance: the distance 
between the deep and the shallow. The social world and its component 
actors have hidden depths which are inaccessible to science.
• This is psychologism with a vengeance. It enables Schutz to derive, 
for example, the basic structure of the social world, the world that 
exists for ‘me as the transcendental Ego5 from our ordinary everyday 
thinking about our fellow men. (Byhf?. 139-214' 20-63)-Thus:
if the world of predecessors is completely fixed and determined, 
the world of consociates free, and the world of contemporaries 
probable, the world of successors is completely indeterminate 
and indeterminable. Our orientation toward our successors cannot 
amount to more than this: that we are going to have some. No 
key will open the door to this realm, not even that of ideal types. 
For the latter method is based on our experience of predecessors, 
consociates, and contemporaries, and there is no principle which 
permits us to extend it to the world of our successors5. (.PT-T
b j
The basic structure of the social world is given in common-sense experience.
(iii) The lebenswelt and the world of everyday life.
'The intrinsically first being, the being that precedes and bears every 
worldly objectivity, is transcendental intersubjectivity: the universe of 
monads thxt which effects it communion in various foms ' (Husserl, 1970c, p. 156)
The! 'universe of monads’ is the realm of direct experience of an immanently
13transcendent, primordial or lived world ‘ (Unvwelt or lebenswelt). It is not
enough merely to open one *s eyes and live in order to find this world of original
expedience since what is given in the 'natural' attitude' is always imprgnated by
14logical and other cognitive operations. Nor can it be revealed through a genetic
psychological inquiry for that would lead only to mental processes or lived
experiences as 'experiences of the world, of a world which, for this subject, is
already given as complete; and this means that the world is there as that on
which contemporary science has already done its work of exact determination'
15(Husserl,1973, pp.47-8) , To return to the original, to pure experience, would
be to strip the world of the idealizations with which it has been clothed by the
determinations of science. Only then, in Husserl’s view, could we hope to reach
the ’pure universal nature ' which for the concretely existing world of the natural
attitude 'signifies an abstraction' (ibid,, p,56), Bachelard notes that this is
'an abstraction in the sense that one must exclude all of the idealizations which
impregnate the concretely existing world. This is enough to indicate that an -
existentialism cannot legitimately avail itself of Husserl's return to the
16life-world'(Bachelard, 1968,pp.142-3)
The concretely existing, objective, world belongs to 'a higher level than 
that of primordial transcendency' (Husserl, 1970c, p.105). Husserl's Lebenswelt 
and Umwelt refer to this latter, the primordial realm of direct experience. They 
are not the concepts of any (positive) science and they play no part in the 
scientific investigation of the concretely existing world. They do,however, appeal’ 
in the philosophical investigation of the origins of the sciences (and therefore., 
of the 'concretely existing world*): that is, they appear in the tracing of the
b Lt
sciences back to their sources in antepredicative experience. Such an investigation, 
in Husserl's view, is neither an alternative to, nor a denial of, science. It is 
not, nor do its concepts belong- to, a sociology - of knowledge, of science, or 
of anything- else. In particular, then, these concepts can play no pai’t in a 
science which aims to 'see the world of social facts with an unbiased eye, to 
classify these facts under concepts in an honest and logical way, and to subject 
to exact analysis the material thus obtained' (PSW, p.4). If an existentialism 
cannot legitimately avail itself of Husserl's return to the life-world neitherj
can a sociology.
It is clear that the common-sense interpretations of everyday life, which 
playjsuch a crucial role in Schutz’s projected scientific models of human action, 
refer to experiences of the world ’npiisnxwkxskxHisdsxHxasxenssxhasxalxKKdy on 
which contemporary science has already done its work of exact determination1 and 
which, one might add, is infected by the idealizations with which it has been 
clothed by the inexact determinations of philosophies anti, ideologies and pseudo­
sciences. These common-sense interpretations do not, any more than scientific 
interpretations, refer to the original world of pure experience, the 'pure 
universal nature'. In Husserl’s philosophy common-sense interpretations have no 
claim whatever to any priority over the interpretations of the sciences.
17
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It is no surprise that Schutz’s psychologism lias its effects here in a 
confusion of ^ various worlds. In all of his writings, early or late, the 
‘original world of pure experience1 reappears as the/world of daily life”, as 
the'world of common-sense interpretations, or the'world of everyday 
life!
/ _
[This] world of daily life is the archetype of our experience of 
reality. All other provinces of meaning may be considered as its 
modifications^ |>, 233)
It reappears also as a specific sector of the social world; that is, as one 
sector among others.
j
[The] social world is by no means homogenous but exhibits a 
multiform structure. Each of its spheres or regions is both a way 
of perceiving and a way of understanding the subjective experi­
ences of others.' (hmJ ^,139)
These spheres or regions are: the realm of directly experienced social 
reality, or realm of consociates, (sostale Uiuwelt); the realm of contem­
poraries; the realm of predecessors; and the realm of successors. These 
realms are differentiated on the basis of our (common-sense) experience 
of them. Of the differences between social science and history, he writes 
of ‘the former being defined as the science of the world of contem­
poraries, and the latter as the science of the world of predecessors’. 
The world of contemporaries is ‘the sole object of the social sciences’.
Successors, as we have seen, and consociates are in a different position. 
Only in the realm of consociates, of face-to-face relationships, ‘can the 
partner look at the self of the fellow man as an unbroken totality in a 
vivid present. All other manifold social relations are derived from the 
original experiencing, of the totality of the other’s self in the com- 
munity of time and space.’ The We-relationship, or face-to-face relation­
ship, is a ‘basic structure of the world of daily life’. 2Zl)
Thus one and the same social world contains: the original world of 
pure experience (the world of consociates); the world of everyday life, 
of common-sense interpretations; and the world of social science 
(contemporaries) and of history (predecessors). This social world is 
neither the primordial world nor the concretely existing world whose 
transcendency belongs ‘to a level higher than that of promordial trans­
cendency’. (Husserl, 1970 Rather it is some union of the two
worlds: they are merely experienced differently in ordinary social life.
So, too, are the provinces of history and of social science experienced 
differently: that is why they are distinct provinces. However, the 
constructs with which we interpret both realms—the course-of-action 
types, motivations, systems of relevance, and the rest—are derived 
from the same originary experiencing of the other in the realm of 
consociates. This fact assures the unity of the social world,
^In a sense history can be regarded as one continuous We-relation- 
ship from the earliest days of mankind to the present, a rela­
tionship of variegated content and ever-changing partners. This 
view of history is no mere metaphysics, although a metaphysics 
could no doubt be derived from it. Unless one accepts such a 
view, there is no reason to regal'd the world of our predecessors 
as one continuous world and, in fact, no reason to assert the 
unity of the social world. Indeed, our interpretation is the only 
one that leaves room for subjective meaning in history. ( 
f. 2i4)
Thus the central core of the social world is forever opaque to object- 
tive knowledge. This central core provides the archetypes for both 
common-sense and scientific experience of reality. The continuity of 
the provinces of history and of social science is not assured by the 
system of concepts of these sciences, for they are quite distinct, but 
rather by an objectively opaque continuity within this central core. The 
continuous We-relationship thus serves, for Schutz, as the external 
condition of the possibility of history and of social science—and of the 
impossibility of social laws.
Schulz’s psychologising of the transcendental ego produces a sociolo- 
gising of ‘the universe of monads which effects its communion in 
various forms’. The sociology of this sociologised monadic sphere is 
heavily infected by a methodological individualism.
(tv) The subject of science
;Only a science clarified and justified transcendentally (in the 
phenomenological sense) can be an ultimate science; only a 
transcendentally'—phenomenologically clarified world can be an 
ultimately understood world; only a transcendental logic*^ can 
be an ultimate theory of science,'an ultimate, deepest, and most 
universal, theory of the principles and norms of all the sciences. 
(Husserl, 19 69^ px 6)
The positive sciences are not genuine or ultimate sciences. They are 
only one-sided sciences, ‘lost in the world’. (Husserl, ipyoC^/y?) Thus 
Husserl writes of ‘the blinders imposed by their method, as an inevitable 
consequence of the exclusive focusing of each [positive science] on its 
own particular province’, and of ‘the self-forgetfulness of the theorizer,
who, in his theoretical producing . . . knows nothing of the inwardness 
of that producing—who lives in producing, but does not have this 
productive living itself as a theme within his field of vision.’ (Husserl, ;
J4 ) The particular sciences, even the most theoretical of them, 
e.g. mathematics, are, for Husserl, only techniques, lacking insight 
into the ratio of [their] accomplished production’, {ibid^,2) They are 
theoretical techniques. , ’
^Thus modern science has abandoned the ideal of genuine science 
that was vitally operative in the sciences from the time of Plato; 
j and, in its practice, it has abandoned radicalness of scientific :
| self-responsibility, (/i/^,13-4)
This position does not involve Husserl in any disavowal of science or ^ ------------
denial of its accomplishments. On the contrary he was ‘quite in earnest ' 1
in adiiiring the great discoverers of classical and post-classical physics and 
their intellectual accomplishment,' which, far from being merely mechanical, was 
in fact astounding in the highest sense. This accomplishment is not at all 
disparaged by the above elucidation of it as ^TtechniqueJ '(Husserl, 1970a,
However, the scientist ‘knows nothing of the inwardness of [his] 1 ’ ;
producing’. The sense, or meaning, of a science, of scientific practice, ;
is not determined by the attitude of the scientist towards his work, the 
meaning it has for him. The subject of the science, the transcendental .
correlate of its knowledge, is neither the individual scientist nor the *
community of scientists—neither the technician nor the community of ;
technicians. The subject is transcendental intersubjectivity, the universe ! ,
of monads that precedes and bears every worldly Objectivity—-some­
times loosely referred to as humanity, or Western or European Man.
Pi* Ojxtef dvi. subject of Schutz’s science is the individual scientist, and only ‘
then, by extension, the community of scientists. The world of scientific 
theorizing is just one finite province of meaning amongst others. I
All these worlds—the world of dreams, of imageries and 
phantasms, especially the world of art, the world of religious 
experience, the world of scientific contemplation, the play world 
of the child, and world of the insane—are finite provinces of 
meaning, 232)
The world of scientific theorising is distinguished from other finite 
provinces of meaning—in particular, from the paramount reality, the
world of daily life—by ‘a specific tension of consciousness and ... a : '
specific epoche, a prevalent form of spontaneity, a specific form of self­
experience, a specific form of sociality, and a specific time perspective’
(ibid.) The shift from one finite province to another is prompted by the 
experience of ‘a specific shock which compels us to break through the 
limits of this ‘finite’ province of meaning and to shift the accent of 
reality to another one’. 231)
Thus the scientist shifts tire accent of reality from the world of daily 
life and adopts instead the role of dismterested observer. Ide ‘detaches
himself from his biographical situation within the social world’ and '
enters a ‘field of pre-organised knowledge, called the corpus of his |
science’, (ibid^j) This corpus he must accept in his scientific work or
else show cause why he does not. He thus operates with a stock of ’
knowledge that has ‘quite another structure than that which man in
everyday life has at hand’, (ibid^g)
The scientist, as scientist an:d not just another human being, has a 
specific attitude towards the world which he interprets with reference 
to a specific stock of knowledge at hand and to a specific problem which 
provides him with criteria of relevance. Given the problem, he is 
scientific if he has the appropriate attitude and uses the appropriate 
stock of knowledge. If not, not. The sense of a science, of scientific 
practice, is determined by the attitude of the scientist towards his work 
and by his conformity to the standards acknowledged by his colleagues.
This scientist is an actor like other actors and his scientific activity may
be studied by the social scientist in the same way as any other activity ;
may be studied—in terms of the relevant attitudes, values, norms, etc.
For Schutz, science, as a cultural objectification, is reducible to the '
most elementary forms of individual behaviour. Its meaning ‘is precisely
that which the individuals involved attach to their own acts’. (6) '
Thus Schutz’s social science is not founded or based upon a phenomeno­
logy. The ‘foundational’ role that phenomenology may play is precisely 
determined in advance by what is the true foundation of his thought: 
the unexamined basic project of reducing the world of objective mind
to the behaviour of individuals. This basic project defines a role for : ..............  .... ......
1 phenomenology which (Husserl’s) phenomenology is unable to play.
In consequence Schutz pi’oduces a theoretically eclectic and ultimately incoherent
conception of social science and history, a more or less complex psychologistic
perversion of transcendental phenomenology which gives an appearance 
of ‘radically’ to Schutz’s idealist individualism. In the ‘phenomenology 
of the social, world’ thus generated the correlative realms of the trans­
cendental and the transcendent interpenetrate. In the cases of the actor 
and of the world in which he acts there is a sector which is accessible to 
knowledge and another sector which is not. The latter functions both 
as the primordial basis of the social world and as the forever hidden 
depths within it. These depths, in so far as they can be reached at all, 
are the province of philosophy. Scientific knowledge of the social world, 
and of the actor within it, is forever condemned to scratching around on : 
the surface.
111. The Soda! Scientist as Puppet Master
The social scientist observes certain facts and events within social 
reality or, perhaps, he takes an interest in a certain type of situation. He 
then proceeds to set up models of puppet actors which he endows with
a consciousoess ‘restricted so as to contain nothing but the elements 
relevant to the perlorming of the course-of-action patterns observed’. 
(1962^64) He thus brings together, in his (real) model of (imaginary) 
actors, circumstances, or situations on the one hand and puppets 
endowed with meanings, sets of motives, relevances, ,and so on, on the 
other. The social scientist has selected the appropriate set of meanings 
for his puppet-actors when these meanings can reproduce the behaviour 
observed in.the situation. This account raises two issues in particular: 
the relation between the situation and the meanings of the actor who is 
in it; the problem of accounting for the situation. Examination of tills 
latter issue will lead on to a discussion of the time structure of Schutz’s 
social world.
(z) Meanings and situations
If the actor acts in terms of meanings, of his definition of the situation, 
these meanings are never, &s far as the social scientist is concerned, 
directly observable. Yet the scientist must refer to these meanings in 
order to account for the actions which he observes. The scientist observes 
things, actions, events to which he assigns objective meanings. The 
actors who populate the world he observes assign meanings to these 
also. In particular they assign ‘subjective’ meanings to their own acts.
Do these ‘subjective’ meanings belong to the ‘concretely existing 
world’? Are they properties of objects in that world which just happen 
not to be observable? Are they non-observable properties of actors? A 
positive answer to such questions leads directly to Lazarsfeld’s problem 
discussed in the first part of this paper; the problem of ‘how precisely 
inferences from concrete observations to underlying concepts are to be 
made’. (Lazarsfeld 1954^345)
If the problem of subjective meaning is of this kind then it must be 
answered, in general terms if not in precise details, in the way that 
Lazarsfeld answers it. We expose actors to well-defined stimuli in well- 
defined situations and carefully observe their reactions. In this way it is 
possible to establish precise relationships between stimuli and reactions; 
and, more generally, between situations and actors’ reactions to them. 
There is no difficulty, in principle, in investigating the way an actor’s 
biographical situation affects such relationships. There is no reason why 
such relationships should not allow for the ‘unpredictability’ of indivi­
dual behaviour. They may, in the standard statistical terminology, be 
probabalistie or deterministic in form.
■ It Is easy to see that such an interpretation of the problem of subjective 
meaning leads to a formulation in which subjective meaning, the actor’s 
interpretation, or what have you, functions as a mere intervening 
variable relating a more or less complex set of observable stimuli to an 
equally observable response.
Such, at least, is how a sociological empiricism must respond to any
talk of subjective interpretation, of verstehen, of the actors’ definition of 
the situation. That is how, for example, Lazarsfeld interprets Weber 
and how Kuhn or Bales interpret Meadf^' No longer is there any 
imperative to refer back to subjective meaning or ‘to the activities of 
the subjects within the social world and their interpretation by the 
actors’, (C-d,^ 35) On the contrary reference to subjective meaning is, 
at most, a theoretical convenience.
In general, it might seem that if subjective meanings affect action in 
the ‘concretely existing world’ it must be because they belong to that 
world and can therefore be studied and located within a network of 
relationships in much the same way as anything else. If they cannot be 
studied, they do not belong to the concretely existing world and can 
play no part in the explanation of anything that happens within that 
world. If the social scientist ‘always can and for certain purposes must— '
refer to the activities of the subjects within the social world and their ’
! interpretation by the actors’ (ibid.) then these interpretations are simply
facts, difficult perhaps to establish, but nonetheless facts among other j
facts. ;
It is clear that, for Schutz, subjective meanings are not simply facts !
cj_ .among other facts; that they do not just belong to the ‘concretely !
. cxisting world11 the same way as other facts, events or situations do. j
, ’ As far as the social world is concerned they are determining but not
determined, in it but not of it in the way that all other things are.
* . . .He who lives in the social world is a free being: his acts proceed 
, from spontaneous activity. Once the action has transpired, once
i it is over and done with, it has become an act and is no longer
1 1 free but closed and determinate in character. Nevertheless it
was free at the time the action took place; and if the question 
1 concerning the intended meaning refers, as it does in Weber’s
case, to the point in time before the completion of the act, then 
the answers must be that thmactor always acts freely, and this 
is true even though I am able to know him only indirectly and 
in Ideal-Typical fashion. On the other hand, the personal 
; Ideal Type that is correctly constructed, that is, one that is
nontype-transcendent, is essentially unfree'(p^^277)
The actor on the social scene, unlike the puppet-actor in the social 
scientist’s model, is essentially free and unknowable. What the social .
scientist, or indeed any social observer studies, ‘is only a conceptual 
model, not a real person’, (ibid^z^z) The realm of directly experienced
; social reality, the scientifically unknowable central core of the social ..........
world, is the source of the undetermined-determining subjective 
meanings, the home of human ‘freedom’. It is the special character of
his social world, combining the 'concretely existing world’ of phenomena and the 
primordial, pre-phenomenal, pre-predicative world in a single structure, that 
enables Schutz to maintain the privileged status of the concept of subjective 
meaning. It is the
conflation of the transcendent and its transcendental correlate that gives 
human freedom its central place in his social science.
This freedom produces the essentially problematic character of the 
relation between situation and actor’s interpretation, Schutz’s actor is 
not only ‘unpredictable’, he is essentially free and creative. In this 
respect Schutz’s actor shares many of the characteristics of Mead’s self 
and generates much the same kind of social science:
^Insofar as sociologists . . . are concerned with the behaviour of 
acting units, the position of symbolic interaction requires [him] 
to catch the process of interpretation through which they 
construct their actions. This process is not to be caught merely 
by turning to conditions which are antecedent to the process.
.. . Nor can one catch the process merely by inferring its nature 
from the overt action which is its product' (Blumer, 196^ p, 145)
In its insistence on the need to refer back to the subjective meaning 
of the actor, on the essential incompleteness of the merely ‘objective’ 
meaning of an act, Schutz’s account of social science is an affirmation of 
a particular notion of human freedom. Schutz’s social science resembles 
Duhem’s conventionalist astronomy: a saving of the phenomena, a 
science ad majoram gforiam dei. (Duhem, 1969) Where one science
speculates in the name of an omnipotent and creative deity the other speculates 
in the name of a lesser but essentially similar creature: the sensible-supersensible
free individual subject. It was shown in section II above that this 
subject was anathema to Husserl: it is precisely such beings that his 
transcendental phenomenology sought to abolish.
(zY) Accounting for the situation
The social scientist puts his puppets into situations characterised by, 
amongst other things, various more or less ‘institutionalised patterns of 
behaviour’. The puppets themselves are endowed with relevant values, 
motives, interests and appropriate ‘stocks of knowledge at hand’ which 
form the basis of their interpretation of the world. ‘All interpretation of 
this world is based 011 a stock of previous experiences of it, our own or 
those handed down to us by parents or teachers’.
Thus, if he is to proceed at all along the lines laid down by Schutz, 
he must select situations, stocks of knowledge at hand, institutionalised 
patterns of behaviour^ and much more. It is clear that some situations, 
institutionalised patterns of behaviour, stocks of knovdedge at hand, will 
be of more interest to social scientists than others. Of particular interest, 
for example, would be those situations which the social scientist has 
observed within social, reality, or which, for some reason, he feels are 
likely to appear there. How is he to account for those situations? What 
grounds could he have for asserting that certain types of situation seem 
likely to arise? Or tliat others, equally possible in the free play of his 
imagination, will not appear within social reality? Similar problems arise
in the case of other notions. Why has precisely this stock of knowledge 
been handed down by parents or teachers? Why have those previous 
experiences been lost? And so on.
Consider the case of a puppet banker and part-time philosopher—we 
might call it Alfred Schutfz—forced by the coming Nazi occupation to 
. leave Austria. He stays in France for a while and finally emigrates to the 
United States, arriving there in July, 1939. Having observed these facts 
and events within social reality, how does the social scientist proceed? 
Fie constructs a model of the situation in which the banker finds himself. 
He endows the banker with a fictitious consciousness containing values, 
motives, sets of relevances and a stock of knowledge at hand. This 
fictitious consciousness notes certain changes in the situation, interprets 
them in terms of the given set of relevances, and tells the puppet that 
he ought to be going. He goes. Other puppets, with different, but equally 
fictitious consciousnesses, stay behind.
The social scientist proceeds by filling out such a sketch. Given the 
situation and the observed facts and events the social scientist has dealt 
with this problem as soon as he has discovered fictitious consciousnesses 
to fit the actions of his puppets. Given the fascism and the facts that 
some actors on the social scene get out while they can and that others do 
not the social scientist constructs consciousnesses to fit these actions.
But where does the fascism come from? How did this situation, which 
would have seemed so unlikety to our banker a few years earlier, come 
about? Those are questions which do not arise in the fictitious conscious­
ness of the puppet social scientist that Schutz describes.
It is no accident that his account fails to provide for the posing of 
such problems. Certainly a glance at his work might suggest that his 
main interests lay in a social psychology: in particular his essa3rs on ‘The 
Stranger’, ‘The Homecomer’, ‘Making Music Together5, ‘The Well 
Informed Citizen’, (all in .CjU * or parts of his Reflections o?i the 
Problem of Relevance (1970). Such an interpretation leaves open the 
possibility that Schutz has provided the foundations for a social psy­
chology; and either that other aspects of the social sciences could be 
built upon these same foundations, or that this social psychology is to 
be practised in situations provided, so to speak, by some other science. 
In the latter case the puppet master survives as a humble Punch-and- 
Judy man playing on a pier provided by the corporation, who perhaps 
provide his stall also, but nonetheless endowing Iris Mr. Punch with 
motives, goals, and all the rest, and relating him in interaction patterns 
to Judy, the policeman, and so on.
Schutz leaves no room for such interpretations. There is no possibility 
of any over-arching macro-discipline providing the situations in which 
the Punch-and-Judy man performs. Such a discipline would concern 
itself with various structural and historical features of the world. 
However, the conditions which assure the validity of the procedures 
adopted by the puppet social scientist render' such a macro-discipline
utterly meaningless. These conditions concern the structure of the 
social world and, in particular, the distinction between social science 
and history.
The structure of the social world has been discussed in section II {in) 
above. History and social science are two quite distinct provinces of 
meaning. These provinces that is, the realms of pi'edecessors and of 
considered in the context of scientific knowledge—are 
related in two ways. One is that the constructs with which we interpret 
both realms are derived from the same originary experiencing of the 
other in the realm of consociates. In other words, the course-of-action 
types, motivations, systems of relevance and the rest, which we use in 
interpreting the realm of contemporaries and the realm of predecessors 
are all derived from the same intersubjective, directly experienced, 
primordial reality—apart, of course, from the constructs derived from 
the stock of knowledge that has been handed down to us. This stock of 
knowledge in turn can be traced back to its origins in the same primor­
dial reality. Ideal types based on these constructs enable us to establish 
purely external relations of similarity and difference between the two 
provinces.
*1 he other relation is one that exists between any two finite provinces.
The finite provinces of meaning are not separated states of the 
mental life in the sense that passing from one to another would 
require a transmigration of the soul and a complete extinction 
of memory and consciousness by death, as the doctrine of 
wfiWpEijdifisis ■ assumes. They are merely names for different 
tensions of one and the same consciousness . . . experiences in 
various provinces can be remembered and reproduced. And that 
is why they can be communicated in ordinary language^ (TC ?£ 
pp. 257-8) 7
Thus relationships between the provinces of history and of social 
science exist only in the consciousness of the knowing subject—or in 
books or papers that he may have written. Such relations are external to 
their objects: there is no possibility of referring one province to another 
by introducing a formula of transformation’, {ibid^z) The ‘continuity’ 
of the social world (which ensures the possibility of history and of 
social science) is established in the realm of ‘directly experienced social 
reality , the lived world’, which is not available for scientific scrutiny 
but is pre-predicative, pre-scientific. History and social science are 
forever set apart. There is no possibility of an overall science \of history', 
which covers both the past and the present. In the absence' of such a 
science the problem of the emergence of some present situation out of 
the past, say, the presence of fascism in Europe, cannot arise as a 
problem amenable to scientific study. The social scientist, then, when 
he puts his puppets into some situation or other, must take the situation 
as already given or as something dreamed up by himself.
(ui) The time structure of the social world
While the realms of predecessors and of contemporaries are quite 
distinct the line dividing the two is rather fluid. Some people were once 
contemporaries. ‘[I] remember that I was around at the time, that I was 
on the scene having my experiences as my partner was having his.’ 
(llib!; f.20?) In such memories the sense of the simultaneity of the 
experiences of the partners is preserved. Such memories overlay the 
boundary between the world of contemporaries and the pure world of 
predecessors which existed before I was born. ‘Simply by looking at 
them in a different light’ {ibid) I can interpret these memories as 
belonging to the world of my predecessors.
Thus the stream of histoiy appears as a continuous manifold of present 
moments, each, one blurred a little at the edges and flowing into the 
succeeding present moment. In this respect the stream of history is 
similar ‘to our own stream of consciousness. But in another respect the 
two are different, for history takes place in objective time, whereas 
consciousness takes place within the inner duration-flow of the indivi­
dual. The stream of history includes anonymous events, it knows 
coexistence and fixed loci in time’. (^^^,213) In the flow of this 
objective time consociates and contemporaries become predecessors, 
successors become consociates and contemporaries.
Each moment in objective time has its own social science and its own 
history. That social science is the science of the present moment viewed 
from the standpoint of the detached social observer. That history is the 
science of what precedes the present moment. As one moment flows 
into the next history gains the territory that social science loses. As the 
moment changes so dq its sciences.
Each moment has its full complement of individual actors. As each 
moment flows into the next some actors drop out, others drop in. The 
remaining actors act. The product of this dropping in and out and of 
tiffs acting is the next moment, in the course of which more dropping in 
and out and acting takes place. The acting, but not necessarily the 
dropping in and out, is free and undeternffned. After the event, to the 
future historian, it appears unfree and determined. Such is the march 
of histoiy: from one simultaneous product of the actions of a multipli­
city of free individuals to another.
Given any fact or event within social reality the historian may trace 
a sequence of acts or events of which the.fact in question may be said to 
be the result. At each step of this sequence he must single out a few of 
the multiplicity of preceding acts for attention. The present moment 
and all that it contains is the product of every one of the acts performed 
in the preceding moment. From the infinite multiplicity of paths 
leading backwards from the fact in question the historian creates his 
‘history’ by singling out a few for special attention and relegating the 
rest to a more or less amorphous background.
The main task of the science of history is to decide which events 
acts, signs, and so on of all those found in the past are to be 
smgled out for interpretation and systematised into somethin? 
called history, (jbid ^zi i) 6
The ‘history’ of a given historian, or the ‘social science’ of a mVen 
social scientist, depends on the present moment in which he finds him­
self and on his attitude towards the time which is the object of his 
scrutiny. J
/
Just as the individual interprets his past experiences in different 
ways at different times, so the historian interprets past ages now 
in this way and now in that, looking at them from his own 
expenence of the social world. This means that in the process 
of interpretation he will always be constructing new ideal types 
o both persons and actions, all in order to understand precisely 
the same facts, {ibid z 212)
History and social science are determinations of the present moment 
As the moment changes so do its ‘histories’ and its ‘social sciences’. But 
this docs not mean that all of their categories are historical. The schemes 
we use to interpret the world of our predecessors are based on the 
characteristics of human experience in general: on ‘the essence of human 
expenence as such, something that necessarily transcends not only our 
own directiy experienced and contemporary social worlds but the whole 
cmhsation of our times as well’, (ibid^zio) The supertemporal character 
of such categories is guaranteed by the view of history ‘as one continuous 
We-relationship from the earliest days of mankind to the present ’ 
\tbidg2i^) r • • • .
Such supertemporal categories apart the historian is free to interpret 
the past now m this way and now in that’. Just as he singles out certain 
acts or actors for special attention so he organises the multiplicity of 
simultaneous background facts and events into a pattern. This pattern 
is the situation’ which his puppet actors have to meet. Just as the 
choice of actor is determined by the historians’ interests or relevancies 
so is the structure of the situation in which the actorhas to play his part!
The present moment lias no intrinsic structure/* It contains indivi­
duals endowed with consciousnesses but the content of these conscious­
nesses comes into play only after the social scientist has picked his facts 
and events and has sorted out the actors who are going to generate these 
facts and the situation m which they are going to do it. He makes these 
selections on the basis of the interests and relevances that he happens to 
have at the time. 11
The movement of lustory is the movement from one intrinsically 
structureless moment to another. The facts and events that lie scattered 
across the face of tins history are connected to each other by an infinite 
multiplicity of temporal sequences. The historian and the social scientist
make patterns out of these. There is no social structure and no structure 
of history beyond those determined by the interests of some social 
scientist or historian or other. In particular Schutz’s ‘phenomenological’ 
sociology and history are the only social sciences: they are not dependent 
upon some other structural science. The effect of Schutz’s humanism is 
a speculative empiricism of the surface phenomena of social formations 
in which social structures and historical events are reduced to givens 
which govern but do not appear in the analysis.
There can be no Schutzian politics and indeed no rational social 
action of any kind. The ‘knowledge’ of the social world upon which such 
action might be based consists merely of one set of stories about the 
world among a multitude of others. The fascism in Europe was nothing 
but a pattern that some storyteller or other happened to have made up 
about some facts and events that he happened to be interested in. Why 
then did our puppet banker/philosopher flee to America?
Concluding Remarks
From the many puppets with which Alfred Schutz populates his models 
this essay has been particularly concerned with the two puppet puppet- 
masters: the social scientist and the historian. They are both story­
tellers making sense of the mass of facts and events that lie before them. 
This mass is already given as organised into layer upon layer of present 
moments with a multiplicity of temporal sequences running from one 
layer to another. The social scientist is concerned with the top layer of 
the mass, the historian deals with the rest. Both work with a set of 
superlemporal categories, which have been uncovered in the course 
of a ‘laborious philosophical journey, for the meaning structure of the 
social world can only be deduced from the most primitive and general 
characteristics of consciousness’. {pSk/^,12) They flit around applying 
the categories provided by the nice philosopher to their plasticene figures 
until they are able to reproduce the behaviour observed in the situations 
they happen to be interested in.
Their stories are constructed in such a way that each act ‘would be 
understandable to the actor himself as well as to Ins fellow men in terms 
of common-sense interpretations of everyday life’. (£^,5,64) The story 
teller, in other words, must use categories and situations that are already 
familiar to his audience. His stories must appear plausible?^'Schutz’s 
preferred audience is given by the everyday world of his essays and the 
the categories used in its description. This audience is drawn from the 
cultured middle classes of Western Europe and North America, sensi­
tive academics and professional men. They are staid and rather con­
servative, rational economic men. Their story-book world is governed by 
the hidden hand of the margin.
That such an audience can recognise themselves in some of Schutz’s
accounts, and are familiar with the characters appearing in others is 
hardly sufficient to ensure the scientific status of his social science or his 
history. If some of Schutz’s followers in sociology use the ‘common- 
sense’ categories of a somewhat more radical audience that in no way 
alters the general character or the scientific status of their stories.
In both cases social science and history are subordinated to the 
interests of a more general concern: that of reducing ‘tire world of 
objective mind’ to the actions of individuals. These individuals are the 
true, and indeed only, subjects of history. Schutz’s social science is no 
science. It is a complex product of his humanism, a theoretical ideology 
affirming in its ‘results’ its own necessary and unquestioned premise: 
that ‘the world of objective mind’ can be reduced to the behaviour of 
individuals. The cost of this humanism is a social world in which there 
are no social or historical laws; in which there is no possibility of 
rational political action. Far from posing the problems of the social 
sciences, Schutz was concerned with a rather different issue: that of 
subordinating these sciences to his conceptions of man. His answers 
show the social scientist his place and his procedural injunctions would 
keep him in it.
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3^. Husserl : transcondental phenomenology and the problem of the hist cry of ph 11 os o ph y 
and the sciences.
Introduction
In his uncompleted last book, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
1Phenomenology , and particularly in its second part, Clarification of the Modern 
Opposition between Physicalistic Objectivism and Transcendental Subjectivism', Husserl 
discusses the birth of scientific physics in Galileo's 'mathematisation of nature' 
and the theoretical effects in philosophy induced by this transformation of the field
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of objective knowledge. In this text and to a certain extent elsewhere Husserl 
develops the elements of a theoretical history of philosophy and of the sciences.
The object of the present chapter is to demonstrate the contradictory structure of the 
history attempted in this text and to show that its contradictions are inescapable 
effects of its fundamental concepts.
Husserl's Crisis and several other texts of his later years have been subjected
to humanist reading's and have been interpreted as evidence ^of a move towards existent-
3
ialism in his later philosophy . In fact, as will shortly become clear, all such 
interpretations are the product of gross and vulgar misrepresentations of what is, in 
reality, a profoundly antihumanist position, I have shown in chapter 2 that, far from 
being based on the work of Husserl, Alfred Schutz's alleged phenomenology perpetrates 
a specific humanist and psychologistic distortion of Husserl's philosophy. The 
subsequent critique of the theoretical effects of Schutz's position with regard to thca 
history and the social sciences was therefore directed not against the phenomenology
t
of Husserl bu^ only against certain of its grosser misrepresentations. Thus that 
chapter might seem to leave open the possibility of a sociology and, more generally, 
of a science of history based on the rigorous transcendental phenomenology of Husserl.
I argue that no such possibility exists, that no sociology or history based on the 
phenomenology of Husserl can be scientific and that a transcendental empiricism cannot 
escape the theoretical constraints of the empiricist conception of the knowledge process
n
v_y(
This chapter may be summarised as follows. It is concerned to analyse the
theory of the nature and history of the sciences and of philosophy which governs 
the argument of Husserl's The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology, It will be argued that Husserl's position is structured around a 
central and inescapable contradiction between his theoretical objective on the 
one hand and the terms in which that objective is to be realised on the other.
His objective is to demonstrate the possibility of a rational non-subjectivist 
history of the sciences and of philosophy and to present at least the outlines of 
such a history ivk with respect to the birth of a scientific physics in the seventeenth 
century and the theoretical effects of that birth in philosophy. This attempted 
demonstration is governed by the problematic of a theory of knowledge which retains 
the essential structure of empiricism, in this case, of a transcendental empiricism. 
That structure is discussed immediatly after this Introduction,
/ i;
The effect of this contradiction between Husserl’s problematic and 
what he attempts to achieve within it is to produce a discourse structured 
by a series of ‘discrepancies’ between its elements and by the presence 
of a denegatory play on words, a theoretical ‘slide’. These last function 
so as to cover or gloss over the discrepancies or else to link the dis­
crepant elements. The crucial discrepancies that may be identified in 
Husserl’s text are indicated below.
First Discrepancy, Husserl maintains that Galileo’s physics is grounded 
in a meaning which is taken for granted by Galileo and which he fails 
to recognise. Galileo’s endowment of meaning upon his physics refers 
back to an earlier original endowment of the meaning of pure geometry. 
Thus the origin of pure geometry is thought as an original act of 
endowment of meaning taking place within the consciousness of a 
subject. Yet Husserl’s analysis of the origins of pure geometry shows 
that its meaning cannot be located within the consciousness of an 
epistemological subject but that, on the contrary, it is the effect of a 
determinate system of concepts and theoretical instruments. There are 
thus two quite distinct concepts of ‘meaning’ at work in this portion 
of the text. Husserl’s play on the word ‘meaning’ denegates this dif­
ference and functions so as to gloss over the discrepancy between the 
grounding of Galileo’s physics in a presupposed meaning and the 
absence of any original embodied meaning in the pure geometry which 
this physics presupposes.
Second Discrepancy. The meaning assigned by Husserl’s text to 
Galileo’s natural science is of a character entirely different from that 
assigned earlier to pure geometry. The latter ‘meaning’ is embedded 
within the system of concepts and intruments of the science; it does not 
refer to the consciousness of any transcendental ego. The ‘meaning’ of 
natural science on the other hand functions as a very different concept. 
It refers to the consciousness of a specific subject, Galileo. Hence there 
are two quite distinct epistemologies. In one knowledge is conceived 
as the result of a process of production governed by a determinate 
system of concepts. In the other it is an effect of the practice of a 
unique type of subject confronted by a real world which he maps with 
the aid of mathematical instrumentalities.
Third Discrepa?icy. In the analysis of Galileo’s mathematisation of the 
world the scientist is conceived as working on a real given externally to 
him—so that the idealities of, for example, pure geometry are said to 
reflect the essential form of the world that is immediately given to the 
knowing subject. In contrast Husserl’s conception of the essential mean­
ing of philosophy as consisting in the suppression of all forms of 
objectivism involves a subjectivisation of the world as an accomplish­
ment of world-constituting subjectivity. Here the opposition of subject
and object is superseded since both are now throught to be contained 
entirely within consciousness. Hence there is a discrepancy between 
his conceptions of science and of philosophy. The unconditional objec­
tivity of scientific idealities that is an essential feature of the one is 
unthinkable in the other. Ultimately, philosophy is seen as representing 
a process without a subject, as the self-consciousness of a world- 
constituting subjectivity, that is, of a world that is essentially spiritual.
These discrepancies are essential to the theoretical structure of 
Husserlian epistemology. It follows that an Husserlian epistemology is 
impossible without these discrepancies and impossible as an epistemo­
logy because of them. The objective of the present cK-tpltf is thus to 
show that no Husserlian theory of knowledge is possible unless these 
contradictions are also present. As a consequence of this demonstration 
it must follow that there can be no ‘positive1 knowledges that are 
realisations of Husserl’s theory of knowledge, that is, no Husserlian 
anti-psychology, no Husserlian histories (of the sciences, of philosophy, 
etc.), and no Husserlian sociology or science of history. This -chapter 
therefore closes the gap left by my .difcu&io'n ^ <AMv 
which might appear not to have eliminated either the possibility that 
Schute’s sub-Husserlian position was inadequate because it invited a 
rigorous Husserlian critique or the possibility of a Husserlian social 
phenomenology. The effect of the present cTapT is to forestall any 
possible attempts at an Husserlian social theory.
The theoretical collapse of even the most rigorous transcendental 
epistemology is an inescapable effect of the essential structure of the 
empiricist conception of knowledge. No theoretical empiricism can 
avoid the contradictions that are the necessary result of this structure.
At best those specific to one variant of empiricism ma)^ be displaced 
into the somewhat different contradictions specific to another. Before 
proceeding to establish these results in the analysis of Husserl’s text 
it is necessary to situate his transcendental philosophy in relation to 
other variants of the empiricist conception of knowledge.
Transcendental variants of the empiricist problematic
In the empiricist conception of the knowledge process as one that 
takes place between a given subject and a given object the result of 
this process is that the subject extracts from the object its essence. This 
essence is then called knowledge and its structure is thought to represent 
that of the object known. Here the subject is conceived as preceding 
any knowledge process in which it may happen to engage. If the 
process of knowledge takes place under appropriate conditions it 
results in scientific, or objective, knowledge, but if not the result is 
either a knowledge of some other kind (i.e. not objective, not scientific) 
or else it is not really a knowledge at all but a non-knowledge parading
Ill the guise of knowledge.4 If in these conceptions the subject of the 
knowledge process is also conceived as a possible object of knowledge 
then certain interesting and curious consequences follow. Knowledge 
In general, and scientific knowledge in particular, appears to be an 
effect of the conditions of the knowledge process and to be the product 
of whatever governs the habits of thought and modes of perception of 
the subject in question. In this way the theory of knowledge may be 
conceived as belonging properly to the province of whatever natural 
science is thought to investigate the functioning of the thinking ap­
paratus. It follows that scientific knowledge must now appear to be 
subjected to natural determinations that are independent of the parti­
cular structure of the object known. This latter structure, therefore, 
can no longer be represented in knowledge in undistorted form and 
scientific knowledge cannot be considered objective in any worthwhile 
empiricist sense.
In the history of western philosophy the recognition of this con­
sequence has provoked responses ranging from acceptance to various 
attempts at escape. The extreme of bland acceptance is represented by 
the varieties of subjective idealism, a tendency which reaches its highest 
development in the works of Hume and Berkeley, a systematic and 
reactionary anti-rationalism culminating in the doctrine that reason 
and objective knowledge are fictions. Social phenomenology and 
cthnomethodology are more recent examples of a similar tendency. 
Others, while recognising the effects of social and psychological 
influences, have appealed to the norms and conventions of the scientific 
community to save us from the dreaded relativism and subjectivism. 
The work of Popper and his associates and of logical empiricism 
represent two somewhat different attempts of this kind. All such 
attempts are doomed to failure. At most <ps)rchological> influences and 
problems may be replaced by ‘sociological’ ones, psychology by the 
sociology of knowledge. Scientific knowledge is then reduced to an 
effect of whatever produces the norms and conventions of the scientific 
community. In. recent years Kuhn and those who follow him in sociology 
and philosophy have gone furthest in this direction.
More interesting and at first sight perhaps more successful is the 
response of transcendental philosophy in Kant and the neo-Kantians 
and later in a very different form in the transcendental phenomenology 
of Husserl. B}r representing the epistemological subject and certain of 
its properties as the condition of existence of phenomena, that is, by 
specifically excluding the I^ubj^f ti^s^ndentaTj from the\ realm of 
objects of knowledge ^ _ Kd.vv^\ .. epistemology
appears to guarantee the relative autonomy of knowledge with regard 
to any determination by natural, that is, material, causes. The anti­
naturalism of these positions ensures that the conditions of knowledge 
are not subjected to psychological, biological or other natural deter­
minations. In thus establishing the relative autonomy of the sciences
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If the transcendental subject is not to be a phenomenal object it must follow 
that the activities of subjects in the world, producing knowledge, making choices, 
and the like, cannot be susceptible to naturalistic explanation. If the phenomenal 
effects of these activities are to be treated as phenomena in nature and therefore 
as susceptible to naturalistic explanation then, by definition, such explanation 
cannot proceed by reference to the transcendental attributes of free human subjects 
since|these are transcendent objects. Naturalistic explanation is restricted to 
the phenomenal, sensible realm of nature while supersensible, transcendent objects 
are beyond both knowledge and explanation,
I.
'Nov/ where determination according to laws of nature ceases there all 
explanation ceases also, and nothing remains but defense, that is, the 
removal of the objections of those who pretend to have seen deeper into 
the nature of things, and thereupon boldly declare freedom impossible.'
(Kant, 1949,p.76)
Since loiowledge, qua knowledge, is a function of the operation of transcendental
faculties it cannot be treated as an object in nature. Similar arguments apply to other
cultural products in so far as they are conceived as dependent on the operation of
transcendental faculties of free human subjects, for example, as products of aesthetic
and ethical conceptions. In this way transcendental epistemology appears to leave
5the field of history, or at least of cultural history , prey to the theoretical 
ravages of all kinds of humanism, free will, mysticism, and other irrationalist 
tendencies. In effect the very, possibility of an objective knowledge of history 
has to be denied in the name of the free creative human subject. The pernicious 
theoretical effects of this dogmatic imposition of limitations to knowledge with 
respect to history and the social sciences are only too well known. They may be 
seen in the various subjectivist, irrationalist and romantic positions elaborated 
by the Geisteswissenschaften traditions of German philosophy and historiography, in 
particular, in the idealist distinction between the 'natural' and the 'human', that is, 
non-natural, sciences, and in the doctrine of a special hermeneutic method peculiar
to the latter, a doctrine in which rationalist forms of proof and demonstration
. are systematically denegated in favour of the mysterious 
faculty of the understanding.^ Positions of this kind have found their 
way into sociology through the works of Weber, Dilthey, Scheler, and 
of their later followers and interpreters.
The human subjectivity whose will, freedom, choice, and related 
humanistic appendages are defended by hermeneutics at so great a 
theoretical cost is anathema to the rigorous idealism of Husserl. In 
fact it is easy to see that the hermeneutic division between the natural 
and the human sciences merely reproduces in a specific romantic and 
irrationalist form the essential structures of the old ‘naturalistic* 
accounts of knowledge. Where a naturalistic empiricism reduces 
objectivity to a fiction in the name of natural causes a hermeneutic 
empiricism calls in unnatural, that is, human, causes to achieve the 
same result. The arbitrary assignment of various human characteristics 
to the epistemological subject of the empiricist process of knowledge 
reduces the theory of knowledge to a hermeneutic psychology, history 
or sociology. If these consequences are to be avoided within the con­
straints of an empiricist conception of the knowledge process a more 
rigorous and systematic transcendentalism is required in which all 
qualities, natural or human, are ejected from the epistemological 
subject. The transcendental phenomenology of Husserl attempts 
precisely this displacement of all that is human into the realm of 
positivity so that neither the natural nor anything human is to be 
arbitrarily excluded from the possibility of a rigorous and objective 
knowledge^ Thus in the transcendental subject of the knowledge 
process
‘nothing human is to be found, neither soul nor psychic life nor 
real psycho-physical human beings, all this belongs to the 
‘phenomenon’, to the world as constituted pole. (p. 183)
It will be argued below that this project is unrealisable and that in 
liberating the theory of knowledge from the fetters of theoretical 
humanism Husserl’s empiricism can only reproduce in more rigorous, 
and therefore more acute, form the difficulties of the earlier, incomplete 
transcendentalism of Kant and the neo-Kantians, in particular, the 
problems resulting from the double status of the subject (epistemological 
and human/natural) and from the contradictory status of knowledge. 
The theory of the knowledge process and, in particular, of the history 
of the sciences and of philosophy consequently remains the site of 
acute contradictions. If the knowledge process of transcendental 
subjectivity is to be the object of investigation then that investigation 
itself requires reference to a higher subjectivity. Since the existence 
of its object requires that of a non-objectifiable subject-correlate of 
knowledge the transcendental movement can only be repeated. Indeed 
it is clear that this movement must be repeated indefinitely if it is not
to be brought to an entirely arbitrary halt. Cavailles has insisted on 
this crucial point in his critique of Husserl’s analysis of logic. If there 
is to be an absolute logic, if transcendental subjectivity is to be governed 
by the norms of logic in its argumentation, then
;a new transcendental investigation is necessary in order to relate 
its norms to a higher subjectivity, since no content but, rather, 
only consciousness has the authority to be posited in itself. If 
transcendental logic truly grounds logic, there is no absolute 
logic (i.e. logic subjecting the absolute subjective activity to its 
norms). If there is an absolute logic, it can draw its authority 
only from itself; it is not transcendental. (Cavailles, 1947^65)
In Husserl the empiricist theory of the knowledge process reaches 
its highest point of rigour and of theoretical honesty. It is this that 
gives his work its exceptional interest. If in his attempts to rescue the 
theory of knowledge from the ravages of a romantic and irrationalist 
humanism Husserl nevertheless produces a contradictory history of 
the sciences that finally collapses into a speculative philosophy of 
history then this collapse has an exemplary character with respect to 
the essential structures of the empiricist conception of knowledge. In 
its very rigour and purity it exemplifies the inherently contradictory 
character of empiricism, a theory of knowledge perpetually tom 
between the extremes of speculation on the one hand and of irration­
alism and subjectivism on the other.
This chapter analj^ses certain texts in which Husserl discusses questions
concerning the history of the sciences and of philosophy. It is concerned with 
his concepts and with the logical character of their relationships and it argues 
that Husserl's position involves fundamental and inescapable logical discrepancies 
and contradictions. It should perhaps be emphasised that this analysis is in no 
wayjconcerned to elicit the views of the subject, Husserl, on these histories or 
on the supposed crisis of philosophy and contemporary science. To search the text 
for the view of its author is to impose a preconceived and possibly spurious coherence
son to the structure of its argument . It cannot be maintained that the order of, 
and relations between, the concepts of a text is a mere expression of the consciousness 
of its author, nor can it be maintained that this consciousness is, perhaps, more 
accurately represented in some portions of the text and less accurately in others 
so that, by judicious selection, it might prove possible to isolate what he 'really' 
thought. The theoretical structure of a text is a matter of the logical properties
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which obtain between its concepts and not of some ghostly emanations originating,
say, from the pineal gland or cerebral cortex of its authors body. An exposition
of the views of an author has the effect of denegating the specificity of the
theoretical structure of his text. It identifies various manifest statements as
the views of its author, thereby separating these statements from y the theoretical
conditions of their appearance. That is, it denegates the specific theoretical
character of the text, ti-ansforms it into an untheoretical discourse, and allows
10the reader to deal with specific identifiable positions in a piecemeal fashion.
The contradictory structure to be examined in this chapter is that of the concepts 
and the relations which obtain between them in Husserl's text. The crucial 
ambiguities of his text are necessary effects of that structure. To read the text 
for the views of its'author is to denegate that necessity.
Science and philosophy in Husserl’s conception of knowledge
Tiie empiricist conception of knowledge is characterised by the invariant 
structure of the subject-object relation. Variations in the precise 
characteristics assigned to the subject and correlatively to the object 
define the variants of the basic empiricist problematic. In all cases 
knowledge, if it is indeed a genuine knowledge, is thought to be based 
upon and reducible to the original experience of a knowing subject. 
It has been shown above that in Husserl’s case this subject is to be 
one in which ‘nothing human’ can be found. Only if it can be reduced 
to the original experience of such a subject may what is alleged to be 
knowledge be accepted as genuine. In this respect the existence of the 
sciences and of philosophy poses an immediate and obvious problem. 
Scientific knowledge is never reducible directly to the immediate 
experience of a scientific subject. It always rests upon some existing 
and presupposed knowledges. Galileo, for example, makes use of a 
pre-given mathematics in the formulation of his theories. A similar 
situation prevails in fact in philosophy and in other non-scientific 
theoretical domains. Not even the the most theoretical of the positive 
sciences can guarantee the epistemological status of their knowledges, 
that is, that they are indeed knowledges. Two aspects of this situation 
are especially significant for the present argument. First, the sciences 
must appear to be radically incomplete. Husserl can therefore claim 
that ‘modern science has abandoned the ideal of genuine science... and, 
in its practice, it has abandoned radicalness of scientific self-respon­
sibility’ (Husserl, 1969^3-4). It is this situation that Husserl refers 
to as the ‘crisis of European sciences’: not a crisis within the positive 
sciences but rather a disjunction between these sciences and their 
necessary grounding in original experience. This ‘crisis’ is an effect 
of the very success of the sciences, of the theoretical, formal and 
mathematical, techniques which they have developed and which can be 
used mechanically without reference to their true meaning. The 
scientist knows nothing of the meaning of his work, he ‘lives in producing, 
but does not have this productive living as a theme within his field of 
vision’ (p. 15).
Nevertheless the knowledge produced by the sciences is always 
thought to be reducible to its basis in original experience.
/ ,
Science, and in particular geometry, with this ontic meaning,
must have had a historical beginning; this meaning itself must
have an origin in an accomplishment: first as a project and then 
in successful execution. This process of projecting and success­
ful^ realising occurs, after all, purely within the subject of the 
inventor. . . ,'(p. 356)
This reduction to original experience is a task that can be performed 
only by philosophy. Thus it is the radical incompleteness of the sciences 
that leads to the necessity of philosophy in.-which their supposed 
knowledges are to be judged and either guaranteed or found wanting 
and theii essential meaning, of which the scientists themselves are 
ignorant, determined. In thus establishing philosophy as the final 
arbiter of scientificit)'' Husserl reflects the roles traditionally assigned 
to the sciences and philosophy in the problematic of the empiricist 
conception of knowledge/* In the absence of such a philosophy the 
sciences can only appear as brilliant and successful theoretical tech­
niques that have no meaning for life in the world. In its absence the 
crisis of European science must appear as a crisis of reason itself, 
meaningless yet technically successful, as a general crisis of culture 
and of mankind.
Secondly it should be noted that, for Husserl, when the scientist 
makes use of some pre-given knowledge he is ignorant of its essential 
meaning. It is because he fails to investigate the presupposed and 
hidden meanings that he takes over that the scientist is ignorant of 
the true meaning of his own work. In this conception theories, formal 
and mathematical techniques, instruments, function as embodiments 
of the true meanings with which they were supposed originally to have 
been endowed. Husserl’s philosophical history of the sciences and of 
philosophy therefore consists in the re-establishment of the original 
meanings of scientific knowledge and of philosophies, in the identifica­
tion of what meanings were presupposed and what original meanings 
were added in Galileo’s work, and so on. This history is not and 
cannot be a merely empirical history of scientific products, a chrono- 
logical sequence of results, of theories, facts and discoveries. Such a 
history would be as meaningless for Husserl as are the positive sciences 
themselves. Husserl s philosophical history is a theoretical history, a 
history which must weigh and judge the facts presented to it and 
which, in particular, must seek the true meaning of a theory beneath
x
the conceptions and manifest statements of the theorjgists themselves.
Now this establishment of original and presupposed meanings, this tracing of 
knowledge back to its basis in some original experience, is possible only on condition 
that these original meanings, in spite of the fact that they go unrecognised, are 
indeed transmitted in the theories, techniques and instruments in which they are 
embodied. In effect it requires that there be a ti’anscendental intersubjectivity 
which must precede any particular communication of meanings if that
communication is to be able to function as the bearer of hidden and presupposed 
original meanings from one transcendental ego to another. It would seem then 
that the true subject of scientific knowledge is not so much the isolated
transcendental ego in all its epistemological splendour but rather the transcendental 
intersubjectivity that is the indispensible condition of existence of the ego's 
scientific or philosophical practice. It appears, in other words, that scientific 
knowledge is strictly reducible to the original experience of one or more individual 
transcendental egos only on condition that the ego ceases to be conceived as the
true subject of the knowledge process. But if transcendental intersubjectivity 
is the true subject of the knowledge process then there can be no necessity for 
maintaining that the possibility of reduction to the original experience of an 
individual ego is a condition of existence of all genuine knowledge. It will be shown 
that in practice Husserl's history must make use of 'meanings ' that are not 
reducible to the original experience of any subject.
It is essential that the nature of this difficulty he clearly understood. 
The rigorous delimitation of knowledge to what conforms to Husserl's empiricist 
criteria must presuppose a transcendental intersubjectivity which functions as a 
bearer of embodied meanings. What is presupposed as a condition of existence of 
the empiricist knowledge process cannot be established by such a process. This 
difficulty is in no way reducible to that problem of vulgar existentialism, the 
existence of other human beings. For Husserl everything human belongs to the 
realm of positivity and is the proper object of the positive sciences. Whether
the observed motions of some appropriatly shaped lump of flesh are connected with
any peculiarly human processes going on within is not a serious question for the
philosopher. The existence of other transcendental egos is another matter entirely
12and it is certainly true that Husserl is continually troubled by that question.
However the problem that Husserl is confronted with by the existence of theoretical 
knowledges cannot be resolved by the mere presence of a multiplicity of transcendental 
subjects. They must also be able to communicate. But if the communication of 
determinate presupposed meanings is required as an essential precondition of the 
production of scientific knowledge then that knowledge cannot be xegar reduced ■f&s'*
without residue to the original experiences of these subjects; they cannot be the
!true subjects of the knowledge process. Thus in his attempts to locate the sciences 
within the terms of an empiricist conception of the knowledge process with the 
individual transcendental ego as subject Husserl is forced into a quite different 
conception of the knowledge process. In this new conception knowledge still 
appears to be the embodiment of meanings but individual subjects are reduced to 
the status of functionaries of the knowledge process and can no longer appear 
therefore as its determinant elements.
The essential paramaters of Husserl’s epistemology and his history of 
philosophy and the sciences are given in the above sentences. On the one hand he 
produces a purely speculative philosophy of history in which the philosopher and 
the scientist appear as mere functionaries, as the bearers of the self-development 
of transcendental intersubjectivity. On the other hand knowledge is to be 
rigorously reduced to the original experience of a transcendental ego. But it seems 
that this reduction is possible for the sciences only on condition that it is
?/
incomplete. One index of this necessary incompleteness is the fact 
that Husserl’s history requires the presence of knowledges that are 
not reducible to any original experience. Several commentators have 
observed the presence of a speculative philosophy of history in Husserl’s 
later writings, notably in the Crisis itself and in the ‘Hegelian’ fragment 
‘Philosophy as Mankind’s Self-Reflection: the Self-Realisation of 
Reason1 (pp. 335~342)^- It is easy to see that this speculative philosophy 
must contradict the transcendental empiricism that is the dominant 
problematic of Husserl’s work. Less obvious is the necessity of the 
coexistence of contradictory variants of empiricism in these texts. This 
cWytL- is intended to demonstrate that his collapse into a speculative 
philosophy is a final empiricist response to Husserl’s production of 
problems that are insoluble within the terms of his dominant tran­
scendental empiricism. The ambiguities and inconsistencies of his text 
are produced in the tension between a rigorous empiricist epistemology 
of the transcendental ego and a speculative philosophy of history. In 
the following discussion these effects will be demonstrated in the 
analyses of the pure geometry taken for granted by Galileo and of 
Galileo’s ‘mathematisation of the world’. These will be followed by 
the analysis of what is tire true objective of Husserl’s text, namely, 
the establishment of the meaning of modern philosophy and its origin 
in the transformation induced by the birth of a scientific physics. 
Finally this examines the more general theoretical effects of tire
contradictory conceptions of the knowledge process at work in Husserl’s 
text.
i I. Tiie''meaning' of the pure geometry taken for granted by Galileo
I The book of nature, in Galileo’s conception, is written in mathematical 
characters and nature itself is conceived as a mathematical manifold, 
a rational infinite totality which can be systematically mastered by a 
mathematical natural science.^ If we are to establish the meaning of 
this mathematisation of nature it is necessary that we examine the 
motivation of Galileo’s thinking. Husserl finds that pure geometry, 
the mathematics of spatio-temporal shapes in general, is taken for 
granted by Galileo, it is pre-given as part of an already old tradition. 
With this relatively advanced geometry a hidden, presupposed meaning 
enters Galileo’s physics. In order, then, to establish the meaning of 
this physics it is first necessary to determine the hidden meaning 
implicit in pure geometry.
!
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Pure geometry is a science of pure idealities, that is, of ideal entities that 
are not to be found in the world. In this respect Husserl insists that it be 
distinguished from the practical art of surveying which knows nothing of the geo­
metrical idealities, of dimensionless points, of ideally straight lines without 
width, and so on. Pure geome^.try is not, in Husserl’s
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view, reducible to the practical art of surveying and its idealities are 
not derived from the surveyor’s instruments. Instead they emerge
^out of the praxis of perfecting, of freely pressing toward the 
horinons of concGivable perfecting again and again, limit shapes 
emerge toward which the particular series of perfecting tend, 
as toward invariant and never attainable goals. If we are 
interested in these ideal shapes and are constantly engaged in 
determining them and in constructing new ones out of those 
already determined we are "geometers'’, (p. 26)
The ideal shapes do not fall ready made from the sky, they ‘emerge’ 
as limit shapes produced in an existing conceptual and theoretical 
practice. Thus the construction of the concepts of these limit shapes 
requires the concepts of the non-ideal shapes whose limits are to be 
the idealities and also the concept of limit and the related concepts 
which govern the practice of constructing the limit of a series. The
birth of this geometry, far from being a pure endowment of original meaning in
the consciousness of the first geometer, is dependent on an existing mathematical
practice and on what is presupposed in that practice.
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The offspring of this birth process is, according to Husserl, a 
scientific geometry in which we ‘have an ideal praxis of “pure, thinking” 
which remains exclusively within the realm of pure limit shapes’ (ibid). 
Once produced these limit shapes become acquired tools which, like 
all cultural aquisitions, ‘remain objectively knowable and available 
without requiring that the formulation of their meaning be repeatedly 
and explicitly renewed1 (ibid). In this way geometry is able to develop 
a technique of calculation according to technical rules. These rules 
enable the geometer to achieve results which are valid but of whose 
genuine meaning and truth he may be completely ignorant. The 
technical development of a science leads to an emptying of the original 
meaning. The technical practice of mathematics therefore contains 
meanings that are present but unrecognised, ‘significations which are, 
so to speak, sedimented in their embodiments’ (p. 27). It would seem 
then that starting originally from the practical art of measuring there 
develops, thi-ough the change to a theoretical interest and a purely 
geometrical way of thinking, the science of ‘all possibly conceivable 
ideal shapes’ (ibid). This science in turn is able to transform and to 
guide the practical art of measuring by means of an applied geometry 
based upon the technical rules for calculation with geometrical idealities, 
frowns-transformation of the methodology of surveying through the 
change to a theoretical interest and the development of a pure geometry 
plays a crucial role in Husserl’s account of the meaning of modem 
physics and of its mathematisation of the world. The hidden meaning 
that enters into the new physics by means of the geometry taken for 
granted by Galileo is precisely the meaning of measurement that 
appears as a result of that transformation. . JU . shown
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that in Husserl’s account of the construction of pure geometry a 
pre-existing mathematical practice is required. In tUtcase.since pure 
-tW^--kW| geometry is)the first of the sciences to appear this practice which 
precedes pure geometry must be non-scientific. Husserl locates it in 
the pre-scientific practice of surveying. He notes that the art of measure­
ment, whether or not it is based on an applied geometry, necessarily 
involves much more than the actual technical process of making a 
particular measurement. The possibility of measurement requires a 
1 set of strictly determinable concepts (forms, magnitudes, positions)
and the construction and practical determination of empirical standard 
measures and instruments. Any art of measurement therefore involves 
a practice of determination governed by a definite system of concepts 
j and of instruments. Measurement is never reducible to the raw
! experience of a knowing subject, to the mere recognition of a given.
In the case of a pre-scientific art of measurement the system of concepts 
and instruments cannot be the product of the application of any 
science. On the contrary it strictly precedes the process of ‘idealisation’ 
that results in ‘the ideal praxis of pure thinking’.
The essential features of Husserl’s theoretical history of the sciences 
are already present in this attempt to establish the meaning of pure 
geometry. Husserl describes the original endowment of meaning as a 
process in which an existing system of embodied meanings, (the 
techniques and instruments of the pre-scientific art of measurement) 
is transformed by a determinate theoretical labour. This labour consists 
of the construction of limit concepts and the establishment of forms of 
proof and demonstration with respect to these concepts. It is precisely 
, their character as limit concepts that enables the establishment of 
j Jforms of demonstration with respect to these idealities. The properties 
tUju. | of^geometrical idealities are related to those of the ‘practical’, ‘non- 
ideal’ concepts by the mechanism of construction of the limit. Since 
Husserl presents geometry as an exemplar of mathematics and as the 
first of the sciences we may conclude that the science of pure mathe­
matics is tire product of a determinate transformation of an existing 
^ mathematical practice. Generalising this result it appears that the 
original endowment of meaning of a science must be analysed as the 
product of a determinate theoretical labour of transformation of an 
existing system of embodied meanings. The ‘original’ endowment of 
meaning always refers back to already endowed meanings.
Nevertheless this concept of the endowment of meaning is not 
equivalent to the concept of the epistemological break developed by 
Bachelard and others to refer to the constitution of a scientific proble­
matic in the ttansformation of existing theoretical but non-scientific 
problematics. For the latter the determinant element in the production 
of knowledge is the problematic itself, a determinate articulated system 
of concepts, instruments and modes of theoretical labour. Here the 
scientist far from being a meaning-endowing epistemological subject is
present solely as the bearer of certain functions in the process of 
production of knowledge. For Husserl on the contrary the endowment 
of meaning is the determinant element. The system of concepts and 
instruments is thought as the embodiment of original meanings, that 
is, of meanings originally produced in the consciousness of a knowing 
subject. It is these meanings alone that guarantee the truth of whatever 
knowledge may be produced with these concepts. If the development 
of technical means of calculation makes it possible to achieve valid 
results while ignoring these original meanings then there appears the 
possibility of unrecognised and ‘dangerous shifts of meaning’. These 
dangers are to be avoided only by ‘keeping always immediately in 
mind the original bestowal of meaning upon the method, through 
which it has the sense of achieving knowledge about the world’ (p. 47). 
'Ihus pure geometry and the preceding practical art of measuring are 
thought as the embodiment of meanings, significations, ideas, and so 
on. Yet these meanings are located within the system of concepts and 
instruments and not in the consciousness, mind, soul, or what have 
you, of some epistemological subject. The meanings are not therefore 
to be found in the consciousness of any geometer, in particular, of 
Galileo. It is only on this condition that an essential element in Galileo’s 
mathematisation of the world can appear in the relatively advanced 
pure geometry that he takes for granted.
The 'dangerous shift of meaning1 that may appear as a result of the 
technical development of geometry or of other sciences obviously refers 
to a shift away from the meaning originally bestowed by the conscious­
ness of an epistemological subject, of a transcendental ego. We have 
just seen that in the case of pure geometry the original bestowal of 
meaning is not strictly original. The system of concepts in which the 
meaning is embodied is itself the product of a determinate transforma­
tion of an existing system of embodied meanings. It is not the simple 
product of some original act of bestowal. A shift in meaning, then, can 
refer only to some further transformation of an existing system of 
concepts and of instruments. The ‘dangerous shift’ referred to in 
Husserl’s text is therefore a shift from a non-existent origin.
These last points may be taken as a first index of the contradictory 
structure of Husserl’s theoretical history of the sciences. The question 
of the origin oi geometry must be posed in terms of the original endow­
ment of meaning by a transcendental ego. This original endowment 
gives the meaning of the pure geometry taken for granted by Galileo. 
It is with respect to this original endowment that ‘dangerous shifts of 
meaning’ can appear. In fact it has been shown that Husserl’s text 
gives the answer to a somewhat different question, namely, in what 
does the process of constitution of pure geometry consist? The answer 
to that question is indicated above. The scientist constitutes pure 
geometry on the basis of an existing system of embodied meanings 
by means of a determinate theoretical labour of transformation. This
answer ensures that the transcendental ego cannot appear to be the 
true subject of the knowledge process and that his endowment of 
meaning cannot be original. The scientist, as will be shown below, 
far from being the subject of the process is a mere functionary, a 
bearer of the activity of transcendental intersubjectivity.
2. Galileo's mathematisation of the world
The existence of a pure geometry and of a pure mathematics in general 
provides the conditions of a specific manner of objectifying that may 
Te practiced on one abstract aspect of the world’ (p. 33). With regard 
to this aspect pure mathematics allows in principle for an exact measure­
ment, i.e. for empirical measuring with increasing precision, but under 
the guidance of a world of idealities—such a world having been 
objectified in advance through idealisation and construction’ (p. 34). 
Geometry provides, that is to say, a universal form of the world. Un­
fortunately there is only one geometry, the geometry of spatio-temporal 
shapes. It follows that a direct mathematisation of the specifically 
sensible qualities of bodies is impossible since the limit ‘shapes’ of 
these qualities are not themselves idealisable in the same way. Thus 
‘measurement of them cannot be related to corresponding idealities 
in a constructible world already objectivised into idealities’ (p. 35).
If thrjc is not to appear an entirely arbitrary conclusion it is necessary 
to examine the specific character of the objectivity of the idealities of 
pure geometry. Otherwise it might seem that ‘ideal’ concepts relating 
to other sensible qualities could be constructed in the same way as 
geometrical idealities. Husserl examines this question in ‘The Origins 
of Geometry’ (pp. 353-378) where he argues that geometry must 
have its origin in an accomplishment which occurs
purely within the subject of the inventor and thus the meaning, 
as present originaliter with its whole content, lies exclusively, 
so to speak, within his mental space. But geometrical existence 
is not psychic existence; it does not exist as something personal 
within the personal sphere of consciousness; it is the existence 
or what is objectively there for'‘everyone’.'(p. 356)
In the problem of the origins of geometry is posed the problem 
of the emergence of the unconditional objectivity that is neither relative 
nor time-bound of scientific idealities. The ideal constructions of pure 
geometry, as opposed to the non-ideal constructions of the art of 
surveying, are products
^arising out of an idealising, spiritual act, one of'‘pure1 thinking, 
which has its materials in the designated general pre-givens of
this factual humanity and human surrounding world and creates 
‘ideal objects’ out of them.’ (p. 377)
The idealities of pure geometry reflect the essential form of the 
world that is immediately given to the knowing subject and pure 
geometry itself represents a direct mathematisation of that world. Here 
the objectivity of geometrical idealities is reduced to an effect of the 
conditions of the confrontation of the knowing subject and its known 
object: geometry is objective because it really does reflect the essential 
form of the real world that is really given to the consciousness of the 
subject. It may be noted that this ‘objectivity’ specifically precludes the 
account examined above of the ‘meaning’ of pure geometry. If this 
latter meaning emerges only on the basis of an existing system of 
embodied meanings then the world is not immediately given to the 
consciousness of the first geometer. Instead it is given in and through 
the system of embodied meanings that he takes for granted.
In the discussion of Galileo’s mathematisation of the world, however, 
it appears that the subject is confronted with a given world one aspect 
of which may be directly mathematised by pure. geometry. Other 
aspects must be mathematised indirect^. Galileo’s achievement consists 
precisely in producing an indirect mathematisation of the non-geo- 
metrical plena. Since geometry, or rather mathematics, is the only 
universal form of the world Husserl is now confronted by the problem 
of how Galileo could have hit upon the following conception
''that everything which manifests itself as real through the 
specific sense qualities must have its mathematical index in 
events belonging to the sphere of shapes?V(p. 37)
What, in other words, was tire motive for taking an analytical attitude 
towards the network of intuitively given events in respect of their 
dependencies on events in the sphere of shapes? Husserl is content to 
note that the men of the Rennaissance were inclined to bold general­
isations. It seemed reasonable, then, to assume that qualitative occur­
rences were mathematisable if only an appropriate method of measuring 
could be worked out. Thus the mathematisability of nature, the con­
ception of nature as a realm of universal exact causality, is a given for 
Galileo. What was lacking was the means of establishing exact causal 
determination with regard to both aspects of the world, to spatio- 
temporal shapes and to sensible qualities. This ‘was a matter of discovery 
in physics ... for the passionate praxis of inquiry and not a matter for 
prior systematic reflection upon what is possible’ (p. 40). This can 
hardly be considered a satisfactory solution but it appears to be 
sufficient to enable Husserl to return to the question of the meaning 
of Galileo’s mathematisation of the world.
Galileo, it seems, is the inheritor of a pure geometry which was
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founded upon a practical art of surveying which itself knew nothing 
of idealities. Since Galileo fails to inquire back into the original meaning 
of this geometry it must appear to be a self-contained science produc­
ing self-sufficient objective truths which could be applied without further 
ado. In other words the existing technical forms of proof and demonstra­
tion in this geometry appear to stand in need of no further guarantee. 
Nevertheless the real world is not inhabited by geometrical idealities.
/
^ ct this triviality has been buried precisely by exact science; 
indeed since the days of ancient geometry, through that 
substitution of a methodically idealised achievement for what 
is given as actually presupposed in all idealisation, given by a 
verification which is, in its own way, unsurpassable! (p. 50)
In this way a well-fitting garb of ideas has been surreptitiously 
substituted for the life-world, for the world that is originally given.
Mathematics and mathematical science, as a garb of ideas, or 
the garb of sjmibols of the symbolic mathematical theories, 
encompasses everything which, for scientists and the educated 
generally, represents the life-world, dresses it up as ‘objectively 
actual and true’ nature. It is through the garb of ideas that we 
take for true being what is actually a method) (p. 51)
It follows that the true meaning of their theories had to remain 
hidden from the physicists, even from Galileo himself. If natural 
science can only be and remain meaningful in a true and original 
sense if the scientist has developed in himself the ability to inquire 
back into the original meaning' (p. 56) then the true meaning of natural 
science has never been recognised by any scientist. The natural scientist 
is at best a brilliant technician. He is unable to'ensure that the know- 
* ledge he produces is indeed ‘true knowledge of the world itself, of 
nature itself (p. 57). Thus what Husserl calls the ‘crisis of European 
science , the disjunction between the sciences and their necessary 
grounding in original experience, is co-extensive with the very existence 
of the sciences, The crisis’ appears at the very beginning of natural 
science in Galileo’s ignorance of the true meaning of his work—and 
before then with the technical development of a pure geometry in 
which the meaning is merely sedimented.
It has been shown in the preceding section that in Husserl’s account 
of the meaning of pure geometry there is no original meaning for 
Galileo or anyone else to inquire back into. There is, in other words, 
no original meaning in the sense of a meaning endowed by the con­
sciousness of a transcendental ego that corresponds to and is embodied 
within the system of concepts and instruments of a science. In that 
case the crisis’ of Husserl’s title consists precisely in the existence of
the sciences, in the production of knowledge by means of a determinate 
theoretical labour governed by a system of concepts and instruments, 
in the existence, that is to say, of a knowledge that is never) reducible 
to the original experience of a transcendental ego. The crisis consists 
in the production of knowledge independently of the category of the 
individual epistemological subject, is in the name of this category it
that all scientific knowledge has been declared by Plusserl to be radically 
incomplete.
It is clear that the meaning assigned by Husserl’s text to Galileo’s 
natural science is of a character entirely different, from that assigned 
earlier to pure geometry. This latter ‘meaning’, as we have seen, is 
embedded within the system of concepts and instruments of the 
science. It does not refer to, and is not constituted within, the con­
sciousness of any transcendental ego. The account of the origin of 
that meaning is an account of the process of production of a new 
system of embodied meanings, a process which has no transcendental 
ego as its subject. The former ‘meaning’, that of natural science, 
functions in Husserl’s text as a very different concept. It refers to the 
motivation, that is, to the consciousness, of a specific subject, Galileo—a 
consciousness in which there are admittedly the hidden, presupposed 
meanings of pure geometry. Once this motivation has been established 
the accomplishment of the new physics, the production of the new 
system of concepts, is left to look after itself.*® It is a matter ‘for the 
passionate praxis of inquiry’ (p. 40), for the ego to discover in its given 
object. The presence of these different and opposed senses of ‘meaning’ 
in different sections of Husserl’s text may be taken as a second index of 
the inherently contradictory structure of his attempted theoretical 
history of the sciences.
3. The birth of scientific physics and its effect in the transformation of 
philosophy
These preliminary investigations of the meaning of Galileo’s ‘mathe- 
matisation of the world’ provide the requisite foundations for what is 
the true objective of Husserl’s text, his investigation of the meaning 
of modern philosophy. This philosophy is seen as the result of a 
transformation induced by the new developments in science beginning 
with Galileo’s mathematisation of nature. The effect of the new science 
is that ‘the world and, correlativcly, philosophy take on a completely 
new appearance’ (p. 61). This transformation is not to be interpreted 
as the establishment of a new philosophy alongside existing philosophies 
but rather as a transformation of the whole theoretical field within 
which individual philosophies take their place. With the birth of the 
new physics the philosophical field takes the form of a struggle between 
transcendentalism and objectivism. The objective that Husserl sets for
his historical investigation is to elicit the unity of these opposing 
pliilosophical projects and thereby to establish the meaning and the 
teleology of the historical development of philosophy. In this way, he 
suggests, it is possible to achieve clarity about ourselves ‘who are the 
bearers of this teleology, who take part in carrying it out through our 
personal intentions’ (p. 70).
In Husserl’s view the unity of this development is the unity of the 
epistemological structure of the subject-object relation. 
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The whole transcendental set of problems circles around the 
relation of this, my I—the ‘ego’—to what it is at first taken for 
granted to be—my soul—and, again, around the relation of this 
ego and my conscious life to the world of which I am conscious 
and whose true being I know through my cognitive structures.
(p. 98)
It seems however that the knowledge of this unity must be of a very 
special and privileged kind. It is a knowledge that cannot be supported 
by documentary proof:
^it is not to be gained through the internal exposition and 
comparison of the individual systems. Rather, it is a concept 
acquired by pondering the coherent history of the entire 
philosophical modern period, . . (ibid.)
Thus the existence and form of the unity of the modern philosophical 
field is not to be established by means of any rational forms of proof 
and demonstration, by the marshalling of evidence. It will be necessary 
to return below to the significance of this appeal to a faculty of judgement 
at the heart of Husserl’s rationalism.
. Before doing so we must examine Husserl’s account of the effects of 
the presence of the new science on the structure of the philosophical 
field of the theory of knowledge. It seems that these effects are of two 
kinds. The first concerns the transformation of knowledge that is 
effected within the domain now occupied by the new science. In this 
comiection it must be emphasised that the ‘science’ in question here 
is a science recognised and duly accredited by philosophy, that is, its 
knowledges are recognised as genuine knowledges appearing in the 
consciousness of an epistemological subject. Thus the knowledge 
recognised by the empiricist theory of knowledge always appears to be 
the result of a process of abstraction by some subject. In that respect 
the philosophical theory of knowledge always involves a specific dis­
tortion of the theoretical mode of production of knowledge by the 
sciences.^ In Husserl’s conception it is such ‘sciences’, already 
transmuted so as to conform to his empiricist reading, that appear to 
transform the structure of the field of knowledges that form the subject
matter of the theory of knowledge. Thus, for example, he is able to 
represent Galileo’s physics as the mathematisiation of a ‘nature’ that 
is given in immediate experience. The mathematisation of this nature is 
thought to result in a separation between the world that is given in 
sense experience and the world that is given in scientific knowledge; 
between the ‘merely subjective’ sense qualities and an objective nature 
‘that is itself mathematical; it is given in formulae and can onfy be 
interpreted in terms of the formulae’ (p. 58); or between the ‘real’ 
elements of experience and the ‘merely conventional’ constructs built 
up out of these elements; and so on. These and many other variations 
are just so many different forms of realisation of the one determinate 
opposition between the knowledges produced in the sciences and those 
produced in immediate experience.
Secondly there is the effect of the new science, that is, of what is 
recognised as such, which functions as an exemplar with regard to the 
forms of proof and of demonstration developed within other theoretical 
domains. This effect consists in the external application of theoretical 
forms developed in one domain to other domains. Of particular 
significance for the history of philosophy is the development of a 
naturalistic psychology (for example Hobbes, Locke) in which relations 
between mental things are thought to be modelled on the relations 
established by physics between physical things and in which, for 
example, forces of attraction and of repulsion may be thought to exist 
between ideas. Having noted the existence of this examplar effect 
Husserl observes
/
it is something else to ask how far the exemplary character of 
these sciences [mathematics and physics—B.H.] should be 
stretched and whether the philosophical reflections which were 
said to be responsible for the new conceptions of the world and 
of world sciences, were at all adequate.' (p. 66)
Thus the philosophical theory of knowledge appears in Husserl’s 
conception to be a field of discursive forms in which the following 
oppositions are realised:
(i) subject—object;
(ii) experience—scientific knowledge;
(iii) naturalistic/physicalistic domains—other domains.
Any theory of knowledge in the field of modem philosophy must 
specify what, if anything, occupies each of the notional categories 
defined by these oppositions. The following brief examination of two 
cases from Husserl’s exposition will show that the first of these opposi­
tions is dominant since the form in which it is realised determines 
the manner in which the remaining oppositions can appear?^ It will
then be possible to consider Husserl’s account of the meaning of modern 
philosophy and of the teleology of its development.
(fl) Descartes
Husserl s examination of Descartes is concerned with ‘extracting what 
was ically involved in his thinking and then separating what he became 
conscious of from what was concealed from him, or rather what was 
smuggled into his ideas, because of certain things taken for granted’ 
(p* /S)* ^ kci seen here that the opposition noted above between a 
meaning’ which exists only as a function of the system of concepts 
and instruments in which it is embodied and a ‘meaning’ which exists 
m and by means of the consciousness of a subject is displaced on to 
an opposition between a conscious meaning and one that is taken for 
granted, one which could have been conscious but as it happens was 
not. rhus the meaning’ of Descartes philosophy is conceived as one 
which could have been endowed by a single consciousness.
In Cartesian philosophy the place of the subject appears to be doubly 
deteimined. In the first place the method of the radical skeptical 
places the subject in opposition to all possible objects. While 
the existence of the latter ma3r be doubted that of the former may not: 
I am necessary as the one carrying it out’ (p. 77). Secondly the subject 
appears as the legitimate subject matter of one of the sciences, that is, 
of psychology. Thus ‘in wonder over this ego, first discovered in the 
cpcc^, lie himself asks what kind of an ego it is’ (p, 79). The subject 
that precedes and is opposed to all possible objects is transformed by 
Descaites himself into an object. For him the soul becomes the ‘resi­
duum of a previous abstraction of the pure pl^sical body’ (p. So).
Thus the ego appears both to be the condition of existence of all 
things and to be a thing that can be known like other things. The 
object pole of the subject-object relation therefore divides into two 
distinct realms (called substances), matter and thought. It is thought 
that subjects belong to the latter realm and that they can be known 
by an objective ps37chology. Scientific knowledge is then conceived to 
be the result of an abstraction from the experience of the subject. 
Knowledge of thought is the result of a corresponding abstraction..
{b) Hume and Kant
Hume’s achievement is to reduce to an absurdity the double determina­
tion of the subject in Cartesian philosoph3r, ^ knowing subject is 
also a known object (belonging to psychology) then the theory of 
knowledge must become a province of ps3rchology. Thus in Husserl’s 
view the world in general, nature, . . . and according^ also objective
'■v:.
science are transfonned into fictions. To be consistent, we must say. 
reason ... is fiction’ (p. 87). As soon as a naturalistic psychology 
includes the rational knowing activity of scientists and philosophers the 
whole of knowledge becomes completely incomprehensible to empiri­
cism. Hume’s arguments appear to demonstrate this bankruptcy of 
objective knowledge. However, according to Husseil, theie is a hidden 
motif underlying the absurdity of Hume s skepticism. It consists in 
the ‘revelation of a completely new way of assessing the objectivity of 
the world’ (p. 90). Thus, in spite of appearances, Hume’s attack has 
the effect of clearing the way for a transformation of the philosophical 
problematic with regard to the position of the subject as a knowable 
object and also to the opposition between the objective knowledge of 
the sciences and the merely subjective. In the new transformed philo­
sophy made possible by Hume the subject is to become the foundation 
of all objective and subjective meanings. All thing-hke qualities are to 
be ejected from the transcendental subject
^nothing human is to be found, neither soul nor psychic life nor 
real psycho-physical human beings, all this belongs to the 
‘phenomenon’, to the world as constituted poleJ (p. 183)
In this new transformed philosophy the sciences and the objectivity 
of scientific knowledge must appear to be accomplishments of the life
of consciousness. }
Kant, unfortunately, fails to respond to the hidden motif of Hume s 
philosophising and he fails, therefore, to effect the requisite trans­
formation of the philosophical theory of knowledge. In his philosophy 
the subject-object polarity takes the form of an opposition of the 
transcendental subject to the transcendent object. While the former 
can never be an object for scientific knowledge the latter can never be 
known in itself. In this case the opposition between sense experience 
and scientific knowledge is realised as follows. Experience or sense 
data given to the subject are brought together into things through 
a priori forms. Since these forms determine the necessary structure 
of objective knowledge the necessary form of the world is presented 
as a construct of the faculties of the subject, of pure reason and of -net I 
‘pure intuition’. In Husserl’s view, then,\critical philosophyJ.replaces c WTj 
the earlier objectivist treatment of the subject as an object that can be 
known by a partial insertion of the object into the subject. All know­
ledge is represented by Kant as a combination of a priori forms coming 
from the subject and of raw experience coming from the ‘thing-in- 
itself’. Things-in-themselves must therefore be inaccessible to objective 
knowledge. Since, furthermore, the transcendental subject cannot be 
(X CImvU'ji object it necessarily follows that the activities of subjects in the 
world cannot be susceptible to naturalistic explanation. Thus history 
and culture are established as domains for which the new physics and
)
$
mathematics cannot serve as exemplars. The ‘freedom* of the human 
■ ; subject is thereby preserved at the expense of the possibility of objective
knowledge. The theoretical consequences of this result have been ;
j indicated above and are, in any case, only too well known. t
I Thus in Husserl’s account the emergence of a new science has the
j effect of imposing a division within the field of knowledge which is :
the recognised subject matter of the theory of knowledge between the 
I scientific knowledge of an object and the subject’s pre- or non-scientific
experience of the same object. More generally it imposes a division 
; between scientific and non-scientific forms of knowledge and therefore
. j between domains in which these different forms of knowledge are
^ appropriate. The unity of the different and opposing philosophies, of
the varieties of ‘physicalistic objectivism* and ‘transcendental sub- 
v. j jectivism’, consists in the fact that they are just so many different
forms of realisation of the same essential structure. They are all variants,
it is tempting' to conclude, of the same fundamental system of concepts. However
this temptation is one that must be resisted. Husserl does not represent the unity
of modem philosophy as that of a set of fundamental concepts, but rather as the
unity of a meaning and a teleology. If for Husserl modem philosophy has the unity
of a structured whole the form of this structuring is that of an expressive totality
It iS) a totality in which each component part, each individual philosophy, is a 
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£_£?■. jjoiadis , an expression of the essence of the whole, that Is, of its meaning 
or teleology. Thus, however complicated it may appear, the unity of modern philosophy 
consists in .its expression of the same basic meanings. It is essentially simple,
It is clear that, for Husserl, the meaning of modern philosophy is 
to be found m the invariant structure of the whole rather than in the 
consciousness of any philosophical subject. The history of philosophy 
is i epresented m the form of a teleology, of the realisation of an 
1 ristoi ical tasK. The investigation of the historical becoming of philo-
. sophy is necessary in order that we may achieve clarity about
ourselves ^ who are the bearers of this teleology, who take part in 
carrying it out through our personal intentions’ (p. 70). Since the 
| teleology is realised through the personal intentions of philosophers
In J56, dlfm^ k'0111 tllQse intentions. Its meaning cannot be
| ,0C^ed,at,the eveI of thc intentions themselves. It follows that the
1 trUth the. teIeol°gy cannot be deduced from nor refuted by the
personal testimony of philosophers. Nor is it to be gained ‘through the 
internal exposition and comparison of the individual systems’. Accord­
ing to Husserl it can only be acquired by ‘pondering the coherent 
histoiy of the entire philosophical modern period’ (p. 98). f
What is the meaning of this teleology that can be recognised only 
by a subject endowed with a suitable faculty of judgement? How does 
it differ from the meanings of the particular philosophies that are the 
moments of this teleology? These latter meanings can and indeed must 
be demonstrated through the analysis of documents, through ‘the 
internal exposition and comparison of the individual systems’. Husserl’s 
own exposition gives several examples of such demonstrations, however 
sketchy and incomplete they might be. The meaning of the teleology 
on the other hand involves the suppression of all forms of objectivism 
through the achievement of a level of reflection in which all opposition 
of subject, to object is dissolved and in which, therefore, all questions 
of proof and demonstration must vanish. Two forms of this objectivism 
were identified in the examples discussed above: the double determina­
tion of the subject in Descartes and in British empiricism as that which 
knows and as an object to be known; the partial identification of subject 
and object in the critical philosophy of Kant and the neo-Kantians. 
Both forms must lead to the limitation of knowledge and the devaluation 
of reason. The first implies the bankruptcy of objective knowledge by 
reducing alii categories of knowledge to fictions while the second denies 
the possibility of objective knowledge of things-in-themselves. These 
limitations on reason are effects of the different forms in which the 
subject-object opposition is realised in the different philosophies. Wher­
ever this opposition appears, wherever the subject is indeed con­
fronted by an object that is essentially foreign to it, the conditions of the 
confrontation determine precisely what may or may not be known. It 
follows that these conditions themselves must be essentially unknowable, 
knowledge is turned into a mystery and reason must require the support 
of something beyond reason. Thus all forms of objectivism must end 
in a doctrine of the limitation of reason, that is, in irrationalism.
The meaning of modern philosophy, in Husserl’s view, and the task 
which its teleology imposes on the true philosopher is to supersede the 
limitations on reason imposed by objectivism. It is the defence of reason 
against ah limitation while preserving, in a certain sense, the category 
of the subject. This radical suppression of objectivism, the task of a 
genuine philosophy, is to be achieved in the demonstration that all 
phenomena without exception, that is, everything that is given, are 
accomplishments of the constituting activity of consciousness. The 
apparent giveness of an object, then, is an effect of consciousness’ 
misrecognition of its own activity, that is,' of itself. In this problematic 
of the alienation of the subject the world is represented as a ‘universal 
mental accomplishment’, as
*the construct of a universal ultimately functioning subjectivity.
It belongs essentially to this world-constituting accomplishment 
that subjectivity objectifies itself as human subjectivity, as an 
element of the world' (p. 113)
Here the subject-object opposition is preserved and also superseded 
since it is now contained entirely within consciousness. All the limita­
tions that objectivism imposes on reason and knowledge are therefore 
overcome in principle. The task that Husserl finds in philosophy, it 
seems, is to achieve that variant of empiricism which allows the most 
consistent and thoroughgoing rationalism. This glorification of reason 
in the recognition of the teleology underlying the history of philosophy- 
in the modern period is not something to be gained by means of 
exposition and comparison of different systems.
^ Rather, it is a concept acquired by pondering the coherent history 
of the entire philosophical modern period, (p. 98)
Strictly speaking each philosopher is a mere functionary of this 
teleology and expresses its meaning in his work. If, therefore, this 
functionary is to become conscious of the meaning of the teleology he 
expresses it can only be because the world-constituting subjectivity 
chooses to represent itself to itself, that is, to become conscious of 
itself, through his work. Jjkt that condition can never be
shown to be satisfied. It can only be asserted by those functionaries 
who believe it to be the case and denied by those who do not. In the 
last resort the privileged character of Husserl’s final solution to the 
problem of knowledge rests on an act of faith and in this respect his 
history of philosophy is merely speculative. In recognising itself as the 
ideal solution to the problem of knowledge that it poses Husserl’s 
philosophy is no different from those other representatives of modern 
philosophy that it claims to supersede.
this variant of empiricism is quite distinct 
from that identified above in the discussion of Galileo’s mathematisation 
of the world. In the latter the idealities of, e.g. pure geometry, far 
from being accomplishments of world-constituting subjectivity, reflect 
the essential form of the world that is immediately given to the knowing 
subject. If that world is itself a mental accomplishment, that is to say, 
not in fact given, what happens to the alleged unconditional objectivity 
of geometrical idealities and of scientific idealities in general? If every­
thing is an accomplishment there are no unconditional objectivities and 
the specific difference of tire sciences, those producers of unconditional 
objectivities, collapses. The difficulty that the recognition of the 
existence of the sciences poses throughout Husserl’s work is exemplified 
in this combination of two contradictory variants of the empiricist 
problematic, an extreme subjectivism and a scientific objectivism.- 
The suppression of objectivism proposed by the former suppresses 
also the specific difference of the sciences. The final glorification 
of reason is achieved at the cost of the denegation of the products 
of reason.
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Conclusion: from transcendental objectivism to a 
speculative philosophy of history
The movement of Husserl’s text may be schematically represented as 
starting from a rigorous transcendental empiricism in which the 
idealities of the sciences are thought to represent the essential form 
of the world that is immediately given to the transcendental subject, 
that is, they represent an ‘apodictically general content, invariant 
throughout all conceivable variation’ (p. 377). The absolute givenness 
of this content is the condition of the objectivit}'’ of scientific knowledge. 
It is not the construct of a freely constituting subjectivity. Rather the 
subject is confronted with absolute and invariant structures of the 
given and the objectivity of the sciences consists in the fact that their 
idealities reflect these invariant given structures. Scientific knowledge 
is therefore free from all relativity; it is neither time nor culture bound. 
Cultural differences with regard to scientific knowledge are reducible 
to differences in the recognition of what is always already there. An 
immediate difficulty appears in the form of the inescapable circularity 
of any attempt to demonstrate these assertions concerning the objectivity 
of the sciences. The epistemological structure of transcendental 
empiricism must refer these assertions to a higher level subjectivity 
which relegates the original subject to the level of an object. An 
analogous difficulty emerges, as Cavailles has shown, with regard to ^ 
the objectivity of logic. In addition certain positions emerge in the 
course of Husserl’s analysis of the meaning and the origins of the 
sciences which cannot be reconciled with this variant of empiricism.
In the above analysis of Husserl’s account of the meanings of pure 
geometry and of Galileo’s mathematisation of the world ttrwits 
a certain tension between two quite different senses of the word 
‘meaning’. One ‘meaning’ is represented as originally endowed within 
the consciousness of an individual subject while the other is thought 
to be embodied in a determinate system of concepts and of instruments. 
Husserl attempts to maintain that the latter ‘meaning’ is reducible to 
the former so that the user of existing concepts and instruments may be 
represented as taking their meanings for granted. Thus his examination 
of Descartes’ philosophy seeks to establish both what meanings he was 
conscious of and himself endowed and what meanings he took for 
granted and failed to become conscious of. The presumption that, in 
principle, he could have become conscious of these latter meanings 
clearly depends on their being originalfy endowed by some other 
individual. With Descartes, then, as with Galileo the analysis refers 
back to some earlier original endowment of meaning. However when 
we turn to consider such an original endowment in the case of pure 
geometry we find that it is analysed as a process depending on already 
existing embodied meanings. The apparent origin is not really an 
origin at all. In Husserl’s text the endowment of a meaning is repre-
,r
sented as a process in which a subject labours to transform an existing set of 
embodied meanings. Such meanings cannot be analysed as originally endowed entirely 
and without residue within the consciousness of any one individual subject. To be
e
truly original a meaning would ne^d to be endowed in the absence of any pre-existing 
embodied meanings. But in Husserl’s text no individual ego appears to be capable of 
such a feat. It must be concluded, in effect, that there are no true origins in the 
process of knowledge described by Husserl. If there are no origins then the analysis 
of objectivity sketched in the previous paragraph must collapse.
These difficulties in Husserl's theoretical history result from a conception 
of the existence and the objectivity of the sciences, that is, of a form of productio 
of knowledge^ that cannot be reduced to processes occuring in any individual 
consciousness. All attempts at such reduction either reduce the sciences to the 
level of ideology, to fictions, or else, as with Kant, save certain sciences at the 
expense of imposing limitations on others and on reason.
We have seen that the radical suppression of all forms of objectivism 
that is the task of genuine philosophy is to be achieved in the demon­
stration that anything that is given is itself an accomplishment of the 
constituting activity of consciousness. The apparent givenness of an 
object is an effect of the world-constituting subjectivity’s misrecogni- 
( tion of itself, in other words it is an effect of its alienation. In this 
conception the structure of the subject-object relation is retained 3ret 
also denegated by its insertion within an all-embracing subjectivity. It 
: has been shown above that each individual subject (philosopher, j
scientist, or whatever) must be conceived as a mere functionary of the 
alienated spiritual totality which expresses itself in his work. In 
* Husserl’s conception one such functionary, namely, the true philo­
sopher, is the means whereby the world-constituting subjectivity 
i becomes conscious of itself. Philosophy is not therefore conceived
simply as one mode of expression of world-constituting subjectivity: 
i it is the highest of all possible modes of expression. Philosophy is the
t self-consciousness of the world. It follows that the history of philosophy
i must he conceived as the history of the development of the self-aware- •
, ness of the world. In this conception it must appear also that history
consists in the world-constituting subjectivity recalling its own past to 
; consciousness. Thus the practice of history is a philosophical activity
j and philosophy itself is identical to the philosophy of history, that is,
to subjectivity’s self-conscious reflection upon its past and its present.
( In his apparent attempts to save reason and objective knowledge
1 from the ravages of empiricism Husserl’s text Anally culminates in a ;
full-blown speculative philosophy of history, a position in which the , ;
subject-object relation is both preserved and denegated by its insertion
within a larger subjectivity. The world then appears to he an ideal
or spiritual whole in which the subject and its object are effects of
the world-constituting activity of consciousness. Subjects, the world,
and the objects within it are all alike effects of the mode of self-alienation
/'■
of the spiritual whole. Thus the tension noted above between the two 
‘meanings’ vanishes since both are referred to this larger subjectivity 
within which the object is no longer essentially foreign to the subject.
This final solution to the problem of objectivism posed by the 
recognition of the existence of the sciences is achieved through the 
displacement of the subject to the leveLpf an element or expression 
(these two concepts are now identical4*) of the whole. Individual 
subjects (scientists, philosophers, and die rest) now appear to be the 
bearers of specific functions in the process of development of the 
world-constituting whole. No longer can they appear to be autonomous 
consciousnesses busily abstracting knowledges from the world around 
them. It is this denegation of the epistemological autonomy of subjects 
that finally legitimises Husserl’s mode of analysis of the history of 
modem philosophy and, in particular, his refusal to reduce the meaning 
of a textUo the personal testimony of its author. The text is no longer 
conceived as an expression, of the consciousness of its particular author 1 ^
but rather an an expression of the present moment in the movement 
of the whole?^ This distinction is easily misrecognised and it may 
appear arbitrary to other empiricist readings of Husserl. Thus Ricoeur 
complains that he
systematically sacifices each philosopher’s particular set of 
problems to a single problem-set which is termed the ‘true’ 
problem, the ‘hidden’ problem, . . . the aspects of a philosopher 
which do not lend themselves to this unifying reading of history 
are omitted.1 (Ricoeur, 196^.170)
This complaint is registered in the name of the importance of ‘the 
character peculiar to each philosopher’ [ibid.), that is to say, precisely 
in the name of the epistemological autonomy of the individual creative 
subject that Husserl’s analysis has forced him to reject. Ricoeur’s 
complaint is addressed to what is in fact a necessary effect of the
£,f;Tu.v‘p!x fit” ,
At the same time Husserl’s solution involves him in the systematic 
denegation of all origins. We have seen that neither Galileo’s physics 
nor Descartes’ philosophy represent any true origin. Both refer back 
to the origin of the science of pure geometry but Jratorigin too has its 
conditions of existence in a pre-existing process. Since Husserl con­
ceives of origins as internal to the consciousnesses of individual subjects 
it is clear that the denegation of all origins is the necessary correlate 
of his displacement of the subject.
In these respects, in its denegation of origins and in its displacement 
of the subject, Husserl’s conception of history corresponds to what.
Althusser, in another context, has called a process without a subject, 
a process that is neither initiated by nor governed by the consciousness 
of a subject. For Husserl subjects, their consciousnesses and activities,
arc so many subordinated elements in the world-historical process of 
the self-realisation of consciousness. What remains, of the empiricist 
category of the subject in this process is the particular form of unity 
of the ideal or spiritual totality. It is a unity of meanings in which 
each component part of the whole is an expression or embodiment 
of (^essential meaning. Thus the movement of world-constitutm* 
subjectivity is governed by the mode of expressive^causality. In this 
way Husserl’s text reproduces the essential structures of those other 
great speculative system builders of modem philosophy, Leibniz and 
Hegel. * J
In spite of their apparent glorification of reason these speculative 
systems result in a denegation of the sciences. All things, the 
objectivity of filings, all human qualities, are conceived as accomplish­
ments of subjectivity. The subject-object relation of the empiricist 
conception of knowledge then becomes a relation internal to subjectivity 
itself, a relation between one of its constructs and another. The positive 
sciences provide a knowledge of objects as already constituted while 
ignoimg their conditions of existence as expressions of the alienated 
structure of the whole. Scientific knowledge must therefore be con­
ceived as necessarily distorting its object and as misrecognising the 
real nature of the world. In this speculative philosophy of Husserl 
subject, object, and knowledge of the object are all conceived as just 
so many. expressions of the present moment in the development 
of the alienated process of world constituting subjectivity. Trans­
cendental inquiry is itself conceived as a further moment in this process. 
Thus in the discussions of psychology in part 111B of the Crisis we 
are informed that
transcendental inquiry is itself a world-historical process insofar 
as it enlarges the history of the constitution of the world, not 
only by adding a new science to it but also by enlarging the 
content of the world in every respect; everything mundane has 
its transcendental correlates, and every new revelation of the 
latter adds, for the investigator of man, the psychologist, new 
determinations of man and the world, (p. 264)^
The effect of conceiving the totality as being governed by the mode 
of expressive causality is that knowledge, whether or not it is called 
objective, is reduced to a mere expression of the present state of the 
whole. In particular, then, any knowledge which represents its object 
as having a determinate structure and any analysis of the'possible 
future states of that object in determinate conditions is nothing more 
than an expression of the present state of alienation of the whole. 
Hence, for example, there can be no rational Husscrlian politics since 
the conditions for the determination of rational action to produce a 
determinate specific effect cannot be realised within the expressive 
totality. Similarly it is clear that there can be no Husscrlian science, 
in particulai, no science of history, which produces in its theories and 
its objects a determinate theoretical knowledge of the real. In the last 
analysis Husserl’s speculative philosophy resolves for empiricism the 
problem of objectivism posed by the production in the sciences of 
objective knowledge of the real by eliminating the cause of all the 
trouble, that is, by the traditional idealist denial of the existence of 
any reality independent of subjective activity.
To conclude, Husserl s rigorous transcendental empiricism attempts 
to save the objectivity of the sciences from the theoretical ravages of 
all forms of psychologists empiricism. However the cost of this anti­
psychologism is an epistemology that can cope neither with the history 
of the sciences and philosophy nor, as Cava files has shown, with the 
objectivity^ of logic and mathematics. Husserl resolves these problems 
by collapsing into a speculative philosophy of history which with its 
mode of expressive causality and the consequent necessary denegation 
of the sciences is the last theoretical refuge of the empiricist category 
of the subject.
Notes : chapter 3
1. The Ting-lish language edition (Husserl, 1970a) includes a number of additional 
papers and fragments published as appendices. These include the text ’The Origins
of Geometry' and the Vienna lecture 'Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity.'. 
All references to this bool;'■give the page number only.
2, .Particularly the Vienna lecture, 'The Origins of Geometry', and Husserl, 1973.
3, See, for example, the works .of Merleau-Ponty and Sclmtss, The latters interpret­
ation has been discussed in chapter 2. For the former see Merleau-Ponty, 19(32, and 
’The Philosopher and Sociology* in Merleau-Ponty, 1964b .
4. These two positions are we 11 represented in the different functions assigned 
to the criterion of testability in Popper and in logical empiricism. In both cases 
testability distinguishes between science and metaphysics. For the latter metaphysics 
is meaningless, for the former it is not scientific but may be meaningful.
G. ■ But see Kant's proposal for a naturalistic science of history in his ’idea- 
for a Universal History' in Kant, 1963,
6, Positions of this kind have been elaborated in recent English philosophy, 
e.g, in Winch, 1958. For an account of the similarities between analytic philosophy 
and the Geisteswissenschaften tradition see Apel, 1967.
7, Perhaps it is necessary here to comment on those readings which would distinguish 
the earlier anti-psychologistic Husserl from his later transcendentalism. For a recent 
example see Pivcevic's review of the Logical Investigations (Husserl, 1970b) in which 
he argues both that Husserl's phenomenologica:r"airalysTs*_'o*f“'logic 'makes good sense'
and that there 'is no reason why this analysis should force us into adopting a 
radically transcendental position in Husserl's sense, i.e., the position of" a 
"Transcendental-phenomenological idealism"*(Pivcevic, 1971, p.471), This distinction 
between Husserl's anti-psychologism and his transcendentalism cannot be seriously 
maintained. In a review published as early as 1903 the descriptions of phenomenology 
are'said ;to deal neither with lived experiences nor classes of lived experiences of 
empirical persons ... Phenomenology knows nothing of persons, of my experiences or 
those of others, and surmises nothing regarding them: it raises no questions in 
regard to such matters, attempts no determinations, constructs no hypotheses'
(Husserl, 1970b, p,48 - quoted in the 1913 Foreward to the second German edition).
It is true that Husserl does not develop all the consequences of this position for 
some years but this radical anti-psychologistic empiricism is already a transcendental 
empiricism in all but name.
8, ihus Ricoeur in what is nevertheless a useful commentary on the Crisis examines 
this text -£or ‘Husserl's views on the crisis of philosophy and contemporary science , 
These views constitute the core of the second part of the Crisis’ (Ricoeur, 1967,p.161)
9. I return to this question in chapter 7.
A10. For examples see the texts of Ricoeur and Pivcevic referred to above and'the1 
extremely selective readings of Husserl practiced by Schutz and Merleau-Ponty.
11. Compare, for example, the position of Popper: ’it was during the summer of 1919 
that I began to feel more and more dissatisfied with these three theories - the 
Marxist theoi’3r of historjr, psychoanalysis and individual psychology; and I began
to feel dubious about their claims to scientific status,My problem perhaps first 
took the simple form, Vhat is wrong with Marxism,■psychoanalysis and individual 
psychology? Why are they so different from physical theories, from Newton's theory, 
and especially from the theory of relativity?"’ (Popper, 1963,p.34) Popper's 
problem is co find a criterion of scientificity_which includes physics but excludes
INotes ’ chapter 3
Marxism ami psychoanalysis It should be clear that what is or is not duly accredited 
by philosophy is that philosophy's reading of the science in question. Such an 
empiricist reading^, whether it ^recognises1 the science or not, always a distortion 
of the science. Popper’s vulgarisation of Marxism is well known. For an analysis 
of recent Popperian distortions of psychoanalysis see Cosit.>v Freeman and Freeman, 1972.
12. • See Husserl, 1969, chapter 6 and especially §96,'The transcendental problems of
intersubjectivity and of the intersubjective world!, and the Fifth Meditation in 
Husserl, 1970c.
13. Ricoeur op.eit., Gurwitsch, 1966, and Carr's translator’s Introduction to the 
Crisis, pp. xxxi-x.xxviii.
14. For the concept of a definite manifold see Husserl, 1962 §72 and Husserl, 1969 
chapter 3.
15. ■ For an excellent short analysis of Bachel&rdian concepts see 'Gaston Bachelard's 
Historical Epistemology' in lecourt, 1975,
16. This is essentially the position adopted by Koyre with regal’d to the scientific 
advances of Newtonian mechanics. See especially 'Newton and Descartes' in Koyre§ 1S65,
17. See note 11 and Fichant 'L’idee d'un histoire des sciences' in Fichant & 
Pecheux, 1969, A large part of this last text is translated in Theoretical Practice 
no*. 3/4,1971. ----- *---------- --------------------
18. The adequacy of Husserl's account of Descartes, Hume and Kant is not in question 
here. In fact his analysesare not concerned to elicit the views of these individuals 
but rather to determine the meaning of the teleology that is expressed and represented 
in their intentions and activities. It is this theoretical objective that governs 
his mode of analysis of their positions.
19. I refer here to the Liebnizian conception of the form of unity of the totality 
of the world in which, in the formulation of the 'Discourse on Metaphysics§:i.x, 
every individual substance, i.e. each part of the whole, 'expresses the whole 
universe in its own manner1. It is 'like an entire world and like a mirror of God, 
or indeed of the whole worn- which it portrays, each one assaxdXKg in its own fashion; 
almost as the same city is variously represented according to the various situations 
of him who is regarding it*(Leibniz, 1902, pp.14-15). This mode of expressive 
causality which governs the relations of part and whole is reproduced in Hegel's 
conception of the totality and also in Husserl's world-constituting subjectivity.
20. cf. Hegel's elaboration of the concept of the World-Historical individual, 
in the Introduction to Hegel, 1956,
S-eu'no’ce 18. It should-"be"c.leal’ HrrrlrM-hiSixexH-S—reg-g-ciior oj/jm author-ccnfr 1 c
mode of analysis is not based on a conception of the logical conditions of existence 
of the propositions of the text as outlined in chapter 7. Husserl's search
'5&cai_^der^y4nTg-Tne-anlngs^lnpIi^s^r_^rte—dxTTe^erH’—mode.-.oX^analysis.
21. This difficulty is most acute in the caee of logic which is thought to provide 
norms for subjectivity. If logic is an accomplishment of subjectivity there is no 
absolute logic, if there is an absolute logic it cannot be a subjective accomplishment. 
See especially Husserl, 1969, and the discussions of that work in Bachelard, 1968,
and Cavailles, 1947.
22. See note 19, ..... '
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23. See .note 18. It should be clear that Husserl's rejection oI an author-eentri 
mode of analysis not based on the concept of the logical conditions oi existence 
of the propositions of ti discourse briefly outlined in chapter 7, Husserl's 
search for underlying meanings implies a quite different mode of analysis.
24. .Althusser (1972,pp.161-186) introduces this concept to designate a property 
which he belfe^ves to be common to the structure of the conceptions of history of 
both Hegel and Marx, For a critique of the concept of 'structural causality 
which he attributes to the work of Marx, see Hindess & Hirst, 1975, chapter 6.
25. Essentially the same argument applies to the relation between other positive 
sciences and transcendental inquiry. Hence Fink's outline proposal for the 
continuation of the Crisis (published as appendix x) suggests 'the idea, of all
chc sciences being caken back into the unity of transcendental philosophy 1(p.400)
4, i;o~1111,visi.i : Fr.ct rj.d Thrjovy
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^.on-suhjccl: !.v;Lst r.tothocrolo^y in the social sciences is dominated by 
systematic eiapir.ieis:;; and by the self-styled c.r:i.tical; rati on a 1 is ca of il?,rl 
^Poppoi and ills acj^clytos. Those positions are derived from more or 3_ess 
sophisticated forms of positivist epistemology, from more or loss elaborated 
versions of the thesis that, in the last resort, all knov/lcd-c is reducible 
to 'tub facos of experience and that all claims to knowledge must be measured
$
those facts. In this chapter I outline the basic features of positivist 
epistemologyt indicate something of the range of epistemological positions 
that nJy be taken up within positivism, and, finally, demonstrate the inescapable 
circularity and ultimate dogmatism of even- the most sophisticated positivist 
epistemology. Popper's position is discussed in a later chapter. Y.re shall see 
t*j.at it is neither rational, nor critical and that, despite its extravagant 
^ pretensions, its conception of testing denegates the conditions of rigorous 
tneoratical argument and debate. The most significant varieties of systematic 
empiricism, on the ether hand, have already been the subject of a devastating 
and most effective critique by David and Judith Wilier in Systematic Empiricism : 
critique of a pseudo-science. Their argument involves first an internal 
critique of empiricist methodological doctrines to show that, even in terms 
of empiricist, epistemology, these doctrines have no coherent foundation, and, 
secondly, an epistemological argument to establish that empiricism and science 
are quite distinct forms of knowledge. I argue in chapter 7 that their 
epistemology merely counterposes a complex and sophisticated positivistic 
empiricism to the crude and simplistic versions current in the social sciences. 
Nevertheless, the weakness of the Y/illcrsf own epistemology in no way detracts 
from the effectiveness of their thorough and systematic demolition of many of the 
dominant positivistic methodological doctjrines. In that respect their work 
cannot be too highly recommended and I shall not attempt to repeat their arguments
hero.. My critique oi §vgt0tumc BnPtrlcl8a ie'chapter 7 ia ccncornod exciv.sivel 
with their epistei^locy, to particular, rith their contrast botoeou science and 
empiricism as distinct foiaS of hnoeledge »hich, by topresonttog o^iricia,,
as a real process, falls into the fundamental problems 0f the positivist
corjception of laiowiedgo.
Positivist. Spistenoloq-v1
The tem 'positivism' is used in a number of senses in the social sciences 
and an philosophy. In this bool: it is used to refer to a distinctive type 
of epistemology, a theory of the possible forms and conditions of knowledge, 
that is perhaps best characterised by its adherence to a fundamental doctrine 
. of phenomenalism. This doctrine asserts that we can know reality only on 
the basis of experience and, further, that the object of knowledge can only 
be what is given or what can be given in experience. ' There is no real difference 
between the object of knowledge and the phenomena, of experience. Positivism is 
thus.concerned not only to assort the claims of experience as the ultimate 
foundation of human knowledge but also to deny, the possibility of knowledge of 
supersensible objects, that is, of objects whose very definition precludes 
their being given in sensory experience. For positivism, then, there can be 
no essences lying beyond the realm of phenomena and no 'ideal' objects 
corresponding to universal terms such as square, circle, triangle, and so on; 
there are particular triangles but there is no essence of triangle of which 
each particular triangle is a phenomenal realization. To admit even the 
possibility of such an object is to admit the possibility of objects of knowledge 
that do lie beyond the realm of sensible phenomena. But if there are no such 
objects of knowledge then there can be no meaningful discourse concerning them. 
Positivism Is thus a form of subjective idealism; that is, it is a doctrine 
according to which the objective world cannot be regarded as existing independent1 
of man's cognitive activity and means of cognition. Metaphysics, which does
lay claim to. a kaow.ledgo of objects beyond the realm of sensible phenomena, :is 
therefore meaningless. The claim that the world consists of 'spirit* or 
•matter in motion' would be*meaning-less on this view since 'matter' or 'spirit' 
would then be something different from and underlying'the phenomena of experience 
Similarly value judgements and normative statements would not count as knowledge 
since justice’f 'goodness’, etc., are not phenomena of experience, nor, for that 
matter, is ’truth’. ‘ . . •
Positivism is completely opposed to the epistemological bases of the 
subjectivist methodologies examined in the pareceeding chapters. The force and 
the significance of that opposition can be seen if we consider the first section 
of the Intreduction to hant's Critique of Pure Reason, Kant does not doubt 
that all our knowledge begins with experience:
’But though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not 
follow that it all arises out of experience. For it may well be 
that even our empirical knowledge is made up of what we receive 
through impressions and of what our own faculty of knowledge 
(sensible., impressions serving merely as .tha& occaision) supplies 
from itself. If our faculty of knoy.^dge makes any such addition, 
it may be that we are not in a position to distinguish it from the 
raw material, until v/ith long practice of attention we have become 
skilled in separating it.
\
This, then, is a question which at least calls for closer 
examination, and does not allow of any off“hand answer;- whether 
‘ ^ there is any knowledge that is thus independent of experience and
even of all impressions of the senses. Such knowledge is called 
» 3-nd distinguished from the empirical, which has its
sources r posteriori, that is, in experience.’ (Critique of Pure Reason,
(-?■) ... .
■ B, pp,„4.!--*4-3jr
Positivism provides precisely such an roff-hand ruisv/er' to Joint's question, 
namely, that ther^can he no knov.'led^e that is independent o! cxporicnce. han.t’s 
ansv:er, namely, that.a pure0a priori knowledge is indeed possible, requires 
the existence of objects of knowledge that do not belong to the realm of 
sensible phenomena and admits the possibility of rational and meaningful 
discourse concerning at least some such objects. The' neo-Kantian, subjectivist,
conceptions of the cultural and historical sciences are predicated on Kant's
2 # }
answer . They presuppose a knowledge of man as a supersensible ( i.e. 
extra-phenomenal ) object whose meanings, actions, etc,, receive phenomenal 
expression in the objects investigated in the cultural and historical sciences. 
The neo-Kantian sciences of culture and of history are therefore predicated 
on a theoretical position that is strictly precluded by positivist epistemology.
But the positivist repudiation of all objects that in principle cannot be 
given in sensory experience has a further and in many respects a more significant 
implication. ^ Kant fs conception of knowledge ^is- cliscuesed—mere—f-u-l-iy—--in-
• a,-
vl-ppen-d-i'-x—I- but it should be clear even from the- passage cited he-re that the 
notion of priori .knowledge is dependent on a definite conception of the 
conditions of obtaining knowledge on the basis of expeiulence, namely, that 
^empirical knowledge is made up of what we receive through impressions and 
of what our own faculty of knowledge supplies from itself'. luiow'ledy^ of 
the conditions of obtaining knowledge allows one to determine vuiich forms of 
knowledge are in fact possible and what constraints any claim to valid knowledge 
should conform to. Kant's conception of these conditions allows him to conclude 
il\at a pure priori knowledge is indeed possible and it a 1 lows him^ 
furthe^ t£> castigate the bulk of 'pre-critical* metaphysics for failing to 
respect the constraints on such a' knowledge.
Now, any doctrine of the formation of knowledge on the basis of experience 
would seem to depend on some conception of the conditions in which experience
ta':c-s place, and of the processes in which knowledge is ior/aod out of e;:pcrioncc 
s S?
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Y/g shall see that positivist; opistenology is certainly no exception. Yet the
conditions in which experience takes place can hardly.he .conceived as given
in experience itself. The peculiar and distinctive feature of positivist
i while
epistemology is therefore this : thatAit is logically dependent on a conception
of the conditions in which knowledge is produced it must insist that those
conditions cannot be an object of knowledge and, in consequence, that there
car. be no rational discourse concerning those conditions. Positivism’s
insistence that ±xk knowledge must be restricted to what is or may be given
in experience must therefore take the form of a dogmatism; it is a conclusion
3that can be supported by no meaningful argument . I return to this point in 
a later section. For the present it is sufficient to note that positivist 
epistemology doss depend on a conception of the conditions in which knowledge 
takes place but that it prefers not to talk about them.
A Positivist Liethodolcgy : J,S,Mill's A System of logic
If epistemology involves a definite conception o£ the possible forms and 
conditions of knowledge than methodology goes further and attempts to elaborate 
a definite S3rstem of rules and protocols for the formation of knowledge in 
general and of scientific knowledge in particular. A methodology is positivist 
to the extent that its rules and protocols are derived from and in conformity
with positivist epistemology. Propositions that are methodological in this
* *sense .may be found in the worls of any positivist philosopher but few have 
troubled to elaborates systematic methodology. One of the earliest and still 
perhaps the most comprehensive of all systematic positivist methodologies is 
elaborated in «3.S,Mill’s A System of Logic . Mill's 'logic' concerns the 
rules.of valid or correct reasoning and his book contains a lengthy and 
systematic exposition of the canons of experimental inquiry, that is, of the
^ A
methods of the empirical sciences. The following brief examination of Mill's.
logic will serve to highlight some of the fundamental problems of positivist
4 ' ’ .epistemology and methodology . - ____
Mill's methods of experimental inquiry are derived from a definite 
conception of the regularity of nature and from a 'law of universal causation*.
'The course of nature in general is constant, because the course of 
each of the various phenomena that compose it is so, A certain fact 
invariably occux\s whenever certain circumstances are present, and 
does not occur when they are absent; the like is true of another 
fact; and so on. From these separate threads of connection between 
parts of the great whole which we tern nature a general tissue of 
connection unavoidably weaves itself, by which the whole is held 
together. If A is always accompanied by D, B by E, and C by F, it 
follows that AB is accompanied by DE, AC by DF, BC by EF, and finally 
ABC by DEF; and thus the general character of regularity is produced, 
T/hichi along with and in the midst of infinite diversity, pervades all 
nature* (p,206)
The law1 of universal causation affirms that every pheomenon v/hich has a beginning 
5has a cause . That *law' and the conception of the regularity of nature are 
arrived at by induction. The regularity of nature consists in the coexistence 
of an infinity of separate uniformities called 'laws of nature*. The objective 
of the empirical sciences is to discover these laws by identifying and sorting 
uniformities such as 'A is always followed by D*. Mill gives the following as 
examples: ~ .
'the law that air has weight, the law that pressure on a fluid is 
propagated equally in all directions, and the law- that pressure in one 
direction, not opposed by equal pi'essure in the contrary direction, 
px-oduces motion, which does not cease until equilibrium is restored. ’ 
(ibid. ^
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aro also based on experience. Thus the 'necessity' that is soskotines attributed 
to Xogical or i.iacheiiiatica.l propositions is an illusion for the deductive axioms 
referred to in logical or Mathematical reasoning are really the products of 
expedience. The ubiquity of experience in both the experimental and the 
deductive sciences suggests a certain basic .continuity between the methods of 
the sciences and those of everyday life. This point is given a concise 
fGimulation in Mill p table of contents t 'The Logic of Science is also that 
of business and life',
*what are phenomena? The lav/ of universal causation and the doctrine 
of the uniformity of nature are both expressed in terras of phenomena. Unless 
we knov/ exactly what defines a phenomenon we can hardly proceed to a serious 
investigation of the lav/s of nature. Mill's account, such as it is, is given 
in Book III, chapter xiv, 'Of the Limits to the Explanation of the Laws of 
Nature and of Hypotheses': ' . .
It is therefore useful to remark that the ultimate Lav/s of Nature 
. cannot possibly be less numerous than the distinguishable sensations
01 other feelings of our nature ~ those, I mean, which are distinguishable 
fiou one another in quality, and not merely in quantity or degree. For 
example, since there is a phenomenon sui generis called colour, which' 
our consciousness testifies to be not a particular degree of some other 
phenomenon, as heat or odour, or motion, but intrinsically unlike all 
others, it follows that there are ultimate laws of colourj ,
-The ideal limit, therefor©, of the explanation of natural phenomena ... 
would be to show that each distinguishable variety of our sensations ,
P.1 states of consciousness , has only one sort of cause; that, for os
example, whenever we perceive a white colour, there is some condition 
or set of conditions £ka:fc v/hich is always present, and the presence of 
which always produces in us that sensation' (pp,318-9 - emphasis added)
In the last analysis, then, phenomena are to be conceived as distinguishable 
'• V:V
sensations or states of consciousness or else distinguishable combinations of 
these. ’Lav/s of Nature' therefore describe relations which obtain between one 
state of consciousness and another. Yet those 'laws' discussed by Mill do not 
at first sight appear* to relate states of consciousness to each, other at all.
Consider the examples cited above:
t j
l 'the law that air has weight, the law that pressure on a fluid is 
propagated equally in all directions, '
To which distinguishable states of consciousness or sensations do those laws refer?
■ I
How -is the concept of 'pressxire on a fluid’ to be translated into a rigorous 
statement of determinate sensations and states of consciousness? Unless we can 
answer such questions we retain confronted by the awful possibility that 'pressure 
on a fluid' may not be a properly scientific concept at all, that it nay not be 
reducible without residue to the contents of experience, in short, that it may 
be metaphysical and our exemplary ’lav/ of nature' the product of a metaphysical 
presupposition.
Nov/, while these problems clearly arise out of Mill’s attempt to conceive 
of scientific discourse as reducible to the contents of experience it can hardly 
be claimed that he makes any serious attempt to deal with them. For that we must 
consult more recent positivist philosophers. Some examples of attempts to achieve 
a rigorous positivist conception of the phenomena of experience and of the 
relation between those phenomena and scientific concepts are considered below.
If a relatively simple concept such as 'pressure on a fluid' poses problems 
for Mill's position the problem faced by later positivist philosophy seems 
even more serious. Contemporary scientific theories appear to arrive at knowledge of 
electromagnetic fields, electrons, protons, the geometrical structure of 
relativistic space-time continua, and other such entities which can hardly be 
considered to be objects of direct experience. If it is not to dismiss those 
sciences as meaningless rubbish, positivism must maintain that assertions
referring: •to objects inaccessible to immediate perception only appear to refer 
" ¥=?
to objects that transcend experience. In effect vre shall see that it has to 
maintain that tkEXKXKxsE these assertions are only a complex shorthand which, 
correctly interpreted, translate into, or at least make possible, statements 
referring to sensible phenomena. For positivism, therefore, a great deal turns 
on the precise manner in which the relation between theoretical shorthand and 
observational phenomena is conceived.
To return to Mill's ’logic of Science1 it is clear that his ’Four Methods 
of Experimental Inquiry’, namely, the Methods of agreement, difference, joint 
agreeiaent and difference and the method of residues (there is in fact a 
method, concomitant variation), ai’e intended to uncover laws of Nature, the 
regularities which are supposed to pervade the infinite diversity of nature.
The methods are sorting procedures designed td> elicit laws by means of 
systematic observation or, at least, to test hypotheses concerning such 
Ip^ws. For example, Mill’s first canon states .*
*If two or more instances of the phenomen£tn under investigation have 
only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all 
the instances agree is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon’(p,255) 
The nethod of agreement follows directly from the doctrine of the uniformity of 
nature. If nature were not in fact pervaded by regularities such that AB is 
accompanied by DE, AC by DF, and so on this method and all of the others would 
be entirely v/orthless.
It is perhaps unfortunate'for Mill's 'logic' that if nature were indeed regular
^ * L ’ and governed by the lav; of universal causation then its ’infinite diversity',
which Mill also affirms, must render the operation of his methods of experimental
inquiry practically naxtiiiEss impossible. For example, the method of agreement
evidently requires a complete listing of all the circumstances of each instance
of the phenomenon under investigation; otherwise jt would be impossible to
identify one circumstance as the cause (or effect) of the phenomenon in question.
-ao-
No such complete listing is even conceivable except in a finite universe that Is
“ fs ■ '
composed of a small monber el distinct parts. Even as little as a few million
a-
parts would render all four or five methods of inquiry practically inoperable.
In an infinite, or even just a large* universe Mill's methods■of inquiry would 
be impossible to operate.
In practice, of course, neither Mill nor the many social scientists who 
use his own or related sorting, procedures t6 investigate their supposed 
regularities are at all disturbed by mere logical difficulties of this kind.
But Mill himself is not totally unawai'e of the problem here for he comes close 
to citing it in his argument that the social scie3ices can never be exact, First, 
the use of the canons of proof in the social sciences is never entirely 
satisfactory since, although, we may be able to identify the major causes in 
operation it is difficult to* eliminate the effects of minor causes. A second 
argument is more interesting;;:-
fBut the impressieixsK and actions of human beings are not solely the 
result of their present circumstances, but the joint result of those 
circumstances and of the characters of the individuals; and the agencies 
which determine liman- character are so numerous and diversified,
(nothing which has happened to the person throughout life being Yfithout 
its portion of inOuence,) that in the aggregate they are never in 
any two cases exactly similar. Hence even if our science of human 
nature were theoretically perfect, that is, if we could calculate any 
character as v/e cam calculate the orbit of any planet, from .given data
, [Mill fs entphasisj still, as the data are never all given, nor ever 
precisely alike indifferent cases, we could neither siake positive 
predictions, nor lay down universal propositions1 (p.554 - emphasis added) 
If we ignore the element of special pleading in favour of the distinctive 
character of the social sciences it is clear that the difficulty Mill refers 
to is in no way peculiar to any group of sciences and, further, that it
must render the.attainment of theoretical perfection in any science by the 
** .Mill s methods j>ractically irupossi-ble. It is only because he 
already knows what circumstances are pertinent to each particular science - 
he does nor. tell us hov/ — that Mill can imagine that his canons of proof have 
any practical or logical effectivity.
More generally, for Mill's methods to be rendered practicable it would be 
sufficient simply to select for consideration only those circumstances already known 
or considered likely to be pertinent to the phenomenon in question. Once it 
has been established that all but a iinite class of circumstances are not 
pertinelnt then Mill s methods can be relied on to reveal naturefs regularities 
- on the assumption that nature is indeed pervaded by them. Thus the practicability 
and viability of Mill's and related methods must presuppose a knowledgcy^!#^ 
that can only be established in some other fashion, viz. , the knowledge that 
only certain types of phenomena need be considered pertinent. The validity of 
those methods must therefore presuppose the validity of some qxiite different 
form of knowledge. Thus, if nature is regular as Mill supposes then his methods 
-totally impracticable and can never be relied on to produce valid knowledge.
If, on the other hand, they are made practicable they must become logically 
banknipt since their practicability can only depend on the validity of some 
other form of knowledge which Mill's epistemology would rule out of court.
Finally, let us consider the status of the law of univex’sal causation 
and of our belief in the uniformity of nature. In Mill's view they are based 
on induction: • -
. 'the belief we entertain in the universality, throughout nature, of 
the law of cause and effect, is itself an instance of induction, 
and by no means one of the earliest which any of us, or which 
Mankind in general can have made. We arrive at this universal 
generalisation from many laws of inferior generality. We should never 
have had the notion of causation (in the philosophical meaning of 
the term) as a condition of all phenomena, unless many cases of .
causation, or, in other words, many partial uniformities of sequence,
had previously become familiar. The more obvious of the particular
uniformities suggest, and give evidence of, the general uniformity,
and the general uniformity, once established, enables us to prove the
>v
remainder of the particular uniformities of <j:hich it is made up. As, 
however, all rigorous processes of induction presuppose the general uniform 
our knowledge of the particular uniformities from which it was first 
inferred was not, of course, derived from rigoi’ous induction,but 
from the loose and uncertain mode of induction per enumerationem 
simplicem; and the lav/ of universal causation, being collected from 
results so obtained, cannot itself rest on any better foundation'(pp.371-2) 
Is it necessary to comment on the implications of this extra-ordinary passage?
Mill*S' inability to distinguish betv/een the question of the origin of our 'belief-... 
in the universality ... of the law of cause and effect' and the question of its 
valMity (logically presupposed by ±ks his methods of experimental inquiry) is 
well-known; and he does not explain how it is possible for us to be familiar 
with ‘many cases of causation' in the absence of 'the' notion of causation’.
For the rest it is sufficient to repeat the Willers* caustic remark:
*To Justify individual inductions, Mill argued from an induction 
based on them. He justified induction by induction.' (Systematic 
Empiricism, p.35)
The Elements of Experience -
In Mill's view the ultiEiate limits to the laws of nature are determined 
by the ’distinguishable ’sensations or other feelings of our nature' and again 
by "sensations, or other states of consciousness'(p,318), In principle, therefore, 
allphenomena are conceived as being reducible to sensations, states ofI
consciousness, or combinations of these.- Any so-called phenomenon that is not
so redue.iblo in fact cannot be R'iven in experience, it is not a phenomenon
* r*
tit all. To tx*eat of such 'phenomena ' in the sciences is thus to deal with 
objects that are not definable in terms of the elements of experience. Statements 
or 'laws' concerning such objects are, if not strictly meaningless, certainly 
less than complete^ly meaningful. If we are to establish lav/s of nature it is 
necessary to expunge such meaningless or metaphysical elements from the realm
i
of scientific discourse. There is, then, in Mill's conception of the laws of 
nature an implicit programme of reduction of all phenomena to the irreducible 
elements of experience. That programme is not systematically elaborated by 
Mill and he does not attempt a rigorous specification of how precisely the 
irreducible elements of experience are to be conceived. I discuss the problems 
of reduction in the following section. As for the irreducible elements of 
experience, there can be no epiestion here of surveying the variety of more or 
less sophisticated conceptions advanced by different positivist philosophers.
For the purposes of the present- argument it is sufficient to consider two 
' relatively systematic positivist epistemologies in order to establish the 
inescapable dependence of positivist epistemology on a metaphysical conception 
of the world that is both surreptitious and meaningless on any strict positivist 
criterion.
Consider first the position of Ernst Mach, a leading physicist of the late
nineteenth centuiy and one of the most significant figures in the development
V
of contemporary positivist thought,' Mach's epistemology is most clearly set 
out in The Analysis of Sensations whose tone is set in the'fjrSjst chapter, 
^Introductory Remarks : AntiJWtaphysical' That book sets out to eradicate all 
metaphysical notions by means of a conception of the|basic elements of experience 
that appears to dissolve the question of the ’existential' status of experienced 
reality. All objects are, physical or psychological, may be broken down into 
complexes of elements (sensations), ultimate component parts that cannot be
0. ' 
-1&
further subdivided. Science is to be concerned v/ith illations between these
elements. c
For examples, let A,BfC# ... denote 'those complexes of colors, sounds, and 
so forth, commonly called bodies'; KtL,M, .... 'the complex^ known as our 
bodj1*; and 'the complex composed of volitions, memory-images, and the
rest' (p.9). Now these apparent unities such as 'body', lego’, etc.,
'are only makeshifts, designed for provisional orientation and for definite 
practical ends (so that we may take hold of bodies,protect ourselves 
against pain, and so forth)' (p,13)
However., in advanced scientific investigation it is necessary to dispense with 
these makeshift unities :
'The antithesis between ego and world, between sensation (appearance) 
and thing, then vanishes, and we have simply to deal with the connection
K,L,M,.... of which this antithesis
was only a partially appropriate and imperfect expression* (p.14)
For Mach there are only these elements. While it may be practically convenient 
to group them together into relatively permanent unities it is a theoretical 
error to treat those unities as real physical or psychological entities which
cause sensations in us.
'We see an object having a point S. If we touch S, that is, bring it 
into connexion with our body, we receive a prick. We can see S, without 
feeling the prick. But as soon as we feel the prick we find S on 
the skin. The visible point, therefore, is a permanent nucleus, to 
1 which the prick is annexed, according to circumstances, as something- 
accidental. Froai the frequency of analogous circumstances we 
ultimately accustom ourselves to regard all properties of bodies as 
,effects,‘ proceeding from permanent nuclei and conveyed to the ego 
through the medium of the body; which effects we call sensations.
By this operation, however, these nuclei are deprived of their entire
.f
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'sensox’y content, and convex'ted into mere mental symbols. The
assertion, then, is correct that the world consists only of our 
sensations. In which case we have knowledge only of sensations,
and the assumption of the nuclei referred to, or of a reciprocal 
action between them, from which sensations proceed, turns out to be 
quite idle and superfluous. Such a view can only suit with a
half-hearted realism or a half-hearted philosophical criticism' (p, l2-£- ■.pL-W/tiUlt
Sensations are not a means to- knowledge of something else; they arc^the irreducible 
elements of the world. To postulate anything beyond sensations and causing them 
is to lapse into metaphysics, into a realm of pseudo-problems. Similarly, there 
is no such thing as an ’I1 of ’ego* that receives sensations:
*The primary fact is not the ego, but the elements (sensations) ....
The elements constitute the I. I have the sensation green, signifies 
that the element green occurs in a certain given complex of other 
elements (sensations, memories). When I cease to have the sensation 
green, when I die, then the e3.ements no longer occur in the ordinary 
familiar association. That is all, 1 (pp.23-4) :-
Thera’ exists nothing other* than sensations and the whole of science consists of 
the analysis of the various relations that obtain between them. Physics deals 
with one kind of relation and psychology with another but both, in the final 
analysis, deal with the same fundamental elements.
Unfortunately the effect of reducing the observer and what he observes into 
tne plane of sensations is to produce a conception of the world as a network of 
sensations, a conception that can only be regarded as metaphysical in Mach’s 
own sense of the term. Two points here are absolutely crucial. First, consider 
the notion of relatively stable complexes such as ’ego’, 'body*, ’object *, If 
there is no 'I* or ’ego’ to observe those complexes but only'- the elements 
thenselves then how is the existence, let alone the relative stability over time,
x
of complexes to be established? How is it possible for certain complexes to 
be recognised and admitted to the corpus of knowldjc^^ , however 'makeshift1
> ’ tv
or 'provisional1 such knowledge may be? Mach himself answers a rather different 
question, namely, why are certain particular types of complex delimited and 
others not?
’The delimitation of the ego, therefore, is instinctively effected, 
is rendered familiar, and possibly becomes fixed through heredity.
Owing- to their high practical importance, not only for the 
individualjbut for the entire species, the composites 'ego1 and 
’body1 instinctively make good their claims, and assert themselves 
with elementary force1 (p,23)
Here complexes are delimited because of their 'practical importance1 - 
presumably for certain complexes - and that delimitation is effected through the 
agency of instinct and heredity operating, no doubt, on the elements themselves. 
It is clear that this account supposes some dietinct entity, affected by 
practical considerations and instinct and formed by heredity, which does 
receive and organise elements into complexes, But, on Mach’s own account 
there are only the elements themselves. We must therefore conclude that the 
formation and z’ecognition of complexes requires that certain complexes are 
endowed with a wondrous capacity both to recognise themselves and to recognise 
other complexes. That ’capacity’ is clearly a metaphysical notion since it 
is a property of a complex of elements that is not an element itself,
Secondly, Mach's position requires that elements occur in various 
combinations : -'when I die, then the elements no longer occur in the ordinary 
familiar association’ (pp.23-4). But the elements themselves persist! The 
content of the ego is not confined to the individual. Indeed:
’Contents of consciousness that are of universal significance break 
through these limits of the individual, and, attached of course to 
individuals again, can enjoy a continued existence of an impersonal, superpersona 
kind, independently of the personality by means of which they were 
developed, ’(ibid.) . -
The religious and^piz'itualist character of this position is evident. We must 
learn to renounce individual mortality' <p,25 - emphasis added) in the name'of 
the immortality of the elements. At other points in the text (e. g, pp. 32-6)
Mach's exposition clearly requires that the same physical bodies ( A,8,0, etc,,) 
are associated with different human bodies ( K, L,M, and egos (t^
The-same sensations are experienced, by different human observers. In both cases 
the essential problem remains the same, namely, that if Mach is to avoid an 
overt and systematic solipsism he must maintain that the same elements may 
persist from one person to another. Elements that are defined at the level 
of individual experience are required to possess a supra-individual, Intersubjecti 
.character that, since it cannot be given in individual experience, can only be 
regarded as metaphysical. Thus Mach's antimetaphysical reduction of the world 
to sensations requires a surreptitious metaphysical grounding in an 
intersabjective domain of experience.
k A further and equally fundamental problem for Mach's position arises from 
the fact that knowledge, whether scientific or 'only makeshift', consists not 
of complexes of elements but of statements. Not only"must complexes manifest 
themselves, they must also be described. The problem of the relation between 
language and the alleged elements of experience is not considered by Mach, but 
it is taken up in various forms in more recent positivist philosophy. Early 
logical positivism maintained that it is not so much the content of experience 
(e.g. the elements) that is represented in knowledge but the formal structure 
relations of the given. Ihsowledge as such does'not begin until we recognise 
relations of similarity or dissimilarity between experiences. Thus the essence 
of, say, ’red* lies not in the experience itself but in its unique set of 
relations to other qualities.
The most exabsxate radical and systematic elaboration of this conception 
is given in Carnap s The Logical Structure of the World , Carnap attempts to 
show that all concepts of empirical science can be constructed by purely logical
11/
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operations' on a single primitive relation and the primitive elements between 
which it holds. The relation and the* elements are logically irreducible and 
indefinable; they can only be shown or pointed to,. The primitive elements 
are total momentary experiences, cross-sections of consciousness9 and the 
primitive relation-that holds between them is 'remembrance of similarity'.
Thus, it is argued, any proposition of the empirical sciences can be completely
‘ i
translated into a complex list of propositions which express the relational 
structure of the given and as represented in the fundamental relation and 
elements. Knowledge expresses the structure of the given and points to its 
content. The propositions of the empirical sciences express the formal 
structure and not the content of the given. The formal sciences (logic, pure 
mathematics), in contrast to Mill's conception, have no empirical significance 
whatever and their .propositions are tautologies, they say nothing.
Knowledge therefore consists in communicable statements and propositions in 
a language whose primary function is to express the structure of the given.
Ian£jg%e., or at least its elementary propositions, express the structure of the 
world by virtue of a structural similarity between propositions and given facts.
It is a mirror of the world. The truth or falsity of an elementary' proposition 
is ascertained by comparing it with the given facts. The truth or falsity of 
more comp3.ex propositions may be ascertained by reference to that of the 
elementary propositions into which it translates. Knowledge communicates the 
structure of the given but is based upon the content since its elementary 
propositions are definable only through pointing to the content.10 
" However, while logical positivism has at least the merit of recognising 
a problem in the relation it proposes between knowledge statements and the content 
of the given it cannot avoid its dependence on a surreptitious metaphysics.
First, the content of the given can hardly be relied upon to point to itself 
nor can it judge its own similarity to or its difference from the content of 
some other given. Each act of pointing to or judging similarity is thus a function
of something: that 'Is not itsjjlf a giv'en content of experience. That entity,
J0
since it is not in principle reducible to the immediatly givon, cannot be the 
subject of meaningful empirical discourse. It is logically, presupposed but it 
cannot be discussed except in metaphysics - which is meaningless. It should be
emphasised that the problem hex’e does not concern fehsk status of ’other minds’
11‘or of psychological concepts within Carnap’s programme , Even if it were
X^ossible to construct concepts of ^stfesrxEi±Heisjt ’minds’, ones own or others,
on the basis of experience there could still be no warrant in the content of
the given for identifying such constructs with v/hat is logically presupposed
in the notionss of ’pointing to’ the content of experience. The content of
cwhat is pointed to ^.an hardly contain the pointer and the act of pointing.
Thus, for logical positivism to identify the constraict of ’mind’ or 'ego’
with what has experiences is to go beyond the given into metaphysics. Furthermore
if language does communicate the structure of the given then that structure must
be the same for all users of the language. If it were not the same then language
could comniunilt.cate nothing. Once again, the antimetaphysical programme of
reduction of the world to the content of immediate experience requires a
surreptitious metaphysical grounding in the an intersubjective x'ealm of
experience. In its conception of the relation between language and the world
logical positivism clearly presupposes a definite conception of the conditions
in which hjoasiHElge experience takes place and of the processes in which knowledge
is formed out of experience but those conditions and processes cannot themselves
12be,, the object of empirical knowledge or of meaningful discourse . hike all 
positivism, logical positivism represents a dogmatism, a conclusion unsupported 
by rational argument.
Finally, it should be clear that logical positivism does avoid the patent 
solipsistic tendencies of Mach’s position with its conception of knowledge as 
commmicable. Knowledge is not reducible to the expex^nce of any one human 
subject. But the relatipn between the content of the given and the content of
knowledge, even of its elementary propositionsj remains problematic. Since 
the content of the' given caiuonly be pointed to there is an irreducible 
discrepancy between proposition and the given itself. How, for example, is 
it possible to establish that an elementary proposition does indeed correspond 
to the given facts? Does the structure of the given determine a unique 
totality of true elementary propositions? Conventionalism is a variant of
positivist epistemology that denies the existence of elementary propositions
13in the sense of logical positivism . Descriptions, even elementary description
always have a certain conventional character. For example, it may be argued
that the geometrical structure of space is a function of the measuring
techniques we use to determine it and that the choice of elementary geometrical
terms, is to some extent a matter of agreement among scientists. I will discuss
the effects of the conventionalist rejection of elementary propositions in
connection with Popper’s 'critical rationalism* but one consequence of
conventionalism is worth noting in the present context. If all empirical
knowldge is constituted in part by convention among scientists then there can
be no question of identifying the structure of the real andxtkej with the
structure of our empirical knowledge. This fact induces a crucial modification
of the anti-metaphysical stance adopted by other varieties of positivist
epistemology since, in explicitly recognising a discrepancy between the
world and our empirical knowledge of it, conventionalism opens a space for
14metaphysical discourse and for religion . Popper has always taken a tolerant 
view' of metaphysics : it is not science but it may well be meaningful and it 
may even be necessary for the development of science.
Theory and the Phenomena of Experience
The most elementary solution to the problem of the relation between 
scientific concepts and the phenomena of experience is to treat the former as 
stx*ictly definable in tersm of the latter. That, in effect, is *ka Mill's
solution when he considers the fundamental laws of nature pertaining to the
distinguishable sensations and states of consciousness. For Mill all legitimate
t
scientific propositions are either strictly translatable into a finite conjunction 
X actual or possible observations or else they arc universal generalisations 
from such statements. Now, the latter, for example, the proposition thE4?=B=3r3r 
’All Havens are Black’, cannot be translated into any finite number of observation 
statements since itt refers to all ravens and not to any finite number of them.
Such universal statements are called * lav/s of nature* and they are to be 
established by means of the canons of experimental Inquiry discussed above.
Thus all scientific terns and propositions are strictly definable in observation
terms and propositions coupled in certain cases with the universal quantifier.
In this view there is a scientific method and it consists in the application
of various sorting devices to the phenomena of experience. This crude and
simplistic conception of science which admits no systematic distinction between
concept and observation still dominates positivist methodology in the social 
15 ’sciences,
• Carnap’s book, The Logical Structure of the World, represents one of the 
first attempts to establish on a systematic basis the strict
definability of scientific concepts in terms of elementally propositions which, 
as we have seen, describe the essential structure of the given. Those elementary 
propositions refer to ’cross-sections of consciousness ’ and 'remembrance of 
similarity’ but Carnap maintained that propositions formulated in a ’physical 
object language* were methodologically equivalent in the sense that the propositions 
o^one kind were definable in terms of propositions of the other. Thus the 
physical object language could be treated as the basic observation language 
and the critierion for legitimacy of scientific terms and propositions could
be formjjtulated in relation to that language. All legitimate scientific concepts 
are therefore definable in 'physicalistic* terms. In this sense all empirical 
discourse, including psychology, may be interpreted as pertaining to observable 
features of physical objects.
Now, it is an easi1, matter to show that numerous concepts of the sciences
or other ompiricalssd is course cannot be given strict definition in any
'physicalistic’ or 'sensationalistsc' observation language. In ’Testability
and Meaning' (1936) Carnap argued that an important class of predicates
indispensable to empiidcal science, cannot be explicitly defined in obsei’a'Qjtion
terms. For example, the disposition predicate 'soluble in water' may be used
to assert that a given class of objects, say, Tumps of sugar, will, as a
matter of general law, respond to specific conditions in a certain characteristic
manner - sugar will dissolve in water. Thus the attribution of a disposition
to a given object is inextricably bound up with the assertion of a general law,
e.g, that sugar dissolves in water. Neither 'soluble in water’ nor any other
$
disposition predicate can be given explicit definition in observation terms 
alone. More complex concepts of the natural sciences pose a similar problem. 
Carnap therefore maintained that the interpretation of theoretical terms in 
observation language is always incomplete and that theoretical sentences are 
not in general translatable into the observation language.
. What then remains of positivism's insistence that all empirical knowledge 
is reducible to the phenomena of experience? Short of dismissing the natural 
sciences as metaphysical rubbish positivism must somehow reconcile the 
reducibility of scientific concepts to observable phenomena with the 
impossibility of explicit definition of the former in terms of the latter.
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The task of reconciliation entailed a considerable liberalisation of empiricism*''
A more liberal form than explicit definition for the legitimate introduction 
of^ concepts was given by the so-called reduction sentences in 'Testability and 
Meaning1 and a further, more systematic .liberalization of the status of scientific, 
concepts was outlined in me Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts'. 
This latter involves the introduction of concepts through theoretical postulates 
and correspondence rules which XHaaK»± connect some theoretical terms with 
observation terms. Theoretical terms can still have an empirical interpretation 
but it is an interpretation that is necessarily incomplete. The essential
difference between theoretical terms and explicitly defined terms is that only
' V?
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the latter have a complete pbservational interpretation. In Carnap's viev/ 
the concepts of theoretical physics and of other advanced sciences are best 
considered to be theoretical terms in this sense. Scientific theory is therefore 
regarded as a 'freely floating system' of primitive theoretical concepts 
connected with one another by axioms. Further theoretical concepts are defined
C-
by means of the primitive concepts and eventually some are related to observation 
terms by means of explicit correspondence rules. In this way the freely 
floating network is finally 'anchored to the solid ground of observable facts ' 
(Autobiography, p.78).
Thus, while retaining the fundamental positivist doctrine of the reduclbility
of empirical knowledge to the given phenomena of experience Cai’nap's 'liberalization
also allows the sciences 'the great advantages of the theoretical language, viz. •
the great freedom of concept formation and theory formation, and the great
explanatory and predictive power of a theory' (ibid., p. 80), In his view :
•the prodigious growth of physics since the last century depended
i essentially upon the possibility of referring to unobservable
entities like atoms and fields. In our century, other branches of
science such as biology, psychology, and economics have begun to
17apply the method of theoretical concepts to some extent ’ (ibid,)
Finally, what remains of the anti-metaphysical impetus of logical positivism
and, in particular, of its attempted rigorous demarcation between the meaningful 
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and the meanii^less? Quine and Hempel have maintained, that it is no longer
possible to make a clear distinction between tks meaningful and meaningless
terms so that the distinction must be taken as, if anything, a matter of degree.
The exclusion of 'metaphysical* discourse from the realm of science must therefore
18be a matter of degree also . Carnap does not agree. In 'The Methodological 
Character of Theoretical Concepts' he formulates criteria for the significance, 
i.e. the meaningfulness, of theoretical terms based on the operation of explicit 
correspondence rules and on the introduction of theoretical terms in serial order.
2.4
The cori’espondence rules connect theoretical terms of science to observational
0-
terrns such as 'blue*, 'hot1, 'cold', fheavier then*. For example :
fa xmle might refer to two material bodies u and v (i.e, observable 
at locations u and v)J they must be neither too small nor too large 
for an observer to see them and to take them in his hands. The
f ,
x*ule may connect the theoretical term 'mass ' v/ith the observable
predicate 'heavier than* as follows: "if u is heavier than v, the
^ mass of u' (i.e. the mass of the coordinate region u' corresponding
to u) is greater than the mass of v'" 1 (Meth. p.48)
Notice that this rule does not directly connect the mass of, say, the earth with
observable predicates. To be meaningful the mass of the earth must be related
to other, already significant, the'oi’etical terms by means of the postulates
of the pertinent scientific theory. The procedure is as follows. Theoretical
terms must be examined in serial order-. Sxkse Some terns are rendered significant
by the correspondence rules. Other terms can be shown to be significant
provided that for each such term, M, sayjthe mass of the earth, there is a
definite proposition involving that term and others already known to be
significant such that it is possible to derive with the help of the postulates
and correspondence rules pn observational sentence that cannot be otherwise
derived. 'The mass of the earth' is significant if it is possible to derive
the prediction of anjobservable event from a proposition concerning the magnitude
of that 'mass ' and if that prediction cannot be derived without reference to 
A-
'the mass'of the earth*. Here the significance of theoretical terms is 
necessarily relative to the postulates of a theory.
If the significance of theoretical .terms and propositions can be established 
in this way then perhaps the old anti-metaphysical doctrines may be preserved.
The admission of theoretical terms must not be understood as entailing the
acceptance of :
,'certain vontoloEicalM doctrines in the traditional metaphysical
sense. The usual ontological questions about the "reality,,r (in an 
£
alleged metaphysical sense) of numbers, classes, space-time points, 
bodies, minds, etc,, are pseudo-questions without cognitive content.
In contrast to this there is a good scientific sense of the wox'd 
"real", viz. , the cornmon-sense use and the scientific use' (ibid, pp. 44-5)
But what of the theory itself in terms of which the significance of particular 
terns may be established:
| 'For an observer to accept the postulates of T, means here not simply
to take T as an uninterpreted calculus, but to use T together with
specified rules of correspondence, C, for guiding his expectations
by deriving predictions about future observable events from observed
events with the help of T and C (ibid. p,45)
Now the fact that terms are significant only relative to a definite theory
must leave the choice of that theory entirely arbitrary and undetermined by
any■positivist criteria of meaning provided only that concepts may be articulated
on observation by means of correspondence rules and the postulates of the theory.
Only propositions may be tested against the phenomena of experience, the basic
postulates of the theory are quite immune. It is difficult to see why the
rational theology of, say, Aquinas or Duns Scotus could not be adapted to
19satisfy that rather weak condition , To accept the postulates of such a 
theology would mean then to use it, together with appropriate correspondence 
rifles, for guiding one's expectations. 'Gods', 'spirits \ afkl the 'exorcism of 
spirits', and other such entities would be no less real than 'numbers, classes, 
space-time points, bodies, minds, etc.In this sense rational theology, suitably 
adapted, may well be perfectly meaningful in the new 'liberal' era of positivism. 
Where early logical positivism excluded certain toms and propositions as 
meaningless the 'liberal* doctrine can do so only in relation to a given body 
of theory. Thus Carnap's 'legitimization' of scientific theory opens the .way 
fox- the possible legitimization of theoretical discourses that are patently no’fc Sc<A
Critique of .Positivist Epistemology
• *
In the preceding sections of this chapter I have given a brief and very 
schematic outline of a number of distinct positivist episteijiologj.es. The 
level of rigour and theoretical sophistication within positivism varies 
considerably : the-.later position of Carnap is clearly the most rigorous 
and systematic of those considered here. It is easy enough to establish the 
incoherence and downright absurdity of the crude positivism of, say, Mill 
or Mach and I have indicated a number of arguments that may be advanced 
against their positions. It is now necessary to examine the general.structure 
of positivist epistemology and to consider whether, within the limits of its 
fundamental 'rule of phenomenalismany logically coherent and rationally 
defensible epistemological position can be established.
Positivism is an epistemology. It represents a particular form of the 
general empix’icist conception of knowledge in which knowledge is conceived as 
resulting from a process that takes place between a subject and something that 
is given to or confronts that subject, phenomena, objects, the world, etc.
The 'subject' and the 'object' from which it extracts knowledge may be variously 
conceived but in all cases the structure of the empiricist conception of 
knowledge establishes some form of fundamental opposition between, say, 'theory' 
and 'fact’j'men' and 'world', 'subject* and 'object', 'transcendental subjectivity* 
and 'transcendent facticity*, and so on. All epistemology, and all its 
derivative discourses, in particular, methodology and philosophy of science, 
takes some such opposition as constitutive of its theory of knowledge, the ■>
aim of which is to lay down the conditions in which valid knowledge is possible.
In all cases, and however the opposition is conceived, epistemology confronts 
a fundamental problem of circularity in that its theory of knowledge logically 
presupposes a knowledge of the conditions in which knowledge takes place, that 
is, of the tenjis of the opposition, 'subject' and 'object', and of the character
of the relation between them. Thus the specification of the criteria of the 
validity of - knowlc^e must presuppose the validity of the 'knowledge1 from
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which that specification is°derived.
Positivism differs fi'om the epistemologies of, say, Kant and Husserl in its 
conception of precisely what is given to the knowing subject, in its refusal 
to assign any transcendental attributes to the subject and in its negative 
’off-hand answer* to Kant *s question, 'whether there is any knowledge that is 
independent of experience and even of all impressions of the senses?'. I 
argue that positivism is indeed subject to the strictures just outlined and) 
further, that its 'knowledge' of the 'subject'-'object' relation from which 
its epistemological doctrines are derived is specifically precluded from the 
realm of meaningful discourse by those doctx-ines. In that respect positivist 
epistemology and its secondary discourses on methodology and philosophy of 
science are logically incoherent and rationally indefensible.
We have seen that positivism maintains that all knowledge, with the possible 
exception of that px^ovided by the formal sciences of logic and pure mathematics, 
is reducible to thephenomena of experience. Knowledge is either 'empirical1 
in the sense of being so reducible, or it is analytic and tautologous. A 
proposition that is not reducible to phenomena can have no empirical significance; 
it is either analytic, that is, true or false by virtue of its meaning alone, 
or else it is meaningless. Positivist epistemology therefore must logically 
presuppose that there are Indeed knowing subjects with the appropriate 
capacities, that they do indeed experience phenomena of the approved kind and 
that those phenomena consist of the sole and ii’reducib^^ elements of the world 
or combinations of those elements. In addition, positivism supposes that the 
essential structures of experience are Intersubjectively valid and that knowing 
subjects are also endowed with language and the capacity to communicate facts.
Thus early logical positivism treats the content of the given as essentially 
private yet, by happy chance, its structure is intersubjective and mirrored
in the elementary propositions of language. But what is the status of these 
logically necessary presupp6siti6ns of positivist epistemology? If they are 
to count as knowledge then positivism lapses into the circularity indicated 
abovei the validity of its doctrine of the conditions of valid knowledge 
depends on the validity of its own presuppositions. If they are not knowledge
'■'7'then positivist epistemology is at best an^j empty dogmatism, a doctrine with 
no possible foundation in rational proof or argument.
Now, if we restrict ourselves to positivism's ovm conception of knowledge 
then it is easy to shov^ that the second alternative must apply. Consider the 
knowing subject fully endowed with various wondrous attributes. No such 
entity is an irreducible phenomenon of its own experience, a * cross-
section of consciousness’, 'element* or ’sensation*. But, it may be suggested, 
propositions concerning knowing subjects ai'e reducible to elementary propositions 
concerning irreducible phenomena. It may kHXEKggested , for example, be possible 
to construct concepts of human subjects, oneself and others, by means of Carnap's 
primitive ’cross-sections of consciousness’ and 'remembrance of similarity’ or 
in his 'physicalistic’ observation language. In this sense it may be argued 
that discourse concerning knowing subjects is, at least in principle,
meaningfulness. Unfortunately no
argument along those lines can save positivism from incoherence. For the sake 
of argument let us admit that a meaningful concept of human subject is possible 
in positivist. terms. Nevertheless there could be no warrant in the content of 
the given itself for the claim that what is experiencing this content is indeed
such a ’subject* nor that other 'subjects’ experience givens of their ovm. In
either case an inference is called for that can hardly avoid going beyond the 
evidence of the senses. In that respect the concept of the knowing subject
endowed with all the attributes required for the positivist theory of knowledge
has no empirical significance, it is metaphysical. Thus positivist epistemology
is the product of an ontology, a doctrine of what there is, that on its own
' <c? .
terras is metaphysical and therefore meaningless.
It only remains to consider the effects of the treatment of language and 
of concepts as a result.of the ’liberalization' of positivism's criteria of 
meaningfulness and, in particular, of its later conception of theory as a 
'freely-floating system’ ultimately'anchored to the solid ground of observable 
facts' (Autobiography, p.7S) There can be no escape from the circularity of 
epistemology but perhaps some of the other problems of positivism may be 
avoided with this more 'liberal* treatment of language.
* It Is clear that the crude positivism of Mill and of Mach must presuppose 
an intersubjectivity of the world, so that its ultimate constituents and the 
relations between them are basically the same for all human subjects, and a 
language in which knowledge may be stated and communicated. The relation 
between language and the irreducible elements of the given is treated as 
unproblematic. In particular, the problem of the articulation of empirical 
propositions onto the content of the given receives no sei’ious consideration.
In that x-espect the epistemologies of Mill and Mach are manifestly inadequate. 
They may be interesting historical curiousities and they may provide forceful 
statements or systematic elaborations of positivist dogma but as theories of 
knowledge they have little to recommend them.
The picture theory of language elaborated in the early work of Wittgenstein 
and early logical positivism has at least the merit of recognising the‘.necessity 
of articulating propositions on to the content of the given. Knowledge 
communicates the structure of the given but it cannot express the content.
The latter cannot be stated, it can only be pointed to and seen of not seen 
as the case may be. Elementary propositions therefore represent the point 
at which reason and argument must cease, where knowledge is confronted by the 
raw given which it may recognise or fail to recognise but which it cannot 
dispute. This conception of a naked confrontation between an observation 
language or a picture language and -the world'-poses a problem for positivist 
theory to which I return below. For the present notice that the picture theory
30-
must strictly confine laiowledge to propositions expressing the structure of
the given. Universal propositions, for example, Mill's 'laws of nature1 or
even 'All Ravens are Black', cannot be represented as finite combinations
of elementary propositions. Thus the positivist conception, accepted Popper,
that science aims at the formulation of universal propositions requires that
science goes beyond the content of the given. Where positivism sees here an
inference to be justified, i.e. the problem of induction, Popper and his
acolytes maintain that universal propositions can only be falsified by the
given. But in both cases the conception of science as aiming at universal
propositions entakis a necessary discrepancy, between scientific theory on
V ‘
the one hand and statements of observation on the other.
I am not concerned here with the positivist problem of induction but with 
its conception of language. Once scientific discourse is conceived as containing 
the tautologies of elementary logic and both universal propositions and 
descriptions of observations thenjit must also contain concepts that cannot 
be given complete definition in observation terms. Elementarj* logical 
operations on universal propositions, which cannot be fully translated into 
statements of observation, suffice for the definition of concepts that are 
not definable in observation terms alone. The simplest possible case of such 
a concept would be the so-called disposition predicates, e.g. 'soluble in 
water', analysed by Carnap in 'Testability and Meaning' but there is no 
reason why the formation of theoretical concepts should be restricted to 
dispositions Is. If universal propositions are a legitimate and meaningful 
part of science then so are the concepts formed from them. Thus the division 
of the language of science into a theoretical and an observation language 
and the conception of scientific theory as a 'freely-floating system’ in 
relation to observable facts are logically necessary consequences of a 
conception of knowledge that combines a picture theory of language, with
logic and pi^re mathematics"as tautologies, and the doctrine that science
v:
‘ a
foxwlates universal laws. ^For all its rigoui* and sophistication Camap's 
‘liberalization ' of positivism's meaning criteria involves little more-than 
a systematic elaboration- of the effects of logical positivism's conception of 
language and of science while hisstrict specification of the conditions 
for the legitimate introduction of 'theoretical' terms is designed to ensure
I
the primacy of the ultimate positivist dogma of phenomenalism. I have 
suggested that it would be difficult to exclude rational theology from the 
realm of meaningful discourse under the new 'liberal' dispensation.
*We can now return to the effects of ‘liberalization' and of the logical 
positivist theory of language. I have argued that positivist epistemology is 
the effect of an ontology that is meaningless in terns of its own criteria 
of validity. Does the 'liberal' version escape that absurd consequence?
Since the knowing subject and its language are neither ’cross-sections of 
consciousness' nor 'physical objects' their concepts can have no place in 
any strictly conceived positivist observation language. Perhaps the concepts 
of 'knowing subject' and 'language' belong to the theoretical language instead. 
At first sight this proposal seems quite promising. Given the character of the 
criteria of empirical significance it would be sufficient for the concepts of 
'language' and 'knowing subject' to be necessary conditions for the derivation 
of empirical predictions for them to be admitted to the corpus of meaningful 
concepts. Thus, it seems, 'liberal' positivism may be saved from incoherence 
if not from circularity and dogmatism. But this 'solution * reckons without 
the effects of the primacy of the doctrine of phenomenalism. To admit that: 
certain concepts to theoretical discourse is not to be understood as accepting 
'certain ’,ontological,, doctrines in the traditional metaphysical sense' (Meth. 
pp.44-5). On the contrary, the questions of the'reality' or 'existence' of 
entities designated by these concepts ' are pseudo-questions without cognitive
content'(ibid^ ). The folltowing proposition is therefore without cognitive
n ’ A
content: , e
the existence of at least one knowing subject is a necessary condition 
of there being any content of the given and the existence of 
language is necessarj* for the communication of its structure.
Knowing subjects can hardly be less real than the content of the given which 
they make possible nor language less real than the structure of the given 
which it expresses. But to make that assertion is to assert an ’ontological1 
doctrine ’in the traditional sense’. Thus ’liberal’ positivism remains a product 
of an ontology that is meaningless in terns of its own criteria. It is no 
moie successful than the more primitive forms in avoiding incoherence.
Finally it is necessary to comment on the logical positivist conception of
the articulation of language on the irreducible elements of the given. In
effect this involves the conception of a point where reason and argument must
cease, where elementary propositions in some alleged observation or picture
language are confronted by irreducible givens. The observation language performs
a double role in the■positivist conception of science. On the one hand it
belongs to science: its terms are, at least in principle, the terms of scientific
to
observation and all ’theoretical’ terms are reducible^, if not strictly definable^ 
in, observation terms. On the other hand it designates the elementary constituents 
of the real and it expresses the structure of their interrelations. Only on 
condition that the observation language performs this double role can scientific 
theory, in any positivist conception, be rigorously articulated on the irreducible 
givens that science is supposed to know. The observation language represents 
the veiy frontiers of theoretical knowldege, the ultimate point beyond which 
theory cannot go. But there can be no demonstration that an observation language 
does indeed designate the irreducible elements of the real and express its 
relational structure, that there is not, perhaps, some ’finer’ structure of 
the given which the observation language in question cannot discriminate. Thus
although any particular observation statement can be disputed, by reference, 
<rfor example,, to ^rrors of observation or the competence of the observer, no
amount of pointing at.or showing can ever establish that the language in
question does indeed express the relational structure of what is pointed at.
Any such demonstration would of necessity prove circular: it would require
reference to an observation language with respect to which the same problem
would arise. There can be no proof that a proposed observation language is
|
an observation language in the strict sense and that it does not include a 
hidden strain of metaphysics and meaninglessness. Thus, even if its criteria 
of meaningfulness and empirical significance are accepted logical positivism
is condemned to dogmatism in practice. It must assume, without hope of 
demonstration, that a particular theoretical terminology, say, that of physics,
‘■t
is indeed meaningful and then judge others by its standard. But, is there can
be no proof that any given language is an observation language then there can
be nothing but positivist dogma, viz,, its meaningless ontological conception
of the world, to show that an observation language is even possible. In fact,
as I ai'gue in the next chapter ±±£, it is impossible to provide a positivist
20demonstration of the possibility of an a-theoretical observation language.
Now Popper has always denied the existence of an observation language in 
the strict positivist sense and, with the 'liberalization' of logical positivism's 
meaning criteria, many authors (e.g. Quine, Hempel, Kuhn) have disputed the 
possibility of maintaining a rigorous distinction between theoretical and 
observation languages. Nevertheless these authors maintain some allegiance 
to thepositivist position that knowledge is reducible to the phenomena of 
experience and that therefore theory is to be tested against the facts of 
observation. Others have tended to assign what can only be called a 'transcendental 
function to language maintaining, in effect, that the elements of the world 
and our knowledge of it are essentially structured by language so that the 
investigation of the structure of the world is best conducted, in the first 
instance, by means of an investigation of language itself. This tendency
has been most clearly aeveJ.oped in the work of Wittgenstein and in the so-called 
analytic philosophy. This position would take us beyond the limits of' r? ■■
n * A
positivist epistemology andoit need not be considered here. It is however 
necessary to xiisist comment on those positions which appear to retain a 
residual positivism while denying the possibility of a strict observation-,., 
language. If all observation is to some extent theoretical how is it possible
to maintain that all knowledge is reducible to observation and that theory isj
to be tested against the 'facts' of observation? In the work of Carnap it is 
clear that the doctrine of the reduction of theoretical propositions to 
statements of observation and the related doctrine of testability are effects 
of the concept of a strict observation language. Theory must be tested against 
observation statements because these latter, at least in principle, rea ny do 
designate the given and they really do express its relational structure. If, 
on the other hand, there is no strict observation language then observation 
statements do not stx’ictly designate the given nor do they strictly express 
its relational structure. Why then test theory against observation statements?
If observation statements do not express the structure of the real then why 
should v/e accept a theory if it conforms to them or reject it as false if it 
fails to conform? The doctrines of reduction and of the testing of theory 
against the 'facts' of observation defensible only within a strict positivist 
epistemology by reference to its strict observation language. If the possibility 
of an observation language is denied - and it cannot be defended - th^n these 
doctrines have no possible xational foundation. I argue this case at length in 
reflation to Popper's epistemology in chapter 6,
I have argued then that positivist epistemology in all its forms., however 
crude or sophisticated its formulations, is logically incoherent and rationally 
indefensible. The secondary discourses of positivism such as philosophy of 
science and methodology are therefore untenable. It follows that the sciences 
and other empirical investigations, for example, social surveys, cannot be 
represented as either testing or measuring theory against the template of the
_21 
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Tho,protocols of positivist methodology therefore have no pertinence
’ A
for any substantive 'empirical1 investigations. Furthermore, since
positivist methodology is logically impossible, they cannot be realised in 
piactice. I return to the significance of this point in my final chapter.
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Notes : chapter 4
X, See Kolakowski, 1972, for a good general survey of positivism and 
Ajdukiewicz, 1973, for an outline of the relations between positivism and 
other epistemologies.
2. Although they develop this pnssxtiBH answer into a position that is strictly
precluded in Kant's theory, -See—A-ppend-ix-, Ihclhu^/‘ja ^ k^h 'ttUa.
c, CLmviUi/iA .
3. This point appears to have been recognised by Y/ittgenstein:
’My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone 
who understands me eventually recognises them as nonsensical, when 
he has used them - as steps- to climb up beyond them, (He must, so 
to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it).
He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the 
world aright. ' Tractatus, 6,54.
4. cf. the excellent demolition of Mill's methodology in D.&. J.Wilier, 1973
5. The implication that there may be phenomena with no beginning is a curious 
one in view of Mill’s subsequent identification of phenomena with 'distinguishable 
sensations or other feelings',
6. This last 'lav;1 appears to be Mill's attempt to formulate one of Newton's 
'lav/s of motion'. It is incorrectly stated by Mill, The effect of 'pressure' 
is to disturb a state of rest or of uniform motion by producing acceleration,
Y/hen 'pressure* is removed acceleration ceases but motion does not,
7. See Kolakowski, 1972, chapter 5, for a good short account of Mach and
Avenarius. The epistemology of these authors and of their Russian followers 
is savagely criticised by Lenin in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism and by 
Plekhanov in Materialismus MilitansT"" " ' '"' "
8. There is a brief outline in Feigl & Blumberg, 1931.
9. In his Preface to the second (1961) edition Carnap expresses a preference
'for vise as basic elements, not elementary experiences, but something similar 
to Mach's elements' (p.vii) \
10. The 'picture theory' of language is rigorously developed in Wittgenstein's 
Tractatus.
11. See 'Psychology in Physical language' (1932) - English translation in 
Ayer, 1959.
12. Logical positivism treats all ontology, and therefore its own phenomenalism, 
as strictly meaningless. Ontological doctxrines are to be replaced by 'the 
practical decision* to use, say, a phenomenalistic or a physicalistic language. 
See, e.g., Carnap's 'Replies and Expositions' in Schilpp, 1963, p.868f.
13. For examples of the conventionalist position see Duhem, 1963, 1969, and 
Poincare, 1963, n.d.
14. See 'Physics of a Believer’ in Duhem, 1963.
15. For an excellent example see the discussion of the 'data matrix' 
in Galtung, 1967,
16. See Carnap's 'Autobiography' in Schilpp, 1963, p. 56f,
Notes : chapter 4
17. It need hardly fce said that positivist methodology in sociology barely 
recognises the existence of theoi'y in even this limited sense, For example,while 
Stinchcombe admits the existence of other concepts his book deals ’only with 
observational concepts’ (Stinchcombe, 1968, p.38). See also the discussion
of dispositional and theoretical terms in Rudner, 19
18. See, for example, Hempel’s contribution to Schilpp, 1963, and 'Empiricist 
Criteria of Cognitive Significance’ in Hempel, 1965, and also the first two 
papers in Quine, 1963. cf. the discussion of positivist semantics in chapter 5,
19. cf. Popper's outline and discussion of a physicalistic interpretation of 
’There exists an omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient personal spirit' and 
Carnap's reply in Schilpp, 1963, p,207f. and 880f,
20. cf.'Positivist Semantics and the Semantic Concept of Truth' in chapter 5,
,21, This conclusion ^is strongly argued by Koyre in 'An Experiment in 
Measurement' in Koyre, 1968, In my pamphlet on statistics (Hindess, 1973^6^
I have shown that the production of social statistics must be analysed without 
reference to either to positivist conceptions of the given or to subjectivist 
conceptions of the state of consciousness of the observer.
■£, Model-Building and Positivist Semantics ‘ - '
The epistemology of model-building is an epistemology in which scientific 
knowledge is said to be produced through the construction and manipulation o£ 
models. Given an empirical domain , in which facts have been 'carefully 
observed and described, without allowing any theoretical pi’e concept ion to 
decide whether some are more important than others’ (Levi-Strauss, 1968, p.2'80), 
the scientist is supposed to construct models to account for the obsei’ved facts. 
Models are leconstructions of the order of the factsj the validity of the model 
is determined by its 'fitting' the order of the facts. For the epistemology of 
model-building facts are taken as given. Their observation and collection 
does not require any theoretical activity on the part of the scientist.. Thus
t
science has a theoretical and a non-theoretical moment. The latter is the 
moment of observation, the former that of model-building. Models are obtained 
through a double process of abstraction and simplification and they may be 
subject to an 'experimental1 manipulation. This last refers to ' the set De­
procedures aiming at ascertaining how a given model will react when subjected 
to change and at comparing kowxaxgixaJixmHdsixxiitl models of the same or different 
types (ibid, ). According to Xevi-Strauss, then, and according to other.advocates 
of knowledge thiough models^ knowledge may be produced through the experimental 
manipulation of forma! systems. It is for this reason that the branch of 
mafchemacical logic known as the Theory of Models assumes a particular importance 
for this epistemology. A number of theorems, especially that first demonstrated 
in CodeIs paper, On Formally Undecidabie Propositions in Principia Mathematics 
and Related Systems', have often been interpreted as establishing the inherent 
limitations ox fonualisafcicn as a means to knowledge I 'since Godel we hiscxsf 
know that the axiomatic method has certain inherent limitations'(Piaget, 1971a,p,33 
Again, the editor of a recent collection on the use of models in scholarly thought 
(v/iuh contributions from workers in physics, biology, mathematics, sociology, 
theology, ...) tells us that the awareness of the limitations of formalised
procedures:
'is reflected today in the conclusions of theoreticians right across 
the disciplinary boundaries from Heisenberg 's 'uncertainty principle’ 
in physics as far as to the discussion of 'theories of the middle 
range ' in sociology with Godels theorem in mathematics as a further 
extension of it'(Shanin, 1972, p.5) v
'Modern science' strikes again: in Godel's proof, in the Copenhagen 
interpretation of quantum theory1, we appear to have the clearest possible proof 
of the intrinsic limitations of human knowledge. Shanin 's volume represents yet 
another instance of the perennial attempts to use advances in the sciences in
I 2support of idealist epistemologies. In fact this recourse of the epistemology 
of model-building to quantum mechanics or to mathematical logic is totally 
illegitimate. To interpret them as establishing the ineluctible limits to 
knowledge involves a gross distortion of the sciences in question. In the first 
section of this chapter X show that models in mathematics and the natural sciences 
do not function in the way suggested by the epistemology of model-building.
The second section of this chapter examines positivist semantics and the 
semantic concept of truth v/hich, as we shall see, plays a central, if fundamentally 
ambigous part’.in Popper's theory of science. In many respects positivist 
semantics reproduces the structure of the mathematical theory of models with the• 
crucial difference that where the mathematical domain of semantic interpretation has 
a determinate theoretical structure v/hich plays a crucial role in the theory 
of models the positivist domain of interpretation has no theoretical structure 
of its own - in effect it is a surrogate for the given phenomena of experience.
In this respect positivist semantics involves little more than a more or less 
sophisticated elaboration of the fundamental logical positivist conception of 
language discussed in the previous chapter, I argue that positivist semantics 
cannot establish a rigorous distinction between analytic and synthetic expressions, 
betv/een formal s'ciences (logic, mathematics) and factual sciences. It follows
tliErt no ligorous denici rent ion of ’theoreticni nnd obserYntional languages can 
be maintained and that, therefore, Carnap*s insistence on that demarcation is 
impossible to defend on positivism's own terms. The significance of the breakdown 
of that demarcation for the coherence of positivist epistemology has been 
shown in the previous chapter,
Finally, I return to the epistemology of model-building. It could hardly 
be further removed from the rigour of mathematical logic or even of positivist 
semantics. On the contrary, in the epistemology of model building an essential 
arbitrariness in the selection of the facts to be modelled is further compounded 
by an arbitrary relation of 'resemblance' between the model and the facts it is 
supposed to represent. This epistemology is often supplemented by attempts
t
to reduce this arbitrariness of knowledge by reference to the social, psychological, 
or biological determinations of the elements of perception and the structures 
of thought or else to some alleged essential organisation of the world itself.
We shall see that such doctrines merely add a dogmatic and speculative dimension 
to a conception that is already so vague and imprecise as to be almost vacuous.
Models in Mathematics and the Natural Sciences3
Mathematical logic is a paradigm case of a theory in which the concept of model 
has a definite and rigorously defined function in theoretical discourse. Elsewhere, 
with few exceptions, the word 'model* is used in a loosely defined and analogical 
sense with little strict theoretical pertinence. Accordingly the following 
discussion will be limited primarily to the place of models in mathematical 
logic, a subject whose peculiar significance for the epistemology of model-building 
has already been indicated, and to a few additional remarks on the model in 
other sciences. In mathematical logic the concept of model relates two
mathematical domains, namely, a foraial system on the one hand and its domain of
...im,ei’pretation on the other. 'Syntax' concerns the structure of the formal
system while 'semantics' is concerned with relations between the formal system 
and its domain of interpretation. Wo shall see below that positivist philosophy 
of science involves a concept of semantics that is in many respects analogous 
to the mathematical concept. Where mathematical semantics is concerned with 
relations between two mathematical domains positivist semantics is concerned 
with relating scientific theory (the formal system) with the givens of observation 
(the domain of interpretation). The positivist concept, in effect, displaces 
intra-mathematical relations on to the relation between theory and the real.4
Very schematically we can say that a formal system involves a set of marks, 
finite strings of these marks, and formation and derivation rules. For example, 
an elementary formal system might contain the following types of mark : constants 
(a, b, c, a', b', c' .:.); variables (x, y, z, y, y, z* ...); predicates (P, Q, u, .. 
connectives of negation and implication ( - and ^ ); and universal and existential 
quantifiers ( U and E ). Informally the constants may be interpreted as designatin, 
objects, the predicates as designating properties of objects, and variables as 
'unknown' constants, places where any eonstant may be written. Quantifiers may 
be read according to the following schema:
(Ex)P(x) : there is an x v/ith the property P;
(Ux)P(x) : all x have the property P,
A formal- system is governed by two sets of rules. Formation rules divide all 
possible strings of marks into those that are well-formed (e.g. 'x=y') and those
noi. (fe.g, xy~ ). in effect the well-formed strings are grammatical 
expressions of the system. To continue the above example we might say that .
P(a), P(x), etc., are well-formed expressions and that, for any well-formed 
expressions A and B, -A and A->.B are well-formed. These,together with rales for 
the use of quantifier's^would be sufficient to define the well-formed expressions 
of a first-order predicate calculus containing only unitary predicates. Derivation 
rules operate on the well-formed- expressions of the system. They allow one to 
deduce theorems from a set of axioms. For example, if A and B are well-formed
////
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and if . J,-, indicates that the iHiiteraring expression which follows has been 
derived then we may have the following deductive schemata :
generalisation : {-----A ^
(Ux)A
separation: |------ (A-^B)
j—A__________
B
Informally these may be read : if A then, for all x. A; and, if A implies B and 
if A, then B. These derivation rules may appear to be obvious from the informal
I
readings. For example, an intuitive' or fcommon-sensef reading of the sign _
(implication) leads directly to the rule of separation. However, such informal 
readings are no more than crude illustrations and they are frequently misleading. 
The formal system with its set of marks and its rules of formation and derivation 
cannot be interpreted as providing merely a neat expression of what is intuitively' 
clear or evident. In logic, as elsewhere in mathematics, what is alleged to 
be intuitively clear is frequently false. It seems clear, for example, that 
'the whole is greater than the part', yet there are no more integers (i.e, 1,2, 
3,4,,,.) than theie are squares of integers (i.e. 1,4,9,16,,,,), In the present
CLil.ucvW.i .s'
example there are intuitively clear'^that cannot be made. Consider the 
following sequence :
(A —j?B ) '
-B
—A
Informally this would read : if A implies B and if not-B, then not-A, It 
conesponds to an intuitive rendering of implication. Nevertheless the conclusion, 
-■A, cannot be deduced from the axioms, A-^B and -B, by means of the rules 
introduced above without the use of further axioms.'5
The fomation and the derivation rules define the sysisa syntax of the 
formal system. A theorem is any well-formed expression that may be deduced 
from the axioms of the system. A formal system in which there is at least one 
expression that is not a theorem is said to be coherent. In a system that is 
not coherent the derivation rules are redundant : any expression , say. A—B, 
and its negation, -(A=B), are both theorems of the system. A formal systemv 
in which every expression is either a theorem or the negation of a theorem is said 
to be decidable. Many of the most important formal mathematical systeips are not 
decidable in this sense.
Formal systems may be constructed, for example, in order to isolate the 
deductive structure of an existing mathematical domain, arithmetic, geometry,- 
set theory, etc. If we are to establish that a formal system does indeed 
express the structure of tha. say, elementary set theory, then it is necessary 
to establish a correspondence between the elements and expressions of the two 
domains. The rules of this correspondence define the semantics of the formal 
system. In the case of set theory and the formal system illustrated above 
this would inquire a function which assigns to each constant or predicate of 
the formal system an element or set. In addition, since our formal system 
contains variables and quantifiers it is necessary to establish a procedure 
for interpreting expressions containing variables or quantifiers in terms of 
set theory. For example, (Ux)P(x) and (Ex)P(x) might 'translate' into 'all 
elements,u, are contained in the set V' and 'there is an element, u, contained 
in the set V' respectively. With such a correspondence it would be possible 
to evaluate all expressions of the formal system in terms of propositions of 
set theory : an expression of the formal system is valid for this interpretation 
if the corresponding expression in set theory is correct. For example, the 
expression P(a) is valid if and only if the correspondence assigns an element 
f(a) to a and a set f(P) to P so that £(a) is contained in the set f(P).
Validity, in this sense, is defined relative to a determinate correspondence 
between the formal system and its domain of interpretation , Now, if the 
correspondence is such that the deduction rules conserve validity (e.g. if A-* 
is valid then (Ux)A is also valid) and the axioms of the system are valid 
then all theorems of the formal system are valid for that interpretation. In
that case the domain of interpretation provides a model of the.formal systemv 
If, in addition, there corresponds to each true sentence of the model a 
theorem of the formal system, then the system is complete for the model.
Since the concept of validity is defined relative to a determinate interpretation 
of the formal system the concept of model also presupposes the establishment 
of determinate rules of correspondence. Without such rules there is no model;
I
A formal system may or may not have a model. It is possible to establish that
any formal system containing the first-order predicate calculus is coherent
if and only if it has a model. Coherence means that some expressions of the
formal system are not theorems, i.e,, that there is at least one expression
that cannot be deduced from the axioms using the derivation rules. With this
7result it is possible to show that the first-order predicate calculus (as
above but with n-ary predicates) is a complete formal logic. In other words
every formula that is valid for all models of first-order formal systems is
8a theorem of the calculus. In addition this formal system is decidable since 
every formula is either a theorem or the negation of a theorem.
This property of decidability is frequently used to define an ’ideal* in 
terms of which logical and mathematical theories are judged. Husserl's concept 
of 'formal system* is defined in terms of this property. It has an axiom 
system :
'distinguished by the circumstance that any proposition that can be 
constructed, in accordance with the grammar of pure logic, out of 
the concepts occiu-ing in that system, is either 'true ' - that is to
' 1st 
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say: an analytic (purely deducible) consequence of the axioms - or 
false - that is to say : an analytic contradiction - tertium non 
datur* (Husserl, 1959, p,96) ^
Now, a theorem established in Godel's paper, 'On Formally Undecidable Propositions
of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems', demonstrates that any formal
system capable of generating elementary recursive arithmetic contains an
expression that is undecidable : that is, neither the expression nor its ’
9negation is a theorem of the system. The formal system of arithmetic must 
therefore be judged to be 'inadequate' in terms of Husserl's ideal concept 
of 'formal system'. Indeed, we have seen that Godel's theorem is frequently'
r
interpreted as establishing limitations to mathematical thought. But Godel's 
result can only be interpreted in this way by reference to some extra-mathematical 
norm of decidability1? In fact it means simply that the partition of well-formed 
expressions into those that are theorems and those that are not theorems places 
at least one expression and its negation in the same category (non-theorems).
The formal systems of arithmetic and therefox*© the vast bulk of mathematical 
formal systems are undecidable in this sense. Decidability , coherence, 
completeness, etc., are properties that any given formal system may or may not 
possess. These properties are investigated by the theory of models. Godei's 
theorem demonstrates that certain 'strong' formal systems (capable of generating 
elementary recursive arithmetic) do no have the property of decidability.
It should now be clear that the function of models in mathematics 
HathxHgxxnxKsnssqua bears absolutely no relation to the function assigned to 
them in the epistemology of model-building. For the latter, in effect, it is 
the formal system that is the model for its domain of interpretation. In 
mathematics the domain of interpretation provides the model for the formal system. 
In the epistemology of model-building the domain of interpretation is external 
to theory: semantics is reduced to a relation of similarity between theory 
(the model) and non-theory. For mathematics the domain of interpretation is
itself theoretical : semantic rules are theoretically defined relations between '
theoretical domains. It is only the erroneous placing of the domain of
interpretation (in this case recursive arithmetic) as external to mathematics
that appears to legitimize the ideological reading of Godel’s theorem as
demonstrating yet again the inherent limitations of human knowledge?'1 This
reading can now be seen to be entirely without foundation, v
In this schematic account of the function of models in mathematical logic
the essential points for the present argument are the following. First, both
the foreial system and its domain of interpretation are mathematical structures.
The model relates theory to theory, it is not a bridge between theory and some
4
reality external to theory. Secondly, the semantics of the formal system is
t
governed by rigorously defined mathematical functions': the model is a theoretical
relation between theoretical domains. In so far as this models have any strict
theoretical pertinence in other branches of mathematics and in the natural
sciences their use retains these essential features. The model is able to^;
function by means of a rigorously defined correspondence between elements and
relations of one theory and those of another. It is only the presence of that
correspondence which allows certain conclusions established in one to be carried
over into the other. For example, the flow of electricity in a metal plate
may serve as a model for the horizantal component of certain hydrodynamic
phenomena. This transfer of results is made possible only by rigorously
defined transformations between the theoretical structures of the two distinct
orders of phenomena. It is precisely such rigorously defined correspondences
that must be denied by the epistemology of model-building,
Where such correspondences have not yet been established we have nothing
but a rough physical analogy which serves, at best, to illustrate relations of
12one science by means of another. Despite the claims of von Bertalanffy and 
13others the use of mechanical or electx’onic models in biology remains largely 
at the level of illustration. If it has been possible, by way of illustration,
ISTU
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to construct analogical models which replicate tka certain gross characteristics 
of, say, the performance of organs these analogies do not rest on rigorously 
established corx*espondences between elements and elementary functions in the^ 
two fields brought together in the model (i.e, between biology and mechanics- 
or electronics). Such correspondences can only be established at the level 
of theory. In the absence of rigorously established correspondences v
'explanatory' models in biology are a myth. Here as elsewhere the epistemology 
of model-building finds no support in scientific pi'actice.
Positivist Semantics and the Semantic Concept of Truth
l
For mathematical logic the domain of interpretation is a mathematical
structure : its properties are used in the investigation of the properties
of semantic systems. In positivist epistemology the domain of interpretation
consists effectively of the given facts. It is external to theory, by
definition, and has no theoretical properties. Thus, logical positivism
identifies the formal or theoretical dimension with the syntax of the
language of science. The real or empirical facts supply the domain of semantic
interpretation. In science, therefore, propositions are subject to a double
constraint : syntactic (theoretical consistency and deducibility); semantic
(the facts of experiment or observation). Observation and measurement are
essentially semantic operations; deduction and computation are essentially
14syntactical (theoretical),"
Carnap, for example, explicitly poses the difference between the formal 
sciences (logic and mathematics) and the empirical or factual sciences in these 
terms. There are no formal or 'ideal' objects of the formal sciences 
corresponding to the 'real* objects of the empirical sciences:
'The formal sciences do not have any objects at all; they are 
systems of auxiliary statements without objects and without 
content' (Carnap, 1953, p,128)
The value of the formal sciences is that they enable us to supplement the 
language of pure observation with ’theoretical’ terms. A scientific theory 
may contain terms that have no direct empirical referent but which are ^
nevertheless related to obsei'vation terms by the formal structure of the 
theory i that is, 'observab3.e ' consequences can be deduced from statements 
containing ’theoretical' terms* In 'The Methodological Character of v
Theoietical Concepts', discussed in the previous chapter, Carnap proposes 
to divide the language of science into two parts : the observation language (Lq) and the theoretical language <v-
'The Lq uses terms designating observable properties and relations 
for the description of observable things or events. The I^,on the 
7^1 other hand, contains terms which may refer to unobservable aspasts events, 
unobservable aspects or features of events, ,.*r (p,3&)
Iliis distinction poses the fundamental problems of positivist semantics which 
is concerned, for example., with relations between 'expressions of a language 
and their designata1(Carnap, 1958,p,79) : how may new theoretical tenns be 
introduced legitimately into the language of science ?; what are the criteria 
for the significance (i,e, meaningfulness) of theoretical terms and sentences?i 
etc. All of Carnap's semantic analyses culminate in the problem of the 
relations between the observation language, Lq, and the various 'artificial' 
languages of the formal sciences. The notions of 'empirical science',
'formal science', 'semantic analysis', 'reducibility', 'the method of intension 
and extension , etc,, serve both to represent the initial difference between 
the formal and the factual sciences and to conceptualise the relationship 
between them. I argue that the distinction is essentially arbitrary, that is, 
that it cannot be justified in any strict positivist epistemology, Carnap's
position is, of course, disputed exponents of othex’ variants of positivist 
philosophy. For example, Quine effectively reduces the distinction between 
theoretical and observational languages to a matter of arbitrary choice ( so
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that any set of propositions may be treated as observational) while Hempel 
appears to retain a form of this distinction but doubts whether a sharp 
distinction between meaningful and meaningless can be drawn , It should be^ 
clear that if the rigorous demarcation of theory and observation is effaced 
in any way then the residual positivist notion of the testing of theory 
against the facts of observation can have no rational justification. Thus 
to deny the possibility ejS either of a rigorously determined a-theoretical 
observation language or of a strict positivist criterion of meaningfulness 
is to destroy whatever coherence there is in the positivist doctrine of 
science as reducible to the phenomena of observation.
In Carnap's rigorous positivist epistemology scientific theory may be subjected
to a double evaluation : syntactic - deducibility and consistencyJ semantic —
measurement, experimentation, testing. This double constraint on the language
of science is reflected in the title of Carnap's Meaning and Necessity, In
that book he proposes an approach to semantics which he calls the method of
extension and intension. The meaning of every expression is analyzed into
two components : the intension, which is apprehended by the understanding of
the expression,and the extension, which is determined by empirical investigation,
He begins by outlining a semantic system for an object language, S, and
develops the semantic concepts of truth and L-truth (logical truth). We shall
see that this construction reproduces the structure of the mathematical theory
of raitsj models with the exception that the domain of interpretation has no
theoretical properties. A semantic system for S requires four kinds of rules.
First, the rules of foi’mation determine the admissible form of sentences.
Secondly, rules of designation for the non-logical constants and predicates 
'. *?*translate at^.omic sentences in S into some meta-language. Carnap proposes to 
use 'a suitable part of the English language ' and offers the following
examples :
'1,1 Rules of.designation for individual constants
’s' is a symbolic translation of 'Walter Scott',
'w* '(the book) Waverly'
1.2, Rules of designation for predicates 
'Hx ' - 'x is human'
'RAx* - 'x is a rational animal1
'Axy1 - 'x is an author of y1 (p. 4)
Thus, S corresponds to 'formal system' and the metalanguage to its domain of 
interpretation.
Thirdly, there are rules of truth for atomic sentences and for logical 
connections and quantifiers. For example,
'An atomic sentence in S consisting of a predicate followed by an 
individual constant^is true if and only if the individual to which 
the individual constant refers possesses the property to which'the 
predicate refers, ' (p. 5)
This rule presupposes the rules of designation. It produces, for example, 
the following result:
The sentence 'RAs' is true if and only if Walter Scott is a rational 
animal.
Finally^there are rules of ranges. These are defined in relation to the 
concept of state-description
'A class of sentences in S which contains for every atomic sentence 
either this sentence or its negation, but not both, and not other 
sentences,is called a state-description in S, because it obviously 
gives a complete description of a possible state of the universe 
with respect to all properties expressed by *ha predicates of the 
system. Thus the state-descriptions represent Leibniz* possible 
worlds or Wittgenstein's possible states of affairs' (p.9)
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An atomic sentence is one that is irreducible in S, It, or at least its 
translation in the meta-language, can be checked against the actual state of 
the universe by observation. It is easy to specify rules which determine
s
whether a given sentence holds in a given state-description. An atomic 
sentence holds if it belongs to the state-description and other sentences 
in S may be dealt with by means of appropriate rules for logical connectives 
and quantifiers. Such rules are called rules of ranges because they define’ 
the ranges of state-descriptions in which a given sentence holds.
The necessity for a distinction between rules of truth and rules of 
ranges is not at first sight too clear since they hukk involve equivalent procedures 
for treating atomic sentences on the one hand, viz., determining whether they 
are 'true’ or whether they 'hold in a given state-description', and logical 
connectives, quantifiers, etc., on the other. 'A sentence is true if and only 
if it holds in the true state-description' (p.10). However, since state-descriptions 
represent possible worlds the rules of ranges permit a definition of logical 
truth, that is, of a truth which can be established without reference to- 
extra-linguistic facts. The definition is suggested by Leibniz* conception 
that a necessary truth must hold in all possible worlds. Thus:
'A sentence is L^true (in S) g holds in every state-description
(in S) ' (ibid)
A sentence is factual, that is synthetic or contingent, if it is ±:& true but 
not L~true. The rules of ranges therefore determine whether a given sentence 
is analytic or synthetic.
Now, in spite of certain differences of detail the first three sets of 
males reproduce the basic structure of the semantic theory of truth presented 
in Tarski's paper,'The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages', which, as 
we shall see, is of considerably importance for Popper's epistemology and 
methodology. I return to the rules of ranges in a moment. Although I have 
given a rather simplified and illustrative- exposition the basic structure of 
the semantic theory of truth should now be clear. In particular, the
construction of the semantic concept of truth for a given formal language involves 
the construction of an appropriate metalanguage (e.g. Carnap's ’suitable part 
of the English language* together with various symbols) containing the ^
following kinds of primitive expression:
*(1) expressions of a general logical kind; (2) expressions having 
the same meaning as all the constants of the language to be discussed 
or which suffice for the definition of such expressions; (3)expressions 
of the structural-descriptive type which denote single signs and 
expressions of the language considered, while classes and sequences 
of such expressions or, finally, the relations existing between 
them.' (Tarski, 1956, p,211)
I
The necessity a for the first group is evident. The second group allow us to
translate expressions of the formal language into the meta-language and the
third provide for the assignment of a name to every such expression.
The semantic definition of truth certainly avoids some of the more.absurd
consequences of the classical definition : Veritas est adaequatio rei et
intellectus - the truth of a thought consists in its agreement with reality.
The classical definition of truth invites Spinoza's response : ' The concept
dog does not bark’. And if the concept 'dog* does not bark and the concept
'circle* is not round then the nature of the agreement of a thought with reality 
16is problematic. The semantic definition does not require that the concept Tdog *■
should bark nor that the concept ’sun* be larger than the concept ’earth* but,
if S represents the proposition 'the sun is larger than the earth* then
17'S is true* means that the sun is larger than the earth,*
But, while the semantic definition of truth avoids the logical absurdities 
entailed in the attempt to formulate a definition in terms of the 'agreement' 
or 'correspondence' of a thought with reality by means of # rigorously defined 
relations between one language and another it cannot avoid the problems of the 
positivist conception of knowledge. The semantic concept of truth must presuppose
some version of positivist epistemology for to prove that 'S' is true is to 
px'ove a sentence in the metalanguage having the same meaning as S., Positivist 
semantics appears to reproduce the structure of the mathematical theory of 
models with the formal or object language corresponding to the formal system^, 
the metalanguage to the domain of interpretation, and the concept of truth to 
the concept of validity. But there remains one crucial difference- In 
mathematical logic the domain of interpretation is itself a mathematical structure. 
Validity for expresssions of the formal system may therefore be investigated 
by means of the theoretical structure of its domain of interpretation. In 
positivist semantics however only the formal languages are conceived as
tLtheoretical. The metalanguage, the domain of semaiitic interpretation, has no 
theoretical structure. On the contrary it serves as an extra-theoretical 
surrogate for the (unknown) structure of the real itself. For all the technical 
rigour of its formulations positivist semantics reduces the ’truth’ of its 
atomic sentences to a question of observation. In the last resort the 'truth' 
of an expression is not a matter of theoretical demonstration. At this point 
the pax-allel between ’truth' and ’validity’ breaks down. To investigate 
’truth’ we translate our sentence, S, into 'a suitable part of the English 
language' and then we simply look and see. Positivist semantics presuppose 
observation as the place where demonstration ceases, I have shown the 
incoherence of this conception of knowledge in chapter 4. For positivism 
'knowledge', and therefore ' •jruth', rests on nothing more than a non-rational 
act of judgement. The observer has only to recognise the given state of affairs 
or else to fail to recognise it. The latter possibility, as we shall see,in 
the case of Popper, poses a serious problem for any positivist or neo-positivist 
epistemology.
Finally, what of Carnap’s 'rules of ranges’ v/hich allow him to formulate 
a distinction between truths that are analytic and those that are synthetic?
An expression is an analytic truth if it holds in every state description.
Now, since the 'rules of ranges’ define the range of state-descriptions in 
which a given sentence holds they must determine what analytic truths if any
U(
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exist in any given object language. For example, from the rules of ranges for 
the logical connective V ('or') and for atomic sentences it follows:
fthat 'Pa’ holds in certain state-descriptions, that '-Pa* holds in 
all the other state-descriptions, and that therefore the disjunction 
’PaV-Pa' holds in every state-description.' (Carnap, 1947, p.ll)
The existence of analytic truths is established in Carnap’s system by stipulation. 
In particular, the concept of state-description 'which contains for every 
atomic sentence either this sentence or its negation 1 ensures that for every 
sentence, S, ’SV-S ' holds for all state-description^, Now, Camap maintains 
that ’state descriptions represent Leibniz' possible worlds or Wittgenstein^ 
possible states of affairs’. The concept of state-description therefore
trepresents a formal constraint on what 'possible worlds’ or 'possible states 
of affairs’ can be given in experience. ^
But no formal constraint of this ku± kind can be justified in terms of 
the pesitivist principle of the reducibility of knowledge i;o the given, for 
how can it be known that the given must always comply with the principle of
18contadiction, viz., that for any sentence, S, either S or not-S is the case?
If knowledge is reducible to the given then the notion of any knowledge, even 
'the laws of logic', governing the content of all possible givens is plainly 
absurd.
Thus Carnap's attempt to establish a rigorous distinction between analytic
and synthetic, the logical and the factual,cannot be justified in terms of any
19strict positivist epistemology. It is entirely arbitrary. It follows that 
Carnap's distinction between formal and factual sciences is equally arbitrary. 
There can be no strict positivist demonstration that logic and mathematics 
are formal sciences at all in Carnap's sense. It follows that there can be 
no rigorous distinction between theoretical and observation languages of the 
kind that Carnap attempts to establish for that distinction requires precisely
that statements in 1^ be reducible to statements in LQ by means of purely 
formal, logical and mathematical, operations. The consequence is clear: 
if there can be no rigorous distinction between theoretical and observation., 
language then the selection of any one partial language as the language of 
observation must be entirely arbitrary. The positivist concept of a pure 
a-theoretical observation language stands or falls with the concept of the 
formal sciences 'which do not have any objects at all; they are systems of 
auxiliary statements v/ithout objects and without content'(Carnap, 1953,p.128)
The concept of a pure a-theoretical language of observation cannot be justified 
within any strict positivist epistemology. The implication of that conclusion 
has been indicated above, namely, that the pssitivist notion of the testing 
of theory against the facts of observation has no rational justification.
Now, we have seen that the vulgar positivism of, say, Mach or Mill, is 
manifestly inadequate since it does not even atten-jtjj to conceptualize the 
articulation of language and propositions on to the phenomena of experience.
This discussion has of positivist semantics has shown that positivist epistemolggy 
cannot rigorously conceive that articulation. A rigorous positivism requires 
a strict demarcation toaacfe between theoretical and observation languages and 
therefore between formal and factual discourses, Those demarcations ai’e 
arbitrary and indefensible on positivism's own terms yet the price of rejecting 
them is to destroy whatever rational coherence there is in the positivist 
doctrine of the reducibility of science to the phenomena of experience.
The Blpis temology of Model-Building
'Theorising means ordering, structuring; as such it is an isomorphic 
correlate of material practice, its 'alter-ego' in the Janus-faced 
human existence. Exactly like the productive activity, theorising 
consists in modelling reality. Theories are models. Any segment
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of universe we isolate in order to formulate its regularities 
presents itself to us as a cybernetic black-box: a processual 
going concern with only two points - inputs and outputs - open to'’
- the investigator^ 1 inspection' (Bauman, 1972, p.303)
In these lines we have a concise statement of what might be called the 
epistemology of model-building. Knowledge of the world is to be obtained v
L
through the construction and manipulation of models. Now, if theories are
models, if theoretical activity consists in the construction of models, then
it is the theory that is a model for its domain of interpretation, the
empirically given. In this respect the epistemology of model-building inverts
the structure of the mathematical feksEjpx theory of models and of positivist
semantics. Since theories are models rigour is possible only at the level
of the model itself. The relation between the model and the facts it is supposed to
represent must be extra-theoretical, a relation between theory nnd, the
f
model, and something exterior to theory, the facts. In this conception science 
is icctUced to the construction of a plausible image and the theoretical activity 
of the sclentis c consists solely in the fabrication itself. The act of observation 
and the selection of some segment of the universe to be modelled are not 
theoietical activities. The selection of facts to be described, collected and 
brought together Into a model can only be arbitrary with respect to theory 
since, for this epistemology, theoretical activity comes into play only after 
the facts have been gathered. If theories are indeed models then fact-gathering 
cannot be subject to theoretical exigencies. If, as for Bauman, any segment 
of the universe to be modelled 'presents itself to us as a cybernetic black-bcx', 
then any model-builder is free to select his personal black-box as he sees fit. 
Observation is essentially a-theoretical. Thus, in his paper on 'Social Structure1, 
Levi-Strauss insists that facts ai’e to be:
’carefully observed and described, without allowing any theoretical 
preconceptions to decide whether some are more important than others’
(levi-Strauss, 1968, p,280)
On no account must theory be allowed to govern the selection of facts. Since 
levi-Strauss has not collected all the facts in the world we can only presume 
that his selection of facts is governed by extra-theoretical considerations/
Once the facts have been collected the scientist may construct models to 
account for them, Ix^vi-Strauss cites von Neumann’s listing of the requirements 
of a good model as follows ; . • v
’The definition must be precise and exhaustive in order to make a 
mathematical treatment possible. The construct must not be unduly 
complicated so that the mathematical treatment can be brought beyond 
the mere formalism to the point where it yields complete numerical 
results. Similarity to reality is needed to make the operation
I
significant. And this similarity must usually be restricted to a 
few traits deemed ’essential’ pro-tempore - since otherwise the above 
requirements would conflict with each other’ (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 
1954,pp.32-3, quoted in Levi-Strauss, 1968, p,316 -emphasis added) 
Theoretical activity consists in the construction of models that are similar in 
certain ’essential’ respects to the empirical domain in question. But how 
similar is similar and how does one choose among the multiplicity of possible 
models? The answer is that the facts must be allowed to decide for themselves; 
'the best model will always be that which is true, that is, the 
simplest model which, while being derived exclusively from the facts 
under consideration, also makes it possible to account for all of them’ 
(Levi-Strauss, 1968, p,281)
In the epistemology of model-building an arbitrariness in the initial 
selection of facts is compounded by the arbitrary relation of‘similarity’ 
which determines what can plausibly be represented as an image of the facts 
concerned. Nothing could be further removed from the rigour of mathematical 
logic or even of positivist semantics. In both cases ±h semantics is a matter
of precise and unambiguous rules of correspondence between either one mathematical 
domain and another or a language and its meta-language. In neither is there 
room for the arbitrary play of similarity and difference - the 'semantic’ 
rules of the epistemology of model-building. This epistemology shares nothing 
but the word \ftodel ’ with the theory of models in mathematical logic. By no 
stretch of the imagination can it be said to represent the place and function
■a*
of models in mathematics or the natural sciences. Where the scientific use 
of models involves the rigorous articulation of two theoretical domains, the 
epistemology of model-building effectively proposes an essential arbitrariness 
in the relation between theory (the model) and its domain of interpretation.
There can be no ipii3!3±±5H specifically theoretical evaluation of models according 
to this conception nor can there be any theoretical comparison of competing 
models. At its best the epistemology of model-building would result in a 
complex and sophisticated theoretical construct resting on an arbitrary and 
merely plausible foundation in resemblance.
Now;the inescapable arbitrariness that characterises the epistemology
of model-building clearly leaves a nasty hole in its theory of knowledge. This
epistemology is often combined with or supplemented by further doctrines which
seek to establish the necessity of model-building as a means to knowledge either
by maintaining that the world itself is essentially ordered and that knowledge
can only reflect its order or by representing models as essentially 'unconscious',
as the product of preconceptions or patterns of thought that precede and
20predetermine the possible forms of knowledge. General Systems Theory maintains 
that the world is organised into a number of structurally isomorphic levels:
'The world is, as Aldous Huxley once put it, like-a Neapolitan ice 
cake where the levels, the physical, the biological, the social - 
and the moral universe, represent the chocolate, strawberry, and 
vanilla layers. We cannot reduce strawberry to chocolate - the most 
we can say is that possibly in the last resort, all is vanilla, all
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mind or spirit. The unifying principle is that we find organization 
on all levels. The mechanistic world view, taking the play of 
physical particles for ultimate reality, found its expression in a. 
civilization glorifying physical technology which eventually has led 
to the catastrophies of our time. Possibly the model of the world 
as a great organization can help to reinforce the sense of reverence 
for the living which we have almost.lost in the last sanguinary 
decades of human history' (von Bertalanffy, 1967, p.139)
Apart from its religious overtones the most striking feature of this position 
concerns its use of certain alleged characteristics of the world to legitimize 
its conception of the necessary forms of knowledge. It is precisely because 
the world is a great organization of systems that the construction of theoretical 
systems gives knowledge of the world. Systems in thought give a knowledge of the 
real systems to which they correspond. It is precisely because real systems 
are structurally isomorphic and because, as systems, they share certain general 
properties that General Systems Theory is capable of integrating the various 
discrete sciences. Thus knowledge of the world is to be obtained through the 
construction and manipulation of models, called systems. Knowledge is possible 
in this way because the world is in fact made up of systems.
An alternative approach to reducing or eliminating the
arbitrariness of the epsitemology of model-building is to refer to the properties 
of the knowing subject and, in particular, to the possibilities of biological, 
psychological or social determination of the categories of thought and therefore 
of the elements of what will be perceived and the 'unconscious’ forms in which 
what is perceived will be organised. It is these possibilities that are taken 
up by the so-es^as-ed genetic epistemology of Piaget and his associates, by 
Levi-Strauss, and by the sociology of knowledge. In all cases these developments 
appear to ensure that what is arbitrary to theory is determined at some other 
level : it is not really arbitrary at all. In these conceptions any conscious
w
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theoretical activity on the part of the subject is founded upon the (biologically, 
■psychologically, socially) pre-given 'unconscious ' structui’e of his thought^
Even when certain products of thought appear to tell us nothing about the external 
world they nevertheless express the structure of the thinking apparatus:
But mathematical thought at any rate reflects the free functioning 
of the mind, that is, the activity of the cells of the cerebral cortex, 
relatively emancipated from any external constraint and obeying its own 
laws. As the mind too is a thing, the functioning of this thing 
teaches us something about the nature of things : even pure reflection 
is in the last analysis an internalisation of the cosmos. It illustrates 
tne structure of what lies outside in a symbolic form J^Logic and
r
logistics are empirical sciences belonging to ethnography rather than
i 22 tto psychologyv ' (Xevi-Strauss, 196% p,248 note)
A detailed commentary on this astonishing text cannot be attempted in the 
present context. What must be emphasised is that the specifically theoretical 
character of mathematical proof and demonstration is here simply swept aside 
in the name of the free functioning of the cerebral cortex. In fact, of course, 
any 8>iven mathematician must work upon existing mathematical materials, theories, 
foxms of pxoof, problems. The place and functioning of these existing materials 
in mathematical thought is totally ignored in levi—Strauss 9 conception. Furthermore, 
it is clear that there is nothing in the properties of the 'cells of the cerebral 
coitex as such to discinguish those of Its mathematical products which
axe valid from those which are not. The effect of this reference back to.the 
structxire of the thinking apparatus (the cerebral cortex) can only bo to obscure 
the significance of the mathematical materials and theoretical constructions 
necessary to the formulation of a given mathematical result and of the conditions 
which determine that this result is or is not valid.
In fact there is a more general px’oblem hez-e. If social, psychological or
genetic determinations are to be invoked by protagonists af the epistemology
.JM-
of models to account for the 'unconscious' structuring of the human mind then 
how can it be claimed that the functioning of its 'unconscious' structure dees, 
at least on occaision, result in knowledge? The answer, of course, is to be 
found in the recourse to the first tendency indicated above : the unconscious 
functioning of the mind may generate knowledge only because its structures 
correspond to certain structural features of the world. Consider, for example, 
levi-Strauss ' explanation of how ’several thousand years of stagnation' have 
been able to intervene between the science of the neolithic revolution and. 
modern science :
'There is only one solution to the paradox, namely, that there are 
two distinct modes of scientific thought. These are certainly not 
a function of different stages of development of the human mind 
but rather of two strategic levels at which nature is accessible to 
scientific enquiry; one roughly adapted to that of perception and the 
imagination; the other at a remove from if. It is as if the necessary 
connections which are the object of all science, neolithic or modem, 
could be arrived at by two different routes, one very close to, and 
the other more remote from sensible intuition 1(ibid.,p,15 -emphasis added) 
The unconscious functioning of the human mind can produce neolithic and modern 
science precisely because there are two distinct levels of the world whose 
organisation corresponds to the unconscious structures of human thought. The 
very possibility of knowledge is the product of a pre-established harmony 
between the structure of the world, at these levels, and the structure of human 
thought, Bauman invokes 'the painful process of evolution' to account for a 
very similar harmony between thought and the world:
'One can hardly imagine anything as cruel and stupid as a nature that 
provided its creatures with logic alone; no living organisms need to 
decipher all the secrets of the world they live in ~ not even those 
vital to their own survival; the basic qualities of their world - and
basic means unchangeable in time-spans commensurable with, the
duration of their life - are built in to their own structure; from 
the painful process of evolution, surviving species emerge with ^ 
salutory disregard for countless highly improbable states of the 
world; as a matter of fact, they manage somehow to make the best of 
of their world only because they have been made to its measure.,
That is a modem version of ICant’s time-honoured conjecture, that 
the basic structure of perceiving the world is given to cognitive 
mind a priorif(Bauman, op.cit., p,307 -emphasis added)
23Here Kant is honoured more in the outrageous breach than in the observance .
Every biological species is the victim of an evolutionary process which determines
{
the limits and structures of what is thinkable' and ’knov/able' by members of 
24that species. In Bauman's conception the limits and structures for human 
animals allow a certain 'play ' within which a cultural determination of the 
categories of thought has its effects. Both the form and the possible contents 
of our knowledge are determined by^evolutionary development together with 
additional cultural constraints. A well-meaning Nature, neither cruel nor stupid, 
guarantees the status of that knowledge by ensuring that 'the basic qualities' 
of our world are built in to our structure.
Is it necessary to snMx&kak argue that these fantastic doctrines add 
nothing to the rigour or coherence of the epistemology of models and detract 
nothing from its absurdity? The notion of a correspondence between the 
constructions of thought and the world, between the structures of models or 
theoretical systems and the forms of organization of the world itself, can 
hardly be subject to proof - for that would involve stepping outside of our 
knowledge of the world to compare it with the world itself. But if the 
correspondence theory of knowledge invoked by some version?of the epistemology
of model-building is purely dogmatic and incapable of rational defense the
pre-established harmony of levi-Strauss1 or Bauman's conception pf knowledge
is merely ridiculous. If the alleged fact of harmony cannot be demonstrated
*
then the mechanisms invoked to account for it must be entirely speculative.
We could just as reasonably invoke some malicious old guy in the sky to 
account for the ‘unconscious' structures of our thought and to plague us 
with fatuous epistemologies which foster the illusion that these structures 
do indeed correspond' to the structures of the world. Or again, if scientific 
knowledge is the product of genetic and cultural determination and is said to 
be guaranteed its status as knowledge merely by 'the painful process of evolution' 
why not rather invoke a nature both 'cruel and stupid' to produce a scientific 
knowledge no different in kind from the 'knowledge' that enabled the dinosaurs 
to survive for millenia?
The epistemology of model-building represents a form of the empiricist 
conception of knowledge that is so vague and imprecise as to be almost vacuous. 
Attempts to shore it up with some conception of the world or of thoughtj or 
both, as essentially structured merely add a further dogmatic and speculative 
dimension to what is already completely indefensible.
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' Notes : chapter 5
1. See Heisenberg 1949 and 1959
2, The philosophical writings of Mach and Duhein are classical examples of 
this tendency. Several contributors to the Shanin volume attempt to use 
contemporary biology in this fashion.
3 For the whole of this section see also Badiou,1969, Canguilhem,1963 
and Hindess, 1971. Some of the errors of my earlier text are corrected in 
the present chapter.
4. It is impossible to avoid vulgarisation in the following elementary 
exposition. On the whole logic texts written by or for philosophers cannot
be relied upon. Those available in English are generally by logical positivists 
or empiricists or else by those 'ordinary language f philosophers who do 
philosophical logic. Positivist semantics tends to assimilate the mathematical 
concept of interpretation of a formal system (which involves rigorously 
defined relations between mathematical domains) with the epistemological 
notion of designation. I present here only what is required to establish 
the distinction between mathematical semantics and the positivist notion.
Martin,1964, is generally reliable as a commentary on logical formalisation.
The following mathematical texts require perseverence in abstraction but little 
mathematical training: Cohen,1966; Davis,1958; Kleene,1966; MendeIson,1966; 
Smullyan,1961.
5. With the conventions introduced in the text the following axioms define a 
first-order calculus for unitary predicates:
1. A —(B~>A)
2. _B) (B-^A)
3. LA->(B-?CH
Axiom 2. is required if -A is to be derived from A—B and —B by means of the 
derivation rules.
6. For example, if the correspondence function assigns the same element,u,
uo each constant of the formal system then the following expression cannot 
be valid : (Ex) (Ey) “P(y)) (-(-P(y)-^P(x))]
7. . The term 'first-order' is used to distinguish formal systems with predicates 
having- constants and variables as arguments from those in which there are 
predicates having other predicates as arguments or in which there are predicate 
quantifiers,
8. What, then, is the status of formal systems in which an axiom or theorem
of this calculus is denied? Suppose, for example, that -(-(-A)-^A) is a theorem 
of a formal system (informally it states that the negation of not-A does not 
imply A). If such a system contains the axioms of the first-order predicate 
calculus then it is incoherent. Otherwise, since that calculus is valid for all 
models, the system has no model. More precisely it has no model in the domain 
of a set theory which contains the axiom of choice. Very schematically that 
axiom asserts that for any set whose members are sets there is a set containing 
exactly one element from each of the member sets. A version of this axiom plays 
a crucial role in many of the constructions and proofs of Russell's and 
Whiteheads s Principia Mathematica . But there are other set theories in which, 
for example, the negation of the axiom of choice may be an axiom. The first-order 
predicate calculus would not bo valid for an interpretation in such a theory.
A formal system containing the above theorem has no model in a set theory with 
the axiom of choice but it may still be coherent. Set theory without the axiom 
of choice provides models of formal systems in which the principle of contradiction 
does not hold. For the history of set theory see Bourbaki,I960, and 'Reniarques 
sur la formation de la Theorie Abstraite des Ensembles' in Cavafiles, 1962.
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Notes -: chapter 5
9. English translation in Godel,1962. There are many expositions. The account 
given in Martin,op,cit,, is excellent and not too technical for the non-mathematician. 
See also Rosser, 1939
10. In Husserl's case this norm would represent the whole of mathematics as a 
number of discrete, isolable, and strictly analytic formal systems which can be 
'grasped' or 'mastered' by the intuition of a knowing subject, (cf.Cavailles,
1947, pp,44-78). Wittgenstein's doctrine on mathematics is very similar in this 
respect.
11. This reading has been used, for example, to show the superiority of man 
over any possible computing machine (machines are formal systems governed by 
axioms, man creates axioms)(Nagel & Newman,1959) and to rniggsst support a 
metaphysical conception of free-will,(Lucas,1970)
12. cf.Canguilhem,1963
13. e.g. von Bertalanffy, 1952
14. A rather different position is taken by Popper in his paper 'Why are the 
calculuses of logic and arithmetic applicable to reality?1 (in Popper,1963). ■
Part of his answer contains the assertion: 'Insofar as a calculus is applied
to reality, it loses the character of a logical calculus and becomes a descriptive 
theory which may be empirically refutable, and insofar as it is treated as 
irrefutable, i.e. as a system of logically true formulae, rather than a descriptive 
scientific theory, it is not applied to reality ’ (p,210) For Popper there is 
no necessai’y correspondence between the logical structure of language and 
reality : 'We are all most intimately acquainted with a world that cannot be 
properly described by our language, which has been developed mainly as an 
instrument for describing and dealing with our physical environment - more 
precisely, with physical bodies of medium size in moderately slow motion. The 
indescribable world I have in mind is, of course, the world I have xn Min my 
mind1' , , , ' (p. 213)
15. Hempel, 'Empiricist Cz'iteria of Cognitive Significance ' in Hempe 1,1965, 
and Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' in Quine,1953.
16. cf. the discussion of 'truth' in Ajdukiewicz,1973,pp.9-21,
17. Notice that the semantic definition of ti’uth applies only to formalized 
languages for which an appropriate metalanguage may be constructed. The distinction 
between the language in which propositions are formulated and the meta-language 
which contains names of propositions is required to escape logical paradoxes such
as the following. Let p designate the fourth sentence in this note, p is not a 
true sentence. It is easy to show that p is a true sentence if and only if p 
is not a true sentence. — '
18. The parallel with mathematical logic is instructive here. There are coherent 
first-order formal systems in which the negation of the principle of contradiction 
(i.e, -(-(-A)~ivA)) is a theorem. Such systems may have models in a set theory 
without the axiom of choice (cf.note 8). Carnap's 'rules of ranges' require that
'possible states of affairs ' be governed by some equivalent of the axiom of choice.
19. Tarski and Quine have both argued that no rigorous demarcation between 
analytic and synthetic is possible. See 'On the Concept, of Logical Consequence ' 
Tarski,1956,p,409f,, and Quine, op.cit.
Notes : chapter 5
20. For a brief exposition seo HHKxBsxlsscislsai von Bertalanffy, 1967. See also the 
references given in note 8, p,119, of that text and von Bertalanffy,1974.
21. The peculiar significance for such a conception of the study of the 
mode1-builder himself should now be clear. Once we can construct a model of 
the model-building activity of the human mind than the circle of knowledge will 
be finally closed; everything that can be known will be contained in this, the 
ultimate model. It only remains for the content to be unpacked. 'The aim is
to arrive at a kind of "generative grammar" of culture as a semiotic system' 
(Bauman,op.cit,, p,319) ' This 'generative grammar' would be generative of all 
culture and therefore of all possible knowledge. v
22. The quotation is from E.ff.Beth,The Foundations of Mathematics, p, 151.
23. Kant's transcendental philosophy specifically precludes all determination
of the categories of thought by natural causes, in particular, by the naturalistic 
psychology of Locke and Hume. The a priori categories are conditions of existence 
of phenomena; they cannot be phenomena to be explained by particular sciences.
The attempt to 'modernise' Kant by reference to biological evolution as the 
origin of a priori categories is by no means peculiar to Bauman.
24. Another paper .in Shanin's collection suggests 'that we regard living 
organisms as systems which generate and test hypotheses about their environment'. 
In the case of the bacterium 'it is probably evident to the reader that the 
obvious candidates for such hypotheses are the genes, or more generally the 
hereditary material of the bacterium'(Goodwin,1972,p.371). Popper's evolutionary 
epistemology involves a similar coziception. For other references see Campbell, 
1974, especially appendix i^,'Biological Evolution as the Origin of the A Priori 
Categox'ies of Thought and Perception in Man,' All such positions require an 
outrageous play on words such as 'knowedge'hypothesis', etc.
m6. Popper
With characteristic modesty Popper opens the first chapter of Objective
Knowledge with the following assertions:
’I think that I have solved a major philosophical problem: the problem of
induction. (I must have reached the solution in 1927 or thereabouts. )
This solution has been extremely fruitful, and it has enabled me to solve
a good number of other philosophical problems. However, few philosophers
would support the thesis that''! have solved the problem of induction. Few
philosophers have taken the trouble to study - or even to criticize - my
views on the problem, or have taken notice of the fact that I have done
some work on it. Many books have been published quite recently on the
subject which do not refer to any of my work, ... 1 (Objective Knowledge,
hereafter o" k”", p. 1)
If many philosophers find no difficulty in ignoring Popper's work it is unfortunate 
that so many others, philosophers, social scientists and several eminent phyASicists, 
biologists and mathematicians, appear quite unable to do so. Lakatos writes that 
'Popper's ideas represent the most important development in the philosophy of the 
twentieth century. ' (Schilpp,1974,p.241), while Sir Peter Medawar, writing in 
Vogue (Dec.1973), calls Popper the 'greatest living philosopher'. Eminent natural 
scientists have testified to the importance of Popper's notion of falsifiability 
as a concept of the most direct significance to science. Similarly many social 
scientists have insisted that the notion of the testing of hypotheses against the 
facts defines the most im^rtant distinguishing characteristic of scientific 
practice. In Popper's conception science is distinguished from metaphysics and 
from pseudo-sciences such as Marxism and psychoanalysis by the fact that in science, 
and in science alone, all theories are submitted to the most rigorous and 
stringent testing.
If, as I argue, the im^tance so often attributed to Popper's normative 
conception of scientific practice is completely unjustified, it does necessitate 
some discussion of his work in this book. But there is a more general and perhaps more 
significant reason for including an examination of Popper's theory of science. I have 
argued that a distinction such as Carnap's between theoretical and observation 
languages cannot be maintained without contradiction in any positivist epistemology.
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Now Popper has always denied the existence of an a-theoretical observation 
language and many other philosophers have disputed the possibility of maintaining 
a rigorous distinction between theoretical and observational languages. Nevertheless, 
these authors maintain some residual attachment to positivism in the notion that 
theory is to be tested against the facts of observation. I have suggested that, 
if the possibility of an a-theoretical observation language is denied - and it 
cannot be defended - then the doctrine of the testing of theory against the facts 
has no rational foundation. Now, while he^xplicitly rejects many of the fundamental 
tenets of positivist epistemology, Popper has elaborated the most systematic 
attempt to combine the notions of testing and of the irreducibly theoretical 
character of all observation into a developed conception of scientific knowledge.
Thus the argument that Popper's conception of luiowledge is fundamentally incoherent 
has a more general implication. If it is impossible to establish a rigorous 
distinction between theoretical and observational languages within positivism 
and impossible to establish a coherent notion of the testing of theory against 
the facts without that distinction, then there can be no coherent positivist 
theory of science.
In this chapter I examine Popper's conceptions of science and of the growth 
of knowledge. His political and social philosophy will not be considered. If 
his conception of knowledge is fundamentally incoherent, however, then many, if 
not all, of his social and political doctrines have no rational foundation. This 
chapter is divided into three sections. The first outlines Popper's theory of 
science and the growth of knowledge. In the second I examine the relation between 
his methodology and the speculative metaphysics on which it depends. While the 
metaphysics is necessary to the definition of the objective of his methodology, 
namely, the aim of science, his methodology cannot be shown to have any bearing 
on the attainment of the objectives defined by his metaphysics. Finally, I 
consider Popper's concept of testing in relation to his insistence on the irreducibly 
theoretical character of all observation, and I show that it is possible to 
combine them only at the cost of theoretical coherence. It folbws'that his 
demarcation between science and non-science is vacuous and that his conception
of science as characterized by what he calls the 'method of rational criticism' 
is absurd.
I Popper's Theory of Science
induction and the demarcation between science and non—science
'A scientist, whether theorist or experimenter, puts forward statements, 
or systems of statements, and tests them step by step. In the field of the 
empirical sciences, more particularly, he constructs hypotheses, or systems 
of theories, and tests them against experience by observation and experiment.'
(The Logic of Scientific Discovery,
hereafter' , p.27)
The task of the logic of scientific discovery is to g'ive a logical analysis
of this procedure. Popper opposes the view that the empirical sciences are
characterized by the use of inductive methods, that is, that their theories are
established by inferring from singular statements, such as accounts of observations
or experiments, to universal statements, such as theories and hypotheses. The
problem of induction concerns whether and in what conditions inductive inferences.
are justified. The problem and Popper's answer to it may be described as follows:
'Can the claim that an explanatory universal theory is true be justified by 
'empirical, reasons ; that is, by assuming the truth of certain test statements 
or observation statements...? My answer to the problem is the same as Hume's: 
No, we cannot; no number of true test statements would justify the claim that 
an explanatory universal theory is true.' (O.K. p.7)2
Popper's answer to the problem of induction depends on his distinction between
universal statements on the one hand and singular statements on the other. The
sciences are concerned to discover true universal statements and they proceed by
testing universal hypotheses or theories^against singular statements. The latter
refer to what may be observed in particular’ regions of space and time. Universal
statements are not so restricted: they refer to all regions of space and time.
Thus the general form of a universal statement is:
Of all points in space and time (or in all regions of space and time) it 
is true that (L.S,D.p.63)
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If there are to be any true universal statements then nature has to be 
characterized by essential uniformities. Thus, as Popper admits, his theory of 
science presupposes a definite metaphysical conception of nature. Scientific 
theories consist of universal statements, sometimes called laws of nature. If they 
are supplemented by statements of particular empirical conditions then it is 
possible to derive predictions as to what may be observed in particular regions of 
space and time. For example, the universal statement ’All swans are white*
together .with the singular statement 'There i^‘a swan in such-and-such a region* 
entails the prediction 'There is a white swan in such-and-such a region*, 
Scientific theories are essentially descriptivet they refer to what may be 
observed in any region of time and space if the appropriate conditions are met. 
In Popper's conception of science there is no need for ’theoretical terms* in
Carnap's sense which refer to ’unobservable* objects or pi
Now, no finite or denumerable sequence of singular statements can ever cover 
all points or regions of space and time. If follows that singular statements, no 
matter how numerous, can never sustain an inference to a universal statement. No 
amount of observations of white swans can justify the conclusion that all swans 
are white. But a single black swan is sufficient to falsify that conclusion. Any 
universal statement can be falsified by finding one point or region at or in which 
whatever it asserts is not true. Popper therefore maintains that there is an 
asymmetry in the relation between universal and singular statements. The latter can 
never justify universal statements, they can only falsify them. Since the sciences 
aim. to discover true universal statements it follows that they cannot proceed by 
induction. Instead they proceed by deduction and falsification. Theories can be 
refuted but they can never be proved. The search for true universal statements 
must therefore proceed through the elimination of those that are false.
Popper's solution to the problem of induction and his conclusion that the 
sciences proceed through the attfr^pt to falsify universal statements provides him 
with a simple criterion of demarcation between science and non-science. Science
l
proposes descriptive universal statements that may be falsified by singular 
descriptive statements and it does attempt to falsify them. Non-science,
metaphysics and pseudo-science do not. Metaphysics advances propositions that 
cannot be falsified by singular descriptive statements. For example, the
* A
proposition that there arp true universal statements can never be falsified by 
any finite sequence of singular descriptive statements. It is therefore meta­
physical. Popper is far from hostile to metaphysics. Metaphysics may not be 
science but that does not mean that it is without meaning. On the contrary, 
metaphysics may well make a definite contribution to science. For example, in 
the Preface to the English edition of The Logic of Scientific Discovery 
Popper insists that:
’purely metaphysical ideas - and therefore philosophical ideas - have been 
of the greatest importance for cosmology. From Thales to Einstein, from 
ancient atomism to Descartes * speculation about matter, from the speculations 
of Gilbex't and Newton and Leibniz and Boscovic about forces to those of 
Faraday and Einstein about fields of forces, metaphysical ideas have shown 
the way. ’ (jJSD p.19)
The pseudo-sciences, for example Marxism and psychoanalysis, are forms of meta­
physics which purport to offer universal descriptive statements but they, or 
rather their proponents, refuse to allow them to be falsified. Consider 
Popper's comment on the status of psychoanalysis:
'...criteria of refutation have to be laid down beforehand: it must be 
agreed which observable stateaEiits situations, if actually observed, 
mean that the theory is refuted. But what kind of clinical responses 
would refute to the satisfaction of the analyst not merely a particular 
diagnosis but psychoanalysis itself? And have such criteria ever been 
discussed or agreed upon by analysts?' (Conjectures and Refutations,
hereafter CR,p.38,n,3)
I will return to the significance of Popper's reference to the analyst rather 
than the propositions of psychoanalytic theory in connection with his doctrine 
of methodologies.! decisions. Y/hat should be noted here is that Popper's dismissal 
of so many theories as metaphysical pseudo-sciences is crucially dependent on 
his particular conception of scientific theoi’y. Since Popper rejects even Carnap's, 
distinction between theoretical and observational terms he must interpret every 
theoretical proposition as essentially descriptive of observable states of affairs. 
On that interpretation there can be no theoretical proposition, however abstract,
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that cannot be directly refuted by observation. Popper's criterion of demarcation 
is an effect of his metaphysical conception^ of the world as characterized by 
essential uniformities that may be represented in universal descriptive statements 
and of science as postulating universal statements and
testing them against observable states of affairs. Any theoretical discourse 
which can be interpreted as proposing universal descriptive statements of the 
approved kind may therefore be duly accredited as scientific. If a theoretical 
discourse is represented in some other v/ay then it may be discredited as 
unscientific. For example, psychoanalysis is unscientific on Popper's reading.
Its theories cannot be interpret^ed as universal descriptive statements since 
they do not preclude any observable states of affairs. Consider the case of a man 
who pushes a child into the water with the intention of drowning it and that of a 
man who sacrifices his life in an attempt to save the child:
’according to Freud the first man suffered from repression (say, of some 
component of his Oedipus complex), while the second man had achieved 
sublimation.' (CR p.SS)^
Here the theoretical apparatus of psychoanalysis is interpreted as non-descriptive; 
it is an empty jargon whose function is to provide an ’explanation’ for all possible 
states of affairs. But, if it precludes no observable state of affairs then 
psychoanalysis cannot be falsified by observation. It is therefore unscientific.
Thus Popper conceives the relation between theory and observation in the 
sciences as conforming to the elemental pattern of the asymmetric relation between 
universal descriptive statements and singular descriptive statements outlined 
above. Anything which he or his supporters can represent as failing to respect 
this simplistic scheme must be unscientific.
2. logic of knowledge and psychology of knowledge
'The question how it happens that a new idea occurs to a man - whether it is 
a musical theme, a dramatic conflict, or a scientific theory - may be of 
great interest to empirical psychology-; but it is irrelevant to the logical 
analysis of scientific knowledge. This latter is ,concerned not with questions 
of fact,(Kant's quid facti?) but only with questions of justification or 
validity (Kant’s quid juris?).’ (IgD p. 31)
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The latter are Investigated by means of the deductive testing of theories. This 
involves analysis of the internal structure of theories and of their relation to 
other theories and, especially, of the testing of theory against observable states 
of affairs. While Popper appears here to refer to the logical structure of a 
theory we shall see below that, in so far as it is applicable to reality, logic 
itself becomes a descriptive theory which may be empidcally refutable. Thus 
logical relations within a theory or between theories are themselves subject to 
empirical refutation. In the last resort, the deductive testing of a theory is 
always reducible to a confrontation with the facts. For the logic of knowledge 
what matters is not where ideas come from but whether they fit the facts. The 
provenance of scientific theories and ideas is relegated to the realm of 
empirical psychology. Popper suggests that problems in existing theory may jell 
have significant effects in determining the direction of work of scientists but 
the investigation of such effects would not be the task of the logic of knowledge.
A related distinction is elaborated in Popper's later work in connection with 
the notion of world 3, the world of objective knowledge. There are. three 
ontologically distinct worlds:
'the first is the physical world or the world of physical states; the 
second ife the mental world or the world of mental states; and the third is 
the world of intelligibles, of ideas in the objective sense; it is the world 2K 
of possible objects of thought..,. ' (OK p,154)
There is more than a little ambiguity in Popper's notion of objective knowledge.
For present purposes it is sufficient to say that for Popper knowledge is 'objective
in that it exists independently of the subjective state of mind of any individual
or individuals. There is an objective structure of knowledge in books, libraries,
newspapers, and so on, and it has properties which are objective and quite
independent of whether they are recognized by any human subjectivity. 'Knowledge
in an objective sense is knowledge without a knower: it is knowledge without a
knowing subject. ' (OK p.109)
Now, with regard to this objective structure we can ask two types of question. 
The first concerns how and by what mechanisms the structure was produced while the
second concerns its properties. The logic of knowledge belongs to the second 
type since it concerns the properties of knowledge rather than:.its production.
It is clear that the distinction involved here need not be restricted to 'knowledge 
in the objective sense '; it may be applied to any class of objects without 
exception. For example, in the case of spiders' webs or ants' nests we can 
investigate their production and we can investigate their properties as objective 
structures. While the web is produced by the activity of a spider it has properties 
which are not reducible to that activity. Furthermore, once it has been produced 
the web will react back on the spider as an external influence on its future 
activity. Similarly for world 3. Once it exists it reacts back on v/orld 2, the 
world of mental states of human animals, and thereby may affect the structure of 
world 1, the world of physical states, through our application of the knowledge 
it contains.
The analogy between the objective struclure^one^§e one hand and the equally
objective structures of spiders' webs and ants' nests, or, for that matter, those
resulting from human sewe'rage disposal, on the other hand, may seem far fetched
but Popper intends it in all seriousness:
S
'the third world ij4 a natural product of the human animal, comparable 
to a spider's web. ' (OK p.112)
Just as the spider interacts with his web so we interact with our world 3. Indeed:
'it is through this interaction between ourselves and the third world that 
objective knowledge grows, and ... there is a close analogy between the 
growth of knowledge and biological growth; that is, the evOlu^tion of plants 
and animals. ' (ibid.)
3. Popper's anti-subjectivism
Science is objective in the sense that its theories cannot be reduced to the 
content of any individual consciousness. Once a theory has been propounded it may 
be subjected to testing against observable states of affairs. For any given test
the theory will either suz-vive or not survive it. The process of testing
scientific *theories does not involve or depend on the subjective beliefs of any
no
individual human subject, since a test performed by one person may be repeated by 
someone else. Both the theory and the singular observation statements against 
which it is tested are objective, i.e. irreducible to the content of any individual 
consciousness. In this respect, at least, Popper is no positivist. There can be 
no question of reducing the content of scientific theory to any supposedly basic 
and irreducible elements of what is given to consciousness. In fact there is no 
place in Popper's conception of laiowledge for irreducible elements of knowledge at 
all. So. whereas Carnap must always suppose the possibility of an a-theoretical 
observation language Popper canhM5Mj insist that all observation without 
exception is made in the light of theory. There are no extra-theoretical 
primitive observation statements on the basis of which scientific theory may be 
constructed.
Popper repudiates all positivist conceptions of the relation between theory
and observation^ Thus there can be no question of conceiving the testing of theory
in terms of any positivist recourse to the elements of experience. On the contrary:
'scientific statements must be objective, then those statements which belong 
to the empirical basis of science must also be objective, i.e. intersubjectively 
testable.' (IBP p.47)
Objectivity, in this sense, requires intersubjective testability. The testing of
a theory therefore involves comparing the predictions of that theory with basic
statements, that is, with singular descriptive staten^its which are themselves
objective, Basic statements must be intersubjectively testable.
'We thus arrive at the following view. Systems of theories are tested by- 
deducing from them statements of a lesser level of universality. These 
statements in their turn, since they are to be inter-subjectively testable, 
must be testable in like manner - and so ad infinitum. ' (ibid, )
Popper insists that there is no danger of an"infinite regress. Popper does not
require that every statement in science be tested, merely that it be testable.
There are no statements which simply have to be accepted. Thus, in Popper's system,
there is no point at which demonsti’ation has to stop. There are always points at
which it does stop but there are no logical reasons why it should ever do so.
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4. methodological decisions
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- . |
Theories are to be tested against descriptions of observed states of affairs
and either rejected or provisionally accepted and then subjected to further tests.
Unfortunately things are ndfc so simple. One complication has been indicated in the
previous section. The deductive testing of any theory must involve reference to
basic statements which are also testable. Now universal statements and basic
statememts are both descriptive. It follows that if a given universal statement
contradicts a given basic statement then at least one must be false. In the event
of a test resulting in such a contraidiction-it seems that we may reject either the
theory or the basic statement and we may reject both. Thus the decision to reject
a theory on the basis of any test requires a prior decision to accept certain
basic statements. Only the acceptance of basic statements can provide the logical
grounds which Popper's theory requires for rejecting theories which appear to
contradict them.
In practice, we are told, the situation is usually even more complex. The
derivation'of predictions from universal statements often requires some
specification of the empirical conditions in a particular region of space and time,
the use of other theories and some application of logic or of pure mathematics. In
such cases what is tested is not so much any one uniLversal statement as a complex
system of theories, singular descriptive statements and elements of logic and
mathematics. If that system fails its test as a result of our decision to accept
some basic statements then which part of the system should we reject? We have seen
that all theories and all singular descriptive statements are testable but the
same is true of logic and mathematics:
'Insofar as a calculus is applied to reality, it loses the character of 
a calculus and becomes a descriptive theory which may be empirically
refutable; and in so far as it is treated as irrefutable, i.e. as a system 
of logically true formulae, rather than a descriptive scientific theory, 
it is not applied to reality.' (CR p,210)
But if logic, other theories, and singular descriptive.statements are all refutable
in principle then no test can ever provide a logically conclusive refutation of any
one universal statement. The observation of a black swan may be interpreted as
l~2r'
disposing of tlie "theory that all swans are white or as a refutation of 
elementary formal logic.
How, then, is the scientist to proceed? He decides to test a certain 
universal statement and he therefore makes the appropriate observations. Having 
provisionally decided to accept the resulting basic statements he compares them 
with his more or less complex system of theories, singular descriptive statements, 
logic and mathematics. If he finds a contradiction then he has a problem. He 
must decide which part or parts of the system to reject. Logic cannot help him 
here. Instead he must provisionally decide that the result of the test entails 
the rejection of such-and-such a part of his system of theory. That decision may 
be mistaken and it is always open to further testing. Refutation is always a 
matter of decision.
Now, the fact that no test is ever logically conclusive for any theory
means that we can effectively immunize any given theory against empirical
refutation by the simple expedient of interpreting test^results as refuting
auxiliary hypotheses,Ss$SxMx descriptions or, if all else fails, logic itself.
Thus it is not the structure of a theory as such which detennines whether it is
testable and falsifiable but rather the methods we apply to it,
'The question whether a given system should as such be regarded as a 
conventionalist or an empirical one is therefore misconceived. Only 
with reference to the methods applied to a theoretical system is it 
possible to ask whether we are dealing with a conventionalist or an 
empirical theory. T (ISD p.S2)
The implication is clear. The difference between science and metaphysics is 
not a function of their concepts and relations between concepts. It is ike a 
MKavtsux function of how we decide to treat them. It is the behaviour of the 
analyst rather than the structure of psychoanalytic theory as such which 
determines whether or not it is scientific. Similarly for Marxism or theology.
It is the behaviour of Marxists and theologi^ans that counts, not the character 
of their concepts.
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Thus Popper s demarcation criterion between science and non-science, while 
it appeals to refer to the character of theories, actually involves a normative
conception of scientific and unscientific forms of behaviour. To be scientific
5is to accept a behavioural norm which Popper describes in terms of methodological 
decisions:
'We decide that if our system is threatened we will never attempt to save it 
by any kind of conventionalist stratagem.' (ibid,)
This norm is methodological: it cannot be justified in or based upon any empirical
science. In effect, it is based on metaphysics, and Popper has frequently insisted
that what is and what is not an acceptable scientific explanation changes over time.
These 'big changes ' he describes in terms of 'metaphysical research programmes ' for 
6science. Thus the content of scientific knowledge at any time is a function of 
intersubjective decisions based on methodological norms derived from 'metaphysical 
research programmes'. The demarcation between science and non-science is an effect 
of the prevailing metaphysics.
As a final complication we should note that the making of observations in
science is conceived by Popper as a function of training:
'Any empirical scientific statement can be presented (by describing experimental 
arrangement^ etc.) in such a way that anyone who has learned the relevant 
technique can test it.' (ISD p,99)
And again:
’I have no intention of defining the term ‘'observable1' or '‘observable event. 
I think that it should be introduced as an undefined term which becomes 
sufficiently precise in use: as a primitive concept whose use the epistemologifn. 
has to learn, much as he has to learn the term "symbol1', or as the physicist 
has to learn the use of the term "mass-point' (i&jUl. p. 103)
Thus the result of any test, and therefore the content of scientific knowledge, must
depend on the forms of training which prevail within the scientific community at the
time. Now, we have seen that the rejection of a theory on the basis of a test
requires inter alia the prior decision to accept the relevant basic statements.
If the basic statem^ents are not accepted then no methodological decisions in the
world can enable us to reject any theory through deductive testing. In the last
resort basic statements must be accepted or rejected on the basis of prevailing
..training
experimental technique. The function of1therefotre provides a means
for obtairujig acceptance of basic statements at least from other members of the
scientific community. In Popper's system, as Lakatos has noted, unanimity on
basic statements ’can be reached by expelling the minority as pseudoscientists
or cranks. ’ (Schilpp 1974 p.243) When all else fails the danger of an infinite
regression in the testing and retesting of basic statements by the scientific
7community may be averted by the elementary rule that might is right.
•
II Rational Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge
Popper’s theory of science depends on a definite metaphysical conception 
of nature as characterized by certain essential uniformities. Because nature is 
so organized there will be univers^) statements which are true, that is, which 
correspond to the facts of nature. However, the very fact of their universality 
ensures that universal statements can never be shown to be true. Thus, while we 
know from Popper's metaphysics that there are true universal statements we can 
never hope to establish that any scientific theory actually is true. But we can 
certainly hope to eliminate those theories which are false. In Popper's theory 
the aim of science is to get nearer to the truth and it does so by fulfilling 
the method of rational criticism. This method involves the clear formulation of 
problems and the rigorous testing of proposed solutions according to the 
methodological rubrics indicated above. The growth of knowledge proceeds through 
the elimination of error, Popper often represents this process in the folowing 
schema:
P —yTT*>EE —^ PJL J»
We Start from a problem and we formulate a tentative solution or tentative theory whic 
we then subject to the severest possible tests in a process of error-elimination.
The elimination of error leads us to the formulation of new problems which 'arise 
from our own creative activity. ' (OK p.119) Not only is this process supposed to 
lead to the growth of knowledge but it also serves Popper as an epistemological anaitB? 
analogue to natural selection. In his paper 'Evolution and the Tree of Knowledge’ 
Popper writes of the natural selection of hypotheses that it is 'a competitive
it if 
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struggle which eliminates those hypotheses which ai-e unfit. * (OK p.261)
The difference between scientific knowledge and pre-scientific or animal knowledge 
is that the former is subjected to systematic and conscious criticism. This has 
the advantage that:
’while animal knowledge and pre-scientific knowledge grow mainly through 
the elimination of those holding the unfit hypothesis, scientific criticism 
often makes our theories perish in our stead, eliminating our mistaken 
beliefs before such beliefs lead to our own elimination. ' (ibid.)
Popper insists that this statement is not meant metaphorically. There is an
evolutionary tree of knowledge and it is governed by the regulative idea of truth
as correspondence wi tS^Sacts,
, 1 >
'Together with the fact that our curiosity, our passion to explain by 
means of unified theory, is universal and unlimited, our aim of getting 
nearer to the truth explains the integrative growth of the tree of 
knowledge. ’ (OK p.264)
The method of rational criticism is the mechanism of a teleological growth cf
knowledge in the. direction of increasing verisimilitude, 
fcUnfoijpnatelyeven if we were to refrain from questioning the 
status of Popper's metaphysical conception of the world, it would be impossible 
to,establish either that the method of ’rational criticism' leads to the growth 
of scientific knowled’ge in the sense of increasing verisimilitude or that it has any 
coherent foundation in his metaphysics and theory of knowledge. I am not 
concerned at this stage with the question of whetler deductive testing, in Popper's 
sense, can be said to represent the method of science, that is, whether the relation 
between theoi’y and observation can be reduced to the pattern of the ssysnaeta
asymmetric relation between universal descriptive statements and singular descriptive 
statements. I return to the question of theory and observation in the concluding 
section of this chapter. • The present argument is concerned with the relation 
between Popper's specification of the aim of science and his account of its method, 
in particular with the question of whether there is any rational basis for the claim 
that the latter has a bearing on the attainment of the .former. We shall see that 
there is not;
Consider first the question of the aim of science, namely, getting nearer
IYT
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to the truth. Popper uses the concept of truth in the sense of the classical 
theory that truth is correspondence to the facts. He regards Tarski’s theory 
of truth as ’a rehabilitation and an elaboration of the classical theory. ' (OK p.323) 
Because of Tarski it is legitimate to talk of ’truth’ and ’correspondence to the 
facts'. Now, as I have shown in the previous chapter, Tarski’s concept of truth 
concerns a relation between two languages: an object language in which statements 
are formulated and a metalanguage which contains names of statements in the object 
language and sentences having the ^same meaning as statements in the object 
language. If P lepresents a name and p represents a metalinguistic ’translation’ 
of the statement P then, following Tarski’s definition, we can make metalinguistic 
assertions such as:
P is true if and only if p.
Thus Tarski s theory of truth establishes a clear and rigorous concept of truth 
b^neans of precisely determined relations between an object language and a meta­
language. But Popper’s theory of science is not concerned primarily with 
relating the language of science to some metalanguage of the lan^guage of science.
It is concerned with relating scientific statements to the world, to the 
essential uniformities of nature, Tarski*s theory tells us nothing about the 
relation of language to the world and it certainly cannot legitimize any conception 
of truth as correspondence with some extra-linguistic reality. It is this latter 
correspondence that is required for Popper’s theory of science. If, in order to 
talk of the truth or falsity of scientific statements, he has recourse to some 
metalanguage thenne merely transposes the question of correspondence to the world 
from one language to another. In one of his examples Popper uses German as an 
object language and English as the metalanguage. Consider the statement ’Dei’
Mond besteht aus grunem ICase’. This statement is false but testable. It is 
therefore scientific. Now, we can formulate the conditions of the truth of our 
statement as follows:
'The German statement Der Mond besteht aus grunem Kase" is true if and
only if the moon consists of green cheese’ (Cf.OK p,326)
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Fine. But the facts have still to be established and, in Popper’s theory of 
science, that would lead us away from relations between English and German to
the relation between an English statement and the world. His use of Tarski's 
definition of truth resolves none of the problems of his correspondence theory 
of knowledge. Popper’s metaphysics assures us that there are true universal 
statements j it remains to be shown that what he describes as ’rational criticism’ 
is able to lead us in their direction.
Now, it is clear that any systematic application of the method of rational 
criticism must involve a change in the content of what passes for knowledge at any 
given time in 'the game of science'. (ISD p,53) But why should we suppose, 
as Popper does, that it also leads to a growth of knowledge in the sense of 
increasing verisimilitude? The importance of that question should be clear. Unless 
it can be shown that the application of Popper's method does indeed entail a 
growth of scientific knowledge then it is impossible to justify that method in 
terms of Popper's metaphysics and his specification of the aim of science. If 
the method of rational criticism cannot be shown to lead to the growth of knowledge 
then Popper's insistence on the necessity of testing and falsifiiaiimn7 can rest 
on nothing but blind faith.
But, if it"is impossible to establish that any theory is true then it must 
also be impossible to establish that one theory is nearer to the truth than any 
other. Indeed, Popper frequently appears to recognize this point. For example, 
in his paper 'Truth, Rationality, and the Growth8oi^ftnowledge ’ Popper tells us 
that the question 'How do you know that the theory tg has a higher degree of 
verisimilitude than the theory t^?' must be answered as follows:
’T do not know - I only guess. But I can examine my guess critically, and
if it withstands severe criticism, then this fact may be thken as a good
critical reason in favour of it.' (CR p,234)
And again:
'even after has been refuted in its turn we can still say that it is better
than t , for although both have been shown to be false, the fact that t has * ^
withstood tests which t did not pass may be a good indication that the
falsity-content of t exceeds that of t9 while its truth content does not. *
(CR p.235)8
The circularity of Popper's position here is evident. ‘If it is possible to
establish that one theory is nearer to the truth than another theory then it may
Jr?-
be possible to argue that what Popper describes as the method of rational
i
criticism does indeed lead to the growth of knowledge. Popper merely offers 
a guess and suggests that the guess be subjected to rational criticism.
'Rational criticism* is to be used to provide 'a good critical reason in favour* 
of the guess that one theory really is closer to the truth than a competing 
theory. Thus the only argument that Popper can offer to support the assertion 
that 'rational criticism* does.lead to the growth of knowledge is itself 
dependent on the method of ’rational criticism'. In effect we are'asked to 
accept that rational criticism leads to the growth of knowledge because rational 
criticism gives a good reason for accepting that it does.
Popper's conception of scientific theory as cons^l^ting of universal 
statements ensures that no theory can be shown to be nearer the truth than any 
other. While it may be possible to maintain that one theory is better than 
another in the sense of surviving more severe tests it cannot be shown that the 
'better* theory is any any closer to the metaphysical utopia of true universal 
statements. There is nothing but blind faith and empty dogmatism to support 
the view that 'rational criticism* leads to the growth of knowledge. In the 
absence of such a faith it must seem that the game of science is entirely 
destructive: it can show that theories are false but it has nothing positive to 
offer. But can it even show that theories are false? Popper's doctrine of 
methodological decisions and his remarks on the function of the training of 
scientists suggests that the procedure of deductive testing can provide no 
rational grounds for rejecting any theory which fails its test. We have seen 
that no test can ever be logically conclusive so that the 'refutation' of a 
theory is a matter of decisions, conventions and forms of training. A theory 
which fails its test is one that falls foul of the forms of training current 
within the community of scientists in question and of their methodological 
decisions to accept certain basic statements, not to question various other 
theories or the empirical applicability of formal logic, etc. The test itself 
provides no more grounds for the conclusion that a theory which fails is false
than it does for the conclusion that one which does not fail is true. While
Popper constantly alludes to ’good reasons’ for accepting or rejecting basic
statements, for accepting or rejecting hypotheses and theories, and so on, the
reasons cited are never commensurate with the conclusion we are asked to draw.
Reasons are ’good' in so far as they conform to Popper's specification of the rules
of the game of science; in effect they must satisfy the conditions of 'rational
criticism'. But reasons that are 'good' in that sense cannot entail the conclusion
that such-and-such a hypothesis is- false or that such-and-such a theory is nearer
to the truth than some competing theory.
Consider, for example, the status of basic statements in Popper’s theory.
Popper has been criticized by positivists for the consequences of his refusal
to allow that any statement can find its justification in experience.
'Experiences can motivate a decision, and hence an acceptance or rejection 
of a statement, but a basic statement cannot be justified by them -' no more 
than by thumping the table. ' (LSD p.105)
Why, then, should Popper insist that basic statements should refer to states of 
affairs that can be observed, that is, experienced? It is our decision which 
is decisive in Popper's theory of science, not our observation. In effect, as 
Ayer points out, Popper has a very simple way of assessing the truth or falsity 
of basic statements:
'True basic statements are those that we decide to accept; false basic 
statements are those that we decide to reject. ’ (Schilpp 1974 p.687)
In reply, Popper first admits that the acceptance or rejection of a given basic
statement is arbitrary 'from a purely logical point of view' and then argues
that, like the verdict of a jury, it is far from being 'completely arbitrary'.
'The jury decides about a fact - say, whether or not Mr.A killed Mr.B.
Its decision is the result of prolonged deliberation; much time is needed for 
coming to a common decision (which is the meaning of 'convention" intended here) 
But who would say that a jury which has long and seriously debated the issue 
decided ^completely arbitrarily*? Its decision is the result of a common 
effort to find the truth. ' (Schilpp 1974 p,1^111)
This reply is entirely beside the point. The problem dt issue concerns the
logical capacity of accepted basic statements to support conclusions based on them.
Popper offers a ’good reason’ in the shape of the seriousness of the scientific 
jury and the effort it devotes to its task. Unfortunately the problem concerns 
not the existence effort and seriousness on the part of the jury but whether 
they are put to any useful purpose. Popper’s ’good reason' has no bearing at all 
on this latter question. The inadequacy of Popper's position may be seen if we 
consider the case of a hypothetical scientific jury which accepts basic statements 
on the results of a long and careful examination of chicken entrails. Suppose 
now that some hypothetical sceptic^were to question the logici.1 status of basic 
statements derived in this fashion. An equally hypothetical 'Popper' might well 
reply that of course the accjS^tance of basic statements was logically arbitrary 
but that nevertheless a jury of carefully trained inspectors of chicken entrails 
had long and seriously debated the issue and that, therefore, far from being 
completely arbitrary its decision was the result of a common effort to find 
the truth.
If the aim of science is to get nearer to the truth in therlSSSl; of Popper’s 
metaphysical conception of the world then not one of the 'good reasons' to which 
he alludes is commensurate with the conclusion that the method of rational 
criticism has any bearing on the attainment of that aim. Popper's defence of 
his methodology and his criterion of demarcation is this:
’My only reason for proposing my criterion of demarcation is that it is
fruitful. ' (LSD p.55)
This defence is on a par with the 'good reasons ' he invokes at other points in 
his argument and is vulnerable to the same criticism.
Ill Theory, Observation and Testing
Popper rejects the positivist notion of the reducibility of knowledge to the 
phenomena of experience. Nevertheless, there are at least two significant respects 
in which his methodological doctrine'bears comparison with that of the most 
elaborate and compendious of positivist methodologies outlined in Mill’s A System 
of Logic. In both, the aim of science is defined with reference to a definite 
metaphysical conception of the world as populated by ess^tial uniformities.
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Those uniformities exist and it is the job of science to discover ^16111 or, at 
least, to produce better and better approximations to them. I have'shown that 
Millfs conception of the world is such that no methodological rules can ever be 
shown to be effective. Thus Mill’s methodology has no rational foundation in 
the KEthHdsiHgy metaphysics on which it nevertheless depends for the definition 
of its objectives. We have now seen that Popper's methodology is similarly 
related, or rather unrelated, to his metaphysics. While his metaphysics is 
necessary to define the objective of his methodology , his methodology cannot 
be shown to have any bearing on the attainment of that objective. There is a 
sense in which Popper, unlike Mill, recognize^ the glaring HlgasX&X discrepancy 
between his mthodology and its objective since he admits that the degree of 
verisimilitude of any theory cannot be known. His ’solution’ to the problem 
posed by that discrepancy is disarmingly simple. He explicitly recognizes that 
the discrepancy exists and then proceeds almost as if nothing had happened, invoking 
a plethora of ’good reasons’, ’critical discussions' and even, as his jury analogy 
effectively requires, ’good intentions’, none of which are capable of supporting 
the weight of argument that Popper’s theory places on them. Where Mill disposes 
of the problem by the sleight of hand of his circular justification of induction 
by induction Popper tries to smother it with a mass of irre^ant, and therefore 
empty, verbiage.
A second area of comparison concerns the articulation of scientific 
propositions on to the realm of phenomena to which they allegedly refer. Mill 
treats that articulation as unproblematic and fails to develop an elaborated 
conception of language. We have seen that twentieth century logical positivism 
and associated positions have posed the problem of the articulation of scientific 
propositions and the real and that they have attempted to resolve it by means of 
the concept of a primitive observation language in which propositions 'point to’ 
the content of the given and ’represent’ its structure. In the two previous chapters 
I have described some of the internal problems which have led to the breakdown of 
the theory of an a-theoretical observation language. Briefly, the positivist 
distinction between theoretical and observation languages requires that
elementary logic be non-empirical; logic must represent the structure of all 
possible experience. Thus any rigorous distinction between the languages of 
theory and of observation must lead to a contradiction within positivist 
epistemology: on the one hand all knowledge is reducible to the phenomena of 
experience; on the other hand elementary logic determines in advance the 
Structure of all possible experience and it therefore represents a 'knowledge ' 
that is independent of any experience. For this and other reasons many authors 
have denied the possibility of a rigorous distinction between the languages of 
theory and of observation while, retaining a residual allegiance to the positivist 
doctrine of the reducibility of Imowledge to the phenomena of experience.
Popper, too, rejects the logical positivist dHHtxxHH distinction between 
theoretical and observational languages and, like Mill, he appears to treat the 
articulation of scientific propositions on the realm of phenomena as essentially 
unproblematic. Consequently, while he has a great deal to say on the functions 
and significance of language, he fails to develop an elaborated conception of 
the articulation of language on to the world. In the remainder of this chapter 
I argue that the rejection of the concept of an a-theoretical observation language 
must remove any possible rational foundation for the notion of the ’testing' of 
hypotheses against the facts of observation. Popper's own conception of the 
nature of scientific language therefore KsnfcxiHK entails the absurdity of his 
methodological prescriptions and of his criterion of demarcation between science 
and non-science. Similarly the notion of testing can have no rational foundation 
in a residual positivist methsdHiHgjc epistemology which fails to recognize a 
rigorous distinction between the languages of theory and of observation. Since, 
as I have shown, that distinction itself entails a contradiction within positivist 
epistemology it follows that there can be no rational positivist or neo-positivist 
defence of the doctrine that science proceeds through the testing of hypotheses 
against the facts of observation.
In Popper's work the disjunction between the propositions of science and the
\
objects to which they refer is enshrined in the thesis of realism, the thesis of 
the reality of the world. The scientific tradition, defined by the regulative
ideal of verisimilitude, is a realist tradition:
‘This regulative ideal of finding theories which correspond to the facts 
is what makes the scientific tradition a realist tradition: it distinguishes 
between the world of our theories and the world of facts to which these 
theories belong.' (OK p,290)
Now, to propose such a distinction is to pose a problem of the status of the 
concepts and theoretical structure of the propositions of science in relation to 
the objects to which they are supposed to refer. I am not concerned here with the 
question of whether some particular proposition can be said to correspond to the 
facts but with the more general issue of the relations between the realm of scientifi 
discourse on the one hand and the realm of real objects on the other. If the two 
realms are conceived as distinct then it cannot be presumed that the concepts and 
relations between concepts of the one are adequate to represent the structure of 
the other. For example, if the structure of the real is distinct from that of 
scientific discourse then distinctions made in the one may well not represent any 
difference in the other and, conversely, different objects may well be subsumed 
under the same concept. If the structures are indeed distinct then it is possible 
that there are no true propositions. If Popper is to spe&k of truth as correspondenc 
with the facts then he must show that the structure of scientific discourse is such 
as to make such correspondences possible. Tarski's theory of truth cannot help him 
here since it remains within the sphere of relations between two languages.
It should be noted that the problem of discrepancy between scientific discourse 
and the objects to which it refers is not peculiar to Popper# Analogous difficulties 
must arise within any positivist epistemology which attempts to reduce knowledge to 
the phenomena of experience. If experiences are distinct from statements about 
them, then only a doctrine of the pre-established harmony between language and the 
order of experience can avoid the problem of discrepancy. Once knowledge is 
conceived in terms of a correspondence between two distinct realms, between 
propositions on the one hand and real objects, experiences, or what have you, on• 
the other, once it is a matter of both a distinction and a correspondence which 
bridges what has 2K& been distinguished, then the fact of the former must make 
problematic the possibility of the But, in positivist epistemology or
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in Popper s episte]iiolog3.CEl realism, if the possibility of correspondence is 
problematic then it can never be show to exist. Any attempt to investigate 
or to establish some proposed correspondence must have recourse to further 
propositions whose status is no less problematic than those of the propositions 
under investigation.
It is for this reason that a doctrine of the pre-established harmony between 
language and the world is required to overcome the possibility of a discrepancy 
between them. This, in effect, is the thesis of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and of 
the logical positiyjst postulate of an a-theoretical observation language. There 
is a language of elementary propositions whose distinct constants ’point to’ 
different elements of the world and whose logical grammar reproduces the structure 
of the world. The possibility of a correspondence is established by the simple 
expedient of effacing the problematic distinction, I have shown that the notion 
of an a-theoretical observation language must conflict with the fundamental 
theses of positivist epistemology since it postulates, in logic, a knowledge
e
that is independent of experience. In addition, since it cannot hope to be 
established it is clear that the thesis of pre-established harmony can rest on 
nothing but an act of faith - with an open or surreptitious vote of thanks to the 
old guy in the sky who made it all possible.
Now, to reject the postulate of an a-theoretical observation language is to 
preclude the notion of the pi’e-established harmony between the language of 
scientific observation and the world. Popper and all those residual positivists 
who dispute the possibility of a rigorous distinction between the languages of 
theory and observation are condemned to the thesis of iJigE discrepancy between 
the language of scientific observation and the objects or experiences which it 
is supposed to describe. Thus Popper insists that statements of observation 
are always interpretations, ’that they are interpretations in the light of 
theory. * (ISD p,107n) If observation or description is always theoretical then 
so, conversely, theory is always descriptive. We have seen, for example, that,
I
in Popper s view, logic and mathematics, insofar as these are applied to reality, 
are empirical and therefore falsifiable. It follows that every propositioiij
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however abstract, can be interpreted as a description of some real or 
postulated state of affairs. There are no terms or propositions which refer 
to unobservable objects or unobservable properties of objects. In addition, 
we have seen that, in Popper’s theory, the recording of observations is not 
only made * in the light of theory' but that it is a function of the training 
of scientists in the use of scientific instruments. Theory is therefore 
implicated in observation in the interpetation of results and, at least for
s'
Popper, in the construction of the instruments which make those results 
possible.
What are the implications of this rejection of the postulate of an 
a-theoretical observation language for the notion o^j^esting of hypotheses 
against the facts? In the positivist epistemology of Carnap the status of the 
concept of testing is clear and unambiguous: because there are protocol 
sentences which difectly represent the structure of the given it follows that 
hypotheses which contradict the relevant protocol sentences must be false; 
they cannot correspond to the given. Here the concept of testing is a consequence 
of the postulate of pre-established harmony. Popper rejects that postulate. I 
have just quoted his assertion that observations are made in the light of theory. 
He continues:
'That is one of the main reasons why it is always deceptively easy to |ind 
verifications of a theory, and why we have to adopt a highly critical
attitude towards our theories if we do not wish to argue in circles: the
attitude of trying to refute them.' (ibid.)
Theories must be severely tested against the facts, they must be measured against
basic statements, accepted statements of observation. Now, if conflict between
basic statement and hypothesis is to entail the falsification of the latter then
the former must stand in-as a surrogate for the facts. But that possibilitj^ is
specifically precluded once the postulate of an a-theoretical observation language
is denied. The comparison of hypothesis and basic statement cannot
then be interpreted as equivalent to the comparison of1 hypothesis with reality.
The notion that testing, as Popper describes it, involves the falsification and
refutation of theories or hypotheses is simply fatuous. If theory is inescapably
/-Jr
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implicated in observation then testing cannot be a rational procedure. If testing 
is a rational procedure then there must be an a-theoretical^BlDservation governed 
by a pre-established harmony between language and the real. To maintain, as 
Popper does, both the rationality of testing and the thesis that observation 
is an interpetation in the light of theory is to collapse into a manifest and 
absurd contradiction. Popper's theory of science is therefore strictly incoherent.
It is necessary to insist on the significance of this conclusion. If there 
is no positivist observation language then the experimental practice of the
sciences cannot be conceived as a matter of working on a given nature. On the 
contrary, and even in terms of Popper's own conception of scientific theory, 
the sciences work on constructs which are produced through .the operation of its 
theory and instruments, (and these latter in their turn depend on theory). It 
follows that the relation between theory, instrument, and observation must be 
conceived as internal to the practice of the science concerned.^ When observation 
statements are hypostatized and are represented in oppsosition to the theoretical 
conditions of their production the result is a more or less speculative conception 
of the relation between theory on the one hand and 'the facts of observation ' 
on the other, For example, Popper's own speculative metaphysics is required to 
close the gap opened up by his hypostatizing of the status of basic stat^ients 
in relation to the theories and instruments implicated in their production.
If there is no: positivist observation language then experiment and observation
in the sciences cannot be reduced to the Popperian notion of testing. Whatever
Popper, neo-positivist philosophers of science, and many practising scientists may
believe, the sciences cannot proceed by any process resembling Popper's account
of deductive testing. It is only the internal incoherence of his own theory
that allows Popper to represent what he regards as science as being characterized
by testing. Strictly speaking his criterion of demarcation between science and
non-science is vacuous and rational critictem, as he defines it, is an irrational
absurdity. In particular, then, his ideological polemic against Marxism and
{? 1psychoanalysis as metaphysical pseudo-sciences ase made possible only by the 
incoherence o^iis own conceptiob of sesxheh science: it has no rational foundation.
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Notes : chapter 6
1; „ Th®re ^ ln ®ffeotive demolition of Popper's ignorant and misleading critique 
o egel m W.Kaufmann, The Hegel Myth and its Methods’ in Kaufmann. 1960 For 
discussion of Popper's interpretation of Plato see the papers in Ba^rough, 1967
2 Popper also refers to Hume's 'psychological' problem of induction, namely why
all reasonable people nevertheless expect and believe that instances of which they
have no experience conform to those of which they do have experience. Whe-e Hume
refeis to custom and habit, to repitition and the association of ideas, Popper
maintains that there is no such thing as induction by repitition. Hume's 'psychologioa 
problem does not arise. , pbycnoaogi^a
3. Popper frequently suggests that this criterion provides the solution to an
My problem Perhaps firsfet took the team simple form "What is wrona 
with Marxism, psychoanalysis and individual psychology? Why are thev'so different 6frora Ne'vto-n's theory’and t^r
„ -l. t . — P‘ or an excelhent critique of Popperian interpretations ofpsychoanalysis see Cosln et al.,1972. Popper's attack on the scientific stat,- o’ 
Marxism is examined in WilTiSf 1975. scienriiic status o*
4. See Cosm et al. ,op. cit. , p. 132f for discussion of this and other examples
^ust^nilcinit^f ^ 0°nception to its^conclusion: 'a good rationality theory 
must anticipate further basic value judgements, unexpected in the light of t»«Jr
6. cf. Schilpp, 1974, p.1070 and 0. K. chapter 5 and Appendix.
and the t,0™01'1^31®"^1031’06 °f trainlnE. intersubjective agreement,
cool i 1 ? .hi theory of science Popper remains implacably opposed to any sociology of science, e.g., to Kuhn's 'sociological' conception of science “a
community of workers held together by a routine' (cf.Schilpp, 1974,p 1144f) The 
difference is far from clear but it coomo +>,0,+ « r. , p, iiieis or is not qMianti-Pi u th^ f° PopPer the norm establishes what
scientists as * l he_interprets Kuhn as representing the community ofscientists as the primary determinant of what passes for science.
8.He artd^WH9i°teVteSe passages ln hls reply to lakatos in Schilpp. 1974, pp lOU-d
to the iruthf thL ? °( aim9iry ^ ^ °rder that “ EhoUld be better (o1’ nea^r '
!° h .•••■(P-.1012)' . But what ^ issue is precisely theconnection between ~ being 'better' and being 'nearer to the"truth<\SCly
9. The implications of this conception of the relation between theoryxasd instrumenl 
haS+be!n 'nOSt Eissxi^ fuUy elaborated in the work of Bachelard For 
•Th a°c°unt of the basic concepts of Bachelard's theory of science see
The Historical Epistemology of Gaston Bachelard' in Leeourt, 1975.
7. The Critique of.Empiricism and the Analysis of Theoretical Discourse
Theie have been many critiques of the empiricism of the academic social 
sciences and it has even been claimed that the critique of empiricism is now 
fashionable in sociology?' In this chapter I begin by examining two of the 
mole oerious foiros of this 'fashionable 1 critique in order to establish 
both its theoretical force and its limitations, I consider first the 
trenchant and in many respects extremely successful critique of sociological 
methodology advanced by David and Judith Wilier in Systematic Empiricism : 
critique of a pseudo-scfence and secondly that based on Althusser's critique 
of the empiricist conception of knowledge1. Several of my own publications 
and much of the argument of the preceding chapters xsi falls into this latter 
category, Witnin the general area of the critique of empiricism it is 
necessary to distinguish between, on the one hand, KHsSjtsxa the analysis 
and critique of a methodology or an epistemology in the sense of a theoretical 
doctrine within which a definite body of procedural rules for scientific 
practice may be elaborated and, on the other hand, a critique directed at the 
alleged results of the application of such rules, for example, a critique 
of survey-type sociology as 'empiricist' and therefore not scientific but 
ideological. In the Willers-' book and in a great deal of 'Althusssrian ' 
woris we find both a critique of empiricism understood as an epistemological 
doctrine and an extension of that critique to what are held to be the 
products of empiricist methods. I propose to examine the validity of that 
extension and to argue that, however effective the critique of epistemology 
may be, its extension leads to an invalid and logically ineffective mode of 
critique.
The Willers ' concept of empiricism is limited to what is often described 
as the British Empiricist Tradition in philosophy (Hume, Mill, Russell, etc.) 
axid -ielated positions, Althusser's definition of empiricist conception 
of knowledge' as outlined in Reading Capital is pitched at a level of 
generality which, at least in intention, subsumes the whole field' of classical 
epistemology. The force of these authors' critique of empiricist epistemology 
and methodology is indisputable but, as we shall see, serious difficulties 
arise as soon as these authors extend their critique, or others extend it 
for them, to what they represent as a real empiricist process of knowledge.
If these is a real process which conforms to the concept of empiricism 
developed by the 'Willers ■' or by Althusser then what they describe as the 
essential elements of that process must also exist, For the Willers there 
is indeed a realm of observational knowledge, of 'given' facts, and empiricism 
is simply a non-scientific, rion-theoretical mode of relationship to that 
.realm. For Althusser the situation is more complex but his conception of
m
o__-
ideology implies that there are ’givens ' which human subjects appropriate
in the formation of ideological discourse- In this sense there is a real
*
empiricist process of knowledge and it takes plaVe in ideology. I ai’gue 
that, in both cases, their conceptions of empiricism as a real process of 
production of knowledge and of science as a different real process generate 
inescapable problems arid result in a logically impossible theories of the 
process of production of knowledge. The critique of empiricist epistemology 
and methodology cannot be extended to a critique of what might seem to be 
products of the realization of empiricist protocols.
Now, these arguments raise a more general problem which concerns not 
so much the demarcation between science and xdeaifcagy non-science as forms 
of production of knowledge but rather the manner in which the process of 
production of discourse is conceived, namely, as the realization of an 
extra-discursive conceptual totality. What is at stake here is what I shall 
call the rationalist conception of the production of discourse in which whether 
what is to be realized is conceived as a methodology, an author’s presuppositions 
or even, as with Althusser, a (vertical) system of concepts which underlies, 
but does not appear in, the order of concepts in discourse, the relation between 
what appears in the discourse and its extra-discursive conditions is conceived 
as one of coherence and logical consistency. This conception will be shown 
to be a particulax* case of the more general rationalist conception of action 
outlined in the Introduction in which human action, variously conceived, 
provides a mechanism fox’ the realization of ideas, Weber's concept of action 
is x’ationalist in this sense : 'meanings' ai’e realized thx’ough the mechanisms 
of consciousness and will, I argue that the rationalist conception of action 
can be maintained only at the price of theoretical incoherence and, in pax*ticular, 
that therefore no x’ationalist conception of the production of d^Sjcourse can. be 
tenable.
it follows from this critique that a rigorous separation should be
maintained between problems concerned with the logical properties of the order 
of concepts of a discourse and those concerned with its process of production. 
Rationalism, in the above sense, conflates these two types of problem. I 
conclude this chapter by considering some of the implications of the proceeding 
arguments and of that separation' for the analysis of theoretical discoiu’se.
Systematic Empiricism : critique of a pseudo-scfence
The Willeis conceive of empiricism as an epistemological and methodological 
doctrine which advocates the production of knowledge by means of the application 
of various sorting pxsKsci and generalising procedures to given facts, Empiricism 
maintains that all knowledge is based on and reducible to what the Willers 
call 'empirical knowledge'. This type of knowledge:
'is gained by experience or sensation alone, and is clearly shared by 
men with the higher animals. Like all animals with 4 well-developed 
sensory organs and a nervous system, man learns from his environment, 
developing expectations useful for survival ,,., Man, however, has 
an advantage over other animals in his extensive ability to 
communicate empirical knowledge to his fellow’s. It is this simplest 
and most fundamental type of knowledge that man shares with some 
other members of the animal kingdom' (Systematic Empiricism , p,7)
The distinctive feature of empii'icism is that it regards this fundamental 
type of knowledge as the sole basis of thought so that man gains knowledge 
only through sensory experience.
The Willers' examination 
involves first the argument if, 
science and secondly a form of 
methodology ±sr has no rational 
do not support its conclusions
of various empiricist methodological positions 
to which I shall return, that empiricism is not 
internal critique to show that empiricist 
or logical basis, that is, that its arguments 
and that the methodological rules which it
advocate The best example of thisare therefore without foundation. latter is
probably their critique of Mill’s conception of knowledge by induction and of 
his canons of argument. The attempt to establish the universality and effectivit 
of induction by means of induction is simply absurd. Furthermore, if phenomena 
are indeed governed by 'laws of nature’ of the kind Mill proposes, if there 
are regular and recurrent sequential relations between the appearances of 
diffeienfc phenomena, than Mill s canons of agreement and difference, and so on, 
can never hope to establish those ’laws’. Thus methodological doctrines based 
on Mill's epistemology are logically absurd and impracticable.
In their internal critique of Mill's A System of Logic and of other 
empiricist methodological positions the fillers have provided £$1 extremely 
effective analyses of many of the positivist methodological doctrines which 
to dominate the contemporary social sciences. However, as I have 
suggested in chapter 4, there is an aspect of their critique of empiricism 
which leads to very serious problems. In particular, they maintain that 
empiricism represents a real pxesisss form of knowledge so that the fundamental 
error of empiricist epistemology lies, in effect, in its failure to acknowledge 
the existence of other forms/ of knowledge. In fact, we are told, there are 
three distinct types of thought which may be schematically represented in the 
following diagram ;
Theoretical 0 —^ © 0 o1 A
Qbservationa1 0 —- -r> o
y------------ -ji------------
Empirical Rational Abstractive
p
Three Types of Thought (Systematic Empiricism, p.15)
These types of thought and their combinations constitute the forms of knowledge 
ihac are possible. Empirical knowledge remains at the level of observation} 
ic attempts to relate observables to other observables in a more or less 
systematic fashion. Science, on the other hand, involves all three kinds of 
thought. Rational thought is concerned with concepts and relations between
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concepts. It thevefoi-e uses theoretical forms of argument and theoretical 
demonstration. Concepts are not defined in terms of observational ' but by 
their relationship to each other' (p.24). A scientific theory 'is a'constructed 
relational statement consisting of non-observable concepts connected to other 
non-observable concepts' (ibid.) Thus, while empiricism and science are both 
concerned with observables the latter also involves concepts and rational 
connections between concepts. Since concepts and observables are the concern 
of different types of thought science must also involve a type of thought' which 
is capable of relating the two levels. Concepts and observables are brought 
together by means of relations of abstraction. Thus, the Willers ' conception 
of science involves the postulation of a distinction between concepts and 
observables on the one hand and of a correspondence between them on the other. 
There is indeed a realm of given facts' and of observational knowledge and 
empiricism is simply a non-scientific, non-theoretical mode of relationship 
to that realm. Where science involves relations between concepts and observables 
the empiricist conception of science merely involves relations between empirical 
categories of different levels of generality; it confuses general empirical 
categories with concepts.The difference between empiricist and scientific 
conceptions of science tj represented in the Willers* figure 5.
PRINTER ; FIGURE 5 TO GO HERE
iSo.v, if the Willers distinction between science and empiricism is to be 
sustained it is essential that they establish a clear demarcation between the 
relations of abstraction, characteristic of the sciences, and the relations 
between more and less general empirical categories characteristic of empiricism.
We shall see that no such rigorous demarcation is possible within their conception
of knowledge. In fact they have some difficulty in specifying precisely what
an abstvac11ye relation is :
'While empiricism and rationalism have dominated Western philosophy, 
the type of knowledge sought by some philosophers of the East rests 
on a different kind of thinking. Eastern knowledge has been gained 
through abstraction from the empirical to the pure idea, such as 
nirvana. Such thinking which bridges the empirical and the rational 
will be termed abstractive; .... A more modern example of abstractive
thought may be found in the work of Max Weber, who proposed the use 
of ideal types as a crucial part of his sociological methodology'(pp.12-13 
But examples are no substitute for the concept they are alleged to exemplify. 
Abstractive thought is supp^Opd to relate concepts and observables. What we 
require, then, is not to be told tliat_ it relates them, that in its conceptual 
purity Weber’s ideal type 'cannot be found anywhere in reality ' (TlieJIethodology 
,9^ Scx'iftf Sciences, p,90), but rather some specification of how precisely 
concepts and observables a re brought together in abstraction. The nearest 
approach to such a specification is given in the following comparison between 
abstraction and the empiricist process of generalisation which relates observable 
to observable,.
’Abstraction is a matter of establishing an isomorphism between 
theoretical non-observables and empirical observables. Whereas 
generalization is confounded by the problem of figuring out "How
similar is similar?'' because of the/unlimited number of observable
points of similarity, abstraction has no such problem, in abstraction) 
empirical circumstances may either be manipulated in the laboratory 
or elsewhere to approximate the [theoretical] model in all relevant 
respects, or they may be fexxdx fixed while the model is varied so 
that it is isomorphic to them ,,,, Whereas generalization involves 
the unanswerable problem that there are a potentially infinite number 
of points of comparison between any two empirical events, this is not
lo'i
'T
ti’ue when empirical cases are abstractively related to theory . . . The 
model has a denumerable set of characteristics (limited by the theory) 
and consequently the number of points of comparison with any empirical 
event is limited to that numbeih Abstraction, therefore, does not 
have the problem of determining the point at which one has exhausted 
a sufficient number of points of comparison to claim that two events 
are similar. Abstraction, indeed, is not a process of comparing 
empirical events at all, '(p,26)
Here the relation of abstraction is conceived in terms of the epistemology 
of mode^ examined in chapter 5. Theory, with its rational connections and 
rational proof, is conceived as a conceptual model which has to be related 
g to observables and their empirical connections. And there is a point by 
point comparison between the one and the other, at least in the sense that 
elements of the model have to correspond to determinate observationals, But, 
if there s.Vi has to be a correspondence between concepts and observationals,
C\how does the abstractive relation between the two differ from the types of 
relations between observables postulated by empiricism?
Consider, for example, the relatively sophisticated empiricist conception 
of science elaborated in the works of Rudolph Carnap examined in chapter 4.
In his later work we find a rigorous distinction between a theoretical language 
on the one hand and an observational language on the other. Both are necessary 
to science. The theoretical language consists of a set of terms that are 
related by means of the fundamental postulates of scientific theory and by the 
calculi of logic and pure mathematics. The observation language on the other 
hand consists of terms which designate observable objects, observable properties 
of objects and observable relations between them. Elements of the theoretical 
language are therefore related in the mode of 'rational thought' while the 
observation language defines the field of ’empirical thought’. Since both are 
necessary to science they are connected by definite correspondence rules which 
define particular theoretical toms in relation to, and by means of, observationa
terms. For Carnap, in effect, theory becomes a complicated symbolic formalism 
foi expressing complex regularities at the observational level, a sophisticated 
empiricism.
Now, Carnap's sophisticated empiricist conception of science can be 
lecxdily interpreted as postulating a realm of rational and a realm of empirical 
thought and specifying - the nature of the relation between them. How, then, 
does it differ from that of the Willers? The ansv/er is that Carnap tells us 
precisely what the relation between theoretical and observational terms is 
supposed to be. Every theox’etical term is related to observationals through 
a definite system of concepts and correspondence rules. The Willers on the 
other hand do not and cannot tell us what their abstractive relation is. But 
Uien concept of theoretical models requires that there be determinate, i.e. 
definable, relations between concepts and observables; otherwise the notion of 
a rigorous point by point comparison between model and empirical event is simply 
absurd. In effect correspondence rules are necessary to the Willers' position. 
Yet, if they tell us what the rules are, then their position reduces to a 
complex and sophisticated empiricism — an improvement on much of sociology no 
doubt but still an empiricism. Thus the contradiction : science requires 
rational knowledge xn which concepts a re defined not by reference to observables 
but only in relation to other concepts, but the connection of rational and 
empirical knowledge in science requires that concepts arc defined by reference 
!,o observables through correspondence rules. Only their failure to conceptualize 
the character of the abstractive relation prevents that contradiction from 
appearing directly in the text. If there are obse.rvab.les and if concepts 
are connected to them by correspondence rules then the relations between these 
concepts are governed both by their theoretical relations as concepts and by what 
may be empirically observed. The Willers ' conception of science, like that of 
Carnap requires a pre-established harmony between conceptual relations and the
world, Their concept of science is just a complicated empiricism,
2*>5
The 'A.lthusserian * Critique of Empiricism
.Cii Readmg Capjj:a 1 and in several of the papers in For Marx Althusser 
elaborates a concept of the general structure of classical epistemology, 'the 
empiricist conception of knowledge', and concepts of science and ideology as 
distract forms of knowledge. These concepts have provided the foundation of 
two quite distinct 'Althusserian' critiques of empiricism. One is the critique 
of epistemology and, by extension, of the associated methodological doctrines 
of Uie kind that I have developed in the proceeding chapters. The other is the 
critique of KpxHtxmoiogy: particular substantive discourses as ’empiricist' and 
therefore as ideological. Thus, it is argued. Political Economy, Sociology, 
History, etc., are forms of theoretical ideology, that is, they are theo?ce1;ical 
but unscientific. Examples of this mode of critique are given below. I shall 
aigue that, this second mode of ci’itique is based on a concept of ideology as a 
real empiricist process of knowledge and on a logically incoherent theory of 
the difference between science and ideology as forms of knowledge. Thus, 
however effective the critique of epistemology may bo, the ’Althusserian' 
critique of what it calls 'theoretical ideology' is invalid and logically 
ineffective.
(i) the empiricist conception of knowledge
‘Thf? empiricist conception of knowledge presents a process that takes 
place between a given object and a given subject. At this level, the 
status of the subject (psychological, historical, or otherwise) and of 
this object (discontinuous or continuous, mobile or fixed) is not 
•very important. This status only affects the precise definition of 
the variants of the basic problematic, while the basic problematic 
itself is all that concerns us here. The subject and object, which 
are given and hence pre-date the process of knowledge, already define
l_al'
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a certain jEundamontaX fiald theoretical field, but one which cannot 
yet in this state be pronounced empiricist. What defines it as such 
is the nature of the process of knowledge, in other words a certain 
relationship that defines knowledge as such, as a function of the 
real object of which'it is said to be the knowledge.
The whole empiricist process of knowledge-lies in fact in an operation 
of the subject called abstraction. To know is to abstract from the 
real object its essence, the possession of which by the subject is 
then called knowledge,' (Reading Capital,pp,35-6)
Here Althusser offers a concept of empiricism which, unlike that of the Willers, 
is intended to encompass the whole field of classical epistemology.3 The concept 
of 'the empiricist conception of knowledge' designates a conception which 
counterposes subject to object, knowledge to being, theory to fact, and so on, 
and which represents knowledge as a function of fdxis operation of 'abstraction * 
on the part of the subject, whether this subject is conceived as empirical or 
transcendental, as an individual or a community (e,g\ of scientists). Knowledge 
is therefore a function of the conditions in which that operation is thought to 
take place, Empiricisiji involves a definite conception of the subject, the object 
and the relation between them and it derives protocols for the evaluation of 
knowledge claims from its 'knowledge' of that relation, ’Empiricism' in this 
sense is not restricted to anything liko the Willers' conception, that is, to 
the British empiricist tradition and their associates. It subsumes the 
classical rationalist epis temolog’ies as well as, for example, the epistemologies 
of Kant and Weber since, although they do not conceive the subject as merely a 
passive recipient of knowledge, they nevertheless retain rhe fundamental structure 
of the counterposition and correlation of subject and object.4
Althusser argues that the empiricist conception of knowledge is logically 
impossible, that it involves an inescapable play on words resulting, in his 
example, in the conflation of real object, with object in knowledge, that is, of
lo-y
an object outside of knowledge with an object that is constituted or represented 
in knowledge in the form of dotorfumaie propositions. The most general form 
of the fundamental problem of empiricism concerns the following feature.' that 
any empiricist theory pf ‘knowledge requires a knowledge ox the fundamental 
conditions of the knoiyjdge process, that is, of the fundamental features of the 
subject, object, and relation between them. Many instances of this general 
structure and of the inescapable difficulties to which it gives rise have been 
examined in the proceeding chapters. For example, the derivation of Mill's 
four methods of experimental inquiry requires that tho woi'lcl does indeed consist
of an infinite multiplicity of phenomena and that their appearance is governed 
by regular and recurrent sequential relations called Uaws.-of nature’. Fine : 
induction and the canons of inquiry provide a real knowledge of tho world because 
the world is really structured by laws. And how do we know that? By induction.
Ihe inescapable circularity and ultimate dogmatism of this position is evident.
An immediate consequence of this critique of empiricism is that there can 
be no epistemological protocols of scientific practice, no extra—scientific 
guarantees that what the sciences produce is indeed knowledge. Thus, in the 
first part of'Reading Capital and in 'On the Materialist Dialectic’ in For Marx 
Althusser follows Bachelard in maintaining that, in so far as there are protocols 
for sci.ent.ific practice, these are essentially internal to the science in question, 
lorms of proof and canons of scientific practice are always specific to the science 
in question; they cannot bo derived from any extra-scientific, or rather supra- 
scientific, epistemology. Similarly scientific oxj)erimentation can no longer 
be conceived as a process of comparison or testing of theory against the real.
On Lne contrary, experimentation and scientific practice in general must be 
conceived as specifically theoretical processes, that is, as interiorised v/ihhin 
xuiuej,-. knowledge, and scion t,xfXc instrumen ts , for example, as 'materialised theory ’.
Finally, Althusser’s critique of epistemology requires that knowlodge can 
no longer be conceived as involving a relation of abstraction between knowledge
on the one hand and the real on the other. There is no longer any question 
of maintaining both a distinction and a correlation between real object located 
firmly without knowledge and object of knowledge constituted within knowledge.
Thus the classical epistemological problems concerning, say, the conditions in 
which valid knowledge is possible,can no longer arise:
Unlike the theory of knowledge of ideological philosophy, I am not trying- 
to pronounce some djs jure ( or de facto) guarantee which will assure us that 
we really do know what we know, and that we can relate this harmony' to a 
certain conexion between Subject and Object, Consciousness and the World’ 
(ibid. pp.68»9)
Instead Althusser attempts to pose a different problem, that of the ’knowledge 
effect , which concerns the mechanism whereby a particular discourse functions 
as a knowledge and not as something else, not as ’a hammer, a symphony, a sermon, 
a political slogan, ei.c. (ibid) What is at stake here is not an epistemological 
question such as How do we know that knowledge really ci^es correspond to its 
real object? or How do we know that it really is a knowledge "and not a poached 
baby elephant (ibid., p,57) ?'. Rather it concerns the question of what, in the 
foims of ordex of the discourse, constitutes scientific discoux’so as a specific 
form of discourse as distinct from theoretical ideology ox* fx’om a sermon, poetry, 
fiction, etc. How does the ox*der of appearance of concepts in, say, the discourse 
o:l- function to constitute an object in knowledge? In Reading- Capital
the problem of the knowledge effect is explicitly conceived as concerning the 
order of appearance of concepts in determinate discourses and as a function of 
the system of concepts, ox* pi’oblematic, which is held to govex'n the*ix* oi'der 
of appearance in discourse :
’The knowledge effect acts, then, in the duality or duplicity of the 
existence of the system, which is sajc]^ to ’develop’ in the scientific 
discourse, on the one hand,'and on the other of the existence of the forms 
of order of the discourse, precisely in the 'play' (in the mechanical sense 
of the teI'm) which constitutes the unity of dislocation of the system and of
20?
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the discourse. The knowledge effect is produced as an effect of the 
scientific discourse, which exists only as discourse of the system i e 
of '-he object grasped in t;he structure of its complex constitution' (ibid. p. 18) 
1 will return to the problems involved in this conception of theoretical discourse 
as generated by a problematic which is absent from the discourse itself but 
nevertheless governs the order of exposition of its concepts.. For the present 
it is oniy ‘nocess a ryjlo note that Althusser recognises at least two distinct 
types of knowledge effect: the ideological knowledge effect and the scientific 
knowledge effect. Both are a function of specific forms of order of appearance 
of concepts and, therefore, of the problematic that governs those forms of order.
In addition, we are told, the ideological knowledge effect 'depends on other 
social functions which are dominant in it' (ibid,,p,67), Thus theoretical 
ideology is defined both in terms of the specificity of its order of concepts, 
which pioduces its particular knowledge effect, and by the dominance of 'other socla 
functions' which are necessarily extraneous to theory. We shall see that the 
insistence on both conceptual and extra-conceptual determinations in the case 
of theoretical ideology generates inescapable problems for Althusser's theory 
of science and ideology as distinct forms of knowledge,
(^(~"3-0nce and ideology as distinct forms of knowledge
A cradiLional way of making the distinction between science and non-science 
is by isefexence ',o epistemological protocols: knowledge conforms to the protocols 
and non-knowledge i.aiis to conform to them, it is either ideological rubbish or 
else a special kind of knowledge, say, metaphysics or theology. For example, ' 
Popper s criterion of demarcation between science and metaphysics is made by 
means of rhe notion of 'testability* which provides an extra-scientific protocol 
for scientific practice, Nov,', since he rejects the claims of epistemology to 
legislate ioi the sciences, Alohusser can hardly base his distinctions between 
science and theoretical ideology on any epistemologically derived protocols,
Ij. a demarcation between science and theoretical ideology is nevertheless to be
mo
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maintained then it must be established‘.in a different fashion. In this section
I outline Althusser's definitions of, and distinctions between, science, ideology
and theoretical ideology. Science refers to a determinate form of production of
knowledge that is governed by a determinate problematic, that is, by a determinate
system of concepts and relations between concepts,^ Scientific knowledge is
produced within and by the operations of the concepts of scientific problematics,
tka
Since protocols are internal to^problematics of the sciences, since they are 
constituted by their own specific systems of concepts, it follows that there ' 
can be no such thing as the scientific-method-in-general, only scientific 
methods. The sciences are not defined by the scientific method but by their 
own specific problematics; they are sciences (in the plural) not merely separate 
aspects of science in general.
Neither ideology nor theoretical ideology are governed by problematics 
in tne same way as the sciences. For purposes of a brief exposition it Is 
sufficient to introduce these concepts by means of the Glossary provided by the 
translator and vetted by Althusser for the English edition of Reading Capital 
'Ideology is the "lived" relation between men and their world, or a 
reflected form of this unconscious relation, for instance a 'philosophy', 
etc, It is distinguished from a science not by its falsity, for it can 
be coherent and logical (for instance, theology), but by the fact that the 
practice-social predominates in it over the theoretical, over knowledge,
Histotically, it precedes the science that is produced by making an 
epistemological break with it, but it survives alongside science as an
Q_
essential element of every social formation, including a socialist and -even 
a communist society, » (Reading Capital,p.314)
Tneie aie several elements to be noted here : ideology is defined by reference 
to a 'lived ' relation between men and their world - elsewhere Althusser refers 
to images, myths, experiences, etc.; theoretical ideology appears here in the 
K>ha^e of a leflecfced form of this 'lived' relation; in ideology in contrast 
to the sciences 'the practico-soclal predominates over the theoretical'; finally,
*L ll
ideology is an essential element of every social formation. This last is
9straightforward: if ideology is defined with respect to human consciousness ,
that is, in terms of the 'lived1 relation between men and their social conditions
10of existence, then so long as there are men there will be ideology.
Now, since ideology is conceived in terms of the consciousnesses of human
subjects, the demai’cation between science and ideology may be represented as a
distinction between their respective modes of production of knowledge. In the
sciences the production of knowledge is governed by its problematic and by the
protocols, canons of argument and forms of demonstration which it defines. The
non-sciences represent those modes of production of knowledge that are governed,
directly or indirectly, by the structure of the consciousness of human subjects
and therefore by whatever governs that structure. The historical emergence of
a science the .ref ore requires a shift from one mode of production of knowledge
to another; from a form of theorising or of rumination governed by the
consciousness of the subject to a form of theorising governed by a determinate
order of concepts. The concept of 'epistemological break' refers to this
shift from the dominance of one mode of production of knowledge to that of
another.
The location of theoretical ideology in relation to science and ideology 
imposes the double constraint which I have noted above: on the one hand-it is 
governed by its problematic, by a determinate system of concepts; on the other 
it is dominated by the 'praetico-sooial' through the medium of the 'lived'
relation which it reflects. It is like science in that it produces its knovMgc
effect through the operation of concepts in' the production of discourse. But it 
is unlike science in that its concepts are themselves dominated by extra-conceptual 
:mterests, by the practice-social. Tins conception of ideology and theoretical 
ideology in teirus of the consciousness of human subjects allows AXthussei’ to bring 
together his conception of the demarcation between science and ideology on the one * 
hand and the traditional Marxist conception of the social formation as consisting 
of economic, political and ideological levels on the other. Because theoretical 
ideology is dominated by ideology which is itself located at a deiiiiito
112.
structural level in the social formation it follows that theoretical ideology
provides, inter alia, a mechanism for the representation of class interests in
12the realm of theory. Ideology and theoretical ideology belong to the social 
formation and therefore, so long as there are classes within it, they provide 
an arena of the class struggle, • The sciences on the other hand, since they 
are not dominated by the 'practico-social •' through the medium of 'lived' relations 
must be conceived as autonomous. They are governed by their problematics and 
not by the consciousnesses of human subjects, not by 'lived' relations between 
men and their social conditions of existence and the class interests which 
these relations represent.
Finally, it should be noted that the conception of ideology in terms of 
consciousness and of theoretical ideology as its reflected form implies that there 
is a real empiricist process of knowledge and that it takes place in ideology 
and also, therefore, in theoretical ideology. The human subject appropriates 
a knowledge of objects that are given in the content of his consciousness, i,e, 
in his 'lived' relation to his conditions of existence. The 'object' in this 
case is not, of course, a real object but rather one. that is constituted in and 
given by ideology. Ideology and theoretical ideology are therefore empiricistj 
they produce 'empiricist' knowledges,
(111) the cr11tquo of theoretical ideologies
The Concepcion of ideology as the location of a real empiricist process of 
knowledge provides the foundation of a critique of particular substantive discourse! 
lollcical Economy, frociology, History, as empiricist, and therefore ideological, 
because they operate with given objects. Theoretical ideology, a form of theory 
dominated by ideology, works with what is given to the knowledge process by 
ideology. A good example of this mode of critique appears in chapter 7 of 
Heading Capital, part II, 'The Object of Political EconomyPolitical Economy 
is represented as a form of theoretical discourse that is constituted in part 
by the intervention of 'given', i,e. extra-discursive, extra-theoretical, elements., 
of a 'given' realm of economic facts. Thus:
Political Economy *s pretensions to existence are a function of the nature 
Pi-ixtiiEj and hence of the definition of its object. Political Economy gives 
itself as an object the domain of 'economic facts 1 v/hich it regards as 
having the obviousness of factsi absolute givens which it takes as they 
’give' themselves, without asking- them for any explanations. Marx's 
revocation of the pretension of Political Economy is identical with his 
revocation of the obviousness of this 'given', which in fact it ’gives 
itself ' arbitrarily as an object, pretending that this object was given it' 
(Heading Capital,pp,15S-9)
Here it seems that discourse is constituted by a 'given' which is not really 
a given at all. in effect iu is given to theory by ideology. It is precisely 
this suppjs;
theoretical ideology as such. Political Economy cannot be scientific because 
it is governed by ideology, because it must operate with elements that are given 
to theory.
It is easy to see how this mode of critique could be extended to provide a 
general critique of the academic social sciences and of history, They are
Qed effectivitycof ideology in the realm of theory which constitutes
empiricist because they define themselves in relation to particular given objects, 
the 'pafet', the 'facts' of social life, and so on. In our Introduction to 
Pre-Capita 1 ist Modes of -Production Paul Hirst and I have argued:
'The empiricism of the academic social sciences and of much Marxist 
scholarship has serious theoretical effects, In so far as certain facts 
are represented as 'given' in the real or as 'given ' by history they must 
fall below the level of theoretical determination: they cannot be the 
product of an explicit theoretical practice. The empiricism of these 
disciplines therefore ensures that these 'facts ' are ideological constructs 
and that their'theories' arc,at best, sophisticated theoretical ideology ’(p.3) 
Similarly the sociology of a Durkhsini or a Weber cannot be scientific because it 
pretends to operate with 'givens', with given 'social facts' or with a mass of
GivipiiicciXly given inEiteiitiX tlicvfc must l)e soi’tsd unci oi'dGX’ed Ijy nie&ns o£ idetil 
types.
2.1 If
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The general sti’ucture of this form of critique of ’empiricist' discourses 
may be outlined as follows. First, it is a consequence of the critique of the 
empiricist conception of knowledge that knowledge never operates with direct
apperceptions of the real. Therefore, all elements of knowledge must be 
conceived as constructed elements; they are never given directly by the real as 
sucai. Nov/, the conceptions of science and ideology as distinct modes of 
production of knowledge implies that the construction of elements may take place 
in the realm of theory, through the operation of concepts governed by a determinate 
problematic, or else it may take place in ideology. Elements givenx&u constituted
in ideology are, in effect, given to theory prior to the operation of the 
Idieoie cical knowledge process. in the sciences the elements of knowledge a roe 
constituted within theory through the operation of concepts - hence the attraction 
for Althusserian theory of the Bacholardian notion of scientific instruments as 
theory incarnate, as tne materialisation of theory. In theoretical ideologies 
the operation of concepts is restricted to the manipulation of ideological 
givens, Finally, if a i-heo.retical discourse is constrained by its very definition 
to work on givens then ideology must intervene at the most fundamental level of 
that discourse. Hence the conclusion : Sociology, History, Political Economy, 
or whatever, cannot be scientific,
Ihe final steps of this argument deserve further comment. The argument
beg;:Lns with a. conception of
dis course : one goveined by
an operation of concepts til:
of human subj ect ivity. The
considered be 1 ow, For the 3
the a bove argruiieii t depen ds i
of the produo.t ion of dis cou:
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of Rica I’d o 's Principles of Political Economy and Taxation or of Parsons* The
Structure of Sccla 1 Act,i.on? It is clear what the answer must be. The critique 
of discourse as empiricist and therefore as ideological must require that the proces 
of production of the discourse leaves its mark on the product. Thus, in the 
work of Althusser, we find that the demarcation between science and ideology 
functions not only at the level of the process of production of discourse but 
also at the level of the product of that process. There are scientific rasdsK 
sfxprcsislHstroenxj-sfxtksHA’etXKarlxdxsKsuXHaxaHd and ideological modes of production 
of theoretical discourse and there are scientific and ideological knowledge effects. 
The latter refer to features of the discourse itself which may serve as an index 
of how that discourse was produced,
I will return to the consequences of this conflation of the process of 
productionjof discourse with the conceptual structure of the discourse itself.
But first I want to indicate a certain practical difficulty. Theoretical ideology 
is to be identified by discovering the little droppings er tell-tale marks 
which show the trained eye that ideology has been at work here. For example, 
fn Beading Capital (p.160f.) Althusser establishes the ideological character of 
Political Economy in this way. He takes as his text an extract from lalande's 
Dictionary bui; he could equally well have taken the Preface to lUcardo 's Principles, 
Ic is the work of a few lines to discover that the secret of Political Economy's 
basic definition lies in a supposedly given sphere of human wants. Political 
Economy is therefore theoretical ideology. Or again, we could take a work such 
as Durkheim's The Rules^of Sociological Method and discuss the secret of Ills 
definition of sociology ax in an alleged realm of 'given' social facts.^ But, 
because of the critique of the empiricist conception ox knowledge we know that 
rhese ’givens 1 are not given by the real at all. They must be given by ideology. 
Thus Durkheim’s 'science' must be placed in the trash-can along with Political 
Economy, His irony, etc, , etc.
Now the practical difficulty that arises in this mode of critique is that 
the tell-tale indices of ideology which one finds in Political Economy or
^20-
Sociology can also be -found in what are normally held to be scientific texts.
It is easy to establish, for example, that several rather crude positivist and 
Machist conceptions play a crucial role in the exposition of Einstein's 1S05 
paper ’On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies ’ - the paper which first introduced 
his ’principle of relativity’. A more serious difficulty, from the point of 
view of Althusser’s defence of the scientific status of Marxism, is posed by the 
evident presence of numerous empiricist formulations in the work of Marx and 
even in Capita 1 itself ; the references to real and apparent motions, inner - 
essence and outer appearance, or the reference to England as the classical 
ground where capitalist relations ’occur in their most typical form, and most 
free from disturbing influences',
’That is the reason why England is used as the chief illustration in the
development of my theoretical ideas’ (Capital, I, p, IS)3'4
Xf Marx poses a problem in this respect then how much worse is the case of Lenin
who in whose works we find numerous references to the facts, frequently conceived 
in a positivist form, the use of ’given' statistical tables, and so on.
In the later chapters and Appendix of Reading Capital, part II, Althusser 
is clearly much concerned by the presence of these 'empiricist’ and therefore 
ideological elements in Marx's text. In this case, however, they do not serve 
as an excuse to put him in the trash-can of ideology alongside Ricardo,. Durkheim, 
and numerous others who tried hard to get to science but never quite made it. 
Instead Althusser adopts a different mode of treatment of Marx's text. For
example, referrinpto the ambigous positions outlined in volume 3 of Capital he 
writes of Marx’s confusion between the thought-concrete and the real-concrete, 
between the object in knowledge and the real object, and adds:
’whereas in reality, the concrete of volume 3, i.e. the knowledge of ground- 
rent, profit and interest, is like a3.1 knowledge, not the empirical concrete 
^} and therefore still always an abstraction1 (Reading Capital,
p.189)
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Marx only appears to be dealing with empirical givens. In fact it is all in the 
realm of theory. Similarly:
'when Lenin describes the peculiar 'circumstances' of Russia in 1917; 
when Marx(and the whole Marxist tradition) explains, with the aid of av  i
thousand examples, that such and such a contradiction will dominate
according to the case, etc,, they are appealing' to a concept that might
appear to be empirical : the 'conditions ' .... On the contrary, it is a
theoretical concept' (For Marx, pp,206-7 - emphasis added)
In the sciences the order of discourse is govex’ned by its pi'oblematic, by the
operation of concepts, even when the formulations in the text suggest otherwise.
In ReadIng Capita 1 (p,182t) Althusser attributes many of the empiricist
formulations in Capital to the fact that Marx is operating in practice with
a concept, namely 'structural causality', that he is unable to develop explicitly,
15I have examined this notion of 'structural causality' elsewhere. What 
must be noted here is that the sciences and the theoretical ideologies appear to 
call for quite different modes of analysis of their texts. In the case of the 
sciences v.’e look for concepts and relations between concepts, logical dependence, 
consistency, compatabllity and incompatability, and so on. The status of 
particular concepts and arguments may therefore be examined in terms of their 
consistency with the system of concepts and positions developed in the discourse 
in question. For example, in Reading Capital, part II, chapter S, Althusser 
examines the concepts of ’production' and 'labour process' developed in Capital 
and is able to establish that :
'the social relations of production are on no account reducible to mere 
relations between men, to relations which only involve men, and thei’ofore 
to variations in a universal matrix, to inter-subjectivity (recognition, 
prestige, struggle, master-slave relationship, etc,). For Marx, tho 
social relations of production do not bring men alone onto tho
stage, but the agents of the production process and the material conditions 
of the production process, in specific 'oombinatl.ons 1 ’ (ibi.d, , p, 174)
The conception of social relations of production as intersubjective relations 
is incompatible with <-ho basic concepts of Capital, That conclusion is estsblij-hou 
by means of an examination of the concepts and positions developed in Capital; 
it can be defended even against certain of Marx's own expressions whore, for 
example, 'in a terminology still inspired by his early anthropological 
philosophy, it is tempting to oppose, literally, relations between men and 
relations between things ' (ibid.). The important poinfjin the present context 
concern not so much whether, as 1 would argue, Althusser's conclusion on this 
point is correct but rather the terns in which the problem is posed. First, 
the status of the conception of 'intersubjective relations' in the discourse of 
Capital is to be determined not by reference to any philosophical or epistemological 
propocoIs, for example, those of a philosophical anthropology, nor even in 
terms of manifest statements oy Marx himself. It is to be determined solely by 
means of an analysis of the concepts and relations between concepts required for 
the positions developed in fhe discourse of Capital itself. The status of
'intersubjective relations' as a concept is 
concepts of Capital and not of any explicit 
status.^ J
a function of its relations with the 
statements by Marx concerning that
buc while the sciences are to be analysed in terms of their concepts and 
relations between concepts, the theoretical ideologies are treated in an entirely 
different fashion. In the analysis of theoretical ideology we must look for the 
tell-tale marks, the droppings of ideological contamination. In theoretical 
ideology empiricist formulations are to be taken at their word and read as an 
ixic.cx of the ideological character of the process of production of the discourse, 
In the sciences all formulations which appear in the text are to be examined in 
relatnon to the concepts of the discourse. Now, it is clear that this difference 
in the mode of treatment of theoretical discourses can be defended only if the- 
difference of science and theoretical Ideology is known in advance. Accordingly 
the outcome of the analysis of Poll tics 1 Hconomy is never in doubt : it merely 
confirms what we already knew, namely, that Political Economy is theoretical
2/?
-2-3"
ideology and Marxism is a science, 'Che same point applies to the critiques of 
Sociology, History, etc., sketched above. The conclusion that they are not 
scientific is the product of a teleological mode of analysis'^ in which the 
known conclusion determines how the discourse is to he approached in the first 
place. Thus the 'practical difficulty' I have indicated may be overcome provided 
that we already know which is science and which is ideology.
Secondly, it is clear that to pose the question of the status of particular 
concepts in relation to the basic concepts of a discourse requires that those 
basic concepts be identified. This point raises a. general problem for the 
analysis of discourse to which X shall return briefly in my conclusion. It is 
sufficient to note here that Althusser's own practice in this respect is far 
from satisfactory : it involves not only a general a priori demarcation of 
discourses into sciences and ideologies but also a specifiv conception of 
the basic concepts of Marxist theory. At this level Althusser's position is far 
from being derived from an analysis of the concepts and relations between concepts 
developed in the discourse of Capital itself since it also involves general 
epistemological positions conceraing, in particu3.ar, distinct concepts of 
causality which, in his view, underlie the discourses of the sciences and 
ideologies. For example, he argues that the concept of 'structural causality’ 
underlies but does not appear in the discourse of Capital. I argue in the 
following section that this notion of concepts 'underlying ' the order of 
appearance of concepts in discourse is untenable. The idealist and teleological 
character of the concept of structural causality' has been demonstrated by 
Paul Hirst and me in Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production,
V>'e can now return to the question I have posed above in respect of the 
final steps in the general argument leading to the critique of theoretical
ideology, namely, 'how can a conception of the production of discourse 
a critique of its product?X have shown that the answer, namely, that 
process of production leaves its mark in the product, leads to a ’pract 
difficulty’ which can be overcome only if the difference between sclent 
and ideological theoretical products is presumed to be known indejiendo:"
sustain
the
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the application of the critique. It follows that the application of what I
'7'have called the ’Althussevian 1 mode of critiqiue to what are thought to be 
theoret|cj3jal ideologies and of a quite different mode of analysis
to what are thought to be sciences is entirely without rational justification.
To treat features of discourse as an index of its mode of production in the one 
case and arxi-ts: not in the other is to fall into an indefensible dogmatism in 
which pro-determined conclusions govern our- treatment of theoretical discourses.
If the sciences are to be analysed in terms of their concepts and relations 
between concepts then all theoretical discourse must be analysed in the same 
fashion.
Finally, it may be noted that Althusser's demarcation between science and 
ideology as distinct modes of production of knowledge depends on a curious and 
ex fciemely problematic counterposition of 'the practice—social' on the one hand 
and idio theoretical 021 the other. If the practice—social is to predominate 
over the theoretical, in the case of theoretical ideology and not xh to predominate 
in the case of science then ’the practico-social' and 'the theoretical' must be 
comparable and, at some level, they must be equivalent i theoretical discourse 
may be dominated by one or by the other, Two points should be made here. First, 
since theoretical ideology is conceived as specifically theoretical, the 
predominance of the practice-social can be effective only in so far as it-is 
represented in the concepts of the discourse and the character of the relations 
between them. Thus, as far r.» the analysis of discourse is concerned, the 
decisive questions are always a matter of the concepts and the relations between them. 
The coherence or incoherence, consistency or inconsistency, of the discourse can 
be settled at the level of its concepts alone without reference to the further
questions of whether and 121 what respects those concepts can be said to represent
S’
extra-discursive practico-social interests and forces. Similarly, for example,
>\
the incompatibility of the conception of social relations of production as 
Antersubjective relations with the basic concepts of Capital can be established
in terms of its character as a concept and in relation to other concepts withen it 
reference to the question of its allegedly ideological character,,. In the analysis
7Zi
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of its concepts tho question of the domination of tho discoui’se by a system of 
concepts or by the practico-social cannot arise,
Secondly, in Althusser's demarcation between science and ideology, the 
predominance of the system of concepts or of tho pi^actico-social is supposed 
to be effective in the process of production of theoretical discourses. The 
conception of the logical effoctivity of concepts in the process of production 
of discourse poses problems which I shall discuss in a later section. For the 
present I want to argue only that 'the practico-social' and 'the theoretical’ 
can no more be treated as equivalents at the level of the process of production 
than they are at the level of the structure of the discourse it©self. The 
conception of science and theoretical ideology as distinct modes of production 
of theoretical discourses poses a problem with regard to the articulation of 
the theoretical practice of a science on to other levels ■'•r forms of social 
practice. Theoretical ideology, as we have seen, is dominated by the practico- 
social through the mechanism of ideology; it is characterized precisely by 
the fact that it is implicated in the structure of the social formation. In 
any class society, therefore, theoretical ideology provides, inter-alia, a
mechanism for the representation of class interests in fche realm of theory.
It follows from the nature of the proposed demarcation between modes of 
production of theoretical discourse that the sciences cannot be implicated in the 
structure of the social formation in this way. Thus, in his critique of 
Gramsci's conception of science, Althusser insists that science is not part of 
the social foimiation. To include science within the superstructure would bet 
'to attribute to the? concept "superstructure” a breadth Marx never 
allowed, for he only ranged within it: (1) the politico-legal 
superstructure, and (2) the ideological supex'structure (the corresponding
"forms of social consciousness”); except in his Early Works (especially 
the 1844 Manuscripts), Marx never included sc lenti"io knowledge to it. 
Science can no more be ranged within the category ''superstructure” than can
HZ
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language , which as Stalin showed escapes it. ' (Reading Capital, p.133)' 
On the contrary, the birth of a science:
'inaugurates a new form of historical existence and temporality which 
together save science (at least in certain historical conditions that
ensure the real continuity of its own history - conditions that have
P
not always existed) from the common fate of a single history: that of the 
"historical bloc" unifying structure and superstructure. ' (ibid.—emphasis added) 
Here science in conceived as autonomous from the social foxmatioiv yet, short of 
the most flagrant idealism, it can hardly be conceived as essentially 'opposed 
to the material world, the faculty of a "pure" transcendental subject or 
"absolute consciousness"' (ibid, p.42) Althusser therefore insists that the 
system of theoretical production has a determinate objective reality and that 
it involves relations with nature and with other levels of social practice.
Thus, the ’autonomy' of scientific pz’aetice, the internality of its protocols:
'is not at all exclusive of organic relations with other practices which... 
occa s i onal ly go so far as to induce more or less profound re-oi'ganixaticns 
in their theoretical structure.... Taking Marx as an example, we know that
his most personally significant practical experiences.,.intervened in his 
theoretical practice, and in the upheaval which led him from ideological 
theoret 1 ca 1 practice to sclent 1 f 1 c theoretical practice. ' (ibidemphasis added) 
At this point the attempted demarcation between science and theoretical ideology 
is reduced to an impossibility. Theoretical ideology is distinguished from 
science preesiely by the fact that it is Implicated in the structure of the 
social formation through the mechanisms of ideology v/hich constitute the 
consciousness of human subjects. Yet, in the case of Marx, the shift from 
theoretical ideology to science is conceived as a function of experiences,
19
that is, of changes in 1: h e conscious n e s s o f t h e s u b ,1 o e c, Marx, Th us, Marx's
scien tillLo practice is, like his ideological theoretical pr-et ice, a function
of determinate ideological condit I.ous. More genero 5 ly e*'! Cinl id-'*, t whilei: 
theoretical ideology is implicated in (Mae social formation science, since it
^2.?
can hardly ha conceived of as entirely independent of all social conditions, 
has its own determinate social conditions of existence. Yet, in so far as it 
does have determinate social conditions of existence, science cannot but be 
implicated in the effects of the struggles and developments which affect the 
maintenance or non-maintenance of those conditions; it cannot but be implicated 
in the conditions of the class struggle and their outcome. There can be no 
question of theoretical ideology being implicated in the effects and conditions 
of the class struggle and science not being implicated in them. Thus the 
demarcation between science and theoretical ideology cannot be sustained in 
the form that Althusser makes it. It is not a matter of either 'the theoretical' 
o^* 'the practico-sociai 1 but of both. The latter may belong to the conditions 
of production of theoretical discourse but the question of the dominance of the 
one by the other can hardly arise. In particular, then, Althusser's demarcation 
cannot be used to justify a difference in the modes of analysis of what are 
thought to be the discourses of science and of theoretical ideology.
The Production of Theoretical Discourse
This chapter began with a distinction between two forms of critique of 
empiricism. One operates at the level of the concepts and relations between 
concepts within a specific discourse and attempts to establish a conceptual 
inadequacy at that level. The Willers ' critique of Mill, Althusse’r's critique 
of the empiricist conception on knowledge, and many of the examinations of 
particular epistemological positions in the previous chapters provide examples of 
this mode of critique. The other critique of empiricism is aimed at what is 
thought to be an empiricist practice or at those discourses which arc held to be 
products of such a practice. Thus the authors of Systematic Empiricism advance 
a critique of certain epistemological and methodological doctrines v/hich they 
extend to a critique of the practical realization of these doctrines: 'Systematic
•214
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Empiricism* is a real process of production of knowledge but it does not 
produce vscience. Or again, the 'Althusserian' critique of Political Economy, 
oocioiogy, History, etc,, depends on a mode of reading which identifies those 
substantive discourses as the product of an empiricist practice. For example, 
Political Economy is ideological because it is condemned by its very definition 
to work on what is given to theory by ideology,
Althusser's treatment of the discourse of the sciences, of Marxism in 
particular, is in marked contrast to his treatment of what he regards as 
theoretical ideology. Scientific discourse is to be analyzed in terms of 
the concepts and relations between concepts which are entailed in the positions 
developed in the discourse in question. Particular concepts and arguments 
may then be examined in terms of their consistency with the system of concepts 
and positions developed in that discourse. In this way, as Althusser's 
treatment of the concept of 'intersabjective relations' has shown, it may be 
possible to establish that positions which are manifestly present in the text 
aie nevertheless incompatible with the basic concepts of the discourse. I have 
argued that if the sciences are to be analyzed in this way, in terms of their 
concepts and relations between concepts, then all theoretical discourses must be
2Q
analyzed in the same fashion. Indeed, Althusser's own critique of epistemology 
is the product of precisely such an analysis: the empiricist conception of 
knowledge is inadequate as ja conception not because it is ideological but because 
it is logically incoherent, because it involves a dogmatism, a circularity, 
an inescapable play on words ', 1 shall return briefly to the concepts involved
in this mode of analysis of discourse in my conclusion.
Now, the attempt to extend the critique of empiricist epistemological 
positions to a critique of empiricist practice must move away from a strict 
analysis ol !,Iie concepts and relations between concepts of determinate discourses 
towards an analysis based on the conception of the realization of certain 
concepts or doctrines in rho process of production of theoretical discourses,
This conception depends on ItHijS a theoretical conflation of questions concerning
the conceptual structure of discourse with the question of the production or 
generation of discourse. For example, in the V/illers’ critique of Systematic 
Empiricism and again in the 'Althusserian' critiques of Political Economy, 
Sociology, etc,, we find an identification of certain empiricist conceptions 
of the production of knowledge with the real processes of production of non- 
scientific knowledge; the empiricist conception of knowledge is realized in 
empiricist practice. Similarly, at least in Althusser, a distinction defined 
at the level of the process of production of knowledge reappears at the level 
of the order of concepts in discourse in a distinction between scientific 
and ideological knowledge effects: the process of production must leave its 
mark on the product. X have argued that the attempts, in the works of 
Althusser and of the Willers, to establish a demarcation between the processes 
of production of scientific and non-scientific Icnowledge are rationally 
indefensible.
But there is a more general problem here. It concerns not so much the 
question of demarcation as the manner in which the process of production of 
knowledge is itself conceived, namely, as the realization of an extra- 
discursive conceptual totality, I shall attempt to formulate the point at 
issue here in its most general form but it may be helpful to begin with a few 
examples. Consider, first, Althusser's conception of the process of production 
of knowledge. We have seen that he conceives of theoretical discourse as being, 
in a certain sense, the product of its problematic. The problematic is a system 
of concepts which 'determines the definition of each concept, as a function of 
its place and function in the system. ! (Reading Capital, p,6S) and It also 
determines the order of appearance of concepts in the discourse itself, The 
problematic underlies the forms of order of the discourse but;
'those forms only show themselves as forms of the order of appearance 
of concepts in scientific discourse as a function of other forms which, 
without themselves being forms of order, are nevertheless the absent 
principle.joi\_j:he_ latter, 1 (ibid, p, 67 , cmphasis added )
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By partial analogy with structural linguistics the (vortical) system of concepts
develops in the discourse by means of the (hox-izontal) forms of order of
21appearance of concepts which it underlies. Here the problematic is conceived
as an extra-discursive totality, a system of concepts and relations between
concepts which is held to be responsible for the production of the discourse
itself. Relations between concepts constitute the real conditions of the
production of the theoretical discourse in which they are realized. The
discourse must therefore be read as the expression of an extra-discursive
22conceptual totality.
As a second example we might consider the widespread notion of 'methodology', 
conceived as a definite body of procedural rules for scientific practice derived 
from some more or less explicit epistemology. Methodology proposes a set of 
rules which are intended to be followed and which, it is claimed, can be relied 
on to produce a genuine knowledge. 'Systematic Empiricism' represents a 
definite methodology in this sense. In their critique the fillers argue that 
Systematic Empiricism can be realized in practice but that it only results in 
empiricist knowledge, not in scientific knowledge. Here an extra-discursive 
body of rules is held to be responsible for the production of determinate 
substantive discourses, for example, the research reports ox investigators.who 
appear to be using the methods of systematic empiricism. In social science 
methodology, and in the WiHers' critique of its dominant forms, substantive 
discourses are conceived as products of the application of a methodology. 
Similarly, in Popper's theory of science, scientific progress is conceived as 
resulting from the application of his methodological rules. ‘Science' is the 
realization of Poppex-'s methodology.
Finally, we might refer to all those cases in the sociology or the history 
of science, in the sociology of knowledge or the history of ideas in which 
particular discourses are conceived ay the product of an author's presuppositions 
or as the expression of a particular world-view. This tendwney, which accounts 
for what appears in discourse by means of extra-discursive presuppositions,
world-views, or what have you, is so widespread that it is hardly worth citing 
examples; the work of Lukacs; Sartre's insistence that the great philosophies, 
of Locke, Kant-Hegel, Marx, are 'unsurpassable until the historical moment 
whose expression they are has been surpassed’ (The Problem of Method, p.7, 
emphasis added); Kuhn's notion of the paradigm as governing the practice of 
'normal science'; and so on. In all these cases an extra-discursive order of 
concepts is conceived as being responsible for and as x-ealized in the discourse 
whose production it governs.
Now, I have claimed that there is a general problem here which may be posed 
with respect to each of the range of positions indicated in these examples, That 
problem concerns the conflation of what might be called the logical or conceptual 
conditions of existence of the formulations of a discourse with what are thought to 
be the real conditions of its production. In order to see n^at is at stake in 
this conflation and for ease of exposition it will be convenient to consider 
the case of presuppositions. There is one very precise .sense in which discourse 
may be said to involve 'pi’esuppositions ', niamely, that any proposition stated 
in the discourse must be dependent on definite concepts and relations between 
concepts. let us call these concepts and relations the logical or conceptual 
cond11tons^ ofexlstence of tho proposition in question. In this sense every propositio 
formulated in a discourse has its own conceptual conditions of existence - although 
those conditions may not be explicitly formulated and they may well be contradicted 
by other positions that are formulated in the discourse. For example, Popper's 
insistence that the method of deductive testing leads to the growth of knowledge 
in tlie sense of increasing vexxLsimilitude requires that singular descriptive 
statements function as a surrogate of the real. In short, certain of Popper'r- 
propositions concerning the growth of knowledge require, as their conceptual 
conditions of existence, that singular descriptive statements be formulated
positivis t
in an a-thooretical observation .language in the s t :oi ct \ s n ns e . Wo bare seen that 
'chose conceptual conditions of existence are flagrantly contradicted by nuir.erocs 
other propositions in Popper's discourse. In that respect Popper *s discourse may be
said to be logically incoherent. Presuppositions, understood in this sense as 
the logical or conceptual conditions of existence of propositions, entail no 
reference to any putative process of production or generation of the discourse.
There is no suggestion that logical conditions of existence have any 'real' 
effectivity in the generation of discourse.
So far so good. But the term 'presupposition' is sometimes used to refer,
in addition, to extra-discursive conditions that are held to be responsible, for
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the production of discourse. Presuppositions in this sense tend to be 
located in the consciousness of authors: they are exterior to, and px^ecede the 
production of, the discourses in v/hich they ax’e realized. These presuppositions 
belong to the gene real category of extra-discursive mechanisms that may be 
proposed to account for the appearance of determinate discourses or of determinate 
propositions within them. Since the relation between extra-discursive 
presuppositions and the propositions of the discourse is conceived on the model 
of the conceptual relations between propositions and their logical conditions of 
existence, if presuppositions are to function as a mechanism of the generation 
of discourse thejx the logical or conceptual conditions of existence of its 
px’oposi.tions must be conflated with the x’eal mechanisms of their production.
Tints discoxti’se is conceived as the real effect of its logical conditions of 
existence and thorefox’e as having a definite real logical cohex'once, at least in 
respect of relations between propositions of the discourse and their px’osuppositions. 
It is clear that Althusser's concept of problematic and the notion of the real 
eifectivity of methodological protocols involve similar conflations of conceptual 
relations on the one hand and the relations between propositions and the extrea- 
discursive conditions of their genex-ation on the other,
IVhat is at stake in these conceptions, then, fx*om the relative .simplicity 
of the notion of presuppositions or of the realization of methodological 
protocols to the sophistication of Althxissex’'s conception of px’oblomat.Lc as the 
dofcorminant element in tho process of production of theoretical disooox'se, is 
what might be called the rationalist conception of the production of discourse. It
j. b rationalist not necessarily in the sense of entailing' a rationalist
Zl^t
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epistemology but rather in that it represents the relations between tne 
propositions of a discourse and the real conditions of their production on 
the model of internal relations between concepts. I argue that no rationalist 
conception of the production of discourse is tenable, .Before proceeding to 
that argument, however, it may bo noted that this conception is itself only a 
special case of the rationalist conception of action in which the act or its 
pi’oduct is conceived as the realization of a conceptual totality. Rationalist 
epistemology conceives of the world as a rational order in the sense that its 
parts and the relations between them conform, whether by chance or by design, 
to concepts and the relations between them, the concept giving the essence of 
the real; the rationalist conception of action proposes a nechanism of the 
realization of the idea either in the will and consciousness of a human subject 
or else at some supra-individual level of determination. The theological 
affinities of this comception are evident. Weber's concept of action, as 
opposed to behaviour, as ’consciously guided’ or as 'oriented in its course' 
by meanings is rationalist in this sense. The relation between action and its 
meaning is one of coherence and logical consistency; the action realizes logical 
consequences of its meaning. Where theology postulates God as the mechanism 
par excellence of the realization of the idea 'Weber conceives of man as a lesser 
but essentially similar creature. Two other examples are worth noting. The 
first is Peter 'Winch who, in The Idea of a Social Science, argues:
'that social relations really . .exist only in and through
are current in society; or alternatively, that social
the ideas 
relations
which 
fall into
the same J-ogica 1 category as 
Social relations are therefore a 
W,inch conceives of human conduct 
between conduct and rule is once 
consistency. Per a d if fc’erent and 
to Idle later works of Talcott Par
do roia11ons between 1deas, ’ (p.133, 
species of internal relations between 
as a matter of following a rule. The 
again supposed to be one of coherence 
rather more sophisticated example we 
■sons who .t e the distinct sub -sys toms *
emphasis added) 
concon ts, 
re la 11 on 
and logical 
might rofe r
ef action
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are conceived as organized into a 'cybernetic hierarchy of control’. Lover 
level systems function as conditions in.relation to the higher levels while 
these higher levels function as controls over those below them in the hierarchy.
In so far as the conditioning* factors leave the situation indeterminate then 
the higher level controls come into play. The cultural system, which consists 
in systems of ideas or beliefs, systems of expressive symbols, and systems of 
value orientation, Is supposed to be at a higher level than the social and 
personality systems and these in turn are above the biological organism in 
the hierarchy of control. The hierarchical organization of systems implies 
that social and personality systems appear as.the realizations of cultural 
patterns subject only to the exigencies of conditioning factors defined at 
these or lower levels. Thus Parsons' theory of the sub-systems of action 
attempts to combine a rationalis?03:ka'lix*y0of action with a conception of the 
real effectivity of conditioning factors."'
I have given these examples merely to indicate the level of generality
of what is at stake in the following argument. The rationalist conception of
action may be represented as a theoretical humanism, where the primary mechanism
of the realization of conceptual relations is located in the will and the
consciousness of individual human subjects, or as a theoretical anti-humanism
where, as in Althusser's conception of the production of knowledge, as, to some
extent, in Parsons' theory of action systems, and as in Husserl's theory of the
history of the sciences and of philosophy, the primary mechanism of realization
is located at another level and it subordinates the human individual to its 
26functioning. In all cases, whether humanist or not, the point at issue
concerns the conception of action as the realization of internal relations between
ideas so that the relation between action and idea is one of coherence and logical
consistency. For ease of exposition I shall confine my argunfit to the case in
f\
which presuppositions are supposed to function in the production of discourse, 
but, as I shall indicate, it may readily bo generalized to cover other cases.
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Let us suppose, then, that the generation of discourse is governed by a 
system of one or more presuppositions in the sense that the relation between all 
propositions and their extra-discursive presuppositions is one of coherence and 
consistency. This is not to say that all logical consequences of the 
presuppositions must appear but rather that the presuppositions rigorously 
determine what may appear by rigorously excluding- propositions that are contrary 
to them. Whatever mechanism may be responsible for producing the propositions 
which do appear must conform to the rigorous determination of the presuppositions 
themselves. It is in this sense that we must understand the notion that a 
problematic underlies the forms of order of concepts in a discourse or that 
methodological protocols are responsible for the production of determinate 
substantive discourses. The rationalist conception of the production of discourse 
postulates first an extra.—discursive conceptual totality, a system of concepts 
and relations between concepts, problematics, methodological protocols, 
presuppositions, or whatever, and secondly processes of production of determinate 
discourses which aro somehow constrained (the mechanism is rarely specified) to 
conform to the prior determination of that extra-discursive system of concepts.
1 argue that the rationalist conception of the production of discourse 
cannot be sustained without denying the very possibility of contradiction in 
discourse. For, in the event of contradiction in discourse, neither of the 
contradictory propositions could be accounted for by reference to the extra- 
discursive system of concepts. Their appearance could be accounted for only 
by conceiving the process of production as overriding the postulated extra- 
discursive raHckarrism constraints. Where discourse is supposed to bo governed 
by a system of presuppositions the appearance of logical contradiction in the 
discourse or among the postulated presuppositions ensures that the content 
of discourse cannot be rigorously determined by its presuppositions. If 
contradiction is possib.le then discourse cannot bo the product of rationalist 
me cnanis ms,
This argument can bo elaborated as follows. 'Wo have supposed, for the; sake 
of argument, that p?vPupposii;:Lo-ns govern the prof! net ion of discourse. Nov/, :U: is
"urO
easy to show that this assumption implies that the presuppositions must he
logically coherent among themselves and that therefore all possible discourse
must bo logically coherent. This can be done by considereing a hypothetical
discourse which is governed by a system of presuppositions that is not
internally coherent. In that case, there will be some contradictory
presuppositions. Let A and B be two contradictory presuppositions. Then
among the propositions 'generated' by A there must be at least one whose
&contrary m<£y be 'generated' by B, But, if there arc such contradictory 
presuppositions then the presuppositions cannot govern which propositions 
appear in the discourse, If rigorous consequences of A do appear at any point 
in the discourse why are they not rigorously excluded by B? Where, as in this 
case, the presuppositions are in conflict, their effects must cancel out. But 
then what does appeal’ cannot be accounted for by reference to the presuppositions 
alone. The conclusion is clear: if extra-discursive presuppositions do govern 
the generation of discourse then the presuppositions of any discourse together
with the totality of their logical consequences must form a logically coherent 
system. If they do not then the discourse is indeterminate. Conversely, if a 
logically Incoherent discourse such as Popper's is possible then presuppositions 
cannot datemtixn rigorously determine the content of discourse.
Nov/ this argument turns on the point that if presuppositions in a given 
system do conflict then what appears in the discourse cannot be accounted for 
as a logical consequence of the presuppositions themselves. In the event of 
inconsistency no real effectivity can be attributed to logical relations; the 
process of production of discourse cannot be constrained to conform to the 
requirements of mutually conflicting presuppositions. It might seem that the
situation could bo saved for the rationalist conception of the offectivity of 
presuppositions by introducing some conception of a hierarchy of presuppositions 
such that, in cases of conflict, the hierarchical structure determines which is 
to be cifective in tbo discourse. But such a hierarchy could not be structured 
around logical relations alone since it would have to regulate the offectivity
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of logically contradictory presuppositions.; the determination of priority in 
such a case can hardly bo a function of logical relations between the 
presuppositions concerned, It follows that what appears in discourse would not 
be the rigorous effect of presuppositions alone but only such effects as are 
allowed by the extra-conceptual hierarchy, That determination can hardly be 
conceived in terms of rigour and coherence. Thus, to invoke such a hierarchy 
is to adinru that the content of discourse is not generated as a rigorous effect 
of its presuppositions.
It follows that the assumption that presuppositions do govern the generation 
of discourse implies that all discourse without exception must be logically 
coherent. We can hardly invoke one mechanism of generation for the case where 
a discourse turns out to be consistent and a quite different mechanism where it 
does not. The conflation ox ’presupposition' in the sense of the logical 
conditions of existence of the propositions of a discourse with what are thought 
to bo the 'real ' mechanisms of its production must therefore be rejected as 
unreliable. Discourse cannot bo conceived as a function of logical relations 
with extra-discursive presuppositions. Precisely similar conclusions apply to 
the notion of problematic as both providing the logical conditions of existence 
of propositions and governing the production of discourse and also to all 
conceptions of discourse as the application of a determinate system of methodological 
rules. In the event of inconsistency in the problematic or the rules the outcome 
must, be indeterminate so that what does appear in the discourse can only be a 
function not only of extra-discursive but also of extra-conceptual determinants.
Rationalist conceptions of the production of discourse can cope with inconsistency 
only by invoking quite different determinations to account for what appears in 
discourse. Thus, short of the relativist position which appears to deny the 
existence of logical contradiction"', rationalist mechanisms can be conceived as 
functioning only by courtesy of extra-conceptual forms of determination. The 
assumption of a rationalist conception of the production oC discourse together 
with Uio rceogni c j.ou of the possibility ol’ Incons J s ionoy must entail the primacy 
of non-m i, loan,! is r determinations. But, to admit the primacy of non-rationalist
Z34
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28detc3iminations is to rojoct the rationalist conception itself. The rationalist 
conception of the production of discourse must therefore be rejected as 
untenable.
Is it necessary to add that these arguments may be extended to the rationalist
conception of action in all its forms? Y/ober has been examined at length in
chapter I but consider the other two examples cited above. In these cases the
problem is somewhat complicated but not essentially altered by the introduction
of extra-conceptual pertinences; these provide the conditions of the realization
of internal relations between ideas. Winch tells us that human conduct is a
matter of the following of rules and also that ’the notion of following* a rule
is logically inseparable from the notion of making a mistake' (The Idea of a
Soc1aI Science, p.32). Is it possible to follow inconsistent rules in one's
conduct, for example, in the course of writing a book? 1L is clear that
inconsistency must introduce an element of indeterminacy of the kind I have
indicated above : conduct is a function of rules when they do not conflict and
of something else when they do. Perhaps Winch could avoid indeterminacy by
invoking* a super-rule which regulates the application of particular rules by
reference to features of the situation of action in such a way as to prevent
29conflict between rules from arising. There are two cases here. First, if the 
conduct is that of writing a kook theoretical text, then it is clear that any 
such spcorxxirie super-rule can avoid indeterminacy only by reference to extra- 
conceptual exigencies. Where two rules come into conflict my super-rule may tell 
me, for example, to follow one in the morning and the other in the afternoon; 
in the morning I affirm that there is no a-theoretical observation language and 
in the afternoon I affirm that deductive testing* leads to the growth of knowledge. 
Thus to invoke a super-rule in this case is to reject the rationalist conception 
of the production of discourse. In all other cases a super-rule might appear to 
avoid the problems arising out of inconsistency by specifying extra-conceptual 
conditions in which one rule or the other has priority. The effect of that 
manoeuvre is simply that theoretical incloterminacy enters Winch’s system at a
13?
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different level. Winch states: ’the notion of following a rule is logically 
inseparable from the notion of making' a mistake1. If a person’s conduct never 
deviates from the i-ules then there is
hio sense in describing his behaviour in that way, since everything he 
does is as good as anything else he might do, whereas the point of the 
concept of a rule is that it should enable us to evaluate what is being- 
done 1 (ibid,)
If conduct never deviates from the rule then to specify the rule is merely to 
describe whatever conduct takes place. The concept of rule-governed conduct 
would then be entirely vacuous, But if mistakes with respect to our super-rule 
are even conceivable then the situation is once again indeterminate : the 
super-rule is followed in all cases except those in which it is not followed.
Thus for Winch to insist that conduct is a matter of following a rule is either 
to maintain that all conduct is theoretically indeterminate or else surreptitiously 
to invoke non-conceptual mechanism wheh determine when rules will be followed 
and when they will not.
Parsons1 theory is, of course, altogether more sophisticated. And it is 
further complicated by the fact that the ’cybernetic hierarchy of control1 
includes not only the cultural, social and personality systems together with
the behavioural organism and its physical-organic environment 
but also, at the very top of the hierarchy, 'ultimate reality
in that order, 
30 ,. Jlhxs last is
explicitly conceived as being- inaccessible to scientific forms of cognition.
Now, although the cultural system is located immediatly below ’ultimate reality' 
in the hierarchy of control it is by no means always internally consistent. We 
are .told, for example, that :
'Very close approximations to complete consistency in the patterns of culture 
are practically never to be found in large complex social systems. The 
nature and sources of ma1-intogration of cultural patterns are as important 
to the theory of action as the integration xtself. 1 (Parsons cfc al,, 1062,p.22) 
But, if inconsistency at this level is possible, how is tho functioning of
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cu 1-cure in the hierarchy of control to be conceived? Since higher level controls 
are effective in precisely rhe cases where lower-level conditions lean., the 
situation indeterminate, it follov/s that theoretical indeterminacy at the cultural 
level itself cannot be resolved by reference to the lower-level systems, indeterminacy 
at this level implies that cultural ’controls' are effective only by courtesy of 
some higher-level mechanism. The realization of culture patterns at lower levels, 
for example, in the norms and collectivities of the social system, can only be 
a function of a level of control above that of culture. Thus, inconsistency at 
the cultural level entails a necessary theoretical indeterminacy in Parsons’ 
theory of action systems which can hardly bo resolved by reference to the 
mechanisms of ’ultimate reality’ since these are not accessible to theoretical 
determination. On the other hand, to invoke a mechanism other than ’ultimate 
reality* to counteract theoretical indeterminacy would be to reject the rationalist 
conception of action which is the foundation of Parsonian theory.
Further consequences of my arguments here are not investigated in the present 
, 31texr. but I have said enough to show that the theoretical indeterminacy 
identified abovo in the rationalist conception of the production of discourse 
must also appear in other forms of the rationalist conception of action. Since 
mat indeterminacy is a necessary effect of the basic concepts of the rationalist 
co no op cion o.*. action it can be overcome only at the cost of theoretical 
incoherence.
Conclusion
I conclude this chapter by commenting briefly on the implications of the
proceeding arguments for the analysis of discourse. It follows from the my
critique of the rationalist conception of the production of Iiscourse that a
rigorous separation should be maintained between :
(a) the logical conditions of existence of 
and the logical character of the relations 
in tiiese conditions - in short, the logical
the propositions of discourse 
between the concepts entailed 
. character of the order of
zyi
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concepts of discourse;
and (b) the process of production or generation of discourse.
To insist on such a separation is not to preclude the development of forms of 
theorication of discourse independent of the analysis of its logical character, 
for example, analyses of style, grammar, etc. But it is to insist that internal 
relations between concepts cannot be conceived as having any real effectivity 
in the generation of discourse. The consequences for Althusser's or any other 
rationalist theory of the production of discourse must be quite devastating. In 
particular it is impossible to maintain that methodological or other protocols 
can be effectively realized in particular theoretical discourses. It follows 
that no critique of methodological doctrines can be carried over to a critique 
of those substantive discourses which have been represented as if they were the 
products of determinate methodological protocols. Thus, if we do maintain a 
rigorous separation between the order of concepts of a discourse and the process 
of production of a discourse then there is at least one unfortunate consequence, 
namely, that all the easy critiques of Political Keonomy, Sociology* History, 
and so on, of the kind indicated above, in short the easy anti-empiricist 
critiques of theoretical discourses other than epistemology and methodology,
must be invalid and logically ineffective. If theoretical discourses arc to be 
criticized it can no longer be because they are alleged to be derived from some 
empiricist process or from epistemology but only because of an inadequacy at 
the level of their concepts and the relations between those concepts. To claim 
that the sociology of a Durkheim or of a Weber is empiricist and therefore 
ideological is to suppose that it is the product of a rationalist mechanism 
governed by an empiricist knowledge process which takes place in
ideology. A critique based on its ideological character or on its alleged 
empiricism must therefore be logically ineffective.
The analysis of the logical character of the order of concepts ox a discourse 
cannot proceed by reference to any alleged process of production of that discourse. 
1 have argued that, discourse must bo analysed in terms of the concepts and
4®*
and relations between concepts which Eire entailed in the positions developed in
the discourse in question, and I have suggested that, in contrast to his
treatment of what he regards as theoretical ideology, Althusser's analysis
of the discourse of Capital does have this general character, aIbeit to a
Q
very limited extent, I have tried to give sjLme further indication of what is 
involved in this mode of analysis in the previous section by means of the 
concept of the logical conditions of existence of the propositions of a discourse. 
Very schematically, we can say that every proposition in a discourse 'presuppposes ' 
certain concepts and relations between concepts. But, since there can be no 
question of conceiving logical cond.itions of existence as having' any real 
effectivity in the generation of discourse, there can be no presumption of the 
coherence of & discourse nor of rigour in the development of its positions,
Popper's theory of the growth of knowledge, for example, is manifestly not 
coherent. The logical conditions of existence of one proposition may well 
conflict with those of another. The analysis of discourse is concerned with 
the logical properties of the system of concepts and relations that are logically 
presupposed by the propositions of the discourse in question.
At this point it is necessary to introduce a further concept, nemalv, that 
of a'hierarchy of concepts'. The necessity of this concept can be shown as 
follows, m the case of any reasonably complex of. lengthy theoretical text it 
is usually easy to discover instances in which one proposition appears to 
contradict another. For example, I have referred to Althusser's investigation 
of Idle status of the concept of 'intersubjective relations' in relation to the 
system of concepts in Capital and to the problem this raises with respect to 
the identification of the basic, concepts of a discourse, Althusser's conclusion, 
that the concept of 'intersubjective relations' is incompatible with the system 
of concepts of Capital might be interpreted as implying either that the concept 
of 1 intersubjeetivo relations' has no place in the science of Marxism or tlu;t the 
concepts of Capital are mutually iacoiorcnt. Similar points may be made with 
inspect to the minor in cons is tencios that may be found in most theoretical texts.
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The concept ox 'hierarchy of concepts' provides a means for determining the
significance for its overall coherence of the inconsistencies that may he
established within a discourse. The re is a hierarchy of concepts to the extent that
the formation of certain concepts of a discourse dee pends on, ox* 'presupposes 1,
certain other concepts. For example, in our paper 'Talcott Parsons and the Three
Systems of Action' Stephen Savage and I have shown that the concepts of the
functional prerequisites in Parsons' theory depend both on the concepts of the
action frame of reference and on the concepts of system and of the differentiated
systems of action, i.e,, the social, cultural and personality systems. The
concepts of the functional prerequsities therefore belong to a level of discourse
below that of the fundamental concepts of action and of action systems. It should
be emphasized that .the hierarchy of concepts is a matter of the relations which
obtain between the concepts entailed in the propositions cl the discourse. It
does not depend on any explicit claims and assertions an author may make 
t li o s oconcerning xks relations. The relations of hierarchy, coherence, and so on,
hold or fail to hold in the concepts of a discourse irrespective of any beliefs
or intentions which may be invoked on the part of the author.
In Parsons ' case it is not difficult to show that his discourse is based
on two separate orders of concepts - those of the action frame of reference and
those of system and the differentiated systems of action ~ and that the bulk of his
substantive theory may be derived as lower level effects resulting from the
ofusion of these two orders of concepts. We argue that the brinjtging together 
of these two orders of concepts at a fundamental level of Parsons' discourse 
results in a crucial logical incoherence. It is a crucial incoherence precisely 
because it is located at the most fundamental level of Parsons' discourse since 
this ensures that the effects of this incoherence must be felt throught^out 
his work. They cannot, in other words, be restricted to any relatively discrete 
area as would be the case, fora example, with respect to logical problems located 
at the level of his concepts of education, the family, etc. It follows that, 
quite apart from the theoretical indeterminacy involved in his rationalist 
conception of action, the major subs tautivo positions advanced in Parsons
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discourse within the sphere of sociology or mo re generally in his proposed 'sciences of
action' have no colie.ront theoretical basis.
It should bo clear from this short outline that the analysis of the logical
character of the order of concepts of discourse is itself a theoretical
exercise involving inter alia concepts of the logical character of the order
of discourse, hierarchy of concepts, coherence, derivation, and so on. Further
elaboration of the theory of discourse involved in this mode of analysis must
await future publications but it is necessary here to distinguish the mode’of
critique which [makes^it^possible from those modes of critique that merely
counterpose one theoretical position to another or which are based on particular
epistemological or methodological positions. Whore the former merely establish
differences between one position and another, the latter operate through the
application of a definite set of epistemological or methodological protocols
whose function is both to reconstruct the 'content ' of the discourse in question
and to register any discrepancies between that content and the req^irembnts of
32the protocols - for example. Popper's polemics against Freud ‘or Marx^ and many
33sociological critiques of Parsons, Quite apart from the internal problems 
of the theories from which they derive, all these critiques are merely dogmatic; 
at their best they can only hope to establish that propositions of one discourse 
fail to conform to conceptual relations established in other discourses, 'Yet, 
as I have argued in preceding chapters, there is no possibility of an extra- 
theoretical court of appeal which can 'validate ' the claims of one position 
against those of another.
As against these dogmatic modes of critique the mode of analysis suggested 
here may be described as strictly 'internal'. It is concerned to investigate 
the concepts and relations presupposed in the formulation ox the propositions of the
disconrse in question, 
the logical properties 
concern the coherence 
and their location at 
discourse may, of cour
their logical conditions of existence, and to investigate 
of the relations between these concepts. Those properties 
or incoherence, consistency or inconsistency of the discourse 
determinate levels in its .hierarchy of concepts. A given 
■so, bo totally Incoherent but if it is at all thooretoi cal,
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if, flicit is to s&y, it exhibits cniy level of vigour' and loyical cohei’cnco,- 
hierarchical relations will obtain between at least soiao of its concepts. In 
theoretical discourses, where hierarchical relations between concepts can be 
identified, it may be that certain concepts or sets of concepts are relatively 
independent of the major substantive concepts of the discourse. For example, the 
epistemological, stylistic and grammatical protocols that sometimes appear in 
substantive social scientific discourses often bear no relation^the substantive 
concepts involved, I have argued that protocols cannot be conceived as 
governing the production of discourse. If’nahalllK^can be demonstrated 
at the highest level in the substantive concepts of a discourse, then we must 
conclude that the discourse is fundamentally incoherent and that the substantive 
positions which it develops have no coherent theoretical foundation, In this 
way it can be shown, for example, that in spite of its extremely high level of 
rigour in comparison with the bulk of sociological literati re Parsons 1 discourse 
is primarily and fundamentally incoherent,
To the second of the two areas demarcated above, namely, that of the 
production or generation of discourse there is little I can add by way of 
positive indications at this stage. The negative effects of my arguments in this 
chapter should be clear enough and it is hardly necessary to add that the .concepts of 
the logical character of the order of concepts, hierarchy, logical conditions 
of existence, and so on, are in no way intended to refer to putative meclanisms 
of the generation of discourse, I am not proposing a theory of discourse as the 
realization of a logos. On the contrary, I have argued that the rationalist 
conception of the production of theoretical discourse is but a particular case 
of a more general rationalist conception of action in which the world, or some 
particular part of it, is conceived as the realization of the idea. These 
rationalist conceptions may be humanist or anti-humanist in chtu-actcr; they may 
locate the principle mechanism of the realization of ideas in the attributes of
Ivy
the individual human subject, in particular p-f” its will and consciousness, or 
they may locate it at a supra-individual level of determination. This lost may
A&~
be conceived in various forms: Parsons' 'cybernetic hierarchy of control';
IIusst?il s universal subjectivity whicii realizes itsoif, inter alia? fas human
subjectivity, as an element of the world' (Husserl, 1970a, p.113); the
consciousness and will of a class-subject as in many idealise versions of 
34Marxism ; and, as we have seen, Althusser's conception of problematic as an 
extra-discursive system of concepts governing the order of appearance of concepts 
in discourse, Althusser completely rejects all humanist conceptions of the 
production of discourse and his own position has the very great merit of 
insisting on the importance of concepts and relations between concepts, on 
argument and demonstration, and on the question of tho relative coherence of a 
system of concepts. Indeed, as I have suggested, his analyses of the status of 
particular concepts in relation to Marxist theory are sometimes exemplary. 
Unfortunately ho locates the pertinence of concepts and the relations between 
concepts as much in the process of production of discourse as in the
conceptual relations of the discourse itself. Ho therefore 
lapses into a rationalist conception of the production of discourse.
This collapse of one of the most sophisticated contemporary intex’preters 
of Marxism and the most rigorous critic of classical epistemology into a 
rationalist, and therefore idealist, conception of the production of theoretical 
discourse may serve as an index of the dangers which confront u.s in this area.
If tne dominance of rationalist conceptions of human action has been 
successfully challenged by Marx in his theory of modes of production and, 
at another level, by Freud in the theory of the unconscious, no such theoretical 
emancipation has yet been achieved with respect to tho problems of tho production 
of discourse. Them, in theories ranging from the creativity of the individual 
scientist or scientific community to that of the scientific problematic itself,
the rationalist conception of action reigns supreme.
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•Humanisand Teleology■ and'^Sociologlca 1 Theory
Barry Hindess
Introduction
This paper examines the conceptual structure of theoretical humanism and 
related theoretical positions and of teleology; it attempts to formulate both 
a rigbrous general concept and a rigorous critique of both types of position.
This objective takes us beyond the formal limits of a seminar on sociological 
theories of the economy. The scope of this paper is therefore more general 
than that of the other papers in this seminar. The presentation of a paper of 
this level of generality is justified on the ground that both theoretical 
humanism and related positions on the one hand and teleological conceptions on 
the other play a crucial role in sociological attempts to conceptualize the 
economy and social and economic change. Thus, whilst specific issues concerning 
these positions may be raised in several of the papers in the seminar, fox’ example 
with respect to the work of Parsons or Weber, there is also a place for a mox’e 
general discussion that is not restricted to a consideration of one particular 
school or authoin The pragmatic justification of an examination of teleology is 
in any case clear given the pertinence of the economy as one of the principal 
locations of teleological conceptions in social theory, for example, in theories 
of industrialization, economic growth and development, and given the importance that 
is often attached in sociological theory to problems concerning the origins and 
development of capitalism. The case of theoretical humanism and related conceptions 
of action is a more general one but its
significance for this seminar can be az’gued on two 
gieunds, namely, its fundamental importance for the theoretical work of Parsons 
and Weber and for at least some aspects of the substantivist conception of the ...
2
economy, X shall illustrate my arguments by refernce to the work of Parsons 
and Weber but it should be clear that my conclusions have a general significance 
for social theory'. . *
Theoretical humanism is a form of social theory in which action is conceived as 
a function of the v/ill and consciousness of the human individual. In the social 
sciences theoretical humanism is based on an explicit or implicit philosophical 
anthropology which affirms the distinctive character of the object of social 
scientific investigation. It is a philosophical anthropology in the sense that the
recognition of that distinctive character is thought to be not the product of
scientific investigation but its precondition. Max Weber’s definitions of sociology
and social action in Economy and Society represent a theoretical humanism in this
sense. Sociology is defined as a science of human action. But the essential nature
of action in general and of social action in particular is not something that may be
established within sociiogy. Knowledge of the nation of action enables us to
constitute sociology; it is not established within it. For example, in The
Methodology of the Social Sciences Weber refers to lthe transecendental presuppositfjon »■■■ '■ .... —...... ..... . . .. .
of'every cultural science*, namely:
le .'that we are^cultural beings, endowed with the capacity anci^will to take a 
definite attitude toward the world and to lend it significance, 1 (Meth.p.81)
Theoretical humanism proposes the reduction of the social realm to the will and
consciousness of human actors. Social relations are intersubjective relations and
social life is the product of the teleological action of individual human subjects:
’action ... exists only as the behaviour of one or more individual human beings,1
(Theory p.107)
In sociology, theoretical humanism has been challenged to some extent in the work 
of Durklieim, ^ and in the later work of Parsons, In both cases, far from society 
being conceived as reducible to the will and consciousness of human individuals, these 
individuals are themselves conceived as subordinated to the functioning of more 
general and supra-individual mechanisms. The individual subject is no longer a 'free 
agent' in the sense of theoretical humanism. For example, in the later work of 
Parsons personality systems are conceived as being necessarily integrated into a 
cybernetic hierarchy of control at a level below that of the social and cultural 
systems. There can be no personality system that is not part of such a hierarchy
3
of control.
In this p^ipor I show that both theoretical humanism and the anti-humanist
positions developed,in moje rigorous forms of sociological theory are instances of a
*
more general theoretical tendency which I shall call the rationalist conception of 
2action. That conception is outlined in Part 1. For purposes of this Introduction 
it is sufficient to say that it postulates a realm of ideas (ultimate values, 
meanings, or whatever), a real^m of nature, and a mechanism of action which effects 
the realization of ideas in the realm of nature. This mechanism may be conceived 
as operating at the level of the individual actor as in Weber's definition of 
sociology or at a supra-individual level as in Durkheim's work and in Parsons' 
theory of systems of action. Part 1 examines the theoretical properties of the 
rationalist conception of action in both its humanist and its anti-humanist forms.
I argue that, whilst theoretical humanism in the social sciences has its own 
internal inconsistencies, the more general rationalist conception of action is 
ultimately and inescapably incoherent. There can be no coherent social theory 
based on the rationalist conception of action.
The question of teleology is discussed in Part 2. I propose a general concept 
of teleology as involving at the very least the postulate of a definite hierarchy of 
forms which are or may be realized in a temporal process so that the realization of 
the higher forms is conditional on the prior realization of the lower forms. At 
this level of generality teleology subsumes both those positions which postulate 
a determinate immanent developmental tendency, for example, an immanent tendency of 
'rationalization' or 'structural differentiation', and those apparently more limited| 
forms which merely propose a principle of hierarchy, such as 'modernization', 
'industrialization', or whatever, in terms of which societal differences may be 
conceived, A particular teleology may well propose some foxmi of historical 
necessity but the crucial feature of the teleological postulate consists in its 
conceptualization of the distinct forms as the realization edf expression of their 
position in the hierarchy itself. In so far as teleology entails a necessity it 
does so only in the limited sense that the existence of any one foimi in the hierarchy
3requires that the lower forms must have been realized.
There are two forms of teleology, A universal teleology subsumes the universe
4
and all its parts; it encompasses everything; that exists. A partial 
teleology on the other hand subsumes a part of the universe only, I argue that 
partial teleolog4.es must be confronted by an irresoluble problem of double 
determination since they postulate, in effect, both that some part of the world is 
subject to the constraints of its natuz'al or social conditions of existence and that 
it realizes its position in a teleological hierarchy of forms. Double determination 
in this sense involves partial teleology in conceiving of some social or natural 
process in terms of two incompatible and contradictory forms of constraint. This 
sufi:ices to establish the incoherence of any partial teleology, that is, of any 
teleology which proposes to deal only with some limited part of the world, say, 
human society or the development of Western civilization. By subjecting only part 
of the world to its constraints, partial teleology ensures that the part of the 
world in question must also be subject to conditions of existence extraneous to 
the teleology itself. Teleology must either subsume the world and everything in it 
or it is incoherent. A universal teleology, on the other hand, can be shown to be 
theoretically vacuous since it provides no means of conceptualizing the specificity 
of any determinate phenomena.
Before proceeding to these demonstrations, however, it is necessary to 
distinguish the arguments of this paper both from an influential form of critique of 
theoretical humanism which operates through the designation of humanism as an 
ideology and from a widespread critique of teleology on the basis of its manifest 
affinities with and representation in the idealist philosophies of history. Consider 
first the critique of theoretical humanism as an ideology. If humanism is an 
ideology then theoretical humanism is merely an elaborated form of that ideology; 
it is a theoretical ideology not a science. The best example of this form of critique 
may be-found in Althusser's critique of Political Economy in Part 11 of Reading 
Capital. Althusser represents Political Economy as a form of theoretical discourse 
that is constituted in part by the intervention of 'given', that is,extra-discursive, 
elements, by the intervention of a 'given' realm of economic facts. Now, it is a 
consequence of Althusser's critique of the empiricist conception of knowledge that
knowledge can never involve direct app^erception of the real. The elements of
knowledge must be conceived as constructed elements; they are never given by the 
real as such. In so far as XHS 'given' elements appear in knowledge they are the
product not of some mythical positivistic observation of the facts but rather 
of ideology. Elements constructed in ideology are given to theory prior to the 
operation of th^ theoretical knowledge process. In the case of Political Economy,
** ' A
Althusser argues* ’given* phenomena are constituted as economic by reference to the 
needs of human subjects.
'The peculiar theoretical structure of Political Economy depends on immediately 
and directly relating together a homogeneous space of given phenomena and an 
ideological anthropology which bases the economic character' of the phenomena 
and its space on man as the subject of needs (the givenness of the homo, 
oeconomicus- 1 (R.C, p.162)
Political Economy- is constrained by its very definition to operate on a realm of 
'given' economic phenomena. Since these are given by humanist ideology it follows 
that ideology must intervene at the most fundamental level of the discourse of 
Political Economy. Political Economy, therefore, cannot be scientific. It is easy 
' to see that similar arguments could be advanced to establish that the sociology of 
a Durkheim, a Weber, or a Parsons, perhaps sociology tout court, cannot be scientific 
because it pretends to operate with givens, for example, with a mass of given
4empirical material that must be sorted and ordered by means of Weberian ideal types.
I am not concerned here with the validity or otherwise of Althusser's 
identification of theoretical humanism as a fundamental element in the theoretical 
structure of Political Economy but only with the form of critique of theoretical 
humanism which he proposes. I have examined this form of critique of what is alleged 
to be theoretical ideology elsewhere and have shown that it is logically invalid and
5theoretically ineffective. For present purposes it is enough to note that the 
Althusserian critique of what it designates as theoretical ideology is based on a 
general a priori demarcation of discourses into sciences and ideologies such that, 
whilst the sciences are to be examined in tei’ms of their concepts and relations 
between concepts, the theoretical ideologies are to be t^ated in an entirely 
different fashion. In the case of theoretical ideology texts are to be examined for 
the signs of ideological contamination; in particular^empiricist formulations which 
refer to the given and humanist formulations are to be read as an index of the 
ideological character of the discourse in question. In the sciences, on the other 
hand, empiricist or humanist formulations must be treated as discrepant elements.
For example, in Heading Capital, Part XI, Chapter 8, Althusser argues, correctly in
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my view, that; whilst certain humanist formulations do appear in Capital they 
can be shown to be incompatible with its basic concepts. This form of critique of 
what is thought to be theoretical ideology is ultimately dogmatic and therefore 
in^conclusive since it presupposes precisely v/hat it needs to establish, namely, that 
certain particular conceptions are indeed ideological and not scientific. The 
designation of theoretical humanism as an ideology may have some polemical 
significance but it cannot be theoretically effective.
In my examination of the Althusserian theoi’y of science and theoretical
i
id'eology I have argued that the different modes of treatment of what are thought to
be sciences and ideologies can have no rational justification. As far as their
theoretical character is concerned all discourses must be analyzed in terms of theXX*
concepts and relations between concepts which are entailed in the positions 
o 6developed in the discourse in question. What is significant from this point of view
is not whether a particular concept or set of concepts can be said to represent some
extra-theoretical interests or social forces but rather their theoretical properties
as concepts on the one hand and thier location in particular discourses on the other.
In this paper I am concerned with concepts of theoretical humanism and the more
general rationalist conception of action and with teleology. I am not concerned to
demonstrate that they are present or dominant in any particular theoretical discourse
this question is taken up to some extent in other papers in this seminar. In Part 1
of this paper I examine the particular set of concepts involved in theoretical
humanism and, more generally, in the rationalist conception of action. It is on the
basis of these concepts and the logical character of the relations that obtain betwee
them that I argue that theoretical humanism and the rationalist conception of action
are fundamentally and inescapably incoherent.
As for telology, it is hardly necessary to demonstrate the ubiquity of
teleological conceptions in sociological theory, economic anthropology and in much of
7what passes for Marxism. But is there any reason why social and economic change 
should not be conceptualized in teleological terns? The affinities of teleology with 
religion, and its association with idealist philosophies of history are well known.
Those unsavoury associations may well lead us to1 Vi ewe'll os eS *con ce1 pt ions
-
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that postulate a historical necessity or an explicit ideal principle of
*teleological order but they cannot constitute adequate grounds for dismissing all 
teleologies out hand. Accordingly, rather than present an argument for teleology's
* A
guilt by association \vithe,unsavoury theoretical companions Part 2 examines the 
conceptual structure of teleology and its theoretical effects. It demonstrates that 
teleology cannot avoid either incoherence or vacuity.
Part 1 Humanism and the Rationalist Conception of Action
In this Part I examine the conceptual structure of the rationalist conception of
uaction in both its humanist and its anti-humanist forms, I argue that, whilst 
theoretical humanism has its own particular inconsistencies, both this special case 
and the rationalist conception in general can be shown to be either completely 
vacuous or ultimately incoherent. After an outline of the basic structure of the 
rationalist conception of action I proceed to an examination of the particular 
features of theoretical humanism, with special reference to the work of Max Weber, 
and of anti-humanist forms of the rationalist conception of action, with special 
reference to the -later work of Talcott Parsons. This Part closes with a demonstration 
of the fundamental theoretical indeterminacy of the rationalist conception of action 
and of its theoretical effects.
(a) The Rationalist Conception of Action . I
In its most general form the rationalist conception of action postulates a realm 
of ideas (values, representations, meanings), a realm of nature and a mechanism of th 
realization of ideas in the realm of nature, namely human action. This mechanism may 
be defined at the level of the individual human subject, in which case it operates as 
a function of the will and consciousness of the subject, or at some supra-individua1 
or social level of determination, in which case it subsumes the actions of individuals 
to its functioning. But whatever pai'ticular form the mechanism may be thought to take 
its effect is to define some portion of nature as the product of ideal, extra-natural 
determinations. Thus the social or cultural sphere may be conceived as a sphere of 
both natural and extra-natural determinations. Y/here the one is the object of natural
\8
scientific investigation the other must be understood, that is to say, social
or cultural phenomenal must be referred back to the ideas (meanings, values, or
whatever)^which they express.
** *
To describe this conception of action as rationalist is not to say that it must 
involve a rationalist epistemology. Rationalist positions in epistemology conceive of 
knowledge as being, at least in part, a function of concepts and relations between 
concepts which are independent of experience. The world is a rational order in the 
sense that its parts and the relations between them conform to the order of concepts 
and the relations between them. It is for this reason that concepts which are 
independent of experience may nevertheless be conceived as giving a genuine knowledge 
of the world. Where rationalist epistemology presupposes a pre-given harmony between 
ideas and the world the rationalist conception of action merely postulates a mechanism 
of the realisation of ideas in the world. The theological affinities of these 
conceptions are evident.
It is clear that Max Weberfs concept of action represents a rationalism in this 
sense. 'In "action" is included all human behaviour when and in so far as the acting 
individual attaches a subjective meaning to it.1 (Theory p.88 emphasis added) Both 
action and behaviour are events in nature but action is also something more: it is the 
expression of a meaning which is not part of nature. Weber's concept of action 
therefore postulates a realm of ideas (meanings and values), a realm of nature, and 
the will and consciousness of the human individual as the means of realization of 
ideas in nature. For a very different example consider The Social System, Toward a 
General Theory of Action, and the later works of Talcott Parsons. Parsons elaborates 
a rationalist conception of action which no longer accords primacy to the human 
individual but rather postulates a more complex social and cultural mechanism of the 
realization of ideas. For Parsons cultural systems consist of systems of ideas or 
beliefs, systems of expressive symbols and systems of value-orientations and they 
have a mode of existence that is different in kind from any other type of system:
'a cultural system is not an empirical system in the same sense as a personality or 
social system, because it repi’esents a special kind of abstraction of elements from 
those systems. 1 (TGTA p.55^. Cultural systems may be internalized in the orientation 
systems of actors and'institutionalized in social systems but they also have a 
different mode of existence. Thus we have a realm of ideas (the cultui’al system), a
9realm of nature and a complex mechanism of realization of ideas in nature through 
the articulation of cultural systems on to social and personality systems. Similarly 
Durkheimhs conception of social facts as expressing 'states of the collective
■* ' A
consciousness' also involves a rationalist conception of action functioning at
a supra-individual level of determination.^ Weber and Parsons will be discussed
in more detail below, Y/hat should be noted here is that both Durkheim and Parsons,
at least for Parsons' later work, have been criticized by representatives of
theoretical for their 'reification' of society, for their 'sociologism^', and
9
for elaborating an 'over-socialized conception of man. ' But the positions of
Durkheim and Parsons and of their humanist critics may be subsumed under the same
general concept^. Whilst there are considerable differences between the theoretical
humanism of Weber and the anti-humanism of Durkheim and of Parsons they nevertheless
share the fundamental problems of the rationalist conception of action. I discuss.j
the^/se problems in the last part of this section.
Before proceeding to an examination of the particular features of the humanist
and anti-humanist forms of the rationalist conception of action it is necessary to
consider some of the theoretical consequences of the basic postulates of this
conception. Three consequences are of particular importance. First, the postulate
of a mechanism of the realization of ideas implies a capacity on the part of that
mechanism to register discrepancies between the ideas and the situation in which
action is to take place. More precisely, since ideas and the world are not strictly
commensurable, the mechanism must be able to represent the situation of action in
the realm of ideas and to compare that ideal representation with the ideas to be
realized. In short, the mechanism must possess a recognition structure capable of
q c"t i onconstructing ideal representations of the natural conditions of iiaxiixs. Theoretical
humanism clearly postulates such a capacity on the part of the human subject and it i
for the same reason that Parsons insists on the necessity of a 'subjective ppint of
view' in the analysis of all levels of action anove thht of the biological organism.
Parsons' actor acts in terms of his conceptions:
, 'The actor's system of orientations is constituted by a great number of specific 
orientations. Each of these ‘’orientations of action" is a "conception" (explici 
or implicit, conscious or unconscious) which the actor has of the s-ituation in 
terms of what he wants (his ends), what he sees (how the situation looks to him.
! 3.0
and how he intends to get from the objects he sees the things he wants (his 
explicit or implicit, normatively regulated "plan" of action). ' (TGTA p,54)
Since Parsons insists that an actor may be either an individual or a collectivity and 
since the category of collectivity includes societies, social systems and their 
functional sub-systems, we must conclude that social systems and sub-systems are 
endov/ed with recognition structures analogous to those which Parsons attributes to 
individual actors. In particular, the economy, as one of the major functional sub­
systems of society must have a recognition structure capable of registering 
discrepancies between its goals and the situation of action.
Secondly, it is necessary to consider the sense in which the functioning of the 
postulated mechanism may be said to involve the realization of ideas. Any form of the 
rationalist conception of action postulates first a system of ideas, ultimate values, 
rules, or whatever, in short an ideal totality, and secondly processes of realization 
of the ideas of that totality. Ideas govern action in the sense that the actions are 
consistent with the ideas of the totality; for example, ultimate values govern action
to the extent that actions conform to these values. In effect the ideas govern action
exin at least the minimal sense of precluding actions which conflict with them. In
, Xaddition, whatever particular mech^anism of realization be postulated its 
functioning is ijtomehow constrained to conform to the prior determination of the ideal 
totality. We shall see that the rationalist conception of action runs into 
serioiis difficulties if it admits that ideal totalities may contain contradictory 
ideas, say, conflicting ultimate values, and that it becomes entirely vacuous if 
contradictory ideas are precluded.
The third point follows from the second. If the mechanism of realization must be 
conceived as somehow constrained to confoi^ to the primacy of ideas it must also be 
conceived as involving processes in natxire. There are three aspects of this point.
The first is that what appears in nature is not the idea itself but rather its 
expression, its attempted realization in action. Action must be accounted for by 
reference to the idea it attempts to idealize, and the idea may be known only thx’ough 
its expressions and attempted realization. The circular and speculative character 
of the relation between postulated idea and its supposed expression is evident."^ 
Secondly, the success of the mechanism in .realizing its ideas must, be a function of the
n
situation of action which, in certain respects, must be conceived as beyond the 
control of the acting mechanism itself. Parsons insists on this pertinence of the 
situation^of action in his critiques of 'idealist emanationism '. The third aspect
« ' A
is that the acting' mechanism itself functions according to natural processes and is 
therefore subject to natural determinations. Thus, if contradiction is to be avoided 
on this point, the relevant parts of nature must be conceived as endowed with an 
immanent capacity to realize ideas. Whether contradiction can be avoided or not, the 
mechanism, of realization must be conceived as subject to two quite distinct and 
possibly conflicting modes of determination: on the one hand it is a thing in nature 
and subject to natural constraints; on the other hand it is constrained to conform to 
the prior determination of its ideal totality. In contrast to merely natural entities 
the mechanisms of realization of ideas must be regarded as free and undetermined; thei 
actions go beyond natural determinations. In theoretical humanism this consequence 
appears in the form of the doctrine of the freedom of the will. For example, Weber 
conceives the behaviour of the human individual as a natural process subject to 
natural (physiological, biological, psychological) constraints but in so far as it is 
endowed with meaning behaviour is also constrained to conform to that meaning. 
Similarly Pai'sons conceives social and personality systems as the embodiment of 
culture on the one hand and subject to their own internal conditions of existence as 
systems on the other. The rationalist conception of action cannot avoid postulating
CSM.
two antithetical forms of restraint and it is possible to reconcile them only by 
postulating a pre-given capacity on the part of the realm of nature to conform to the 
determination of ideas. The effect of that attempted reconciliation is to 25HS5SHSS 
contradict the initial demarcation of the realms of nature and of ideas,
(b) Theoretical Humanism; the case of Weber
Weber's conception of action is a theoretical humanism; it postulates a 
mechanism of the realization of ideas (called 'meaningsf or 'ultimate values') which 
operate at the level of the individual human subject. Weber insists that social 
relationships and social collectivities are always reducible to the actions of 
individuals. Social colleetivites:
'must be treated as.solely the resultants and modes of organization-of the 
particular acts of individual persons, since these alone can be treated as agents 
in a course of subjectively understandable action. ' (Theory, p.101)
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It follows, for example, that the investigation of a socialistic economy
■»
must be conducted in individualistic terns. It must begin with the question: 'What
motives determine^ and lead the individual members and participants in this
socialistic community to tJehave in such a way that the community came into being in
the .first place and that it continues to exist?’ (ibid.p.107)
In this brief discussion of.Weber's position I shall consider two aspects of his
theoretical humanism: the first concerns his conceptualization of the mechanism of
13realization of ideas and the second concerns the tension between the individualisti 
consequences of theoretical humanism arid Weber's attempts to conceptualize forms.of 
social action.
In Weber's definitions of sociology and in his methodological writings the
mechanism of realization of meanings and values is the human individual. On the one
hand the human individual is a creature in nature subject to physiological,
psychological and genetic determinations and on the other hand it is a free agent, a
subject of will and consciousness. A recognition structure is entailed in the
postulate of the consciousness of the human subject. Weber, in common with the bulk
of. theoretical humanism, does not elaborate on the mechanisms by which this recognitio
structure is supposed to function. The element of speculation entailed in the
Weberian doctrine of interpretative understanding is well known. Interpretation may
well strive 'for clarity and verifiable accuracy of insight and comprehension'
(ibid.p.SO) but there is no means of knowing if it has been achieved. In no case does
the ‘meaning * attributed to a particular real or hypothetical actor 'refer to an
objectively "correctM meaning or one which is "true" in some metaphysical sense/
(ibid. p„S9) Values that are radically different from our own pose severe difficultie
for the interpretative understanding of action:
'These difficulties apply, for instance, for people not susceptible to the 
relevant values, to many unusual acts of religious and charitable zeal; also 
certain kinds of extreme rationalistic fanaticism of the type involved in some 
forms of the ideology of the "rights of man" are in a similar position foi’ 
people who radically repudiate such points of view. ' (ibid.p,91)
The implications of this position are clear. We are compelled to speculate as to the
meanings involved in the action of other actors and it is only when these values are
reasonably close to our own.that we have any chance of success. We can know their
values only through our speculative interpretation of their actions. Since the
action is defined by its meaning we can only classify and distinguish actions
*
by reference to the meanings and values that we postulate in order to account for the 
But the speculative ..effects of Weber's theoretical humanism go further than this.
The behaviour of the human subject is a function of both natural and extra-natural 
determinations. In the latter case the behaviour is also an action. Action and 
behaviour may be distinguished by the meaning entailed in the one and the absence of 
meaning in the other. And how do we know in any particular case ^ether a meaning 
is involved at all? Since meanings can be known only through their expressions 
we are compelled to speculate not only as to what is the meaning of a determinate 
item of behaviour but also as to whether it has any meaning at all. In these 
respects Weber’s science?? of social action is a science of the speculative 
interpretation of what is speculatively identified as action.
In addition to its speculative effects Weber’s postulate of the realization of 
ideas through human action poses the problem of the articulation of the natural and 
the extra-natural in man. The line between action and behaviour is very difficult 
to draw, and we are told that:
’a very considerable part of sociologically relevant behaviour .., is marginal 
between the two. 1 (ibid, p,SO)
The category of action that is marginal between action and behaviour plays a crucial 
part in Weber's sociology. In Section 2 of 'The Fundamental Concepts of Sociology' 
he distinguishes four basic types of social action according to their mode of 
orientation. Two of these are rational and the other two, traditional and affectual 
orientations, are on or 'very close to the borderline of what can justifiably be 
called .meaningfully orieat^ed action, and indeed often on the other side. ' {ibid, 
p.116) In so far as they cease to be marginal they shade over into mere behaviour 
on the one side and into one or other of the rational types on the other. Action is 
essentially rational; it deviates from rationality only to the extent that it is
by an admixture of behaviour, i.e,, to the extent that it is the product of 
natural determinations. In effect Weber's theoretical humanism imposes a three-fold
... /fi
classification of human behaviour: rational action which conforms to meansings and
values; mere behaviour which is the pure product of natural determinations; and non-
14 * -rational action which is part action and part behaviour. Human- behaviour is 
rational if it conforms to meanings and values and non-rational if it does not. It
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tois this essential rationality of action that Knirsiis Weber's insistence on the
construction of rational ideal types. The causal significance (if all other elements 
in behaviour ma^then be interpreted 'as accounting for the deviations from this
type', (ibid.p.92) Weber^adds that 'rational types' are only a methodological device 
but it should now be clear that they have a theoretical necessity in the humanist forri 
of the rationalist conception of action.
If we ask the question of what is the relative proportion of action and mere 
behaviour in a given society it is clear that Weber's concepts preclude any empirical 
determination of that proportion. Meanings must be postulated but they cannot be 
empiricially observed. Nevertheless in his discussion of the relativeyole of 
'mechanical and instinctive factors, as compared with that of the factors which are 
accessible to subjective interpretation' (ibid.p.lOS) Weber tells us 'that in the 
early stages of human development, the first set of factors is completely 
predominant. ' (ibid, emphasis added) There are two levels in man, the rational and tl: 
animal, and in the early stages of human development the animal is predominant. 
Primitive men are closer to animals than the civilized and rational creatures of the 
West. For example, he describes some domestic animals as able to react to human 
commands in ways that ax-e 'by no means purely instinctive and mechanical' and adds 
that 'there is no a_ priori reason to suppose that our ability to share the feelings 
of primitive men is very much greater. ' (ibid, p, 104)
Thus, in defining sociology as a science of action Weber in no way^ denies XSKSg 
the existence or significance of mere behaviour; But rationality, the capacity to 
realize meanings and values., is represented as what is specifically and essentially 
human. However, this rational essence is by no means always realized in human society 
I refer above to his discussion of men in 'the early stages of human development ' but 
the point is even clearer in Weber's studies of the economic ethics of the world 
religions. In his contrast between the rationalizing development of Western 
civilization and the ossification and stagnation of the East Weber clearly conceives 
the development of the West as a process of realization of the essence of man. In 
this. Sense the development of the West has 'universal significance and value'. (Prot. 
Ethic, p.13) The teleological character of this conception is evident.
The second aspect of Yfeber's position to be considered here concerns the 
attempted combination of a.theoretical humanism with its clear individualistic
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implications on the one hand and a conception of social action on the other.
In his definition of sociology Weber defines social action as follows:
'Action is social in so far as, by virtue of the subjective meaning atteheed to
't? <
it by the acting individual (or individuals), it takes account of the behavioux’ 
of others and is thereby oriented in its course, ’ (ibid.p,88)
In fact, of course, it is not the behaviour but the action of others that is
important here: action is social when and in so far as it takes account of the
action of others. The conceptualization of social action and of certain types of
economic action takes us beyond the level of the individual actor. The very
definition of particular forms of social and of economic action involves a necessary
reference to the actions of others. It might seem that this poses a problem for
Weber's theory since he tells us:
\
'It is a monstrous misunderstanding to think that an ,'individualistic,, method 
should involve what is in any^senle^an■individualistic system of values,'
'(ibid, p.107)
A socialistic economy with socialistic values must nevertheless be understood in
individualistic terms. But whether we are concerned with a socialistic or another 
0type of economy Wel^r’s theory requires that some value or values be shared. It is 
difficult to see how the appearance of shared values could be accounted for in an 
individualistic theory except as an accidental and contingent occurrence.
But the problem with regard to the conceptualization of XKg social and 
economic action in Weber's theory goes much deeper. The existence of what Weber 
regards as theoretically the most signiEicant types of social and economic action 
requires not only that a plurality of actox’s share similar values but also that 
their actions be socially structured and organized. Perhaps the clearest example 
of this point is given in Weber's discussion of the conditions of existence of 
modern capitalistic economic action in his General Introduction to the sei’ies of 
studies on the Economic Ethics of World Religions (published in English as the 
Introduction to The Protestant Ethic) but the same type of problem would arise if we 
were to consider the major forms of political action. To say that a state exists 
is to say:
'that there is or has been a probability that on the basis of certain kinds of 
known subjective attitude of certain individuals there will resxilt in the... 
average sense a certain specific type of action. ' (ibid., p. 119)
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The existence of each of the major types of polilical domination therefore implies 
a reference to a certain social distribution of the approprii te subjective attitudes 
among certain individuals. The problem here concerns how the distribution of 
appropriate subjective attitudes among a plurality of individuals is to be reconciled 
with the individualism of Yfeber's theory of action.
To return to the case of modem capitalism Weber tells us that rational 
capitalistic economic action involves calculations in terms of capital;
'all that matters is that an actual adaptation of economic action to a 
| comparison of money income with money expenses takes place, no matter how 
primitive the form,’ (Prot.Ethic,p.19)
Rational capitalistic economic action presupposes the existence of money; its conditioi 
of existence cannot, then, be defined in individualistic terms. But for modern
rational capitalism a great deal more is required: the rational capitalistic 
organization of formally free labour^ the separation of business from the household; 
rational book-keeping; and last but not least rational structures of law and 
administration:
'For modern rational capitalism has need, not only of the technical means 
of production, but of a calculable legal system and of administration in terms 
of formal rules. Without it ... ^there can be] no rational enterprise under 
individual initiative, with fixed~capital and certainty of calculations. •’
(ibid, p,25)
In short,, modern rational capitalistic economic action presupposes what Weber calls 
, t'the spbific and peculiar rationalism of Western culture' and, above all, its 
realization in the rational structures of law and administration and in 'the ability 
and disposition of men to adapt certain, types of practical rational conduct,' (ibid.pB 
The implication is clear: the existence of the most rational form of economic 
action presupposes the realization of a rationality in the forms of organization 
of society itself. Rational economic action on the part of the individual is possible 
only on condition of the rationalization of his world, Rationality at the level of th 
individual is a function of the supra-individual level of society. In this case the 
functioning of Weber's postulated mechanism of realization of ideas, namely, the 
human individual, is possible only on condition of the functioning of some supra- 
individual mechanism of realization of ideas. Thus the whole Weberian theory of
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is reducible to the actions of individuals, that ’action .-. exists only as the
behaviour of one or more individual human beings. ’ (Theory, p.101) The realisation
of the rathp^al essence of man in modern Western civilization is also the
subordination of man to a*supra-individual rationality in which the world becomes a
meaningless sphere of merely instrumental rationality:
'For the last stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly said: 
specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines 
that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved. 1 (Prot.
Ethi£, p.182)
Although the incoherence of Webr’s individualistic conception of social and
economic action is most apparent in respect of his conception of rational economic
action it is clear that precisely similar conclusions could be reached with regard
16to the other forms of social and economic action. In particular, if rational 
economic action presupposes the rationalization of the world then other forms of 
economic action involve the realization of those spiritual obstacles to the 
develppment of rationality which ’have in the past bee^n among the most important 
formative influences on conduct. ' (Prot.Ethic, p.27)
(c) Theoretical Anti-humanism; the case of Parsons 
<
If humanist forms of the rationalist conception of action locate the primary 
mechanism of the realization of ideas in the will and consciousness of the human 
individual the anti-humanisms subordinate the action of the individual to the 
functioning of a supra-individual mechanism of realization. Where theoretical 
humanism falls into incoherence in its attempt to conceptualize social and economic 
action the anti-humanist forms of the rationalist conception of action have at least 
the merit of being able to avoid that particular problem. Since there is no 
necessity for social life to be reduced to the action of individuals there is no; 
necessary contradiction between an individualistic conception of action and the 
supra-individual reference involved in the conceptualization of social action. The 
more general problems of the rationalist conception .of action remain; the distinction 
between idea and its idealization or expression imposes the necessity for a speculative 
mode of ’reading’ of the forms of social life, of social actions and of expressive 
symbols for the 'ideas ’ that are assumed to underlie them, and the supra-individual
IS
mechanism of realisation remains subject to the double determination of the natural 
on the one hand and the ideal on the other.
A relatively undeve.yped form of this position is involved in the substantive 
view of the economy elaborated by Polanyi and his associates but Parsons is 
undoubtedly its most rigorous exponent in the contemporary social sciences. In spite 
of his insistence on the importance of the 'subjective point of view' Parsons devotes 
little attention to the problems of the 'reading' or 'interpretation' of action 
involved in his conception of social life. Butf at least in his post-war writings, 
he does elaborate a complex and sophisticated conception of the mechanism of 
realization of ideas. It is this aspect of his work that I consider here. Parsons 
proposes a form of the rationalist conception of action in which ideas are thought to 
be realized in and through the articulation of cultural, social and personality 
systems on to human biological organisms. The three systems are independent and 
interpenetrating and none can exist without the other two. In particular there can be 
no personality or social system without a cultural system. Culture, in Parsons' 
sense, consists of systems of ideas and beliefs, systems of expressive symbols and 
systems of value-orientations. Elements of the cultural system may be institution­
alized in social systems and internalized in personalities and some elements will be 
involved in the definitions of the goals of individual or collective actors.
Any mechanism of realization of ideas in nature must function by means of 
natural processes. In Parsons'theory all-action involves on the one hand an 
orientation to the attainment of specific ends and on the other the expenditure 
of energ3r which has its source in the energy potential of the physiological organism. 
In action 'ideas ' in the form of actor's ' conceptions and orientations must be 
articulated on to the sources of energy of physiological organisms in such a way that
jthe behaviour organisms is a function of these 'ideas'. The structure of human
physiological organisms must therefox’e be such as to allow for its expenditure of
energy to be governed by its conceptions:
'In addition to the specific viscerogenic needs and the wider discrimination
between gx'atification and deprivation, the hxunnn organism has a constitutional
capacity to x'eact to objects, especially other human beings, without the
specific content ox1 foi-m. of the reaction being in any way physiologically given. •
iff. G. T.A7 , p, XO'" enipliasis” adde
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The human organism has an innate capacity to act 'in terms of' ideas.
In The Structure of Social Action ’normative orientation' occupies a position of
unique importance? since it is both an demerit of action that is irreducible to the
other elements and an element whose intervention is decisive whenever action is not
uniquely determined by the other elements. In Parsons' later work the decisive and
primary importance of value-orientations in action is retained at least with regard
to all levels of action above the merely physiolog‘ica.1. Action is a function of
motivational orientation^ on the one hand and of value-oi’ientation on the other. One
provides the energy for action and the other provides its control. The energy for
action is derived from the gratification structure of the organism and the direction
or objective of action is given by its orientations. Because of the necessary
articulation of orientation on^the gratification structure of the organism it
follows that orientation must always involve both cognitive and cathectic modes.
'One cannot "orient" without discriminating objects, one cannot discriminate 
an object without its arousing some interest either by virtue of its intrinsic 
gratificatory significance, or by virtue of its relationships to other objects. 
Similarly, one cannot make a choice without "cognizing" the alternatives; and alsc 
one cannot select except on the basis of the cathectic interest aroused by the 
alternatives,' (ibid. p.6S)
In addition, since the situation of action and gratification structure do not in
general uniquely determine action there must be a comparison of the gratification-
deprivation balance presented by possible alternative courses of action and an
orientation to 'ideas', in the shape of standards of value-orientation, which is
decisive in the choice among these alternatives.
Although the ultimate source of energy is to be found in the physiological
organism the combination of motivational-orientation with value-orientation is a
necessa.ry feature of all actors, of human individuals and of collectivities. Thus,
for Parsons, collectivities, including social systems and their functional sub-systems
must be characterized by some equivalent to the gratification structure of the
physiological organism and by a recognition structure in the sense of a capacity
17for cognitive orientation toward the situation of action. The gratification 
structure of the actor is implicated in the forms of his cognition since objects are 
discriminated by virtue of their cathectic significance. There is’therefore a double
20
articulation of the level of ideas and the level of the natural or social: the
■» <- 'P
organization of ideas is in part a function of a grat^fic^ation structure which provides
the source, of energy in action and the expenditure of energy in action is a function of
' *
dvi organization of ideas in the orientations of the actor. A major source of inconsistenc 
and incompleteness in the cultural system is therefore to be found in the exigencies 
of the internalization of culture in personaLlities and its institutionalization 
in social systems.
Action is organized into systems which are defined either at the level of the 
individual organism (the personality system) or at the level of the interaction of two 
or more actors (the social system). Each type of system is dependent on the other 
and.bjafch are dependent on the existence of a cultural system on the one hand and 
physiological organisms on the other. Elements of the cultural system may be 
internalized in personalities in the form of a relatively stable system of
orientations articulated on to the gratification structure of individuals and they 
may be institutionalized in social systems in the form of systems of rules and 
role-expectations, collectivities and social institutions.
Now, although they are interdependent and interpenetrating, cultural, social and
personality systems must each be conceived as relatively autonomous from the other two:
as systems they each have their own functional exigencies and conditions of existence.
Thus, personality and social systems cannot be treat.ed as mere emanations of ideas
since they are also subject to determinate conditions of existence of systems. For
example, a social system consists of the relatively stable interactions of the
incumbents of socially organized roles. The existence of the system therefore 
w
depends olf the performance of its roles (or at least of a high proportion of them) and 
this implies a fundamental set of problems of allocation: the system must 
allocate human capacities and resources among tasks by assigning individuals to 
roles; it must allocate the facilities necessary for the performance of roles 
(including both physical objects on the one hand and rights and obligations on the 
other), and it must allocate the rewards necessary to the maintencance of an Kppxopriaj 
appropriate pattern of motivation among role-incumbents. - if need-dispositions are 
not gratified then the performance of role-incumbents may be impaired.If it fails 
to resolve its problems of allocation to a satisfactory degree then role-performance
will be unable to continue and the social system will not survive. Similarly, social
vXw (. [ L U-V*
systems must achieve’’adequate solutions to their other iundarment-ad. problems and
personality systems must resolve theirs if they are to continue in existence.
'
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Finally, the very definition and classification of the functional prerequisites of 
the three types of system itself presupposes their relative autonomy and independence 
as systems:
’action systems are structured about three:integrative foci, the individual 
actor, the interactive system, and a system of cultural patterning. Each implies 
the others and therefore the variability of any one is limited by its 
compatibility with the minimum conditions of functioning of the other two, ’
(SS p.2? emphasis added)
Thus, in Parsons' theory, social and personality systems as mechanisms of-the 
realization of ideas are subject to the type of double determination indicated at 
the beginning of this Part of the paper. On the one hand they have determinate 
functional exigencies as systems and if they fail to achieve a satisfactory resolution 
of the fundamental systems problems then they cannot survive. On the other hand the 
role of ideas in action is primary: if the situation of action or the physiological 
structure of the organism do not completely determine action then the orientation of 
the action is decisive. This double determination is of fundamental importance for
the formation of the major substantive concepts of Parsons' sociological theory,
\
But, as Stephen Savage and I have shown elsewhere,” the conception of the relative 
autonomy of the sultural, social and personality systems is incompatible with the 
primacy of ideas in Parsons 1 concept of action. Systems of action cannot be 
conceived as truly autonomous on the one hand and as constrained by the immanent 
necessity to realize ideas on the other. Parsons' theory is impossible without the 
conjunction of the concept of action on the one hand and the concepts of autonomous 
systems of action on the other1, and it is logically incoherent as a theory because 
of their conjunction.
In his most recent work Parsons has tended to conceive the personality, social 
and cultural systems in a different fashion both as the functional subsystems of the 
General System of Action and as organized into a definite hierarchy of controlling 
and conditioning elements. The effect, of these changes is to overcome, at least in 
patt, the incompatibility of the concepts'of the systems and the primacy of ideas in
action by denegating both the autonomy of the systems and the specificity of
' 'r ■
their functional exigencies. The cultural, personality and social systems no
O
longer appear as the intersependent and irreducible systems which occuppy a 
central place in much of Parsons’ substantive theory; they are now merely 
different aspects of the realisation of ultimate reality in the' realm of nature. 
In this latest position the three levels of action occupy intenjiediate positions 
between the ultimate controlling elements (called ’ultimate reality’) and the 
ultimate conditions of action in the physical and organic environment. Cultural 
social and personality systems are effects of the intervention of ultimate
world of nature. These changes may well avoid the incoherence
entailed in Parsons' major substantive theory since they postulate an immanent 
capacity in nature, i.e., in the human organism as the highest product of 
biological evolution, to respond to the call of ultimate reality but, as we 
shall see, they do not escape the more general problems and the ultimate 
incoherence of the rationalist conception of action.
(d) The Rationalist Conception of Action, II
So far I have merely considered certain problems that arise within two 
particular cases of the rationalist conception of action. But there are two 
more general problems which are sufficient to ensure that any form of the 
rationalist conception of action must be either vacuous or incoherent. Consider 
first the implications of the postulate of a mechanism of realization of ideas 
for the conceptualization of the realm of nature. We have seen that nature, 
or some part of it, must be subject to a double determination. The mechanism 
of realization must be constrained to confoini^ to the primacy of ideas and it 
must be implicated in processes in nature; it is subject to ideal constraints 
on the one hand and to natural constraints on the other. For example, Weber's 
actor is a rational being acting in accordance v/ith meanings and values and it 
is a human biological organism subject to physical, biological and psychological 
determinations. Similarly in Parsons' theory of the systems of action
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the personality and Social systems are the means of realization of ideas through 
internalization institutionalization and action to realize goals and they
' js ‘ T~
are subject to determinate functional exigencies as systems. In his most recent 
woik the General System of Action is subject to dKtsrra:ijiK.tis the constraints of 
ultimate reality on the one hand and of the physical and organic environment on 
the other. If this double determination of the mechanism of action is not to 
involve the rationalist conception in an immediate contradiction then it is
necessary to suppose an immanent capacity for the order of nature to correspond
to the order of ideas; it is necessary to suppose a pre-established harmony '
between the order of ideas and the order of nature. Nature has a pre-given
capacity to realize ideas and some such capacity must be postulated as the
fundamental condition of existence of any rationalist mechanism of action. Nature
must therefore be conceived as endowed with a purpose, namely, to realize its
capacity to realize ideas, for example, through the process of natural evolution.
The price of avoiding immediate contradiction in the notion of the double
deteimination of the mechanism of action is the conception of nature as subject
21to a universal teleology.
The second problem concerns the ideas themselves and their relation to the
mechanism of their realization. Any form of the rationalist conception of action 
postulates first an ideal totality, a system of ideas, ultimate values, meanings, 
rules, or whatever, and some process of realization of those ideas. Ideas 
govern action in the sense that actions must be consistent with the system of 
ideas in question. Action that fails to conform is either precluded by the 
ideas or else it is a mistake, i.e., not a product of the ideas at all. Whatever 
particular process of realization may be postulated its functioning must be somehow 
constrained to conform to the prior determination of the ideal totality. So far so 
good. Now what happens if elements of the ideal totality,, say two ultimate values or 
two rules, conflict and therefore, entail conflicting forms of action? The authors of 
Toward a General Theory of Action, for example, tell us:
Very close appioximations to complete consistency in the patterns of culture 
are practically never to be found'in large complex social systems.1 (p,22)
Whac are the effects of inconsistency for the conceptualization of action?
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let us suppose that in a given situation one rule or ultimate value entails
<3
Action A and that the other entails Action B, Since A and B conflict and we are
concerned 'with a’ngiven situation of action it is impossible for both A and B to appear
*
in that situation. The problem here is that if one, say Action A, appears then its 
appearance cannot be accounted for by reference to its rule or ultimate value alone, 
because some further explanation is required to explain why that rule or value is 
realized and not the other, conflicting, rule or value. Thus if inconsistency is 
possible within the ideal totality which is alleged to govern action then some 
further mechanism must be called in to account for the realization of one of the 
conflicting ideas in a given situation and not the other. The rationalist conception 
of action must either concede that 3£SiX&i£ ideas govern action only by courtesy of some 
other mechanism, that is, that they do not govern action at all, or else it must 
adopt the relativistic tactic which denies that contradiction within the ideal totalit; 
can arise at all.
We have seen that the possibility of logical inconsistency is clearly recognized 
in Parsons ' theory of action. Ideas, in this case value-orientations, have a certain 
primacy in the theory of action in that they are decisive whenever the other 
elements (situation, motivational orientation, etc,) do not completely determine
; Ju­nction. In effect, value-orijtentations must be called in to account for action that
cannot be accounted for as the resultant of the other elements. If conflict at the
level of value-orientations is possible then the realization of one value-orientation
rather than another cannot be accounted for by reference to the other elements of
action since value-orientation is pertinent only when the effect of those other
elements is indeterminate. In the event of inconsistency in the cultural system .
action would seem to be theoretically indeterminate, that is to say, inexplicable in
terms of Parsonian theoi'y. Since neither value-orientations nor the remaining element
of action suffice to achieve theoretical determinacy the only possible recourse for
Parsons is to call on ultimate reality itself to ensui’e that one value-orientation
rather than another is realized in any determinate situation of action. But, since,
ultimate reality is specifically defined by Parsons as lying beyond the realm of
✓
scientific knowledge, theoretical indeterminacy cannot be overcome by calling on 
ultimate reality to do its turn.
As an example of the relativistic manoeuvre, namely, the effective denial
of logical inconsistency, consider the writings of Peter Winch, In The Idea of a
Social Science W^nch argues that human conduct' is a matter of the following of rules.
Now, it is clear that the'’coexistence of inconsistent rules within a given system of
rules must introduce an element of indeterminacy into Winch's system unless they are
subsumed under the primacy of a more general rule which acts so as to prevent
inconsistency from arising. Winch invokes precisely this possibility in "Understandin
a Primitive Societyu where he argues that:
'many contradictions we might expect to appear in fact do not in the context 
of Zanda thought, where provision is made for avoiding them. ' (p.91 emphasis adde
Inconsistencies ai'e avoided by subordinating apparently conflicting rules to a
super-rule which specifies the conditions in which each rule may be called upon to
take effect. This device, however, does not entirely overcome the problem for there
inremains the possibility that what is ^consistent to us is consistent to the 
society in question:
'the forms in which ratiiomility expresses itself in the culture of a human 
society cannot be elucidated simply in terms of the logical coherence of the 
rules according to which activities are carried out in that society. Pox' . , . 
there comes a point whei'e we ai’e not even in a position to determine what is and 
what is not coherent in such a content of rules, without raising questions about 
the point which following those rules has in that society. T(p,93 emphasis added)
So much fox* the possibility of inconsistency. But this x’elativistic dissolution
of the notion of logical cohei’ence merely gives rise to another problem. If conduct
never deviates from the super-rule whicli avoids conti-adiction then the notion of
rule-governed conduct is simply vacuous because to specify the super-rule is merely
to desci’ibe whatever conduct takes place. Winch avoids that result by means of the
notion of 'mistake': 'the notion of following a rule is logically inseparable from
the notion of making a mistake.1 (The Idea of a Social Science, p.32) But if
mistakes are conceivable then the situation is again indeterminate: the rule is
followed in all cases KK&H except those in which it^s not followed. Thus Winch's
relativistic conception of action is either vacuous or theoretically indeterminate,’
The rationalist conception of action is either vacuous or indeterminate. It can
avoid those alternatives only by invoking some other, non-rationalist, mechanism to
account for action, that is, it can avoid them only at the cost of theoretical
Part 2 Teleology '
The problem of teleology can now be dealt with without difficulty, partly because 
its basic features have been touched on in a different context in Part 1 of this paper 
and partly because several particular teleologies are discussed in other papers in 
this seminar. I propose a general concept of teleology in the form of a minimal 
definition which subs&umes both those positions v/hich postulate a determinate 
immanent developmental tendency, such as Parsons 1 ’rationalization ' and 'structural 
differentiation', and those apparently more limited positions v/hich merely propose 
a principle of hierarchy, such as 'development', ’modernization*, 
'Gem^einshcaft-Gesellschaft', etc , in terms of which societal differences may be 
conceived. In this second case the teleological postulate need involve no necessary 
process of realization of the forms in the hierarchy. I argue that teleological 
theories must be confronted by an irresolvable problem of double determination similar 
to that identified above with respect to the rationalist conception of action, and I 
show that this suffices to establish the incoherence of teleology.
I take as the minimal definition of teleology the postulate of a definite 
hierarchy of forms which are or may be realized in a temporal process so that the 
realization of the higher forms is conditional on the prior realization of the lower 
forms. It should be noted that while, on this minimal definition, teleologies may 
well postulate a necessary process of realization of the forms in the hierarchy, it 
■is possible for them not to do so. The crucial feature of the teleological 
postulate is not historical necessity but rather the conceptualization of the distinct 
forms as the realization or expression of their position in the hierarchy of forms. 
Teleology entails necessity only in the limited sense that the existence of any one 
form requires that the lower forms must have existed. It is clear that the 
rationalist conception of action is teleological in this sense, since any given 
action involves a hierarchy of at least two distinct forms, namely, the starting 
point and the goal to be realized in action, with possibly several intermediate' 
stages. While that teleology is ubiquitous in sociology another quite distinct type 
of teleology is nonnally present in sociolofical attempts to conceptualize social 
and economic change. For example, sociological theories of industrialization,
modernization or development involve teleologies which are, in general, irreducible
■* 15 $to the teleology of action. Much of sociology therefore' characterized by two 
teleologies: a teleolpgica^ conception of action and a more general teleology of 
history. Thus, Weber and Parsons elaborate both a rationalist conception of action 
and a further teleology in the processes of rationalization, structural differentiatio: 
and increasing adaptive capacity.
To postulate any form of teleology is- to postulate a principle of ranking in
tents of which the forms in the hierarchy may be ordered. The principle itself may
take many forms. It may take the form of an ideal, say, of the goal or purpose
of historical development that is postulated in the idealist philosophies of
history. For example, Kant in his "idea for a Universal History" postulates a
purpose in ’Nature’s secret plan’ which is to bring about the full realization of
human capacities in the process of history, and it is well kn^own that Hegel conceives
of history as a process of realization of the Idea. But the principle of teleology
need not be represented in the form of an ideal. Many teleological versions of
-15arxism propose a principle of ranking in terms of the articulation of relations and
forces of production. In its simplest forms this involves an immanent tendency of the
forces of production to expand subject only to temporary constraints imposed from
time to time by the relations of production. History is therefore a process of
expansion of productive forces with occasional interruptions where the class struggle
succeeds in transforming relations of production so as to allow further expansion of 
22productive forces. These teleological distortions of.Marxist theory have been 
criticized by Paul Hirst and me in Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production. A different 
type of example which is particularly prevalent in sociology is provided by those 
teleologies which light upon some alleged feature of the present as their ranking 
principle: for example, the teleologies of modernization, development or 
industrialization, the dichotomies of Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft, or of the pattern- 
variables and the continua of rationalization or structural differentiation in which 
societies are ranked according- to their divergence from the alleged featured of 
'modem society', ’industrial society', 'structurally HSXSSK’iSKX differentiated 
society', or whatever. Teleological conceptions of this kind play a crucial role 
in Parsons' and Weber's theories of the economy and they may also be found in 
Polanyi’s treatment of the differences between market and 'non-market economies.
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But, if it is hardly necessary to demonstrate the ubiquity of teleological 
conceptions in sociological theories of the economy, in much of what passes for 
Marxism and in economic aifthropology, it is necessary to pose the question of v/hat, 
to put it bluntly, is wrong with teleology. Is there any reason why social and 
economic change should not be conceptualized in teleological terms? The association 
of teleology with the idealist philosophies of history and with religion is, of 
course^well known. But, whilst that association may lead us to view with some 
suspicion those conceptions which postulate a historical necessity or an explicit 
ideal princip3.e of hierarchy, it cannot provide sufficient grounds for dismissing 
all. teleologies - in the sense of my minimal definition - out of hand.
Accordingly, rather than dwell on its idealist and religious
affinities, I propose to examine the conceptual structure of teleology and its
theoretical effects. It will be conventient for this purpose to distinguish between
a universal and a partial teleology. A universal teleology subsumes, the world and
all its pai’ts; it encompasses everything that exists. Hegel’s philosophy is perhaps
the best known example. A partial teleology on the other hand subsumes a part of the
23world only, such as natural evolution or human history or even just the process of 
modernization. A universal teleology will, of course, include many partial 
teleologies but these appear merely as different aspects of the one universal 
teleology. I shall concentrate here on partial teleologies because these are by 
far the most, prevalent form. We shall see that the conceptual structure of a 
partial teleology entails a necessary inconsistency whether.or not it postulates 
any historical necessity. A uhivei^l teleology, however, cannot avoid the postulate 
of historical necessity; its principle of hierarchy is also a principle of movement. 
Such a ‘position may well be consistent but, like relativistic forms of the 
rationalist conception of action, it is consistent only if it is also vacuous.
Any partial teleology must confront one of the major problems of the 
rationalist conception of action discussed in Part 1. On the one hand it conceives 
of a determinate hierarchy of forms such that each form is defined by its position in 
the hierarchy. The form is the realization or expression of its place in the hierarch 
of forms. On the other hand, as part of the world, each form is subject
to determinate real conditions of existence. The conceptual structure of partial
teleology reproduces the problem of double determination characteristic of the
rationalist conception of action. In the social sciences this situation is further
complicated by tlie ubiquity of the rationalist conception of action. In effect a
historical teleology is compoxmded with a teleolog3r of action so that we have three
distinct levels of determination: a particular natural process or situation is
subject to the determination of its natural conditions of existence, it serves to
realize an idea and it expresses a position in a hierarchy of historical forms. For
ease of exposition it will be convenient to overlook the particular difficulties
of the rationalist conception of action and to contrast determination 2$X by the
teleology of history on the one hand with the determination of action and of nature
on the other. It should be clear that the consistency or otherwise of partial
teleology does not depend on taking this further complication into account. The
fundamental problem of the double determination postulated by the partial teleologies
and by the rationalist conception of action is that the two determinations can be
reconciled only by the further postulate of a pre-given harmony between them.
Otherwise they will in general be inconsistent and incompatible. A partial teleology
must therefore either presuppose a universal "teleology or lapse into inconsistency.
These points- may be illustrated by reference to the works, of Parsons and Weber.
The teJplogical character of their sociological theories and, in particular^ of th^s-
conception of the economy have been shown in other papers in this seminar and I need
not repeat those arguments here. Consider first the work of Parsons. In The Social .
System, Toward a General Theory of Action, and in much of his subsequent work Parsons
has elaborated a theory of three or four relatively autonomous systems of action, each
with its own determinate functional prerequisites, its conditions of existence as a
system. A society, as a social system, is therefore confronted bj*’ four major tj^pes
of functional problems the resolution of which at some level of adequacy is 
r-
indispejbible for the continued existence of the system. But, in addition to the
determination of social systems according to their functional.conditions of existence
Parsons proposes an immanent directional tendency or tendencies in the form of
rationalization and structural differentiation. (The relation between these
,24tendencies does not concern us here.) Let us take the case of structural 
differentiation. The effect of postulating such an immanent tendency is to subject
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any society to a double determination by its conditions of existence on the one 
hand and by its^immanent tendency on the other. Change in the society is a function 
of changes in its conditions of existence and it is a function of this immanent
tendency. The conflict between these two determinations is clearly demonstrated in 
Savage’s paper: societies are conceived as determinate systems of action with 
determinate structural forms and subject to determinate conditions of existence and 
they are also conceived in terms of their difference from a structurally 
differentiated society. In effect, for Parsons, modem differentiated societies
are conceived in one way and the rest are conceived in the other. Less differentiated 
societies are conceived primarily as less differentiated and not according to then- 
structural forms and functional exigencies as systems. This position is clearly
foi’mulated in Economy and Society:
*We hold that our generalized theoretical scheme, for the analysis of a society 
and of the economy as one of its subsystems, is not bound to any particular 
structural type of society or economy. The analytical elements ... are 
imdistinguisliable as elements in any society, indeed in any social system.
These analytical elements are not, however, equally closely related to the 
concrete structure of collectivities and roles in all societies. In general 
' our functional subsystem categories correspond more closely to organizationally 
differentiated sectors of the social structure as the society approaches 
greater structural differentiation. But even here the correspondence is only 
approximate. Furthermore, the categories of economic .theory apply more directly 
to the concrete social structure of a differentiated society and its pz'ocesses 
as adaptive or economic values approach greater primacy over others. Only in 
societies which meet both these cx-iteria do many of the more technical parts of 
economic theory apply directly to empirical analysis, e.g., in the analysis of 
price detex'minations in specific markets. 1 (pp. 83-84 emphasis added)
Societies may therefore be conceived in terms of the degree to which they realize
the elements of *oux* generalized theoi'etical scheme'. The mofre differentiated may be
analyzed in terms of our scheme.and the less differentiated in terms of their distance 
from it. In this conception Parsons ' teleological principle is accorded primacy over
the conception of a society as a determinate social system with determinate systemA
exigencies. An equivalent teleological principle is invoked in Parsons ’ more X’ecent 
treatment of 'evolutionary universals' and his rank ordering of primitive, 
intermediate and modern societies. Indeed, in '’Evolutionary Universals in Society
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Parsons argues for an essential continuity between organic and cultural evolution.
The 'new ^elativjLty ' proposed in that paper assumes that:
fthe watershed between sub-human and human does not mark a cessation XH of 
developmental change, but rather a stage in a long process that begins with many 
pre-human phases and continues through that watershed into our own time, and 
beyond. Granting a wide range of variability XH of types at all stages, it 
assumes that levels of evolutionary advancement may be empirically specified 
for the human as well as the pre-human phases.1 (p.491)
Here societal evolution is subsumed under a more general teleological process. The
development of the human brain at the highest level of natural evolution provides
the organic foundation of culture in the human capacity to learn and manipulate
symbols. Thereafter culture takes over: 'cultural innovations, especially definitions
of what man's life ought to be, replace Darwinian variations in genetic constitution.'
(ibid.pp.494-5) The highest level of natural evolution establishes the conditions
for 'ultimate reality' to intervenpe directly in the realm of nature through.the
cybernetic hierarchy of cultural, social and personality systems which it controls.
In taking these positions Parsons effectively displaces the partial teleology of
rationalisation and structural differentiation in favour of a universal teleology
of nature. * ^
l
The case of Weber appears to be more complex for two reasons. One is that
he explicitly repudiates the notion of a necessary developmental tendency in history.
Whereas Parsons postulates an immanent tendency in the process of rationalisation and
Structural differentiation Weber appears not to do so. For example in the Introductior
to his studies on the Economic Ethics of the World Religions Weber poses the problem
of the development of the West as follows: "-
'A product of modem European civilisation, studying any problem of universal 
history, is bound to ask himself to what combinations of circumstances the fact 
should be attributed that in Western civilization, and in Western civilization 
only, cultural phenomena have appeared which (as we like to think) lie in a line 
of development having universal significance and value. ' (Prot.Ethic, p.13)
In this paragraph, we find a hierarchical principle of order with respect to social and
cultural forms, namely, 'a line of development*, together with the proposal that
movement through that hierarchy be accounted for by reference.to 'a combination of
circumstances'. We have seen in Part 1 that Weber's 'line of development* may be
conceived as the realisation of the rational essence of man - hence its 'universal '
significance and value'. Weber's position represents a teleology in the sense of 
the minimal def-i^ion proposed above. The present, in the shape of modern rational
* A
capitalism, provides a principle of the ranking of all other societiesand distinct 
social and cultural forms are conceived as the realization or expression of their 
position in the.hierarchy of forms established by that principle, In this respect 
Weber's theory of the rationalization of the West epitomizes the structure of those 
sociological theories of development, modernization, or whatever, v/hich on the one 
hand rank social forms according to one or more dichotomies or continua and on the 
other appear to pose the problem of movement along the hierarchy of forms in terms of 
'a combination of circumstances'.
The second complication is that Weber, in line with his theoretical
individualism, fails to elaborate a rigorous conception of the structures and
conditions of existence of societies and social systems. In this respect too Weber
epitomizes much of sociological theory. The effect of this failure to conceptualize
the conditions of existence of determinate social forms is to obscure the problem
of double determination which appears so clearly in Parsons ' work. Social forms are
ranked according to their position in the postulated hierarchy but the question of
their conditions of existence appears not to arise. However, the fact that the
/
teleological problem of double determination does not appear explicitly in the text 
does notenable these minimal teleologies■to avoid inconsistency in their concepts.
The issue may be ignored in these positions but it does not thereby cease to exist.
We have seen that, bn Weber's theory, the existence of the most rational form of 
economic action presupposes the realization of a rationality in the forms of 
organization of society itself. Rational economic action on the part of the 
individual presupposes the rationalization of his world. Thus Weber's whole theory 
of modern rational capitalism is incompatible with his insistence that the social 
world is reducibe to the actions of individuals. But, if modern Western 
civilization is conceived as the realization of an essentially spiritual rationality, 
then other socidl forms may be conceptualized in terms of their divergence from the 
embodiment of rationality, that is, as the embodiment of those 'magical and religious 
forces, and the ethical ideals based upon them. ’ (ibid, p.27) which Weber conceives
as the major spiritual obstacles to the development of rationality. Consider, to take
just one example Weber's explanation of why capitalism failed to develop in Chinat
£>
'the varied conditions which externally favoured the origin of capitalism in
China did not suffice to create it . . . , Many of the cii’cumstances which could
or had to hinder.capitalism in China similarly existed in the Occident and
assumed definite shape in the period of modern capitalism ... , Circumstances
which are usually considered to have been obstacles to capitalistic development
in the Occident had not existed for thousands of years in China. ' (The Religion
of China p.248-9T "
Weber therefore concludes that 'external1, that is, non-spiritual, conditions have
not proved decisive obstacles in the development of capitalism in China. What
remains, of course, is the Chinese 'ethos' or 'mentality* and the 'practical attitude
toward the world1 based upon them. Whilst these must be considered in relation to
economic and political realities, nevertheless:
'in view of their autonomous laws, one can hardly fail to ascribe to these 
attitudes effects strongly counteractive to capitalist development. ' (ibid.p.249)
There we have it. In spite of his talk about the 'combination of circumstances'
responsible for the unique development of the West Weber discovers, to nobody's very
great surprise, that the decisive obstacle~to the rationalization of the East lies in
its failure to embody the essential rationality of the West, Modern rational
capd-talism developed in the West because it embodied the spirit of modern rational
capitalism and it failed to develop in the East because the East embodied a spirit
alien to that of modem rational capitalism.
Thus the fundamental condition of existence of modemi rational capitalism is
precisely the spirit of capitalism which it is alleged to embody, and the realization
of that spirit in turn presupposes, as we saw in Part 1, the general rationalization
of the world. Other social and material conditions of existence may be mentioned by
Weber but their significance is ignored. Capitalism requires the spirit of capitalisn
and the more general rationalization of the world. Other conditions of existence of
capitalism are either reduced to the level of expressions of ration&lity - the
rational organization of formally free labour, rational book-keeping, rational systems
of law and admins itration - or they are ignored. Weber's myth of the putter-out and
the spirit of capitalism illustrates this last point perfectly. Once upon a time in
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the Continental textile ’industry things were organized in a traditionalistic
•m
fashion. We are asked to*consider:
'the spirit which animated the entrepeneur: the traditional manner of life, 
the traditional rate of profit, the traditional amount of work; the 
traditional manner of regulating the relationships with labour, and the 
essentially traditional circle of customers and the manner of attracting 
new ones. ' (Protestant Ethic, p.67)
Then one day a process of rationalization set in with the result that the
'idyillic state jFof traditionalisnTj collapsed under the pressure of a bitter
competitive struggle'(ibid., p.GS). What had happened was this:
‘some young man from one of the putting-out families went out into the 
country, carefully chose weavers for his employ, greatly increased the 
rigour of his supervision of their work, and thus turned them from peasants 
into labourers.' (ibid., p.67)
At the same time he transformed his marketing techniques and 'began to introduce
the principle of low prices and large turnover' (ibid., p,68). What is significant 
in this stoi’y for Weber is that a new spirit : . .
'the spirit of modern capitalism had set to work . The question of the motive 
forces in the expansion of modern capitalism is not in the first instance 
a question of the origin of the capital sums which wez’e available for 
capitalistic uses, but, above all, of the development of the spirit of 
capitalism. Where it appears and is able to work itself out, it produces 
its own capital and monetary supplies as the means to its ends but the 
reverse is not true' (ibid., pp.68-9, emphasis added).
In the myth of the putter-out and the spirit of capitalism we must also suppose
that the new spirit produced its own raw materials and means of production and
a market for its product so that 'the principle of low prices and large turnover'
could be realized.. Where the spirit of capitalism is at work the appearance of
its social and material conditions is truly miraculous.
Finally, since Weber utterly fails to conceptualize the conditions of
existence of determinate social and economic forms but conceives them -rather
as the expression of a determinate spirit, the spirit of capitalism, the Chinese 
ethos, or whatever, his explanations of the movement from one form to another 
reduce to a single elementary form. Traditional economic life embodies the
spirit of tradition and modern capitalist economic life embodies the spirit of 
capitalism and a more general rationality. The movement from one economic form 
to the other is explained quite simply by the supersession of the one spirit by 
the other. From time to time in human history a new spirit and new ultimate 
values appear from nowhere and transform society in their image. No 'external', 
non-spiritual conditions can stand in their way.
| All partial teleologies must subject some part of the world, say, human 
society, to a double determination. On the one hand as part of the world any 
given human society, any given social or economic form, has determinate social and 
natul’al conditions of existence which must be secured if that society or form is 
to survive. On the other hand, in a partial teleology, it is the expression of 
a determinate inner principle, namely, its position in the teleological hierarchy 
of forms. This combination of two antithetical forms of determination in a 
partial teleology entails an inescapable logical inconsistency. The problems 
posed by the social and natural conditions of existence of societies and social 
and economic forms may be ignored, as they tend to be by Weber, but they do not 
thereby cease to exist.
Now, if partial teleology entails a necessary theoretical incoherence the 
only alternatives for social theory would seem to be either the development of 
non-teleological conceptions of distinct social and economic forms or the insertion 
of partial teleology into a wider universal teleology. Neither alternative is 
much favoured by sociological theory. Although, as we have seen, Parsons tends 
towards a universal teleology in his mpst recent work sociological theory is '*■ 
dominated by crude dichotomies and continua in its attempts to conceptualise 
social change. The beginnings of a non-teleological conception of distinct 
social forms may be found in the Marxist theory of modes of production - although 
it can hardly be denied that teleology abounds in much of what passes for Marxist 
theory. In the 1S57 Introduction to A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy Marx rejects the utility of the notion of ’production in general’ and 
proposes instead the concept of distinct and specific modes of production as 
determinate and theoretically specific structures. Apart from the theory of the
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capitalist mode of production in Capital there are brief indications of other 
possible modes of. production in the writings‘of Marx and Engels. Paul Hist and ^ 
X have developed non-teleological concepts of several non-capitalist modes of 
production and of the transition from one mode of production to another in 
Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production.
But what of the other alternative? If a partial teleology is necessarily 
incoherent that is precisely because its partial character entails the invocation 
of two antithetical forms of determination. A universal teleology avoids at 
least that problem. There can be no question of my attempting an.analysis of 
the theoretical structure of universal teleology in the present paper but the 
fundamental difficulty with universal teleology may be simply shown by considering 
first the structure of an elementary partial teleology. Consider a teleology of 
action involving just two states of the world, the stfarting-point of action 
and the state in which the goal of action is realized. In this case the goal 
of action provides a hierarchical principle of ranking of the two states. The 
two states of the world may be conceived as the non-realization and realization 
of the goal respectively. So far so good. But if we consider those phenomena 
not directly pertinent to the action in question it is clear that the teleological 
principle piovides no means of conceptualizing the specificity of those phenomena. 
They must be conceptualized, if they are conceptualized at all, in terms of the 
non-tele©logical determinations entailed in the concept of a partial teleology.
In a universal teleology non-teleological determinations cannot appear: there is 
a hieraichy .of forms and nothing else. Each state of the universe, and anything 
within it, is the expression of its position in the hierarchy. No other 
determinations are possible. Two consequences follow from this. First, the 
the hierarchical pz’inciple of a universal teleology is also the principle, the 
cause, of movement through the hierarchy, since no other determinations are 
possible. Secondly, the teleology provides no theoretical means of conceptualizing ' 
the specificity of phenomena. At any given position in the hierarchy all phenomena 
are equally the expressions of that position. All differences must therefore be 
’unreal’ with regard to the inner principle which all phenomena express. The
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result is that the specificity of phenomena has no theoretical foundation in the
teleology itself. Specificity may be retained, then, either by denying its
reality or else by positing it at the level of the teleological principle itself
so that every position in the hierarchy is defined as consisting of each and .
every one of the phenomena which are to be conceived as its expression. If
partial teleology offei's nothing but incoherence then a universal teleology can
offer nothing but a complete and exhaustive description of one hierarchical form 
25after another.
Conclusion
This paper has examined the conceptual structure of the rationalist conception 
of action, including theoretical humanism as a spHsiaixsass particular case of 
that conception, and of teleology. The rationalist conception of action was 
considered in Part 1, It postulates a realm of ideas, values, meanings, or 
whatever, a realm of nature and a mechanism of the realization of those ideas
t N-.
in nature, namely, human action. If the mechanism is defined at the level of the 
individual human subject then we have a theoretical humanism which conceives of 
the realization of ideas as a function of the will and' consciousness of the subject 
Otherwise the mechanism is defined at some supra-individual social level of 
determination and it subsumes the human individual to its functioning. But 
whatever particular mechanism may be postulated its effect is to define some 
portion of nature as the product of ideal, extra-natural determinations, as the ‘ 
social or cultural sphere in which phenomena may be objects of natural scientific 
investigation but must first and foremost be understood by reference to the ideas 
they may be alleged to express. I have shown that the rationalist conception of 
action is fundamentally and inescapably incoherent and that, in addition to this
general incoherence, the specifically humanist forms are subject to a further
&
inconsistency in their attemp^g to conceptualize those forms of action which 
involve some supra-individual or social .reference. Part 2 examined teleology
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defined-ilr. terms of the minimal postulate of a definite hierarchy of forms which
may be. realized in a’temporal process so that the realization of the higher forms
*
presupposes the prior realization of those lower in the hierarchy. The forms 
of teleology pertinent to the social sciences are partial teleologies in the 
sense that far from attempting to subsume the universe as a whole to their 
teleological principle they claim to subsume only part of the universe, namely, 
human society or particular social and economic forms. I have shown that all 
partial teleologies are necessarily incoherent and I have suggested that a 
universal teleology must be theoretically vacuous. I have not attempted to 
demonstrate that particular theoretical discourses are indeed dominated by the 
rationalist conception of action or to dsm establish their teleological character 
but I have taken the works of Weber and Parsons as particularly clear examples 
of these tendencies for the purposes of illustration. Since the rationalist
conception of action and.partial teleology are inescapably incoherent it follows 
that any social or other theory in which one or both of these positions plays a 
fundamental part must also be incoherent. To the extent that they depend on 
rationalist or teleological positions its demonstrations must be theoretically 
ineffective and its conclusions can have no rational or coherent foundation.
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Notes
I. See Hirst, ^9753, for a discussion of the limits and significance of 
DurIdaeini 's anti-humanism. *
2 I have examined the conceptual structure of this position with special 
reference to the^ production of theoretical discourse in the Introduction and 
chapter 7 of Hindess, 1976.
3. In his review of Anderson, 1974, Hirst proposes the term 'genealogy’ to 
refer to teleology in this minimal sense. (Hirst, 1975b)
4. This form of argument has been used by Paul Hirst and me to show that the 
academic social sciences cannot be scientific. See especially the Introduction 
and Conclusion to Hindess & Hirst, 1975.
5. 'The Cx'itique of Empiricism and the Analysis of Theoretical Discourse', 
chapter 7 of Hindess, 1976.
6. See note 5.
7. See Hindess & Hirst, 1975, for a critique of teleological distortions of 
Marxism,
8. cf.the discussion in Hirst, 1975, chapter 5.
9. e.g. the critiques of Douglas, 1967, and Wrong, 1961.
10. See Savage's paper for further analysis on this point.
II. This point is elaborated in the Introduction to Hindess,1976. It is this 
consequence of the rationalist conception of action that Lukacs attempts to 
overcome with the postulate of the working class as subject and object of history.
12, e.g. The Structure of Social Action, p.82, p,446,
13, On this point see chapter 1 of Hindess, 1976.
14. While theoretical humanism must imply the possibility of borderline cases 
in this sense it is clearly impossible to derive the specific categories of
traditional and affectual action from theoretical humanism alone.
15. ? cf. the discussion of 'sociological categories of economic action' in 
Economy and Society, where money is defined as an artefact which enjoys 'a 
significant degree of conventional or legal, agreed or imposed, formal value 
within the membership of a group of persons or within a territorial area'
(Theory"| p! 174 emphasis added). The absurdity of an individualistic conception of 
money is brought out very clearly in Parsons' critique of Homans.(Parsons, 1964)
16. Similar points may be made with regard to attempts to conceptualize language 
as a function of the creative activity of the human individual. See Volosinov, 1973,
17, This aspect is developed in. Savage's paper,
IS. T.G.T.A., p,197f.
1
19. Hindess & Savage, 1976.
20. See especially Societies, chapter-2.
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21. Alternatively ideas may be conceived as essentially conforming to the order 
of nature, that is, as epiphenomenal manifestations of natural processes. The 
effect 6f^this manoeuvre is merely to establish a teleology of nature that is 
independent of €%ie postulate of a supra-natural realm of ideas.
*
22. One of the clearest examples is the conception of history outlined in 
Stalin's Dialectical & Historical Materialism
23. I do not intend to suggest that evolutionary theory in biology is teleological 
but it is frequently interpreted' in a teleological fashion. See, for example,
Pax^sons ' treatment in 'Evolutionary Universa.ls in Society'
24. But see Savage's paper.
25. Since the best known and most rigorous of all teleologies is elaborated in 
the work of Hegel it may be necessary to add that the few lines I have devoted to 
universal teleologies in this paper do not suffice for the dismissal of the whole of ^ 
Hegel, I cannot attempt to analyze the conceptual structure of Hegel's work
within the limits of this paper but it may be noted that Hegel makes use of both 
devices given in the text in his attempts to conceptualize the specificity of 
phenomena.
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